BAKS
PAPERS OF THE
BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR KOREAN STUDIES



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Volume 10

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EDITOR'S NOTE

This volume of BAKS *Papers* presents contributions from two sources: the BAKS Study day held in April 2004 at the British Library on the theme of 'Korea in the new millennium: science and technology'; and the 2004 Joint East Asian Studies Conference organised by the University of Leeds. Two extra papers, those by Dr Kwongwon Yoon and Professor Choi Deok-Soo, have been included, since they strengthen existing themes. The differing provenances of the papers in *BAKS 10* have resulted in a diversity of topics; but even these can be marshalled under three broad headings.

Professor James Dator's keynote address leads the first group of six papers, which all examine aspects of the rapid advances in new IT technologies made in the Korean peninsula since the break of the new millennium. South Korea is fast becoming a world leader in this field, and Study day speakers helped us to understand some of the aesthetic, social and administrative and economic implications of these developments.

The middle section of papers is more diverse, but invites us to look at issues thrown up by modernising trends in Korea, such as gender relations, surveyed through the medium of literature, and contemporary native religious practice. The two Koreas' dealings with each other and with their neighbours are explored through the medium of music (North Korea and Japan) and ancient history (claims to legitimacy). Young-mi Kim's paper examines the tendency towards coalition practices in today's politics in both South Korea and Japan.

The final group of five papers all deal with historical themes. Owen Miller's examination of the records of one of the silk guilds throws light on the organisation of an important element in the pre-modern economy of Korea. The four papers of which Dr Vladimir Tikhonov's is the first, discuss the crucial period at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th when Korea was forced to confront the world outside it and in particular the aspirations of its near neighbour, Japan. In a satisfying coincidence, Dr Yunhee Kim's paper details the challenges facing Korean merchants as they were emerging from the economic conventions described in Owen Miller's contribution. Indeed, it might be claimed that the whole of *BAKS 10* offers a broad sweep through the modernisation process on the Korean peninsula, from its difficult beginnings to the confident stance of today.

Where possible, romanisation has followed the standards for Korean current in

academic circles, that is, McCune-Reischauer, the current standard for Japanese—Hepburn—and pinyin romanisation for Chinese. Exceptions to the McCune-Reischauer system are a few proper names and instances of the North Korean style of romanisation. It is clear that some younger scholars feel more at ease with the new romanisation promoted by the South Korean government, a situation reflected here and there in transcriptions. The editor has followed the practice of italicising specialised words only on their first appearance in a text and thereafter presenting them in ordinary roman typeface.

BAKS is indebted to the Korea Overseas Information Service for a generous financial donation towards the costs of printing. The Association also expresses its gratitude to the Anglo-Korean Society for its generosity and show of solidarity. As ever, BAKS thanks the Embassy of the Republic of Korea, and especially Mr Sung Chang-kee, Minister-Counsellor in the Embassy, for support. It is grateful too for the support it has received from the Centre for Korean Studies of the School of East Asian Studies, University of Sheffield, the Centre for Korean Studies at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, and the University of Leeds.

Susan Pares
London, August 2005

KEYNOTE ADDRESS

KOREA AS THE WAVE OF A FUTURE: THE EMERGING DREAM SOCIETY OF ICONS AND AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE

JIM DATOR AND YONGSEOK SEO
UNIVERSITY OF HAWAII

Asians are surfing Hanryu—the 'Korean Wave'

Asia is awash in a wave of popular culture products gushing out of the Republic of Korea (ROK). Youth in China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and Japan, as well as Cambodia, Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, are agog at the sights and sounds of performers and groups such as H.O.T., S.E.S., Shinhwa, god and J.T.L. *Time Asia* reported on 29 July 2002 that:

> K-pop has broken across borders: teenagers from Tokyo to Taipei swoon over performers such as singer Park Ji Yoon and boy band Shinhwa, buying their CDs and posters and even learning Korean so they can sing along at karaoke. BoA this year became the first solo artist in more than two decades to have a debut single and a debut album reach No. 1 in Japan … "Korea is like the next epicenter of pop culture in Asia", says Jessica Kam, vice-president for MTV Networks Asia.

Before the pop stars, Korean movies led the overseas export of Korean popular culture. *Swiri*, the first Korean-made blockbuster movie, earned millions of dollars in Japan and elsewhere. The sound track from the movie was "snapped up as soon as it hit the shelves" in Japan (*Trends in Japan*, 19 May 2000). More than a million Japanese watched *Joint Security Area*, which was also very popular elsewhere overseas. Another movie, *Friends*, was "a huge hit in China" (*Hyundai heavy industries report*, 2004). Certain South Korean television dramas have also become so popular that organised tours bring Japanese to their filming locations in Korea. *Trends in Japan*, 22 February 2004 reported that "Chiyako Inoue, 43, a homemaker from Matsue, in western Japan, said she became so enthralled by one South Korean drama that she began studying Korean. According to Japan's Ministry of Education, the number of

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Korean language programs in high schools was 163 in 2000, compared with 73 in 1994 and 7 in 1986." In China and Taiwan as well, Korean dramas are among the most favourite TV programmes. "Stars of such dramas have become shining idols in those nations and fans there emulate the fashion, hairstyle or makeup of Korean stars" (*Hyundai heavy industries report* 2004).

And as for pop groups, according to the *Korea Herald* of 11 September 2001, "Korea's platinum dance group H.O.T has emerged as national idols of teenagers in China, as indicated by the hundreds of thousands of young fans who stormed the group's concerts in China. Korea's 'techno princess' Lee Jung-hyu has become a nationwide sensation in China and Hong Kong, with her Mandarin versions of her hits heard on every street corner and her powerful choreography shocking local music fans." *Trends in Japan*, 2001, reported that "H.O.T.'s signature costumes and outlandish fashion coordination has fueled brisk sales of Korean-made clothing. Despite their exorbitant prices, boots priced at 200 US dollars and jeans retailing for 100 dollars are selling like hotcakes" in China. *China Daily*'s Hong Kong edition for 8 November 2001 claimed that:

> [l]earning the Korean Hip Hop dance has become a fashion at Beijing's universities, with many students choosing to join in the wave of receiving training on weekends. F1, a professional Hip Hop group in Beijing that got its start at Beijing Institute of Clothing Technology, was warmly received there at a performance in mid-October. During the promotional performance on the university's playground, they attracted many students who immediately applied to take Hip Hop lessons.[1]

Trends in Japan for 11 February 2001 reported that "Chinese girls wear character badges featuring their Korean idols, decorate the dormitory walls with their photos and … study the Korean language in order to better understand the meaning of the songs and to enable them to say hello to their stars in Korean." Even more dramatically, some Chinese women "reportedly ask plastic surgeons to change their faces to look like the Korean stars." Even "eating Korean food, so often featured in Korean TV dramas, has become a new fad among youngsters in many Asian nations. Some even thought kimchi was a cure for SARS and traditional Korean barbeque restaurants are mushrooming around Asia" (*Hyundai heavy industries report*, 2004). The *International Herald Tribune* of 31 May 2002 noted that "South Koreans are only just starting to realize that food can be just as profitable an export as semiconductors."

The Korean Wave has also swept across much of Southeast Asia. On 2 February 2004, Arirang TV reported that:

> In Thailand, the Korean wave is evident on both the small and big screens. Korean dramas are now programmed regularly on TV and enjoy high ratings. The Korean fever is definitely hot at the Bangkok International Film Festival. Hundreds of stargazers and

> reporters crowded around top Korean celebrity Son Ye-jin, who was there to greet her fans and sign her autograph. One fan described the encounter with the South Korean actress as a dream come true.

In Vietnam, as noted by *Korea Herald* for 11 September 2001, "Korean heartthrob actor Chang Dong-gun and actress Kim Nam-ju have been adored as national celebrities—to the degree that the Korean government invited them to an official dinner on August 23 [2001] for Vietnamese President Tran Duc Luong during his state visit to Korea." AP Breaking News on 3 February 2002 reported that "[i]n the streets of Ho Chi Minh City and Hanoi, fashion-conscious young Vietnamese have adopted the darker makeup colors, thinly shaved eyebrows, body-hugging clothes, and square-toed shoes of Seoul fashion."

In Singapore, claimed *The New Paper in Singapore* on 22 December 2002, "K-drama is even hotter than Japanese drama, with Channel U's *Winter Sonata*—a South Korean production—scoring high in the ratings war here. South Korea is now one of the hottest destinations for Singaporeans. The Korean pop music, or K-pop, scene was also given a boost here by the performance of rap group G.O.D. at the MTV Asia Awards 2002. Many Korean stars—like Harisu—and aspects of Korean culture are gaining a place here."[2] The Korean Wave has even washed over Myanmar. *Weekly Chosun*'s cover story of 10 March 2004 rounded up several reports, such as an article in the *Myanmar Times* that quoted Ma Khaing, an ardent fan of Korean TV dramas, as saying: "I don't want to do anything, and I am very angry when somebody visits me or I have to do something while a Korean drama is on the air." He went on to say he does not even eat dinner when a Korean drama is showing. According to the Myanmar Market Research & Development Company, approximately 80 per cent of the population of Myanmar watches TV at night, and Korean TV dramas are among the most viewed. Aung So, a staff member at Myanmar Broadcasting, confirmed that "Korean TV dramas are extremely popular in Myanmar. Wherever people gather—at cafes, at the market, and at schools—people discuss the storyline of the Korean dramas or the actors and actresses that were seen the night before." He went on to say that "most of the calls to the broadcasting station are inquires about Korean dramas."[3]

In recent times, online games exported from the ROK have been enjoying "sensational popularity" in Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, Indonesia and Vietnam (*KOCCA News*, 3 September 2003). In fact, Korean online gaming is overwhelming the other aspects of the Korean Wave in terms of export amounts. *Weekly Chosun* of 10 March 2004 (as quoted above) reported that the Korean firm NC Soft, said to be the biggest online gaming company in the world, earned royalty income of $25 million from foreign countries in the year 2003, and was forecasting $40 million of overseas sales (mostly from Asia) in 2004.[4]

Indeed, the overall rise of pop culture in Korea is so dramatic that one culture critic, writing in *Joong-Ang Ilbo* on 25 February 2004, complained that "all the best young people have moved into movies, leaving the literature circles barren. The era of letters has ended, and has been replaced by the era of images", about which more will be said later.

Why is there a Korean Wave?

Until recently, the United States and Japan have dominated the Asian pop culture scene. So why is this Hanryu sweeping across Asia?

The *Hyundai heavy industries report*, 2004 recorded the views of some that

> Korea's dynamic young generation is the engine behind the success story. Their creativity and imagination is blossoming as a result of the country's newfound economic prosperity and political democracy. As Korea's living standards improve, people look for ways to enrich their lives culturally and spiritually. Particularly younger Koreans, with no memory of poverty or hunger, are exploring the new world of pop culture, taking full advantage of their wealth.

Others, according to the Hyundai report, say that the increased "democratisation" in Korea has also played a role. "In movies and music, full-fledged freedom of expression is guaranteed. Previously taboo subjects such as ideological struggles have been allowed, and a full degree of freedom is granted in depicting such subjects. In pop culture, old authoritarian rules and traditional values can be ridiculed without fear of censorship." Other experts, in the view of the *Korea Herald* of 11 September 2001, "attribute the phenomenal success and advance of Korea's mass culture in Asia to a set of its unique qualities—its characteristic dynamism (as displayed in Korean dance music), highly entertaining nature, admirable production quality, and niche market position."

While there is no doubt these factors are contributing to the phenomenon, they don't seem to be the main reason. There must be more to it than this.

A passing fad?

Of course, fascination with Korea could be nothing more than a passing fad that has no special meaning at all. Pop culture promoters and venders are constantly in search of new material. For the moment, that new material might be coming from Korea. It may be popular only because it is new—and very well produced. But how much 'kim chic' can one endure before it becomes old hat indeed? There are already signs that the trend may be coming to an end as culture vultures look for something even newer and hotter.

Moreover, it is important to realise that the Hanryu did not just spontaneously

emerge. Grungy Korean teenagers, screeching and moaning away in their parents' garage, didn't just happen to be 'discovered' by a passing pop culture promoter. To the contrary, all of the major Korean pop groups were carefully imagined, funded, instructed, created and promoted by culture entrepreneurs (*Time Asia*, 29 July 2002). And they were promoted by the Korean government at precisely the moment when the Korean market was being opened to Japanese pop culture, legally for the very first time.[5]

Indeed, perhaps the entire phenomenon is nothing more than an attempt by Korea to protect its culture from further contamination by American, other Western, and especially Japanese cultural imports. There is some evidence for that, but we do not think that is the main story either.

A flowering of a Pan-Asian culture?

Perhaps the Korean Wave is the long-awaited flowering of post-colonial Asian artistic expression—the creation of a regional 'Asian' cultural manifestation against the erstwhile domination of American/Western culture. There is considerable support for this position as well. Dean Visser, reporting for AP Breaking News on 3 February 2002, quoted the opinion of Zhang Jianhua, the 24-year-old owner of a Beijing video and music shop stocking Korean products, that "Korean pop culture is seen as fresh and edgy, but non-threatening because 'they're Asian and look like us. So it's easy to identify with them'." Sociologist Habib Khondker, also quoted by Visser, agrees. "The Korean fad is part of a region-wide 'reassertion of Asian identity' … It's kind of a pan-Asianism. You can look for alternative cultures, not necessarily European or American."[6] In this case, to quote the *Korea Herald* of 11 September 2001:

> what makes Korean mass culture attractive is its merit of faithfully dramatizing Asian sensibilities, including family values, and traditional emotive delicacies that are warmly embraced by local fans in some Asian countries where full-fledged industrialization has yet to arrive. Korean industry veterans argue that, even though these countries are ready to accept Western values, the people may still find Japanese and American mass culture irrelevant to their reality and are uncomfortable with the foreign cultures' emphasis on violence and sex. "Korean pop culture skillfully blends Western and Asian values to create its own, and the country itself is viewed as a prominent model to follow or catch up to, both culturally and economically", said Lui Mei, a Chinese resident in Seoul of three years.

In addition, the emergence of an affluent middle class in Asia has provided a clientele for Korean pop culture. Iwabuchi Koichi's analysis (Iwabuchi 2002: 270) of Japanese pop culture in East Asia applies equally well to the Korean Wave. According to Iwabuchi:

> [U]nder the globalizing forces, cultural similarities and resonances in the region are

> newly articulated. It is also an emerging sense of coevalness based upon the narrowing economic gap, simultaneous circulation of information, the abundance of global commodities, and the common experience of urbanization that has sustained a Japanese cultural presence in East Asia … For audiences in East Asia, Japanese popular culture represents cultural similarities and a common experience of modernity in the region that is based on a ongoing negotiation between the West and the non-West experiences that American culture cannot represent.

A *China Daily* article of 10 June 2003 support Iwabuchi's argument:

> The changes in media culture, especially in TV culture since the late 1990s, have resulted in a new aesthetic in Chinese popular culture. One feature of this new aesthetic is that cities have replaced the countryside as centres of cultural imagination … The lives of middle income city-dwellers today have nothing in common with those of rural Chinese. They are born into the web-like societies of bustling metropolises that are part of the globalization process. Examples of this trend are the overwhelmingly popular pop idol soap operas and Japanese cartoon series, as well as TV game shows, clothes and hairstyles "imported" from countries and regions such as Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. In Japanese, Korean and Chinese pop idol soap operas, viewers find similar love stories, similar depictions of luxurious lifestyles, pretty faces, chic clothes, big houses and flashy sedans, all elements of the city life Asian youth dream of today.[7]

We are certain that these factors are important in explaining the acceptance of Korean pop culture in Asia. But they are not enough. We need to understand why pop culture itself has so recently begun to flourish. And for this we need to turn to a recently-articulated perspective on social change and the future.

A Dream Society of icons and aesthetic experience?

One of the most persistent theories favoured by futurists describes the recurrent transformation of societies as new technologies make new behaviour, values and lifestyles possible while rendering previous behaviour, values and lifestyles, based on earlier technologies, no longer necessary or desirable. (One of the best applications of such theories is Alvin Toffler's *The Third Wave*, 1980.)

In their most aggregate form, these theories have been used to describe and explain the transformation from small, nomadic hunting and gathering societies, to larger, sedentary agricultural societies, to even larger and more dynamic industrial societies, and most recently (from the mid-20th century) to superfluid information societies. Each society is 'labelled' by the dominant economic system of the time—dominant in terms of the percentage of the population engaged in the economic sector, and 'dominant' in terms of wealth and/or power accruing to people in those sectors by comparison with other sectors. Each transformation marginalises, but does not eliminate, the previously dominant sectors. Thus, hunting and gathering

still happen (but generally as a 'sport' or 'pastime' and not for subsistence) in an agricultural society (and even up to the present), while people still eat, and many eat very well, in an information society, though few till the soil or tend farm animals. Most discussion at present tends to focus on continuing efforts to transform societies from agricultural to industrial economies, or on how industrial societies are becoming post-industrial information societies. But we side with those few futurists who believe they have discovered the seeds and early sprouts of the future political economy. Ernest Sternberg calls it "the economy of icons", while Rolf Jensen designates it "the dream society". Joseph Pine and James Gilmore refer to it as "the experience economy" and Virginia Postel writes of "the substance of style" and discusses the rise of aesthetic value in economic life. All four are describing roughly the same phenomenon. Sternberg (Sternberg 1999:5) puts it this way:

> It is still widely believed that we live in an information society in which the most valued raw material is data, production consists of its processing into information, efficiency depends on computing and scientific reasoning, knowledge and rational calculation underlie wealth, and society is dominated by an educated elite. These were revealing ideas when they were proposed almost thirty years ago, but as we begin the twenty-first century, the concept of the information economy has become a kind of collective wisdom, obscuring another economic transformation that has already overtaken us. The driving force in this newer economy is not information but image. Now the decisive material is meaning, production occurs through the insertion of commodities into stories and events, efficiency consists in the timely conveyance of meaning, celebrity underlies wealth, and economic influence emanates from the controllers of content.

Rolf Jensen (Jensen 1999:vii) says: "The sun is setting on the Information Society—even before we have fully adjusted to its demands as individuals and as companies. We have lived as hunters and as farmers, we have worked in factories, and now we live in an information-based society whose icon is the computer: We stand facing the fifth type of society: the Dream Society." He goes on (ibid:2f):

> The Information Society will render itself obsolete though automation, abolishing the very same jobs it created. The inherent logic of the Information Society remains unchanged: replacing humans with machines, letting the machines do the work. This is reflected in the three waves of the electronics industry. The first wave was hardware. The second wave was software (where we are now). The third wave will be content; that is, profit will be generated by the product itself, not by the instrument conveying it to the consumer.

Very importantly, Jensen (ibid:40) sees society finally moving from a dependence on writing to the dominance of audiovisual images: "Today, knowledge is stored as letters; we learn through the alphabet—this is the medium of the Information Society. Most likely, the medium of the Dream Society will be the picture." He concludes that

Henry Ford was the icon of the Industrial Age, while Bill Gates is the icon of the Information Age.

> The icon of the Dream Society has probably been born, but she or he is most likely still at school and is probably not the best pupil in the class. Today, the best pupil is the one who makes a first-rate symbolic analyst. In the future, it may be the student who gives the teacher a hard time—an imaginative pupil who is always staging new games that put things into new perspectives … He or she will be the great storyteller of the twenty-first century … Steven Spielberg [is] the closest we now have to a Dream Society icon (Jensen 1999:121).

Similarly, Joseph Pine and James Gilmore (Pine and Gilmore 1999:ixf) assert that:

> Experiences represent an existing but previously unarticulated genre of economic output. Decoupling experiences from services in accounting for what businesses create opens up possibilities for extraordinary economic expansion—just as recognizing services as a distinct and legitimate offering led to a vibrant economic foundation in the face of a declining industrial base. And a new base is emerging. Ignore the familiar hype: Information is not the founding of the 'New Economy' … Recognizing experiences as a distinct economic offering provides the key to future economic growth.

More recently, Virginia Postel (Postel 2003:39) has commented on the transformation:

> We are now at a tipping point. Small economic advances that have built bit by bit for more than a century are reaching critical mass … At the same time, recent cultural, business, and technological changes are reinforcing the prominence of aesthetics and the value of personal expression. Each new development feeds others. The result feels less like the culmination of a historical trend than the beginning of a new economic and cultural moment, in which look and feel matter more than ever.

Finally, even such a mainstream journal as the *Harvard Business Journal* in February 2004 included a small item by Daniel Pink about the urgent importance of aesthetics and creativity rather than quantification and control in the future world economy:

> An arts degree is now perhaps the hottest credential in the world of business. Corporate recruiters have begun visiting the top arts grad schools in search of talent … [M]ore arts grads [are] occupying key corporate positions, the master of fine arts is becoming the new business degree … In many ways, MBA graduates are becoming this century's blue-collar workers: people who entered a workforce only to see their jobs move overseas … At the same time, businesses are realizing that the only way to differentiate their goods and services in today's over-stocked, materially abundant marketplace is to make their offerings transcendent—physically beautiful and emotionally compelling

> … [L]isten to auto industry legend Robert Lutz. When Lutz took over as chairman of General Motors North America, a journalist asked him how his approach would differ from his predecessor's. Here's what he said: "It's more right brain. I see us as being in the art business. Art, entertainment, and mobile sculpture, which, coincidentally, also happens to provide transportation." General Motors—General Motors!—is in the art business. So, now, are we all (Pink 2004:21f.).

Nothing new?

As the quotation from Postel makes clear, we are not arguing that the dream society of icons and aesthetic experience is emerging from nowhere, or is completely dominant now. To the contrary, humans have been image-makers from their earliest origins, while modern advertising from the early 20th century onward has relied more and more on image projection and less and less on providing useful and accurate information about the product being advertised. Similarly, Hollywood has been big business since before the Second World War (with Bollywood and more recently Hong Kong kung fu films following on), and the development and diffusion of television, videos and electronic games has inundated everyone with powerful and attractive images. It goes without saying that the United States has been the major producer of most images of the good life and the future for the past seventy-five years, and that it clearly colonises all minds it touches everywhere today. Mickey Mouse was one of the first (but not the first) 'character product', while DisneyWorlds and DisneyLands are everywhere. 'Hello Kitty' simply carried the concept to new heights. Now Aibo and Asimo suggest that a new era of warm, caring, adoring "evocative machines" (in the words of MIT theorist Sheryl Terkle) are going beyond mere artificial intelligence towards simulated but satisfying personal companions, caregivers and lovers.[8]

Korea as a Dream Society of icons?

What we do want to suggest, however, is that the ROK may be the first nation *consciously* to recognise and, more importantly, then to form official policy and take action towards becoming a dream society of icons and aesthetic experience. The global dominance of Hollywood and Disney are not the consequence of American national policy. To the contrary, 'serious' people in the United States still view pop culture with disdain—no matter how much they may pay to consume it themselves.

Similarly, while Japanese pop artists and technicians (especially game producers) have been enormously successful as exporters of pop culture, this has not been the consequence of Japanese national economic policy, but of the exceptional entrepreneurial and creative spirit of a few Japanese, aided by progressively cheaper and more powerful digital production technologies. Ichiya Nakamura, a researcher on Japanese pop culture at the Stanford Japan Center, recently stated that "the market

value of media contents in Japan was worth approximately 13 trillion yen in 2001" (Nakamura 2003:5). However, in Japan, Nakamura claims (ibid:9),

> The venture aspect is one of the features of the pop culture industry. For both the game and animation industries, their software markets were mainly pioneered by newly-risen small companies … The game industry currently contains 146 companies and 46% of these companies have less than 1 million yen in capital. The population of the industry is said to be about 18,500, which means the average number of employers per company is approximately 100 people.

Games are so popular in Japan that they have led to the phenomenon of the 'otaku', a word literally meaning '[your] home'. It is used to designate the growing number of people, mainly young men, who spend all their time at home playing electronic games, often becoming more involved with the characters and situations of the games than with 'real life'. The same word is used in Korea to describe similar people there.

In an article entitled 'Japan's gross national cool', carried in *Foreign Policy*, May/June 2003, Douglas McGray observed that in spite of the obsessive belief of foreigners that Japan is in a deep recession and should follow various neo-liberal reforms to get out of it, "Japan is reinventing superpower again. Instead of collapsing beneath its political and economic misfortunes, Japan's global cultural influence has only grown. In fact, from pop music to consumer electronics, architecture to fashion, and food to art, Japan has far greater cultural influence now than it did in the 1980s when it was an economic superpower" (McGray 2003:47). He goes on (ibid:48): "Gradually, over the course of an otherwise dismal decade, Japan has been perfecting the art of transmitting certain kinds of mass culture." The country "has succeeded not only in balancing a flexible, absorptive, crowd-pleasing, shared culture with a more private, domestic one but also in taking advantage of that balance to build an increasingly powerful global commercial force. In other words, Japan's growing cultural presence has created a mighty engine of national cool" (ibid:53).

On the other hand, in a further essay (Nakamura 2004:1), Nakamura says that "the Japanese entertainment industry has been shrinking over the last few years. Hollywood's full scale efforts towards the content business and the speed of growth of Korea's game and animation industries, backed up by government policy, are also threatening Japan."

So, might the ROK be in the process of becoming the world's coolest nation as a result of Korea's leaders recognising that the dream economy of icons and aesthetic experience is the wave of a future? There is some evidence to suggest that leaders understand this to some extent, but perhaps not to the full extent they might.

President Roh Moo-hyun has declared that "[t]he 21st century is the age of knowledge and the creative mind. A powerful cultural nation will become an

economically strong nation. In particular, the game industry is a high value added cultural industry that has enormous future potential" (*Digital Times*, 25 February 2004).

Moreover, the opening greeting on the website of the Korean Culture and Contents Agency (KOCCA) begins: "Since the advent of the 21st century, the existing industrial society has been transforming rapidly into a knowledge-driven society where human knowledge, sensibility, creativity, and imagination create added value. The knowledge-driven service industry is also emerging as the principal axis of the next generation world economy, with the culture content industry at its core."[9]

These two quotations suggest that while Korean leaders recognise culture as a valuable new export commodity, and are willing to support its development, they still have not grasped the possibility that the dream society of icons and aesthetic experience is significantly different from a "knowledge-driven service industry".

Against that, Shin Ho-joo, president of the KOSDAQ securities market, interviewed in October 2003, said: "I think the culture industry can be a breakthrough for a revitalization of the South Korean economy. It is often said that the 21st century is the age of culture. There is a debate regarding the IT industry as to whether it is already at a mature stage or whether it is still in its infancy. The important point is that we should create new sources of supply, such as the cultural industry, with an economy based on the IT industry as its cornerstone" (reported in *Seoul Shinmun*, 7 January 2004).

The ROK Ministry of Culture and Tourism in its Cultural Industry White Paper 2003, as reported by *Seoul Shinmun* of 25 February 2004, estimated the size of the Korean cultural industry market to be about $350 billion—6.6 per cent of the GDP of the ROK. The number of people who, it is anticipated, will become involved in the cultural industry in Korea is growing rapidly and is expected to reach 200,000 people by 2008. By then, it is hoped, the value of exported cultural goods will reach US dollars 1 billion. In order to achieve these goals, the Ministry proposed the following:

1. To create a promotional subsidy for the effective management of the cultural industry.
2. To systematically cultivate human resources such as talent.
3. To develop cultural content and technologies to promote the growth of the next generation.
4. To modernise the distribution system.
5. To promote regional cultural industries through a cultural industry culture.

Lee Chang-dong, Minister of Culture and Tourism, insisted that "Korea must first build a stronger cultural infrastructure in order to gain a larger piece of the

$1.4 trillion global cultural industry." The Federation of Korean Industries has also emphasised the need for entrepreneurs to engage in more culture-related businesses (KOCCA, 18 December 2003). Experts and government officials have agreed to co-operate in fostering the nation's gaming industry so that it can be ranked among the world's top three by 2007. The government seems set to earmark 150 million won for that purpose (Arirang TV, 13 November 2003). Hyu Jong Kim, Dean of the School of Cultural Industry at Chugye Art University, writing in *Hankook Ilbo* on 24 February 2004, pointed out that "[t]he development of the cultural industry is not a thing that can be achieved only through the efforts of people and experts in the field. It requires comprehensive approaches with full government support." He went on:

> In addition, we must acknowledge the importance of creative minds and the value-added creation of the cultural industry. The educational system is the source of this creativity. Because of its unique character, the development of the cultural industry requires cross-ministerial cooperation, and a collaborative effort between the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Industry and Resources, and the Ministry of Information and Technology. In addition, a central agency which consists of government officials and private experts in the field needs to be created very soon.

Contributing factors

The internet

Among several other factors that have enabled Korea to move quickly towards becoming a dream society of icons and aesthetic experience, the internet has had a great impact. The *Guardian* (23 February 2003) quoted a Western diplomat in Seoul as saying, "[t]he Internet is so important here. This is the most online country in the world. The younger generation gets all their information from the web. Some don't even bother with TVs." The *Guardian* went on to report that "almost 70 per cent of homes [in Korea] have a broad band connection compared with about 5 per cent in Britain … Koreans are said to spend 1,340 minutes online per month. And 10 per cent of economic activity is related to IT—one of the highest levels in the world."

One of the consequences of this—Roh Moo-hyun's electoral success in 2002—has been widely heralded and discussed. Skilful internet use is said to have enabled Roh to beat the odds and all newspaper predictions (and desires) and be elected president of the ROK.[10] However, whether that was a fluke or an example of a new force in democratic politics remains to be seen, especially in the light of the Legislature's attempt to impeach Roh in 2004. Moreover, the rapid burn-out of Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean in the US Democratic Party nomination in 2004 suggests that television may still be more important than the internet, at least in the US. While Dean's advisors were masterful in using the web to organise grassroots support, Dean himself was too "hot" for TV (to use Marshall McLuhan's term), and

there are probably still far more television viewers than internet users among US voters.

Still the point to be emphasised concerning Korea is that significant numbers of Koreans have had access to pop culture via the web for some time, and pride themselves on being early and among the world's most prolific users of the most advanced digital technologies.

Age-cohort shifts

One of the major theories or methods that many futurists use is age-cohort analysis: the fact that people born during a certain time interval tend to have certain common experiences that mark them from people older or younger than themselves—experiences that they carry with them as strong influences on their beliefs and behaviour throughout their entire lives. Age-cohort analysis has recently been applied very usefully in Korea to identify and explain significant differences of attitudes about the future of Korea (Seo 2002).

While the popular press uses the terms '386 generation', 'New generation', 'April 19 generation', 'R generation', 'Generation 2030' and the like, we believe it is more helpful to distinguish the various relevant age-cohorts in South Korea according to the following six groups: colonial, veteran, democracy, baby boomer, silent, and network.

The members of the colonial cohort were born and grew up in the early Japanese colonial period (between 1900 and 1920). While few of this cohort are still alive, they and their efforts are still revered since they envisioned and rebuilt an independent Korea after the Japanese defeat in the Second World War, only to see the country tragically divided as a consequence of the Korean War. The veteran cohort (1921–33) were born and educated in the Japanese language during the Japanese colonial period. They fought during the Korean War and thus hold very strong anti-Communist feelings. Their lives have been characterised by intense suffering, struggle and eventual victory. Neither of these two cohorts has much interest in, or impact on, current Korean pop culture. It is the subsequent four distinct groups that are significant in this analysis.

The older members of the democracy cohort (1934–53) experienced Japanese colonial rule, while the younger members spent most of their lives under American cultural imperialism. This is the cohort that was educated via the Japanese language, and then was crazy for Elvis Presley's rock 'n' roll music and Hollywood movies while yearning for the wealth and power of America. Accordingly, both the older and younger members of this cohort are swayed by feelings of psychological inferiority of Korea as a cultural periphery. At the same time, this cohort played a leading role in the ROK's economic advance and has a strong 'can do' spirit with a burning desire to leave the periphery and enter the centre. They understand that the Korean Wave

is to some extent the consequence of their 'can do' effort, and appreciate it because they believe that it is the realisation of their long desire for Korea to be prominent on the world stage (Cho 2002).[11] The sociologist Gil-sung Park, in his article 'Korean emotions can export',[12] argues that the success of the Korean Wave phenomenon proves the superiority of Korean culture and people. He also asserts that Korean culture can be shared with people around the world. Arguing against this, Cho Haejoang, also a sociologist, points out that Park's article is merely an expression of the inferiority complex displayed by citizens of a nation on the cultural periphery. According to Cho, it is nonsense to interpret the Korean Wave as a source of national pride and superiority, while at the same time arguing that Korean pop culture is an object of envy in Asia (Cho 2002).

The baby boomers (1954–71) are the cohort on the boundary, sharing attitudes towards pop culture with both the democracy cohort and the silent and network cohorts. Most Koreans are boomers and thus dominate Korean economics and politics. They witnessed firsthand the democratisation of the ROK, and played a major role in the information technology revolution. Ko Gun, a professor of Computer Science, writing in *Weekly Chosun*, 23 October 2003, argues that the rapid diffusion of the internet and the mobile telephone in the ROK is largely due to the baby boom generation. According to Ko, its members entered their 20s and 30s during the early and mid-1990s when the internet and mobile technology were sweeping the world. Their young, technology-oriented minds easily absorbed the new technology.[13] However, the perspective of this cohort regarding the Korean Wave is not much different from that of the democracy cohort. They also view Hanryu with a sense of pride that Korea is finally entering into the cultural centre. This is also the cohort that spent its teenage years enjoying American pop music and Japanese pop culture, even though the latter was prohibited in the ROK at the time. Although they have a complex against the cultural centre, this group consists of the film directors, music developers and producers, and television drama directors who now lead the Korean Wave.

The silent cohort (1972–81) and the network cohort (1982–) share many similarities in terms of cultural perspectives and attitudes toward the Korean Wave. The silent cohort is the first 'otaku' generation in Korea. Unlike the baby boomers, the members of the silent cohort grew up in a relatively abundant material environment, and have no interest in politics. They would rather indulge themselves in computer games and animation. They are more accustomed to using computers and the internet than are the baby boomers, and are always searching for their own character and uniqueness. Most importantly, they are very cynical about nationalistic perspectives on culture such as the notion that "Korean can be global". "Korea can become a genuinely advanced nation when Koreans abandon their nationalistic consciousness," said a recently graduated student quoted in *Weekly Chosun* of 4 March 2004. According to her, nationalistic sentiment is the major hindrance to Korea becoming a more

progressive and developed society. Another graduate, also reported by *Weekly Chosun*, criticised the atmosphere of Korean society which, he thought, stifled diversification. He argued that Korea must become a society that respects variety in order to become a truly advanced nation.

In contrast, the occupational perspectives of the network cohort, as conveyed in the same issue of *Weekly Chosun*, are also very different from those of the previous generations. They want to escape from office work in large companies, and instead of wasting their energy on civil service examinations, they willingly jump into unexplored occupational areas. They are breaking the notions of traditional occupations and are instead looking for futures-oriented and unconventional jobs such as pet apparel designer, lotto designer, avatar designer, and other such occupations. Unlike the older generations who spent their teenage years singing American popular songs, the network cohort enjoys music that was made in their own country and in their own language. And yet, for them nationality and the origin of a cultural product are not important as long as they are satisfied with the sensitivities and emotions. The members of this cohort go crazy for teenage idols regardless of whether they are American, Japanese, Chinese or Korean. This cohort is so globally oriented that they often make cyber community fan clubs and communicate with other fan groups across the world through internet language translators. They are the main consumers of pop culture, and their peers make up the majority of the performers. Many current Korean Wave stars (including BoA) belong to this age-cohort. For them, there is no such thing as a cultural periphery inferiority complex, nor is there a strong desire to enter into the cultural centre. They consider themselves already there.

At the same time, the success and brashness of the network cohort offend many of the older cohorts. Bak Sangmee, writing in the *Washington Post*[14] of 26 January 2003, quoted one of them as saying he felt as though he had been driven out of "his old house". Some of them are bitter about the sudden power shift between generations. A businessman in his fifties, again, quoted by Bak, said, "My generation has been working hard and waiting patiently for our turn to take charge. But there was no such thing as our turn. Suddenly, the younger ones are in charge." Access to information technology is reported to vary widely among different age groups. According to a recent survey, discussed by Bak, "58 per cent of South Koreans use the internet. Among these, more than 90 per cent of the the 20-year-olds surveyed use the internet, while only about 30 per cent of the 45-year-old South Koreans use it, and for those who are over 65, less than 5 per cent use it. The generational gap in internet use is much more pronounced in South Korea than in other similarly advanced societies such as the US, where there is virtually no difference in internet use between 20-year-olds and 45-year-olds." Bak comments:

> Cyberspace liberates young Koreans from old hierarchies. To the dismay of many older

(and some not-so-old) South Koreans, the honorifics system of Korean language is often ignored on the Web, and this allows communication between generations on a more equal basis. This has translated into greater political activism among the youth tuned into the Internet.

Consumer debt

Unlike Japanese and almost more than many Americans, Koreans seem to have embraced credit cards with great enthusiasm, and have run up debts of truly impressive magnitudes. Various ROK dailies commented on this trend in their issues of 7 November 2003. "According to the Korea Federation of Banks (KFB), the number of credit defaulters became a record high of 3.8 million at the end of 2003" (*Hankook Ilbo*). "In other words, one of every five Korean adults faced bankruptcy due mainly to overdue credit card debts and it is likely to continue to surge" (*Chosun Ilbo*). "According to the Boston Consulting Group, 40 per cent of Korean households are incapable of paying their debts as they surpass their assets and disposable income" (*Donga Ilbo*). The *Korea Times* of 26 December 2003 quoted a Seoul analyst as saying that "South Korea's ratio of household debt, including overdue credit cards bills, to gross domestic product is forecast to reach 80 per cent this year, up more than 50 per cent since 1999" and that the figure is "already greater than Japan's 70 per cent and similar to the 81 per cent in the United States."

This seems to us clear evidence that many in the ROK are already quite eager to live in a Dream Society of icons and aesthetic experience, where all of the economic and moral principles of capitalism, based on the Puritan ethic and hard work of industrialism, no longer apply. While this huge level of debt may indeed come back to haunt Korea, it need not, since even so respectable an American fiscal giant as Alan Greenspan, chairman of the Federal Reserve, has urged American consumers to keep consuming—that is to say, to continue going into debt to consume—or else the great engine driving the global economy will come to a halt. BBC News for 23 February 2004 quoted Greenspan as stating in a report to the US Congress that "[t]he huge debt run up by US consumers in recent years is not a threat as long as interest rates stay low."[15]

The only thing Korean credit card distributors need to do when people exceed their credit limit is to raise the credit limit endlessly, or, if consumers do enter into bankruptcy, to allow them easily to go into debt again—and again and again. It can all be done in the name of transforming the nation into the Dream Economy of icons and aesthetic experience. To do otherwise—to pretend the debts are real and to call them in—will bring the current global economic house of cards crashing down. Far better to keep the Dream alive!

But how realistic is any of this?

Perhaps the Korean Wave is just a passing fad and not the wave of a future after all. Is it reasonable to expect that Koreans can continue to be the creative risk-takers they are now? Perhaps their present success is just because of the novelty of it all plus a whole lot of luck. Certainly one can expect Disney, or MGM, or Sony, or Murdoch to gobble up the producers and products of the Korean Wave if they do continue to be successful. Or perhaps the world's next media giant will emerge from within the ranks of Korea's current culture entrepreneurs. Time will tell. For now, we remain optimistic that the willingness (can we say it is their 'national character'?) of many Koreans, compared to Japanese and Chinese, to be "out there", with their emotions barely concealed behind a façade of rationality, will enable Korea to succeed while others might fail. An economy of "aesthetic experience" seems just right for Koreans, who seem to love to treat politics, strikes, demonstrations, ritual suicides and many other aspects of public life as though they were high drama—if not high camp—as the impeachment of President Roh and popular reaction to it seems to indicate. The Dream Society seems a dream come true for many Koreans.

But how in the world can one speak responsibly of a "dream economy" when a billion people go to bed hungry each night and half the world's six billion people are malnourished and in poverty? And what about global warming, sea level rise, and the abrupt halt of the deep ocean thermohaline current? Isn't humanity more likely to spend its time coping with the long-ignored consequences of global climate change instead of being lost in dreams via online games?

And terrorists! Where are they in the economy of icons? Indeed, since many of the terrorists are apparently driven by fundamentalist passions—passions that many Korean as well as American Christians share—how can one presume that pop culture has any future at all in a world whipped into submission by Mel Gibson and Osama bin Laden? And what about the growing threat of war, including war between North and South Korea? Indeed, where is North Korea in all of this?

It seems that many elite youth in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea are eager consumers of South Korean pop culture. Kang Chol-hwan, in an article entitled '"Korean Wave" washes into Pyongyang', carried in *Chosun Ilbo* on 30 November 2003, had this to say:

> South Korean hit TV soap operas, such as All In, Autumn Rhapsody, Winter Sonata, and King Taejo, are popular among young North Koreans. The soundtracks of the dramas, such as 'Like the First Day', from All In, are also popular in the North. The spread and popularity of South Korean culture is limited to Pyongyang, Sinuiju, and Cheongjin, areas that are relatively open to outside contact, Chinese sources familiar with North Korea said. South Korean dramas wind up in the three cities about three to six months after being broadcast here [in the ROK] … The eagerness for South Korean culture is

> also spreading to the market where South Korean products are becoming more popular than relatively cheap Chinese products. The conception that South Korean clothes are best, and that South Korean electronics are as good as Japanese electronics, is spreading to North Korea's upper class.

Perhaps young North Koreans are, or could become, talented producers of pop culture too.

Indeed, here may lie a way to break the deadlock between the North and the South. It is already well known that Kim Jong Il is a great movie viewer and an accomplished producer. We propose that North and South Korea join in becoming the Dream Republic of Korea: the first nation consciously to abandon measuring its wealth by its Gross National Product, measuring it instead by that true indicator of a dream society of icons and aesthetic experience, its Gross National Cool.

Notes

1. *China Daily* Hong Kong edition, 8 November 2001, "Hip Hop hits campus"; http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-11/08/content_92715.htm
2. *The New Paper in Singapore*, 22 December 2002, online edition, http://newpaper.asia1.com.sg/printfriendly/0%2C4139%2C11071-1040572740%2C00.html
3. *Weekly Chosun*, "New Hanryu 2004", cover story, 10 March 2004; http://weekly.chosun.com/wdata/html/news/200403/20040310000009.html
4. *Weekly Chosun*, "New Hanryu 2004", cover story, 10 March 2004; http://weekly.chosun.com/wdata/html/news/200403/20040310000011.html
5. *Trends in Japan*, 19 May 2000; 22 February 2004, "Long indifferent".
6. Dean Visser, "'Korea fever' is sweeping the pop culture scene in Asia", AP Breaking News, 3 February 2002.
7. *China Daily*, 10 June 2003: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-06/10/content_168477.htm
8. From a theoretical perspective, this development has not gone unanticipated. Already in the first third of the 20th century, Johan Huizinga was suggesting that "man" was evolving from *Homo Sapiens*, to *Homo Faber*, and finally to *Homo Ludens*—"Man the player" (Johan Huizinga 1950). Somewhat later, two of the major futurists and philosophers of our time, Marshall McLuhan (McLuhan 1951; 1962; 1964; 1967; and 1970) and John McHale (McHale 1959; 1967a; 1967b; and 1969) anticipated the growing prominence and dominance of image and play in society. And of course, postmodern critical theories and the emergence of 'cultural studies' are similarly focused. Important works in this field are by Peters, Olssen, and Lankshear 2003; Stamps 1995; Shapiro 1988, 1999; Appadurai 1986, 1996. For full details see the bibliography accompanying this paper.
9. KOCCA website, http://www.kocca.or.kr/e/index.jsp.
10. See Yun 2003:141–63; Han 2000; Rhee 2003.

11. See http://www.haja.net/users/cho/db4/vi.asp?idx=36.
12. See Park 2001: *Munhwa Ilbo*, 12 June 2001.
13. http://weekly.chosun.com/wdata/html/news/200310/20031021000030.html.
14. Bak Sangmee 2003:B01, online edition <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A41403-2003Jan25.html.
15. http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/3514817.stm.

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THE PAST AND THE FUTURE OF INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF SOUTH KOREA AND JAPAN

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Both Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK) have a long and successful history of industrial policy based on a catch-up strategy in economic development. This article will explore how this pattern has influenced reforms in telecommunications since the 1980s, how it is reflected in current visions for the future of the information and communications sector, and how this approach may be extended beyond the original target of catching up towards an active strategy of global leadership. In a strictly comparative treatment of the subject, single issues are identified on the basis of regulatory specifics of the sector for the comparison of the reform paths and are connected to strategic fields for the visions of the future. The Korean and the Japanese ways of dealing with each of these matters are contrasted and similarities and differences highlighted. In conclusion, the paper will offer an explanation for these findings, together with an attempt to understand the varying results of what would appear to constitute the same efforts.

Specifics of telecommunications

The telecommunications industry has a number of features that in the past led to a special treatment of this sector by national governments.[1] From an economic perspective, it is a network-based industry, with very high initial costs that are difficult to recover upon exit. Traditionally, it was assumed that free competition would inevitably lead to a natural monopoly,[2] one reason being a sub-additive cost function created by economies of scale. The monopolist would behave as monopolists do: offer too little at too high a price, with modest and slow innovation and poor quality.[3]

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There are political issues connected to telecommunications, too. Citizens expect the same universal service everywhere at the same uniform price.[4] Communications form a strategic industry, which for many reasons, such as security considerations, is only reluctantly opened to foreigners. Very importantly, with an upward trend, telecommunications is an intermediary product for other industries, comparable to transportation, energy and education.

All this led to one or other form of state intervention, by heavy regulation of a private firm with monopolist rights, by having the services offered through a state-owned corporation, or by the state itself, in the latter case usually represented by the responsible ministry. As many of us will remember, this system did not work well. Prices were too high, while the quality of the service was low, waiting lists for access were long, innovation was slow and alternatives in services and equipment were few. The resulting tasks for a reform programme consisted mainly of the following components: separation of entrepreneurial, industry-promoting and regulatory functions, usually by creating a state-owned business unit first; privatisation of this business unit; introduction of domestic competition in services; introduction of foreign competition; and finally, further regulatory reform (pricing, entry, exit, interconnection). Other issues that are only superficially dealt with in this paper are the relationship between sector-specific regulation and general fair trade policy, as well as the need for asymmetric regulation in the initial stage of transformation from a monopolistic to a competitive market structure.

In the early 1980s, a worldwide trend to reform the regulatory structure of telecommunications started, mainly prompted by new opportunities presented by computers and digitalisation, the emergence of mobile communications, new regulatory models, and increasing scepticism vis-à-vis the theory of natural monopolies. It was one reflection of the Reagan/Thatcher policy of market liberalisation.[5] Korea and Japan were early participants in this development.

Comparing past reforms in Japan and the ROK

From the specifics of telecommunications as briefly described above, we have derived a number of crucial reform tasks that have to be dealt with in one way or another. Several major questions need to be answered for each of the two countries in order to understand the respective reform path. Why was the decision made to reform telecommunications? Who or what influenced the reform process? How did Japan and the ROK approach the separation of business, industry promotion and regulatory functions? How did the reform of fixed services such as international and domestic long-distance and local services proceed? How was competition introduced in mobile communications? And finally, how did both countries handle privatisation of the established carrier(s)?

Why did the reforms start?

JAPAN: The debate about restructuring of the incumbent carrier Nippon Telegraph and Telecom (NTT) started in 1981 after an internal study group of the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (MPT) proposed the divestiture and privatisation of NTT.[6] The issue has been under debate ever since. It was mainly business pressure that led to a recommendation from the *ad hoc* Committee on Administrative Reform of 1982 to proceed in that way. Support for the reforms came from Keidanren (a Japanese industrial lobby group) and NTT itself, although their ideas of the concrete measures differed markedly from those of the MPT. An additional reform factor was pressure from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to open the market for value-added services to boost the overall economy. The MPT recognised that the sector needed to respond to new demands. In hindsight, it becomes obvious that the origin of the reform debate was more or less an internal one, although the driving forces behind the actual changes were much more diversified.

KOREA: The reforms in the ROK's telecommunications basically started in 1981 with the formal separation of the business unit Korea Telecommunications Authority (KTA) from the ministry, something Japan had done decades before. The initiative for this step came almost exclusively from within the administration and represented a continuation of the successful economic policy of the Park Chung-hee era (1961–79). Impressive results were achieved, new technologies were developed, tele-density was boosted and a whole new sector was created including R&D institutions, service providers, hardware manufacturers and legal institutions. Business played a much less important role than in Japan, although this changed later. The reasons were twofold: the firms directly involved were too young, and the established players, the *chaeböl* (business conglomerates), were under strict control by the state; in fact, they were its agents. However, 'real' reform in the sense of introducing competition and liberalising ownership started much later, towards the end of the 1980s, and was predominantly the result of pressure from the United States (US), which was strongest in value-added services and IT hardware.[7] The Ministry of Communications (MOC) formed a discussion group to cope with the heavy pressure and the American demands; the reform measures of 1990 were a result of these deliberations. The origin of the reform debate was twofold: industrial policy in the 1980s, which had the twin goals of nurturing a new growth sector and of improving the nation's infrastructure, had strictly domestic roots; while the moves towards deregulation and liberalisation in the 1990s appear to have been a reaction to insurmountable external pressure.

What were the driving factors of reform?

JAPAN: As the OECD (1999: 10) observed, Japan usually followed international developments in this area. Numerous delegations and working groups studied the

experience of first movers such as the US and the United Kingdom (UK). To catch up, or better, not to fall behind, was one of the major motivations of the reforms. Another important factor was the rivalry between the ministry—MPT—and the giant carrier NTT. The former wanted to gain control of the carrier, which had an extraordinarily strong position within the Japanese state because of its 220,000 employees and its position as number one in purchasing power among all Japanese companies. Both organisations had a history of about thirty years of parallel existence and competition when the reforms started. Each side regarded reform as a chance to come closer to their goals: the MPT wanted to reduce the monopolistic power of NTT, while the latter saw a chance to gain more independence in its business decisions. Certainly, the unique market structure in Japanese telecommunications played a role, too. Quite extraordinarily, instead of one, there were two players (NTT, and Kokusai Denshin Denwa Co. Ltd.—KDD). Furthermore, no company operated both international and long-distance services until as late as 1997. Last but not least, there were different approaches towards competition in the long-distance market and international service market. In the former, new carriers employed LCR chips built into the customer's equipment to route their calls to the respective carrier's network. New entrants into international services, on the other hand, used separate carrier identification codes to be dialled by the customers. This demanded more marketing efforts, but also created much higher publicity than the LCR chips. A constant source of dynamism was the conflict between the two functions embedded within the MPT. As a regulator, it was responsible for consumer protection; as part of the government, it focused on industry promotion. In light of the close relationship between the state and business in Japan, it is not surprising that the OECD recognised a bias towards the latter function. Regardless of these important domestic factors, foreign pressure played a role, too. It came mainly from the US, although in the later 1990s the European Union (EU) also submitted 'proposals'" to Japan concerning further liberalisation. An interesting detail is that domestic companies utilised foreign pressure as exerted by the American Chamber of Commerce or the European Chamber of Commerce to convey their own concerns and desires to the bureaucracy.

KOREA: Once the decision to change the *status quo* was made, a number of catalysts of further developments emerged. The major driving force was, however, the Ministry of Communications (MOC). Initially, it did not face too much competition from other governmental agencies, mainly because it was agreed that the MOC and its research institute, the Korea Information Society Development Institute (KISDI), possessed superior knowledge and skills in a technically complicated matter.[8] It was not regarded as a serious competitor within the administration either; until the establishment of the Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) in 1994/5, the MOC was among the least attractive workplaces for young bureaucrats. As mentioned above, providing

the country with an adequate infrastructure and the creation of a new growth industry were primary goals in the first decade of the reforms. Later, the businesses created within this process (hardware producers and the carrier DACOM) started to demand deregulatory measures to expand their operations. The ROK did not have a specific market structure, nor did the conflict between the Korea Communications Commission and the MOC (later MIC) play a noteworthy role in the reform process. Rather, foreign pressure, both bilaterally and multilaterally, exerted a significant influence. Domestic companies, nonetheless, did not hesitate to approach the relevant government agencies directly in case of deregulatory demands. Public scepticism vis-à-vis the chaebŏl, however, limited the publicly executable business pressure on the government. Later, the rivalry between the MIC and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy (MOCIE), as well as the responsibility for intervention of the MIC and the Fair Trade Commission (FTC), started to determine the reform process. Korea Telecom (KT) was an important factor, too, and President Kim Young-sam himself publicly promoted his vision of the informatisation of the ROK, as did his successor. It was not possible to observe such direct leadership in Japan. Both presidents had a strong wish to raise the competitiveness of the sector in the national interest.

Outsourcing of the business function

Japan: As early as 1952, the Ministry of Telecommunications was turned into NTT, which had the status of a wholly state-owned corporation. In 1952, KDD was founded as a government-regulated corporation with a monopoly for international service, and the supervisory function for both corporations was handed to the newly created Ministry of Post and Telecommunications.

Korea: The Korea Telecommunications Authority (now KT) was founded in 1981. Until that year, its business function was performed by the MOC. The next step was the creation of several monopolistic business units with clearly designated and separated functions, the most important being the telecom operator DACOM for data services (1982) and Korea Mobile Telecom (today's SK Telecom) for mobile communications (1984). Depending on the perspective, this creates the impression that the ROK used the 1980s to catch up with Japan (while in the 1990s it got ahead of its neighbour). The supervisory function stayed with the MOC. The tasks of all carriers were regulated within a new legal framework (the Framework Act on Telecommunications and Telecommunications Business Act), which replaced the former Telecommunications Act at the end of 1983.

Reform of fixed services

Japan: Competition was introduced gradually. In 1985, the first reform started with the enactment of the Telecommunications Business Law. The major changes

concerned the liberalisation of terminal equipment; the simultaneous introduction of competition in telecommunications network infrastructure and services; a regulatory distinction between market participants who owned infrastructure (Type I carriers) and those who leased infrastructure (Type II carriers); the liberalisation of value-added services and networks; and the liberalisation of the sale of telephone sets.

However, the first wave of reform measures in Japan still left much to be desired. Competition was ineffective, no important business decisions were possible without permission from the MPT, there was no competition in local telecommunications, and only a managed competition existed for long-distance and international calls through the MPT's tariff approval system. In 1990, when the first regular review of the NTT Law of 1985 was due, breaking up NTT was seriously considered. The Telecommunications Council proposed the break-up of NTT into a local and a long-distance company. The MPT supported the Council's recommendation, but faced strong opposition from the MITI, NTT, telecommunications equipment companies, Keidanren and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The main concerns were firstly, that is was too early to make a decision and secondly, that divestiture would adversely affect NTT's share price.

In 1993, telecommunications services through cable TV networks were allowed, but were not able to mount a serious challenge to the established networks. In 1995, the debate about the future of NTT was reopened, this time with proposals from the Prime Minister's Office and the Fair Trade Commission. The result was another compromise. The second reform started in 1996. Its official goals were deregulation, promotion of network interconnection, and reorganisation of NTT. An important catalyst was the adoption of new rules (Annex on Telecommunications) set by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). In June 1997, the Telecommunications Business Law (TBL), the NTT Law and the KDD Law were amended. Some, but not all, entry restrictions for Type I carriers were eliminated, a new interconnection scheme was created and new provisions were made for a numbering plan. The most important measure was the break-up of NTT into one long-distance company and two regional local service companies (NTT East and NTT West) under a holding company (NTT Corp.). Originally, four regional companies were planned. The holding company structure was deemed desirable to secure unified R&D, which was regarded as a Japanese national asset.[9] Nevertheless, real competition has still not been achieved. NTT East and NTT West cannot enter the long-distance market, and it is unlikely that they would compete against each other in the local loop since it would not be in the interest of the holding company shareholders.

A year later, in May 1998, the TBL was again amended. The former approval system for NTT prices was replaced by a notification system; price cap regulation of NTT's local service was introduced, as well as relaxations of restrictions on NTT's international service. The KDD Law was abolished in July 1998, which meant the

lifting of the previous 20 per cent foreign ownership limit and the change in KDD's status from a special to a private company. In addition, the scope of Special Type II carriers was reduced, and the number of Type I and Type II carrier categories went down to three (previously seven for Type I and four for Type II).

KOREA: As in Japan, competition was introduced gradually. Under strong US pressure, by 1992 procurement was liberalised for American bidders and by 1997 for others. The South Korean chaebŏl pushed for a deregulation of the value-added service market, which appears a natural move given the increasing dependency of business transactions on stable access to information and corporate networks.[10] After some reluctant reform measures, which, however, did not address the interests of foreign companies, the US intervened again. Their frustrating experience with the insuperable bilateral pressure from Washington convinced the policy- makers in the MOC that there would hardly be much they could do against further reforms. So they decided to give up direct resistance, to take the initiative and to preserve the chance to actively shape the reform process. After having witnessed the examples of the AT&T divestiture, the privatisation of British Telecom and the beginnings of the privatisation of NTT in Japan, and facing increasing foreign and domestic pressure, the MOC established the Telecommunications Development Council consisting of 96 experts from various fields. This body created a report that formed the foundation for the first telecommunications reform in 1990. As a consequence, full competition was introduced in value-added services, and duopolies were created for paging, mobile communications and international long-distance. The monopoly of Korea Telecom (KT) for domestic long-distance and local services remained intact. What was remarkable was the continuation of industrial policy even under these unfavorable conditions. KT was to be promoted as one of the country's flagship companies, which meant increasing its efficiency by carefully exposing it to competition and by allowing it to enter formerly restricted business fields. Subsequently, KT received the long-desired permission to sell value-added services directly, instead of doing so via DACOM. In December 1991, legislation was amended to introduce two categories of service providers in Korea: those with their own networks (facilities-based service providers) and those without (value-added service providers). This approach was quite similar to what was done in Japan in 1985.

The second reform of 1994 was mainly motivated by the Uruguay Round, the establishment of the WTO and the expected Annex on Telecommunications. With the first civilian president (Kim Young-sam, 1993–7) in office for decades, the state's direct control of businesses weakened and new ways opened for them to express their wishes. Regulations concerning pricing and entry were further simplified to help non-dominant carriers to compete, and a duopoly was created in domestic long distance (DACOM).

Shortly thereafter, the third reform started with the foundation of the Ministry of Information and Communications in 1995. The main feature was the abolition of the duopoly structure, since it was not regarded as having been capable of providing the necessary incentives to make the domestic industry ready for the inescapable foreign competition. Once more, the ROK government acknowledged the superior quality of independent business decisions over administrative measures, and decided to utilise this ability in the context of its industrial policy, rather than wasting scarce resources. Control over pricing and in particular licensing provided sufficient veto power to direct the industry if necessary. In 1997, the duopoly in domestic and international long-distance was abolished with the market entry of Onse, and with Hanaro a second provider received a license for local services.

Later reforms further deregulated entry and pricing, improved interconnection rules and further reduced the entry barriers for foreign ownership. However, the ROK government was able to keep international competition at arm's length for long enough to allow the domestic industry to consolidate its position. Today, foreign companies operate in South Korea only as investors or in strategic alliances with domestic companies, but not independently.

Mobile communications

JAPAN: NTT had a monopoly for mobile communications until 1988. In December 1988, two more companies (so-called New Common Carriers, or NCCs) entered the market with analogue cell phones. In 1992 there followed the separation of the mobile business unit from NTT, which was the result of a compromise in the NTT debate between various governmental agencies. In 1993, this mobile carrier was split into nine companies, in a move reminiscent of the policy in the US. In April 1994, four digital cellular mobile carriers were allowed to enter each of the ten separate markets (Hokkaido, Tohoku, Kanto, Tokai, Hokuriku, Kansai, Chugoku, Shikoku, Kyushu, Okinawa). In the same month, the mobile equipment market was liberalised. Little more than a year later, in July 1995, three Personal Handyphone System (PHS) carriers were allowed to enter each of the ten regional markets, thereby creating a significant degree of competition.

KOREA: Korea Mobile Telecom was spun off the KTA in 1984 and was privatised in 1994 under the new name of SK Telecom. After some irregularities, a second carrier (Shinsegi) was licensed in 1994, and in 1996, KT was allowed to re-enter the mobile market with the foundation of KT Freetel. From 1996, fully fledged competition was introduced in South Korea's mobile communications market with a total of five carriers (SK Telecom, Shinsegi, Freetel, Hansol, LG Telecom). In 2002, the number of competitors shrank to three by merger and acquisition, a process that was strongly supported by the government.

Privatisation of the main player

JAPAN: The privatisation of NTT started with the first reform in the mid-1980s. In 1986, 200,000 shares were sold and the managerial autonomy of NTT was increased. Originally, 50 per cent of the shares were to be sold in four equal blocks annually beginning in 1986, but the sale stopped with the third block in 1988 and was postponed until 1998. It was not easy to reform the powerful NTT against its will. This becomes clearer if we understand that the NTT 'family companies' included NEC, Hitachi, Oki and Fujitsu.[11] The KDD Law was abolished in July 1998, which meant the lifting of the previous 20 per cent foreign ownership limit and a change in KDD's status from a special to a private company.

KOREA: Since 1980, there have been four privatisation initiatives in the ROK, each of which more or less coincided with the inauguration of a new president: 1980 (Chun Doo-hwan), 1987 (Roh Tae-woo), 1993 (Kim Young-sam) and 1998 (Kim Dae-jung). The main goals of privatisation are to increase economic efficiency and to improve the quality of service, to reduce direct state interference and to generate resources for reform programmes.[12] Despite detailed programmes and ambitious announcements, most privatisation efforts have proceeded slowly and often behind schedule. KT was no exception to that rule. The MOC regarded the R&D function of KT as important and was therefore hesitant to push ahead with privatisation of the incumbent. The government was fighting on two fronts: it wanted to prevent domination of the flagship carrier not only by foreigners, but also by the chaebŏl, which were eager to obtain a controlling share in KT and had the financial capabilities to do so. The result was a long and slow process. The decision to privatise KT was made in 1989; in 1994, 49 per cent of the shares were to be sold, which by then was the understanding of 'privatisation'.[13]

This situation changed only after the financial and economic crisis of 1997–8, when full privatisation by 2002 was discussed and decided upon. Further catalysts were entry into OECD in 1996 and the WTO telecommunications negotiations. Between 1993 and 2002, shares were sold in ten steps, reducing the state's share to 28.37 per cent as of January 2002 (in 1994, it was still 80 per cent). It is remarkable that the privatisation proceeded, however slowly, given a well-founded fear within the MIC as the largest shareholder that it would lose its importance within the administration and become obsolete. In fact, if the Korea Communications Commission is really outsourced one day and becomes a truly independent regulatory agency, there will be little left for the MIC to do that could not be done within a bureau of another ministry.

Other administrative units also played a role in the privatisation process. The Ministry of Finance's concern about the low share price of KT after the end of the New Economy boom in 2000 contributed to slowing the sale of the shares. However,

the comparison with Japan shows that in the ROK under its presidential system, the bureaucracy, despite its absolute strength, is still much weaker than under the party-centred system in Japan. This can be seen as a structural advantage for South Korea. Furthermore, international pressure seems to have played a much bigger role in Korea than in Japan.

R&D structure

The R&D structure in Japanese telecommunications appears to resemble that of the ROK. The Communications Research Laboratory, like Korea's Electronics and Telecommunications Research Institute (ETRI), concentrates on technological research, while the Telecommunications Advancement Organisation of Japan has its focus on telecommunications policy, including the introduction of advanced technologies and applications to society. In this respect its remit is reminiscent of the function of South Korea's KISDI. In April 2004, the merger of both Japanese institutions was planned, to form the Info-Communications Research Institute.[14] So far, no similar moves have been announced in Korea.

Similarities in the reform process of the past

The ROK and Japan are two different countries, with different political, demographic and geographical conditions. This will naturally produce differences in the reform paths. The starting point of reform in both countries was different, but the goals and motivations were similar. The reform process shows a number of similarities that are not incidental. Some of them are certainly attributable to universal developments, such as digitalisation or the overall neo-liberal trend towards liberalisation and deregulation in the 1980s, the Uruguay Round, the increased readiness of the US to exert pressure on its allies after the end of the Cold War, and so forth. There are, however, similarities that cannot be explained by general global trends: (1) the reforms were composed of individual measures rather than representing a single, comprehensive reform programme; (2) while interest groups in all countries attempt to influence the decisions of the respective regulatory bodies, in Japan and Korea the active role of governmental agencies and the relatively passive role of private corporations stand out; (3) in this context, the reform process appears to be influenced by concepts of industrial policy rather than by a more neutral criterion of efficiency or the broad acceptance of liberal economic principles; (4) intra-agency competition plays a significant role in both countries as a substitute for the checks and balances that would in other cases be provided by the interaction of the state sector and the private sector; in South Korea this competition is utilised to support the head of state through a strategy of 'divide and rule'; and (5) it is remarkable that in both countries, the respective ministry and the Fair Trade Commission have jurisdiction over the sector, although the involvement of

the FTC has been limited in Japan.[15] In both cases, we have witnessed the continuation of established industrial policies, such as picking the winner, designation of strategic industries, pooling of national resources, and protection of the domestic markets. As a result, both countries have developed a reform strategy and embarked on a long process of gradual reform that in many respects is still continuing, although the most spectacular developments lie behind us.

Comparing future visions for telecommunications

The info-communication policy-making bodies in the ROK and Japan have created hundreds of pages of all kinds of White Papers, strategies, visions and so forth. Continuing with the approach applied above, of choosing categories and comparing the positions of both countries, we can posit the most important questions as: who is responsible for information and communication policy planning? What are the strategic goals? Which ways will lead to success? How aware are the planners of possible obstacles? Which sectors and products are regarded as particularly promising?

Status of the industry

The starting points for developing future visions in Japan and South Korea are not the same, but are still very similar. In both countries, the IC industry is growing faster than the rest of the economy and receives special recognition. With regard to international technological competitiveness, Japan shows a remarkable strength in various types of hardware, such as intelligent home appliances and mobile terminals, and a surprising weakness in terms of software, including security, content, internet and other software. According to the MPHPT (2003: 10), the Japanese strengths are the result of "farsighted" R&D co-operation between the private and public sectors.

The informatisation index developed by the International Telecommunications Union is used to measure progress in a number of IT-related fields, and is explicitly used by the National Computerisation Agency (NCA) as a benchmark to assess the effectiveness of the Korean policy.[16] South Korea's ITU informatisation level is increasing steadily, from 22nd in 1995–7 to 19th in 1999, 17th in 2000, 16th in 2001 and to 12th in 2002.[17] Korea is already doing quite well in a number of information-related indicators, such as broadband access and the relative number of internet users. These fields are seen as particularly important on account of their intermediary nature and spillover effects; all potential growth industries as identified below in one way or the other depend on these networks. The numbers show the leading place the ROK occupies in broadband internet access, although the other parties appear to be catching up.

Table 1: Broadband access as of June 2002 (source: NCA 2003:34)

	Digital Subscriber Line 12/2001	Cable 12/2001	*Total 12/2001*	DSL 6/2002	Cable 6/2002	*Total 6/2002*	Per 100 citizens 6/2002
Japan	1,524,348	1,303,000	2,839,348	3,300,926	1,626,000	5,014,026	3.9
ROK	**5,178,323**	**2,936,280**	**8,146,001**	**5,734,690**	**3,287,464**	**9,058,517**	**19.1**
USA	3,947,808	7,050,000	12,783,214	5,082,856	9,200,000	16,068,262	5.6
EU	4,117,078	1,644,760	5,953,312	6,170,006	2,251,608	8,751,222	2.3
UK	140,000	208,000	350,000	299,000	452,994	751,994	1.3

Meanwhile, Japan emphasises its low broadband prices. Furthermore, since over 80 per cent of all cellphone subscribers in Japan use mobile internet services, the country has a leading position in this field globally.[18]

Information and communications (IC) policy planning

With regard to the quantity of strategic papers, both countries do quite well. Visions are produced regularly. However, if compared to Korea, we find less direct leadership by the head of state in Japan, rather, an attempt to create a broad consensus. Koreans also seem to be more interested in all kinds of numbers and indices than Japan. Importantly, the state's role in the development process is much more emphasised in Korea.

JAPAN: To promote its national IT strategy, the Japanese government has established the IT Strategic Headquarters, which operates on the basis of a newly promulgated IT Basic Law. The IT Strategic Headquarters has taken a number of measures to streamline efforts towards e-Japan, including a revision of the related priority lists and the creation of an expert study group. Another influential institution is the MPHPT's Telecommunications Council.[19]

KOREA: Informatisation as an industrial policy was launched in 1993, with projects such as popularising PCs, building the Korea information infrastructure, adjusting the legal and administrative structure, introducing or enhancing competition, liberalisation and deregulation. Since 1996, three master plans have been developed to promote informatisation: the first in 1996; the second in 1999 (Cyber Korea 21); the third in 2002 (e-Korea Vision 2006). Co-ordination takes place in various forms. At the top, the president himself is involved through the Informatisation Strategy Meeting and the Informatisation Promotion Committee. The main job of the government is "to make the IT industry grow" by rendering support in the following fields: expansion of IT infrastructure, assistance to new business establishments,

development of new technology, management of human resources and improvements in related laws and regulations. The private sector is expected to continue its efforts to lead in new industries on the basis of "creativity and self-regulation". Investments are to be expanded in technology development for strategic value-added services.[20]

Strategic goals

JAPAN: The declared aim of the Ministries of Public Management, Home Affairs and Post and Telecommunications (MPHPT) is to make Japan "*The* world's most advanced IT nation" (emphasis supplied) by 2005, to become a country that is emulated by others and where the most important new developments and trends originate from.[21] Clearly and explicitly, Japan aims for the leading role, hoping to overcome US dominance in the field and to balance growing Chinese influence in more traditional industries. The number of broadband users is expected to increase more than threefold from 19.55 million (28.2 per cent) in 2002 to 59.67 million (67.1 per cent) in 2007, while the market size will grow fivefold to 10.2 trillion yen in the same period.[22]

KOREA: The goal of future policies on information and communications is to further develop the knowledge-based economy, to "boost the nation with the vision of informatization",[23] to secure "Korea's prominent status in the Global Information Society",[24] and to become a global leader. South Korea emphasises international co-operation more strongly than Japan. Compared to earlier "visions", the goals are still ambitious, but appear to be more realistic and mature. As we can expect from a vision, Korea wants to be at the forefront of development, but there are no claims to become the only country accomplishing this task.

Ways to success

JAPAN: The Japanese goals are to be reached by concerted efforts of the private and the public sector; however, no details are revealed, and neither is a possible role for government. As a benchmark, Japanese IT policymakers look to the US and the ROK. It appears there is a tendency to downplay the latter's success. The MPHPT identifies a number of strategic areas on which respective efforts should concentrate (for more details, see below). A major issue is the creation of an appropriate network infrastructure, including various fixed and wireless broadband services.[25] However, no concrete measures beyond a general macroeconomic policy are mentioned in the materials analysed,[26] an impression that has been supported by limited number of interviews with Japanese officials. The White Papers usually do not go beyond the acknowledgement of national and international trends and some future projections, in sharp contrast to the targeted South Korean strategies described above. This does

not mean that the state is not involved in IT promotion; there are numerous examples such as the cooperation between Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK), commercial broadcasters and the MPHPT in the filed of digital terrestrial broadcasting.[27] However, it is not clear whether the state plays a leading or a supporting role in such alliances.

KOREA: The ways to reach these goals involve what we have already seen in the case of telecom reform: a fruitful co-operation between various groups within society, namely the state, private companies and the public, each with its own tasks. The NCA suggests striking a balance between the promotion of the IT industry to "create supplies" and an active informatisation policy "to create demands", and goes on to state that "[t]here is no doubt that national informatization policies such as founding highly advanced informatization promotional funds and building high speed information infrastructure … and e-government indeed contribute to shape an early stage of markets that is vital to the development of the IT industry."[28]

The active promotion of the use of high-speed data networks has to be understood in this context. All detailed measures are related to either one or other of these two components. Such measures call for: building a high-speed network; pushing the sale of computers; promoting various applications such as e-learning, e-government, e-commerce; improving the legal framework related to information and communications; fighting undesirable developments such as hacking, viruses, SPAM, etc.; and enforcing international co-operation for the information society, in particular with China and Japan. The policy-makers in the ROK have explicitly realised that certain old concepts have reached their limits and need to be replaced. They want to advance from quantitative expansion to qualitative accomplishments, from the creation of new industries by the government to laying the foundations for new industries, and from a catch-up strategy to a leading strategy. These efforts will lead, it is hoped, to a number of improvements in various fields. These concern a higher quality of life, lifelong learning and a culturally enriched life, the creation of new jobs and the growth of new industries, enhancement of productivity in existing industries and in the public sector and improvements in public services. The internet, according to MIC (MIC 2002:22) will increase transparency of decision-making. Key success factors are the establishment of a comprehensive framework and system to promote informatisation; the establishment of a vision for the information society in response to changes in the environment; an upgraded information infrastructure; strategic investment in key sectors and the promotion of market competition; and the establishment of cultural compatibility with information technology.[29]

Awareness of problems

The JAPANESE vision does not explicitly identify possible obstacles, but acknowledges the digital divide within society and the need to take countermeasures. Furthermore,

general economic difficulties are mentioned, but rather as something that development in the IT sector will help to overcome and not as an obstacle in the latter's progress.

The KOREAN vision concentrates on overcoming a number of difficulties, showing the ROK's very pragmatic approach. The major problems as seen by the policymakers and outlined by MIC (MIC 2002:14–16) are: (1) the slow spread of informatisation in the public sector; (2) low IT investment among small and medium enterprises; (3) the adverse effects of IC technologies (hacking, viruses, privacy); (4) insufficient investment in R&D and human resources; (5) the entry of "new economic superpowers" such as China and the EU; and (6) the digital divide as a social problem.

Strategic sectors and products

Both countries agree on a number of strategic fields with high future potential. These are all kinds of e-commerce, e-government, m-commerce, broadband internet and VoIP (voice-over internet protocol, or simply internet telephony). E-government and the internet content business are particularly strongly emphasised in both countries, as is the expansion of broadband networks. However, the detailed emphasis is not always congruent.

JAPAN: The Japanese ideas seem to be more detailed, but less focused, at least in the general strategic documents that I have analysed. An exception is the expansion of broadband networks, for which plans appear to be more sophisticated in Korea. A number of products and technologies such as IP telephones, wireless LANs, home appliances, telematics (convergence between mobile internet and GPS) are only mentioned in the Japanese vision. The same is true for 'ubiquitous networks' (usable anytime and anywhere); Japanese policymakers pin high hopes on this new technology, expecting that it will "solve or reduce the economic and social problems Japan is currently facing".[30] The Japanese aim to be the ones who introduce this technology to the world and secure first mover advantages, such as setting technological standards, etc. Concerns over privacy and information security "need to be wiped out".[31] Other future trends, which are not explicitly mentioned in the Korean vision, are the convergence of communications and broadcasting, particularly with the introduction of digital TV and radio; the expected impact of quantum technology and bio-technology on information and communications; the so-called time-stamp technology for online commerce, and stratospheric platforms as an alternative to satellites (automatically operated, unmanned airships that remain continuously at an altitude of about 20 km).

A brief comparison of the above-mentioned Korean and Japanese plans with the 'e-Europe 2005" action plan reveals a similar emphasis on broadband expansion, the connection of schools and the administration to such networks, attempts to bridge the

digital divide within society, and on computer and network security. In addition to this, the Europeans seem to regard online health services (e-health) as an important field for the future, as well as legal problems in connection with electronic commerce.[32] Co-operation between private and public institutions is planned in Europe as well, but the role of the state will be limited to that of a co-ordinator and to the provision of the necessary framework, which comes closer to the official Japanese policy.

KOREA: A Korean speciality is the vision to become a cyber-hub in Asia. This is part of a general excitement about the hub issue; it is decelerating in the ROK, but there are now cautious signs in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) pointing in this direction. The ROK government wants to foster new knowledge-intensive industries such as bio-tech, nano-tech, culture-tech, environmental-tech and space-tech. The public sector's competitiveness needs to be enhanced. An expected growing demand for culture (in cyberspace) has to be met. The government intends to maximise the ability of all citizens to utilize IC technologies in order to participate actively in the information society, to strengthen global competitiveness of the economy by promoting informatisation in all industries, to realise a 'smart' government structure with high transparency and productivity, to facilitate continued economic growth by promoting the IT industry and advancing the information infrastructure, and to become a leader in the global information society by taking a major role in international co-operation. To make this possible, every household is to have broadband access by 2005, and 90 per cent of the population are to become internet users.[33] In the relevant materials, we find all kinds of 'e's (for electronic), such as e-government and e-commerce (B2C, B2B, G2B), as well as 'm's (for mobile), such as mobile internet, m-biz (GPS, Sales Force Automation, Field Force Automation, etc.) and m-commerce (banking, e-shopping, mobile payment). The internet in its various forms plays a central role in these future concepts, including further improvement of access (ADSL, CATV, Apt. LAN, W-LAN, 3G), VoIP, IPv6 (the latest version of the internet protocol), digital contents industry (web-casting, music and video downloads, education, games, digital images), and software (9.84 per cent of the IT industry's sales). NCA reports (NCA 2003:42–44) that protection against hacking, SPAM, viruses and privacy invasion will have a great future in the bio-identification industry.

Conclusion

This paper has thrown up divergences in the paths to telecommunications reform between the ROK and Japan. But as has been shown above, there are many similarities, too. Some of them are certainly attributable to universal developments, others, as it seems, point to a more direct link between the two national economies

and the political systems. Both countries chose a slow and gradual process; both opted for an active role for government with a desire for industrial targeting. In both cases, intra-agency competition played a significant role as a substitute for the checks and balances provided in other societies by the interaction of the state sector and the private sector. Both countries had to react to foreign pressure, although the latter appears to have been higher for Korea. The principle of economic policy in both countries was and is a division of labour between the government and private industry. From this point of view, both countries do the same, but Korea does it much more openly and, depending on the perspective, with more success. The main reason, I would suggest, lies in the political system.

In Korea, the government is more autocratic and therefore able to issue orders, channel and pool resources, etc., much faster and in a much more focused manner (for an excellent account, see Kong 2000). The high risk of such an approach is reduced by leaving private industry enough manoeuvering space, i.e. by carefully integrating market dynamics into a state-led concept. It appears that the DPRK is attempting something very similar, which, if true, would be a strong argument in favour of viewing traditional institutional factors as the underlying reason (institutions defined as 'the rules of the game' in a society; see North 1992:3). 'Korea Inc.' (see Woo 1991) did not die in 1979 after the death of Park Chung-hee, nor in 1987 with the beginning of democratisation, and not in 1997–8 with the financial and economic crisis. It appears to be still intact and highly successful. Competition is explicitly utilised as a tool of industrial policy. Among the political reasons for the ROK's success with this policy are a strong president and, I would suggest, the absence of an established system of political parties. This makes long-term targeting of politicians more difficult and reduces the influence of interest groups on the decision-makers in the administration. The latter usually rise (and disappear) quite quickly and therefore have to be identified and approached in person. This process may well take longer than the period they are in office (the average tenure of office of ROK prime ministers between 1979 and 2000 was 10.6 months; see Frank 2003) and therefore leads to sometimes desperate and not very professional 'lobbying' efforts. The need for speedy and effective lobbying increases the risk of publicity, which in turn increases the transaction costs of such influence.

In Japan, with its party system, private businesses have their long-established ties with the *circles* of prospective leaders, represented by the political parties. This makes influence much less visible, less risky, a viable long-term investment and certainly more efficient. This has not prevented the surfacing of major cases of corruption such as the Recruit scandal of 1988–9, the Kyowa affair in 1991, the Sagawa Kyubin scandal of 1991–3 and the Genecon shoku in 1993. These events, however, support the hypothesis that efforts concentrate on party and bureaucracy and not on a single person at the top.[34] It appears that the Japanese government with its various agencies

that are captured by influential interest groups has to consider industry's needs much more directly than in Korea. This slows down the decision-making process and often prevents quick and powerful action. In addition, the power of the prime minister appears to be less absolute than that of the South Korean president, reducing his potential to accelerate developments. The inter-agency rivalry within the Japanese bureaucracy seems to be much more indigenous by comparison with the ROK.

Finally, we should not forget that the geopolitical position of the ROK and its historical experience make it easier for politicians to appeal to nationalist feelings, both in a protective and an active direction. This ideological factor mobilises energies and overcomes hurdles in a manner that neither a consensus-based nor a less homogeneous society can possibly achieve. Last but not least, its weaker position *vis-à-vis* foreign pressure has forced Korea to become more competitive in many fields, including industrial policy.

In terms of rhetoric, Japan appears to have become more aggressive in its future strategies after the prolonged business slump of the 1990s. Two features in particular can be found in the Japanese visions that not too long ago would have to be expected elsewhere: an excessive usage of superlatives (best, lowest, fastest) and an occasional mentioning of shortcomings of competitors, such as network crashes or the alleged inferior quality of 3G services. It remains to be seen which side will be more successful. The political conditions in Korea are moving dynamically towards a point where the strategies described will be hard to maintain and will necessitate the development of new paradigms; however, the future of the IC/IT industry certainly depends on how well the gigantic Chinese market can be utilised. In this respect, Japan appears to be in a less advantageous position.

Notes

1. Welfens and Graack 1996:127.
2. Bain 1956:15f.
3. Blankart und Knieps 1996
4. Belitz *et al.* 1992:29
5. See Tunstall 1986 for the USA and Beesley 1992 for the UK.
6. OECD 1999:9.
7. Choi 1999.
8. ibid:5
9. OECD 1999:9.
10. Choi 1997:82.
11. OECD 1999:11.

12. PBC 1998:3.
13. Choi 1998:256.
14. MPHPT 2003:67.
15. OECD 1999:18.
16. NCA 2003:14.
17. NCA 2003:19; NCA 2002
18. MPHPT 2003:6.
19. MPHPT 2002:6.
20. NCA 2003:8ff.
21. MPHPT 2003:4.
22. MPHPT 2003:5.
23. NCA 2003:11.
24. NCA 2003:13.
25. MPHPT 2003:5
26. MPHPT 2002 and MPHPT 2003.
27. MPHPT 2002:11.
28. NCA 2003:7
29. MIC 2002:13
30. MPHPT 2003:9
31. MPHPT 2003:11
32. EC 2002.
33. MIC 2002: 20–22
34. For more details, see Manzenreiter 1999, Yamamura and Yasuba 1987, and Pascha *et al*. 2003.

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HIGH TECH MADE BY NORTH KOREA: COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY IN THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND ITS IMPACT ON SOCIETY

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Introduction

At Christmas 2003, the *Tagesspiegel*, a Berlin newspaper, reported that KCC Europe (www.kcc-europe.de), a company set up by a former bank manager, Jan Holtermann, would construct internet access for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK). KCC stands for Korean Computer Centre. The director of the Korean company is the son of Kim Jong Il. Since Germany and other states do not allow the export of computer technology to North Korea, Holtermann installed the server in the embassy of the DPRK in Berlin, which is connected via satellite with Pyongyang. After three years of negotiations he had signed a contract with North Korean officials and had invested around one million euros in the network's infrastructure, although "he initially expects slim profit margins due to the limited number of users."[1]

In an interview, the entrepreneur pointed out that North Koreans, now computer specialists, would be able to offer their services cheaply to the world and because of the time difference would be able to work for German companies during the night.[2] He said: "The North Koreans are the Indians of tomorrow". All they had to learn was how to write computer programmes. He estimated that North Korea already has around 6,000 computer experts with an average age of 27. Holtermann explained that the web project would involve the use of filtering software similar to that employed in Chinese and Cuban networks. According to their internet site presentation, the KCC project includes:

- Planning of infrastructure and design to meet local requirements

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- Consultation and arrangements with German and international interest groups
- Building up of an internet connection from Germany to the DPRK via satellite
- Complete design of an ISP infrastructure
- Building up of an infrastructure in Germany and the DPRK
- Start of operations and control centre

However, use of the internet is restricted. Only a group of hand-picked people (the Communist elite) and state institutions, the leaders of the party, the military and the state office for tourism have access to PCs and mail. In spite of the internet café for foreigners in Pyongyang, which is connected via a line to China and used by a handful of tourists and diplomats, international organisations have to pay for an international call to Beijing to access the Worldwide Web (WWW). Holtermann told the German magazine *Der Stern* that in a charity performance for a kindergarten, the Nigerian embassy gained access free of charge to the web.

This paper focuses on the recent development of both the internet and the telecommunications system in the DPRK. By identifying and reviewing the reasons and trends involved in this process, it will analyse the political, economic and social consequences of the information revolution in one of the world's most isolated countries.

Development of internet and email communication in the DPRK

Emailing is not really new; since October 2001 North Korea has been linked to an email server.[3] The Silibank company in the northern Chinese city of Shenyang offers an email server and provides an email relay service (once an hour) between the two servers in China and the North Korean capital by using a high-speed bandwidth (since 2003 it has replaced the conventional internet access lines in Shenyang with 10Mbps fibre-optic cables) and "guarantees the privacy of correspondence."[4] After registering with Silibank (which costs US $100, the estimated average income per month of a North Korean person) and stating their nationality, employer or business partner, customers can freely communicate with those who have email addresses at Silibank and a programme such as Outlook Express.

The following graph shows the comparison between former and current ways of evaluating prices. Silibank has decreased costs. For example, a user in 2001 paid US $52.20 for an email of 1.6 MB, but in 2004 only 36 euro (US $43.20).

To send an email from Seoul to Pyongyang today would require more than three days. A representative of Hanarp Telecom of South Korea[5] reported that they would send files via mail to Beijing. There they would be downloaded, burnt on CDs and

Graph 1: Comparison between old and new methods of evaluation



Source: http://www.silibank.com/silibank/english/emailprice.asp, accessed on 20 March 2004

sent by airmail to Pyongyang. Up to the present, North Korea does not accept business by mail. Moreover, South Koreans must be careful that they do not violate the ROK National Security Law. Permission it required to contact North Koreans. In August 2001 the public prosecutor arrested six South Koreans who had exchanged electronic letters with members of the DPRK administration.[6]

According to the Chinese Xinhua News Agency, North Korea has had an intranet since 2001[7] with the name *Kwangmyong* ('light'), in which around 1000 users from the party, the military, government and universities can communicate and do research in more than 30 million documents. Because of the large amount of data, it is believed that North Korean agents have already had access to the internet and have copied and transferred documents into the intranet. In this context, the domestically developed translation programme, the Electronic Multilingual Dictionary with seven languages—English, French, German, Chinese, Japanese, Russian and Korean—plays an important role.[8] Before Holtermann announced to the world his activity with the North Koreans in creating internet access, experts already believed that technically North Korea had gained access. *Chosun Ilbo* of 13 September 2001 claimed that "[t]he diagram [in the North Korean magazine *Science World* under the title 'Intranet'] indicates that North Korea, having completed a study on a fire wall, to a certain extent is preparing itself for access to the internet."

Although the national domain '.kp' is reserved for the DPRK, information and goods (from the Pyongyang Informatics Centre: www.pic-international.com) are distributed from Japan, China or Singapore. The official press agency Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) has its provider in Tokyo. In July 2003, KCNA reported that the country's Academy of Sciences had opened a website partly to "introduce local scientific and technological achievements to other countries". The report also included an address for the site, http://www.stic.ac.kp, although it is inaccessible at present.

The agency hinted that the site might be available from overseas. It is the first time a website address under the North Korean '.kp' domain has been scheduled to run.[9]

Since June 2004, the KCC has offered its homepage (http://www.kcckp.net/external_e/) at *Naenara*, which provides a platform for the DPRK's politics, tourism, foreign trade, arts, history and customs, for Korean reunification and for the information industry. After registration it is possible to read the daily *Pyongyang Times* in English or French as well as the monthly *Korea Today* in English, French, Spanish, Russian or Chinese.

Computer technologies in the DPRK

North Korea has had a specialised software industry since 1986 and employs more than 200 engineers educated to university level at Kim Il Sung University, Kim Chaek University of Technology,[10] the University of Science and the Computer Technology College. In May 2003, KCNA reported that North Korea had started an education offensive in information technology by offering new classes in colleges. Competitions take place in writing software programmes. For example, the Tokyo correspondent for IDG News Service reported that children were studying computer programming at Mangyongdae Schoolchildren's Palace in Pyongyang and were sitting in front of modern desktop computers running either Windows 98, 2000 or XP operating systems.[11] One North Korean report revealed that out of 52 graduates of Hamhung University of Chemical Engineering, 20 had chosen an IT topic, as confirmation of the general efforts in IT development.

One result is the Pyongyang Informatics Centre (PIC). It distributes products from Singapore mainly to China and Japan. Promotion material in the internet[12] lists the development of general Korean electronic publication systems, 3D CAD, embedded Linux software, web applications, network servicing and development, karaoke editing systems, Korean desktop publishing, word processing, fonts, optical character recognition, translation, and Input Method Editor (IME) development, interactive programmes, accounting software and virtual reality software. Its advertisements say that "PIC promises to be a company to lead the IT industry by providing software with user-centred best quality and highest profit." In addition, the DPRK is looking forward to establishing international joint ventures. The only computer manufacturing enterprise in North Korea is the Taedonggang Computer Joint Operated Company. Together with the Chinese Panda Electronics Group, they set up a common project in 2002 to support the development of advanced technology.[13]

Such enhancement to build up an independent and competitive computer industry has economic reasons for the regime. North Korea argues that:

> Thanks to his [Kim Jong Il's] loving care many heroes of the times were produced from

> among the scientists and technicians in the period of the 'arduous march' and forced march [during the hunger crisis 1995–9] and more dependable youth scientists are being trained to occupy a high eminence of ultra-modern science and technology. The 21st century is a century of great national prosperity in which the Korean people will build a nation strong in science and technology by using the existing potentials to the maximum under the leadership of Kim Jong Il.[14]

One is reminded of East German attempts, when, before unification, the Communist regime developed micro-processors. But North Korean politics is very serious on this point: in April 2002, North Korean software managers presented their products in an exhibition of foreign chambers of commerce in Beijing (Comdex).[15]

Since December 2001, North Korea has been a member of the global commercial network SWIFT. Over 7,300 financial institutes in 194 states are members of this system, which allows B2B transactions.

Telecommunications

Since May 2001, North Korea has been a member of the International Telecommunications Satellite Organisation (INTELSAT). This association offers commercial services such as internet, media broadcasting and information telecommunication around the world.[16]

As with development of the internet, telecommunications, especially the mobile phone sector, presents a challenge for the leap into the information century. Although, with the support of the United Nations, cities are supposed to be connected by conventional telephone cables, the DPRK might be installing a wireless communication system. The North Korean *Rodong Sinmun* (Labour Daily) reported in September 2003 that the North Korean government had started the construction of 40 different transmission/relay stations in large cities. The United States (US), however, according to a *Financial Times* article, is against the installation of a mobile phone system in the DPRK.[17] The US company Qualcomm holds certain patents of the desired Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA)-2000 technology and would need special export permission for the American standard in wireless voice and data communication, which enables many more people to share airwaves at the same time than other alternative technologies.[18] The first generation supports an average of 144 kbps packet data in a mobile environment, the second release will support rates up to 2Mbits per second, and the third generation higher peak rates, high-speed data and even simultaneous voice.[19] The strategy of the South Korean consortium (Korea Telecom, SK Telecom, Samsung Electronics and LG Electronics) is to launch this new technology in North Korea as in the South, in view of future reunification. US diplomats have refused this request, because they fear that North Korean soldiers could operate in the future with high-tech mobile phones. However,

in the special economic zone of Rajin-Sonbong, a joint venture of Loxley (Thailand), Teltech (Finland) and the Taiwanese Charungthai had already started in August 2002 to construct a Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) network with relay towers to the northern city of Chongjin.[20] Full access to this technology might eventually lead to a blockade by the US administration. The second generation of GSM delivers full roaming capabilities across the world.[21] Like the internet, only primary leading officials would have the right to use mobile phones, and a cell phone moreover is quite expensive, therefore subscribers have numbered only around 3,000.[22] Hwang Chol Pung, president of the Korean Communications Company said: "From now on, we are going to upgrade equipment and to expand our equipment supply capacity so as to meet the growing demand. Then, it will be possible to lower the rate. We are going to farther spread communications networks and a plan is afoot to extend the cellular phone service to all the provincial seats of government and main highway."[23]

Despite progress in mobile phones communication, North Korea has announced restriction of the use of cell phones after the tremendous train accident at Ryongchon station in North Pyongan province in April 2004: "There were unconfirmed suggestions that a recent train explosion … could have been a bomb that was detonated by cell phone and the clamp down is due to this link."[24] And finally, on 25 May 2004, North Korean banned mobile phones completely.

Cyberwar

The DPRK is not only a focus of the international community through the nuclear debate, but its computer industry also alarms the intelligence services. On 29 May 2001, as reported by *Chosun Ilbo*, the National Intelligence Service of the Republic of Korea (ROK) (www.nis.go.kr) gave warning of the new databank of the North Korean government (www.dprkorea.com):

> "If this site is deliberately conveyed to South Korean internet users, it will be in violation of the South Korean law … However, simply viewing this site, or reading the contents do not constitute a violation of the law," added the official. "In the case one is to sign up as a member of the DPRKorea Infobank, one must first register with the Ministry of Unification." In addition, "[i]f one sends e-mail to the webmaster of the DPRKorea Infobank or uses any of the information found in the website publicly, the party must first receive permission from the Ministry of Unification."

But it is not only propaganda from the *juche* regime that might affect the ROK, but also the activities of computer hackers. According to the South Korean military, the DPRK was educating 100 cyber-soldiers or hackers annually, who could start a cyber attack against the ROK.[25] "Graduates of the elite hacking program at Mirim

College are skilled in everything from writing computer viruses to penetrating network defenses and programming weapon guidance systems."[26] However, the US intelligence service has not confirmed this assumption about North Korean cyber-terrorism. Alexandre Mansourov, professor at the Pentagon's Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, discussing the accusation of "some US defense experts" that South Korea is "hyping the cyber threat posed by its northern neighbor, which they claim is incapable of seriously disrupting the US military", has said that "[t]he KPA [Korean People's Army] is still predominantly an analog and vacuum-tube force … We tend to overestimate the level of information-technology expertise in the North Korean military, and South Korea is especially guilty of this."[27]

Nevertheless, the ROK Ministry of National Defence has increased its efforts to protect one of the most wired nations in the world from any form of information warfare. The South Korean internet was attacked several times, since broadband penetration (more than 70 per cent) is very susceptible to any forms of viruses and worms. Simulation processes of the US Department of Defence have recognised the potential threat of North Korean cyber-terrorism.

> In a 1997 Pentagon war game called Eligible Receiver, National Security Agency computer specialists posed as North Korean hackers and reportedly were able to disrupt command-and-control elements of the US Pacific Command. The following year, Pentagon adviser and Rand consultant John Arquilla concocted a fictional scenario, published in Wired magazine, of a global cyberwar engineered by—whom else—the North Koreans.[28]

But this magazine also reported a further story in 1998. South Korean hackers blocked access for millions of internet users of GeoCities of California, because this server was managing the homepage of the Australian Association for the Study of the *Juche* Idea. Eventually, experts in international law discussed the consequences of cyberwar attacks in the virtual world, in which both political and military determinants have lost their geographical meanings.

Internet, globalisation and democratisation

According to the report 'Censor Dot Gov: the internet and press freedom', issued by Freedom House, only 69 out of 186 states have a free press, 51 have part censorship and 66 extreme censorship.[29] Countries like Azerbaijan, Myanmar, China, Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Libya, Tunisia and the DPRK are especially accused because of the attempt by governments to restrict full access to the internet and to censure its content by the use of firewalls or filter programmes. In most cases, governments argue, censorship should protect society against immorality.

Table 1: Press freedom in 186 countries, 2000

	By country	By population
Free	69 (37%)	1.253 (21%)
Partly free	51 (27%)	2.357 (39%)
Not free	66 (36%)	2.364 (40%)
	186 (100%)	5,974 (100%)

Changes in average ratings of 186 countries, 1995–1999

1995=48.33 (*partly free)
1996=45.78 (*partly free)
1997=46.04 (*partly free)
1998=46.29 (*partly free)
1999=49.04 (*partly free)
2000=47.01 (*partly free)

*partly free=31 to 60 on a scale of 100 (lower is freer)

Source: http://www.freedomhouse.org/pfs2000/tables.html, accessed on 20 March 2004

The BBC, as reported in March 2004, described thus the situation of the media in the DPRK:

> Radio and TV sets in North Korea are pre-tuned to government stations that pump out a steady stream of propaganda. The state has been dubbed the world's worst violator of press freedom by the media rights body 'Reporters Without Frontiers'.
>
> Press outlets and broadcasters—all of them under direct state control—serve up a menu of flattering reports about Kim Jong-il and his daily agenda. North Korea's economic hardships or famines are not reported.
>
> However, after the historic Korean summit in Pyongyang, media outlets toned down their fierce denunciations of the Seoul government.
>
> Ordinary North Koreans caught listening to foreign broadcasts risk harsh punishments, such as forced labour. North Korea has a minimal presence on the internet. The web pages of North Korea's official news agency, KCNA, are hosted by the agency's bureau in Japan.[30]

In this context, we must ask what the impact of information technology might be on North Korean politics and economics, and probably on future Korean unification. In answering this question, it is necessary to look at other authoritarian regimes like Cuba or the People's Republic of China (PRC) and especially at the latter. This Communist country has some influence on the North Korean government and is considered even for the DPRK a model in which transformation processes in politics and the economy are possible for both integration into the international community

and the creation of a permanent new legitimacy by reforms that should have the effect of stabilising the regime (not of leading to a collapse as in the Soviet Union). The DPRK has started with economic reforms aimed at recovering its industrial production, which should stabilise the country.[31] Like the PRC, the DPRK has established special economic zones (SEZ) in Kaesong (industrial development) and Kumgangsan (tourism).[32] It has also attempted, so far unsuccessfully, to set up a special administrative region (SAR) in Sinuiju that would guarantee free economic capitalistic activities, rights to vote and work, freedom of the media (no censorship), freedom of association and religion, and industrial production with very low taxes. In accordance with the ROK's unification strategy—the 'sunshine policy', to prevent a regime collapse—Seoul supports the SEZ projects by investing and advertising for more foreign direct investment.

Since the launch of the internet, scientists have been asking whether it would support the democratic process around the world. And indeed, since the end of the East-West conflict we can point out that globalisation and accelerated processes in communication technology have promoted civil society and freedom of speech. Besides, the Human Development Report[33] of the United Nations has emphasised the victorious course of democratisation processes (even if it does not consider the role of the legal state):

Graph 2: Democratic regimes in the world



Source: http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/pdf/charts-graphs.pdf, accessed on 18 March 2004

In a study of the question 'Is the internet an instrument of global democratisation?', Kevin Hill and John Hughes come to the conclusion that:

> We find that newsgroups devoted to countries with lower levels of democratization have a much higher content of anti-government messages than the newsgroups about nations that are more democratic … The utopians that think the Internet will bring about a democratic revolution have reasons to be slightly optimistic. If the mere fact that political discourse against repressive governments is taking place is a good in itself, then the utopians have reason to celebrate. Perhaps the Internet *will* bring about a wider democratic revolution in the world. At least people *are* talking about politics and virtually protesting against lesser democratic governments on the Usenet.[34]

The internet might accordingly be considered as an instrument of global democratisation. In the PRC, it is comprehensively controlled. Firewalls block critical foreign newspapers or pornographic material. Software like Wangluo Shentang, a web detective developed by the Shanghai Rainsoft Company, scans the internet for subversive words. Moreover, for the past four years, a special police for "security control of the internet" observes internet chats, and each provider has the duty to keep its online protocol for at least one year so that subsequent investigation might be possible. As an eventual consequence, almost 40 cyber-dissidents are in prison.[35]

In China, there is a very popular website: www.sina.com.cn. The example of a special court case demonstrates how the internet has forced the consciousness of civil society and its participation in publicity via the internet:

> In the province of Harbin, a peasant couple was transporting leeks to the local market by tractor. A bundle of the vegetables touched the outside mirror of a BMW. The female driver and her sister jumped out of their car, beat up the couple, went back into their car and crushed the woman with their vehicle against a tree. She died immediately. Two months later a provincial court gave the driver a probation sentence, they agreed to pay the family around 8000 euros out of court and hoped to forget the case. However, this crime became well known through the internet. While newspapers did not report this case because of an order by the town's administration, witnesses used the internet to claim that this was not an accident as the police had stated, but was an intentional attack. The discovery of the story spread through the country and even newspapers like the *Beijing News* began reporting this story.[36]

Eighty million users in the PRC and more than 50,000 daily, especially young people, consider the internet as the first and most reliable source. The internet is thus a new, but informal, form of public plebiscite that is challenging the state's monopoly on information and may increase in the long term the likelihood for democratic regime change, because it provides numerous possibilities for the growth of civil society and for dissidents to organise and communicate. In this context, the growth of cell phone usage is important too. More than 300 million Chinese transmit around 7,000 short

messages per second, more than the rest of the world together. During the SARS virus crisis in 2003, Chinese mobile phone owners used their cell phones to inform their families, neighbours, colleagues, etc. Information about the disease spread like the virus itself. The mobile phone has become a new media form, especially because of the silence of the official media. Of course, the wide distribution of any new communication technology might support freedom of speech and democracy, as television did in East Germany, when citizens watched the daily news from Western Germany, reporting the first demonstrations which eventually led to the end of the socialist system.

However, the Chinese Communist Party is willing to restrict these possible trends. It has therefore forced providers to control the transmission of messages. Companies who do not agree with the new policies have had to pay harsh fines or lose their permits. Now, each message is filtered, and even numbers like 04 and 06 have been eliminated from the system. These numbers were able to give hints about the massacre on Tiananmen Square on 4 June 1989.[37]

Finally, the internet is, like other media, a perfect tool for political propaganda. While engineers are developing new software, they can be kept informed through new emails about the new achievements of the regime and the dear leader Kim Jong Il. As KCNA reported on 25 November 2003, "[t]he modernization and informationalization of the national economy are an important work to provide a material guarantee for the building of an ideologically strong nation. If the national economy is modernized and put on an IT basis, material means for ideological education will be replaced by modern and IT based equipment to bring about greater successes in the ideological education."

The wireless future: What would a North Korean information society look like?

In order to present a scenario for the next 10 or 15 years, we must realise the contemporary situation of North Korea. Who are the actors: the Korean Worker's Party or the military? What are their objectives: system consolidation or integration into the international community? Which tools are they using: market reforms, or international blackmail with threatening scenarios and the use of the spectre or of rumours as a form of underestimating the potency of North Korea, of what is behind the curtain? Nevertheless, scenarios[38] are not predictions. They help us only to visualise different possibilities by taking into account inherently unpredictable events. In particular, scientific breakthrough could create sudden new possibilities, even though it usually takes many years for profound discoveries to achieve a widespread social effect. Hammond, in his book *Which World? Scenarios for the*

21st Century (1998), distinguishes three different worlds in the future: market world, fortress world and transformed world.

The 'market world' reflects a continuation of current patterns. Actually, it assumes that regions are integrating into the world economy and are boosting human wealth. Privatisation and deregulation would push this tendency. The 'fortress world' focuses on the potential of unattended social problems, increasing environmental challenges and a growing gap between rich and poor that might lead eventually to rising conflicts. On the other hand, the 'transformed world' is a very optimistic vision of the future. It assumes that human ingenuity and compassion can extend opportunity to all of humanity. Transferring these models to the DPRK, we could identify the following scenario of the market world as the realistic one in a brief form, because the latest developments in North Korea have shown that in the next few years we cannot expect either a dramatic regime collapse or a war (against the US/South Korea) in spite of the nuclear crisis. Nor would the transformed world be very likely because of the apparently real stability of the political regime.[39] In order to gain an overview of a possible perspective, this writer presents a very brief sketch in a prognostic report style such as Hammond employs to write his scenarios:

> The Goethe Institute, a German cultural institution operating worldwide, has opened its library in the Chollima House of Culture in Pyongyang under the joint operation of the DPRK-Germany Friendship Association and the Goethe Institute. Visitors may read German newspapers or political magazines, although North Korean newspapers are always censored. On the intranet, every North Korean may research German literature, even critical assessments. University students are likely to be reading the intranet very carefully and studying thousands of copied books about computer science. The technology research linked to universities and the Pyongyang Informatics Centre develops highly valuable software. The dear leader Kim Jong Il supports the education and formation of a thousand young engineers financially and ideologically. He knows clearly that the cheap but modern software, distributed from Singapore and Hong Kong is competitive not only on Asian markets but also in the world. With the co-operation of KCC in Germany, North Korea software developers create joint ventures with European companies. One huge achievement is the modernised Linux programme: a bestseller like Windows. Although the technology boom supports the regime of Kim Jong Il, North Korean citizens don't profit from it. The Communists pay only benefits like beautiful, fast cars and nice houses to the new state's elite in order to prevent any migration to China, which offers better salaries. Meanwhile each North Korean is under surveillance. Instead of roaring loudspeakers in the streets, giving orders to the people, now the virtual dear leader, present on a high-tech screen in each room, gives new instructions to the people throughout the 24 hours. At the same time a web-cam observes each corner of any building or street in the city. Any incorrect behaviour is reported to the police, but people like the virtual talk with their leader. However, US software companies urge their administration and the CIA to stop this threatening market competition. By hiring South Korean software experts, they are able very quickly to start a cyberwar against

North Korea. A virus crashes the security codes, blocks police access and broadcasts nationwide speeches of the virtual dear leader with manipulated, but convincing, messages to the people that have him saying: "now the United States are our friend, we are opening the borders, welcoming our Korean brothers and sisters in the South and starting with democracy."

Conclusion: North Korea—the next Asian tiger?

From the author's point of view, the market world scenario would be very likely in the long term, because economic reforms generally lead to behavioural changes in politics. There cannot be any doubts; the greater the economic dependence on computer development, the greater the risk there appears to be of susceptibility of the regime to attack by foreign computer hackers or a virus. However, the British businessman Roger Barrett sees North Korea not as part of Bush's axis of evil, but as the next Asian tiger.[40] In pointing out the recent capitalist reforms, the planned industrial park at Kaesong, the country's educated working force, its abundant mineral resources and its expanding economic contacts with China and the ROK, he comes to this conclusion: "The North Koreans are so willing, and it's much easier to negotiate with the willing, rather than those who are already swamped with investment."[41]

According to Samsung Electronics, development of the internet in North Korea could have a future. Since 2000 the South Korean company has co-operated with the Korean Computer Centre, where engineers are developing software for search engines, media players or Linux programmes, even though productivity might be only 50 per cent of that of Russia or India. KCC's total investment in the development of computer software since 2000 under Samsung sponsorship has amounted to US$ 2.8 million. Animation technology is especially far advanced, although direct communication between North and South poses the biggest problem.[42]

In conclusion: North Korean computer and communication technology has a future, if it is cheap and competitive. The regime may use it for its own purposes in order to enhance propaganda. But the more the DPRK is linked to and integrated with the world, the more outside influence will challenge the stability of the regime.

Notes

1. http://australianit.news.com.au/articles/0,7204,8277270%5e15318%5e%5enbv%5e15306,00.html, accessed on 20 March 2004.
2. No author noted: KCC Europe GmbH baut Internet-Zugang für Nordkorea, in: http://www.flexist.com/n-16773.html?flexist=b37c69eb965a01036a7786da2ab3ebf9, accessed on 18 March 2004.
3. *Guardian* (UK), 1 November 2001, 'First email link for North Korea'.

4. No author noted: 'North Korea launches "secure" email, in: http://news.zdnet.co.uk/0,39020330,39118217,00.htm, accessed on 10 March 2004.
5. http://futurezone.orf.at/futurezone.orf?read=detail&id=205952, accessed on 10 March 2004.
6. *Guardian*, 1 November 2001, 'First email link for North Korea'.
7. 'China report highlights in N. Korea's homegrown web', cited in Leonid Petrov, 'North Korea in cyberspace', 15 March 2002. See http://north-korea.narod.ru/dprk_internet.htm, accessed on 10 March 2004.
8. *Pyongyang Times*, 10 February 2001, in www.pic-international.com, accessed on 10 March 2004.
9. http://www.computerweekly.com/Article123734.htm, accessed on 13 March 2004.
10. This university has a co-operation agreement with Syracuse University in the US, whereby an exchange programme for researchers to study civilian information technology in the US has been running since 2001. The SU/KCUT project is the first partnership of its kind in which researchers from North Korean and US institutions have participated in ongoing collaboration and made extended visits to each other's campuses; a team from the US went to Pyongyang in June 2002, and KCUT delegations visited Syracuse in March 2002 and December 2002. The bilateral research collaboration, in the general area of integrated information technology, supports the development of civilian-sector IT infrastructure in the DPRK. See http://sunews.syr.edu/fullstory.asp?id=5060311, accessed on 20 March 2004. See also 'Bilateral research collaboration between Kim Chaek University of Technology (DPRK) and Syracuse University (USA) in the area of integrated information technology', at http://20030630-ASPAC-Kim-Chaek-Syracuse-rv.pdf, accessed: 20 March 2004.
11. http://archive.infoworld.com/articles/hn/xml/02/05/17/020517hndrpkorea.xml, accessed on 10 March 2004.
12. http://www.pic-international.com/main/main.htm, accessed on 10 March 2004.
13. http://www.phil-fak.uni-duesseldorf.de/ostasien/china/service/bbc/020616.txt, accessed on 10 March 2004.
14. KCNA, 28 October 2001.
15. *Der Spiegel*, 23 April 2002.
16. *Chosun Ilbo*, 30 May 2001.
17. See http://futurezone.orf.at/futurezone.orf?read=detail&id=126621&tmp=40673, accessed on 10 March 2004.
18. See http://www.cdg.org/technology/index.asp, accessed on 10 March 2004.
19. http://www.protocols.com/pbook/cdma2000.htm, accessed: 10 March 2004.
20. http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200301/200301150025.html, accessed on 10 March 2004.
21. http://www.gsmworld.com/technology/gsm.shtml, accessed on 13 March 2004.
22. However, *Chosun Sibo*, a pro-Pyongyang newspaper published in Japan, reported 20,000 mobile phones. See http://www.cellular-news.com/story/11242.shtml, accessed on 20 August 2004.

23. *People's Korea,* 'Pyongyang Report', vol. 5, no.1 (March 2003).
24. No author noted: 'North Korea restricts cellphone use': http://www.cellular-news.com/story/11242.shtml, accessed on 20 August 2004.
25. Leonid Petrov, 'North Korea in cyberspace', 15 March 2002, in http://north-korea.narod.ru/dprk_internet.htm, accessed on 10 March 2004.
26. http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,59043,00.html, accessed on 11 March 2004.
27. ibid.
28. ibid. See Dan Verton, 2003. *Black Ice: The Invisible Threat of Cyber-Terrorism*. New York: McGrawHill/Osborne.
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30. http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/country_profiles/1131421.stm, accessed on 19 March 2004.
31. *Newsweek*, 2 February 2004:24–7, 'The first signs of life: will economic reforms in the hermit kingdom save Kim Jong Il's regime—or hasten the fall?'
32. Bernhard Seliger, 2003. 'Die nordkoreanischen Sonderwirtschaftszonen—eine Wiederholung des chinesischen Erfolgsmodells?', in Patrick Köllner (ed.), *Korea 2003: Politik, Wirtschaft, Gesellschaft*. Hamburg: Institut für Asienkunde:262–85.
33. http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/2002/en/pdf/charts-graphs.pdf, accessed on 10 March 2004.
34. http://www.professorhill.com/pdf/demoint.pdf, accessed on 14 March 2004.
35. Zhou Derong, 'Silbergrauer Wagen, Porree und Internet', *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, 30 January 2004:38.
36. ibid.
37. See: No author noted, 'Keine Demokratie durch Technologie', in http://www.civisdigitalis.de/em/info/print.asp?article=20040711, accessed on 12 August 2004.
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41. ibid.
42. http://www.east-asia.intel.com/eai/Sample/10.html, accessed on 13 March 2004.

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE USE OF INTERNET MATERIAL: FROM A STUDY ON WOMEN'S INTERNET COMMUNICATION AND *GOBUGALDEUNG* IN KOREA

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The discussion throughout this paper investigates women's internet use in relation to *gobugaldeung*—female intergenerational conflict in familial relationships, with specific reference to mother-in-law and daughter-in-law.

Introduction

The past ten years have seen a myriad of internet technologies and types of communication emerge. The fast growth of internet culture among younger people and its association with newer life patterns are reflected in a greater divergence in internet research and wider areas for social research. However, this has also created a challenge for internet researchers in terms of new areas of communication and the means of optimising the accessibility and availability of internet resources,[1] as well as persistent ethical issues. Researching cybercultures underlines various concerns in relation to using internet data. These can be summarised as: the subjectivity and textuality of social experiences of internet culture;[2] on-line texts in terms of analysis of the rhetoric[3] and their textual indication for research practice;[4] the connection between on-line communication and off-line reality;[5] practicality of on-line research;[6] and finally, ethical issues in the internet which need to be borne in the researcher's mind.[7] The expectation is that these concerns should be integrated into the methodology of internet research as its basis.

In addition, internet materials point to the ambiguity of the research environment for novel circumstances and new technologies. Subsequently, these concerns lead to a lack of confidence or fear on the part of the researcher when dealing with the

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exigencies of collecting and analysing data. Such fears may be due to an awareness of possible accusations in various concerns, such as shortage of quantum display[8] and methodological constraints as well as ethical concerns. For instance, while the internet environment presents extensive potential for researchers to access diverse sources, the very accessibility of private information induces ambivalence in relation to responsibility and sensitivity to personal data. Researchers are subject to the laws relating to confidentiality and copyright in the unlawful downloading and publicising of data. Furthermore, the difficulty in drawing a line between the researcher's in-depth data and the information gained from the disclosure of personal experience means that the researcher is confronted by a great deal of uncertainty in the process of gathering data and is vulnerable to criticism for invading the informant's privacy (see Sharf 1999). This can play negatively for researchers who have less than distinct ideas on the extent to which data can justifiably be collected. The ethical accusation is most likely to haunt internet cultural researchers who aim to have in-depth data. Unauthorised disclosure and the consequent responsibility hold back qualitative social research, whereby the possible revelation of disclosed information has a detrimental effect on the informants.[9]

The foregoing is to illustrate the difficulties involved in internet research. In response to the controversies that arise in researching cybercultures, this paper discusses in general how internet data represent a broader research opportunity for ethno-cultural studies and suggests the feasibility of cultural exploration of on-line texts of internet articles. The value of internet material for researching a specific societal and cultural context is also debated. This point is derived from the argument that internet culture is not separated from the social world[10] and that the computer-mediated communication (CMC) environment provides more than a series of fragmented ethnographic accounts. My discussion throughout has benefited from preceding studies on the internet community,[11] which have testified that internet data provide a diverse and comprehensive source for cultural analysis and that participation in internet communication is a part of understanding the interactive internet culture.[12]

The first part of the paper gives an outline of how the newer mode of communication merges with cultural research, with reference to existing contemporary ethnographic researches on the internet, such as those by Miller and Slater (2001), Schaap (2002) and Markham (1998), and to arguments in relation to internet cultural research (Stern 1999; Kendall 1999). The second part of the paper attempts to discuss issues that have arisen in using the internet as a research source. The third part discusses the reflective nature of grounded theory and its relevance to internet research in terms of offering a way forward. Lastly, this paper tries to sketch the possibilities offered by internet materials, focusing on some of the methodological issues arising from the use of internet data, and outlines the advantages offered by internet cultural study as well as the disadvantages.

Internet use in Korea

Numerous polls in the Republic of Korea (ROK) point to the rapidly increasing use by women of the internet. The total number of internet users in the ROK was estimated at approximately 30 million in January 2003, two-thirds of the population of 48 million. A census done by Internet Matrix on internet users in the ROK suggested that at the end of the year 2003 there were 17,568,000 women net surfers, reaching around 36.6 per cent of the total Korean population, and that this proportion was expected to reach 40.7 per cent by the end of 2004. Internet Matrix sees this phenomenon as the result of women, in particular in their thirties and onwards, who engage in chats, community activities and emailing as well as internet shopping, internet banking and trading in company stocks.[13] Similarly, a White Paper on Internet Korea 2003, prepared by the National Computerisation Agency,[14] points to a fast diffusion of different patterns and interests in social communication with an indication that internet use in Korea is largely focused on sources of information, entertainment and communicational channels. It suggests that almost 60 per cent of the entire Korean population over the age of six has internet access.

As such, internet communication in Korea attests to the worldwide trend in communicational development and echoes the newer trend of people's changed life style, in which leisure and entertainment form an axis, with less prominence given to industrial development, education or socio-political issues.

Qualitative data on the internet

The interpretation of internet articles underpins the viability of social research in eliciting the cultural aspects of informants.[15] Given that computer-mediated communication is a product generated from cultural meanings, keeping references to cultural contexts is the target for internet researchers as they set out to explore such data, in which texts are produced, transmitted and received.[16] Internet cultural researches are engaged in the interpretation of subjective data of individual stories based on personal experiences, and data analysis focuses on the collective cultural ideas from individual cases.[17]

The main thrust of researching cybercultures is within the hermeneutics of interpretation in social sciences research. The hermeneutic, or interpretive, approach, as opposed to a positivistic and 'quantitative' research classification, is characterised by the 'qualitative' enquiry of the research question. This is regarded as bringing out the meaning of a text from the perspective of its own author.[18] Hermeneutics explicitly draws on two central tenets of the qualitative research strategy: an emphasis on the point of view of the author (of the text) and sensitivity to the context in which the research is being undertaken.[19] The interpretation of the context in the hermeneutic

tradition is seen by its modern advocates as a strategy that is related both to the texts of the research documents and to the social meanings (e.g. Sharf 1999). It refers to a methodology and an analysis of research data that is originally devised in relation to the understanding and interrelating of texts.[20] As such, internet communication articles and research manipulation of their texts represent the social community generated by shared understanding and socially constructed meaning[21] in which the participant is situated.

Internet communication and the research possibility

An example of the potential of internet community material is found in the narratives presented particularly in the framework of the Usenet (or Newsgroup), such as Message board, Column and Cafe articles, which discuss a diverse range of topics. These types of internet community provide cultural contexts which are enhanced by the various backgrounds of people who share the understanding of the discussed topic in order to communicate their thoughts based on their own experiences. In the case of women's column sites, for instance, members on the site are invited to post their real-life stories, which in turn cause others to respond in telling their stories. Posting comments to an original article (or adding to an already posted comment) is a mode in user-group communication that works to enhance and increase interactivity in the group, functioning as an interactive communicational tool. The key role of the internet, therefore, is not just a 'resource' provision, but a driving force for communication and sociality (in which it obviates a need for actual physical contact between those using this medium).

On such community sites, posting messages is in general open to members. Thus these sites are not customarily used for personal messages. Through these sites such as message boards and columns, the author of the article gets numerous replies from the general public, to whom the message is posted anonymously, usually with a nickname. Nonetheless, these sites promote intimate conversation between those concerned and provide an open forum without fear of possible blame or of losing face, as it might be the case with their families and friends, who may judge and accuse them. Occasionally, members do get acquainted after reading each other's posted stories. However, a distinct line is drawn between people, resulting in two levels of contact: the publicly accessed message and personal contact by emailing.[22] The following illustrates an interaction in messages posted on one of the Korean women's sites:

> Last Saturday it was the birthday of my *ajubunim* [husband's elder brother]. In the morning I visited my elder sister who is in hospital for intensive care. Thus, I went to my parents-in-law in the afternoon. All the grocery shopping had already been done by

> *hyung-nim* [elder sister-in-law] and my mother-in-law. Mother-in-law said, "Why are you appearing now? Why are you always being like this? What time is it now? Couldn't you make it earlier to come and go shopping together and help your elder sister-in-law better? Your mother-in-law, old as I am, was heavy as a log with shopping bags. You are like an outsider all the time, not my own." I felt guilty and so said "joi-song-ham-ni-da" [I am very sorry], and I hurriedly went into the kitchen to assist them. I stood silently all the afternoon working in the kitchen and serving until all the guests were fed and gone. Serving continued until 10 o'clock in the evening, but I felt as if I was not fully participating in it. Also, *Hyungnim* and mother-in-law remained displeased with me throughout the evening. Maybe I am wrong, but in my opinion, the illness of my own sister deserves more care than having a birthday for my brother-in-law. I could not get my point through to them in case they became more annoyed with me. I could not tell them the circumstances I was in, but I felt like an outsider to them. Should I have told them my sister was sick in hospital? (Message abstracted and summarised in translation, accessed on 25 July 2003).

In general, messages on such sites tend to fuel argument and attract divergent and opinionated replies that are either tradition-oriented or focused on the individual. One of the former type of reply reads:

> I am sorry to hear your case. It was wise of you not to tell them you visited your own family member on your in-laws' family occasion. If you had told them, thinking to gain approval, you would have probably poured gasoline on the fire. Your mother-in-law would have assumed you think of your own family first, in addition to being insubordinate and rebellious, confirming the point that you are an outsider.

The latter type reads:

> How on earth is healthy brother-in-law's birthday party more important than your sister's suffering in hospital? Anyway, they managed to shop, and it's not really your business whether it was heavy or not. You should have clearly stated earlier that you have someone ill who deserves much care from you, especially as she is someone next to your mum. If you keep things hidden like this, you will never get it off your chest and will get neurotic at some point. It is because your mother-in-law is simply not prepared to understand the daughter-in-law's position. She won't. I know that. I have been married for ten years!

In this kind of communication, to the author of the article, the website is a space outside of family in which she can feel free to talk about what she has been through and a place for her to open herself to others. Basically what the author of the article gets from reply messages is empathy from women who have had similar experiences. However, there is also uncertainty arising from this kind of data, such as "How in-depth is the material for the research topic?" and "Is the data quality of messages representative, unbiased and fulfilling as a sample?"

Identifying the challenges of internet material

The opportunities for exploring the internet as a research tool and the issue of how we actually approach the internet for research needs are not as simple as one would assume. Researchers are faced with a great deal of technology[23] and with the diversity and integration of social cultures on the internet.[24] Numbers of people provide internet input with a variety of skills and abilities, and articles on internet culture cover great ranges of communicational material. Thus it is difficult to assess the quality of material. Linguistic analysis has been a conventional research method used in both ethnography and documentary analysis, but cultural researchers face difficulty in exploring internet communication effectively by applying traditional methods. This is evident from the increasing interest in the technical aspects of research rather than in the cultural aspects.[25] Internet communication therefore has its own value and potential as in-depth data for research practice,[26] in terms of the novel circumstances presented by new technologies[27] and personally experienced information.[28] The analytical position of this research environment resonates, in general, with the contemporary debate about the inevitable ambiguity and diversity in the quality of internet articles.[29]

In order for the researcher to gain ground for cultural work and to abstract articles from among the community articles for research evidence, there are many issues within the material that the researcher has to bear in mind. First of all, the information is vast in terms of the range of topics, and it provides researchers with numerous sequential links, which can make the research process draining as well as time-consuming. Raw materials are painstakingly wide on the internet, making it hard to find relevant information; this is due to the varieties of types of article and the unpredictable quality of articles. The research procedure, at times, takes place without plan or preparation to search for a right site. Also, if the focus is on its specific aspect, the evaluation of the content of the site is usually made later, resulting in disruption to the research plan.

A lone article, furthermore, can be short in conveying a bigger cultural frame which the researcher would want to absorb for his or her thematic concerns. Thus, while an article can involve a wide variety of social features and norms, it demands that the researcher understands the context behind the story. For example, an internet article contains many non-homogeneous cultural layers, i.e. writing style, entertainment, recent news, even a simple anecdote, and social humour, which are only meaningful in the specific community. These might puzzle a researcher who is not familiar with the particular culture. Ambiguity is there too, so researchers feel that they are in touch with something ‘real’ but are unsure about its extent. In addition, while a written text can be—in fact, invariably is—produced by different individuals of different abilities and skills, researching on the internet, by definition, requires awareness of a community and of its operation and management.

The following note from a research log indicates my experience of the ineffectiveness of the research procedure:

> Looking for internet material as a medium for social communication production is awkward. The tasks and the researcher's role are not distinguished in my research, thus most procedures have been repeated ineffectively after having mulled over the task to take. Looking for sites which match Confucian ideology and searching focal points to and from community ideas seem to be like a hamster running in the cage. Also always more thinking is needed to support the evidence for backing-up my research theme of female intergenerational conflict, and for ready-made categories and subcategories of 'patriarchal Confucian ideology'.

As illustrated above, apart from the specific concerns already pointed out, the question needs to be continually asked whether the site serves its purpose (the purpose of the site), and whether it gets its message across effectively to the intended audience (the quality of the site article). In order to ensure these requirements, what is clearly needed might be a researcher's participation in the internet site. I started to participate in the community, acting like a member, rather than "staying on the veranda" to appropriate documents. What happened was: (1) I registered on several sites; (2) I enjoyed reading as many articles as possible even though an article might not be directly relevant to my research; and (3) I posted comments to articles where possible.

Participating in the group activity was helpful, particularly in developing a sense of connection to the research subjects. I got replies with appreciation from other members about my postings to existing messages. I cried about other women's sad stories and laughed together with them about a funny story. I gained a developing sense that I was part of a greater community. It was also giving me clear ideas about the limitations of engaging in this type of practice.

Additionally, this on-going participation in the site encouraged me to reflect on its value as a research tool and enabled me to find the right site to gain the right documents needed for my research. This enabled me to discern the quality of articles to study and gave an insight into the research procedure too. A further finding from researching and participating in the women's internet community was that as social norms are repeated and integrated into the communal activities, I became increasingly confident in abstracting the evidence of social and cultural concepts, and more comfortable with evaluating social norms. In this way, an internet community provided a powerful tool for me to become involved in real Korean community culture, which is essential for my research. Furthermore, the shared cultural knowledge in the women's community played an important role in this research as a window for explaining a target research context and community sentiments. This also worked in expanding my general knowledge about contemporary Korean society. At a fairly

early stage of the research, my experience as an active participant and the materials abstracted from women's stories were leading in a certain direction in delineating the tasks in the research, from detailed coverage about individual Korean women's familial life, on to more collective aspects of the 'social gaze' attached to women: such as how women interact in the family, how the roles of daughters-in-law are perceived and expectations on them are met, and how a person is perceived as acting in Korean-specific norms appropriate to the situation. Among other sources of internet articles, these community articles represent the identity of the target group and invite researchers into a forum of communication which can lead on to a focused and fruitful outcome of the research, as it naturally yields to the researcher a ground for true ethnography and a collation for discursive analysis. Different researchers may favour different approaches, and it is not possible to say that a particular approach is at all times better than others. Internet material has varied features according to the focus of the research, from examining a technical aspect to viewing language use and cultural codes for information that can shed light on useful references, such as was the case in my research.

Grounded theory and the emergence of data

The distinctive characteristics of grounded theory are based on its thematic emergence in research, which derives from data collection and the interpretation of data. This includes purposive (theoretical) sampling and memos (note-taking) throughout the data procedures. Its aim is to discover the potential theory implicit in the data through the coded material, as well as to understand the discrepancy between the existent social theory and the subject matter. As such, the ambivalence and consensus of internet cultural research identified earlier are settled down in large by the interpretive position of grounded theory and its methodological approach. Methodological applications of grounded theory and research in cybercultures are largely in harmony, whereby the grounded theory approach is briefly defined as the 'emergence of theory', and its approach endeavours to gain an emergent theme out of analytical samplings in which both methodology and theory evolve.

Historically, researches in the social sciences have been informed by knowledge and assumptions from the findings of the natural sciences. As a result, non-quantifiable research methods and findings have been regarded as a weaker option among the available methods of social science research. This view has been challenged by the grounded theory approach, especially in the areas that focus on interpretive and contextual approaches to social phenomena. The grounded theory approach certifies that objectivist science and quantitative methods are insufficient to perform these tasks. It is not because these modes of inquiry are flawed, but because they

advocate views of the world that do not value the study of situated and emergent social phenomena.[30]

The 'grounded theory' approach is understood by its focus on the interpretation of data and on being responsive to the situation in which the research develops. Its methodology was first introduced by Glaser and Strauss (1967) with their collaborative work titled *Awareness of Dying* (1965). It was developed in 'the research situation' of qualitative research method, and has been applied as a methodological guidance extensively from ethnographic studies to psychological research methods. Its value as a research mode has been recognised as providing assistance in developing ideas in specific observation and as making theoretical sense of social life through data analysis.[31] As such, the assumption of grounded theory is opposite to the positivist approach[32], whose discoveries are made from a preconceived hypothesis, numerical value and notions of a reality external to the observer. Thus, it is generally argued that the discovery of the 'grounded theory' method enhanced the qualitative research method in understanding both the research situation and the subject matter, with an increased chance of interpreting the research subject from the informant's experience, rather than from the presumptions and hypotheses the researcher brings about. Nevertheless, the overall outline of grounded theory indicates that the main criteria for judging the adequacy of applying the emergent 'grounded theory' to the research are about how it fits the research situation and how it works in the research.

Existing ground theorists (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Charmaz 1995) attest that this mode of enquiry can be applied to varied areas of research subjects where the methodological principle cuts across different empirical settings and questions. Nonetheless, its method is verified through the rigours of a qualitative research process (Charmaz 1995:29). For instance, data is collected from the informant's experiences, and knowledge is gained from the 'inside' of the data in achieving the theoretical development.[33] In other words, the method of enquiry in 'grounded theory' identifies the phenomenon through the research situation (Strauss and Corbin 1990:38). Its analytic categories originate from the research participants' viewpoints, together with the researcher's interpretation in the research situation and knowledge about the research subject. The focus of grounded theory is on meanings, intentions and actions of the research participant, along with the revelation of thoughts, actions and feelings within the research environment.[34] Simply, the overall principle of grounded theory is allied to the research situation and is in harmony with the research data.

In practical terms, the initial coding material is used in guiding and informing the research as to how to relate the set categories to sample data, and in specifying the conditions under which they are linked to each other. Subsequent codes emerge from further sampling of the main data set in which categories relate to each other. The codes are applied back to the 'narrowed-down data set' in which the sampling for

the research is to be confirmed until different types of data are exhausted and sifted into theoretical sampling.[35] The whole procedure of analysis is based on the on-going process of coding, as illustrated in the diagram below.

Diagram 1: The on-going procedure of data analysis based on grounded theory

Turning towards positive aspects of internet culture

What Hine (2000) terms "standing on the veranda" originally meant the untenable position of a researcher who appropriates material without real engagement in the discourse with the research participant. In my research, however, I have re-conceptualised the term positively as 'searching thoroughly' with more detailed exploration on the research topics raised in the material and closer attention to the cultural specifics.

Likewise, the principles behind internet research is to set out on the emerging data and to delve into neglected and avoided aspects of social interaction, directly conveying the research subject's account. In consequence, these internet sources might not perfectly harmonise with other established research principles such as those of Stern (1999), Kendall (1999) and Mitra and Cohen (1999). Therefore, a novel application of the research method needs to be found in relation to this aspect, being atypical in eliciting the cultural aspects of internet data throughout the processes of data collection, coding and data analysis.

Arguably, articles from the internet community provide researchers with advanced forms of understanding of human communication and interaction. Internet articles, moreover, have a natural capability to yield thematic illustrations, along with the micro-level experiences of subjects in in-depth discussion. Such debate may lead to a rich production of data,[36] within a mode of communication in which message posters

put across their views in a natural way without being constrained by the common conversational feature of speech[37] and in which the informant carries and contains forms of implicit values and norms in the communication.[38] Internet community articles are meant for a communicational purpose and are accessed by lay persons; they are neither exclusive to researchers nor a research monopoly, and among other types of articles, they are more likely to highlight the communicative aspects of the internet. In line with this position, Stern (1999:257–82) offers a vision of internet material in terms of collectively cultural material, calling for the researcher to conceptualise it from the context in which it is developed and used. Rheingold (2000: xxviii) suggests that "looking for a group's collective items is a way of looking for the elements that bind isolated individuals into community."

Participant observation in computer-medated communication

The resemblance or dissimilarity of internet communication to real society is controversial among scholars,[39] but the general agreement in the dispute is that internet communication is shared in more than a series of fragmented social accounts among its users[40] and in particular in emotional support, companionship, advice and information.[41] The newer communication has opened a channel for participants to perceive their private lives in a public environment. The boundaries between local and global, between private and public, between reality and virtuality have become blurred.

However, in terms of research material, the internet is an advantage for cultural researchers whose research is based on 'participant observation',[42] for intense discussions of the topic and closer views to real-life situations in which information is shared among the general public.[43] Whilst being a public medium, cyber communication also provides researchers with additional opportunities to delve into the background knowledge of the subject and into informants' reasoning behind the story from the text.[44] The indisputable aspect of internet texts is found from the internet forum, which naturally yields a research situation with sensitive topics emanating from the research subject, of a nature not found before from other forms of research data.[45] As Rheingold (1993:5, cited in Mactaggart 2003) defines them, virtual communities are "social aggregations that emerge from the Net when enough people carry on those public discussions long enough, with sufficient human feeling, to form webs of personal relationships in cyberspace." This represents the capability of internet data to research social interaction and its thematic representation.

In line with this, the constraints in survey research methods (i.e. interview and questionnaire) are outlined in Robson (1999:232–3) and Bryman (2001:108), in terms of their disadvantages when applied as a research practice to a latent and sensitive research subject. Such arguments are based on the fact that information from the

survey research is subject to research variables; for example, the types of questions that are asked by the interviewer, the way a question is worded, misunderstanding on the part of the interviewee about the question, memory problems on the part of the interviewee, and the way the information is recorded by the interviewer (Bryman 2001:109). Constraints, particularly in face-to-face interviews, are to do with the informant's socialised behaviour or consciousness, which can emerge over sensitive issues. Personal factors occurring unexpectedly in the dynamics of the research environment also limit the research findings. Such inadequacies might play a role in producing only partial rather than full information.[46]

Observation of ethics in internet research

A further point regarding controversy in the use of internet data falls on the ethical issue. There is an imminent anxiety among academics of internet culture in relation to ethics, such as obtaining consent from the data subject, confidentiality, fair data processing and netiquette. These concerns are relevant to every internet research subject and need to be dealt with at the outset of the research. Any matters related to the privacy of informants need to be protected in order to uphold the dignity of the individuals who are represented in the study and where the findings affect others' emotional and physical well-being.

However, in CMC, the content of the (personal) data is for public reading, and nickname use is the convention in such sites. Data from bulletin boards are intended for public reading, in which people posting the articles do not have an expectation of privacy. Any sensitive commentaries and articles posted are meant to be discussed within the wider public arena, unless the principle governing the site states that the article is to be read exclusively by the members only and has been systematically set up as such. Nonetheless, for most public sites, exchanging ideas with a wider social audience is common. Therefore, such an open discussion leads others to react with similar sentiments, and arguably in return makes a successful site for the internet forum and eventually to a rich source of research data.

As indicated in Sharf (1999:252), the emphasis on research intervention, such as gaining informed consent or the statement of 'participant risk' made on the research sites,[47] might affect the production of natural data, resulting in a reduction in the amount and quality of data, as it can potentially discourage the genuine expression of ideas and feelings of the informant [48] if they are aware that their communications are being monitored and there is a potential hazard from being involved in the research.

Accordingly, in order to gain such data based on in-depth discussion, and at the same time to be free from accusations of wrong-doing in dealing with internet data, the following needs to be born in mind among researchers. Firstly, the samples are to be taken from an anonymously posted message with a nickname allowing informants

to retain their privacy. This rule is also to be observed for the data extracted from public sites such as message boards and column sites, which contain numerous reply/posted commentaries from the general public. In this way, having the references and utilising articles cause least offence to the informants. Secondly, where the sampled data reveal latent feelings and private incidents, personal information is not to be displayed in the research publication. Lastly, if it is necessary to keep personal data, informants are to be asked specifically if sensitive data could be kept for the research project. In this case, 'informed consent' or 'permission' is to be gained through emailing to the informants, in order to incorporate any necessary personal data prior to conducting and publishing the research.[49] A database of email addresses for research back-up is to be maintained for further enquiry.[50]

Searching for community articles

Community culture on the internet can be a particularly valuable tool in facilitating cultural specifics that can bring researchers into purposeful contact with members of their target society. Such contact brings the researcher into contexts with other people at many levels, exposes him or her directly to the issues of the research theme and sensitises him or her to the types of communication interacted in the community group. Every internet community has a definition of its purpose, has a fixed role for the site and introduces relevant documentation. These emphasise the thematic aspect and discursive analysis of the research and also mean that the researcher can pay greater attention to the social features on the internet community, such as cultural ideas and social norms, often regarded as less significant and rather difficult to deal with. For instance, in my research, the initial search for women's communication was made from three major web sites: 'Daum', and two women's-issue sites,[51] all three in general aimed at women, with a greater focus on women-related topics. The experiences discussed on women's sites are mostly in the style of message boards, column and discussion groups. In particular, column and message board articles were the main focus of this study among various types of internet articles such as web news, chat rooms and personal homepages.

A critical view in researching cyber cultures

The points illustrated above lead us to consider the value of internet material as data for cultural research. Nonetheless, research design and methods of cybercultures also have drawbacks. In this section an attempt is made to evaluate some of the criticisms that might be directed against the design and methods employed in cultural research on the internet. Four broad areas of uncertainty are identified.

Firstly, the ambiguity of internet discourse is identified where the research

defines internet discourse as a specific cultural product to study. Although there are well documented claims about the social construction of internet communication and the interconnectedness between individual discourse and collective culture, in which individuals come together in the name of an internet community,[52] the internet community per se stands for the complex web of different individuals. The criticism might rest on the inability to clarify each posted article as representing community culture instead of an individual case. Therefore, when cultural aspects and communicational elements interrelate in a particular way, it is the connection that internet cultural researches should demonstrate in terms of its materialistic merit. The elicitation of cultural information through the analysis of linkages between the set of data and social phenomena might be an ideal study to which grounded theory could readily be applied, whereby the discourse within the internet community readily yields the culture the researcher is looking for. However, in order to approach the data that contain adequate samplings leading to a certain validity, researchers need to exhaust the universe of all data that exist.

Secondly, the possible accusation of data appropriation is identified in relation to internet data. Such an accusation would be made against the researcher who is not engaged in a natural conversation with the research subjects. The researcher can fall into the pitfall of collecting data that is only representative and appropriate for the data 'analysis' and thus of ultimately undermining what value and uniqueness the internet resource might present. As a result, he or she might inadvertently fix the data around the approval of dominant paradigms and on to existing research methods rather than focusing on extracting the data's own unique values.[53]

Thirdly, within this research setting, a critique might be made of the truthfulness of the information contained in the sample articles, which relates to a further question about samples taken on one sector of the internet generation.[54] This also concerns the overall representativeness of the data, since the data selection might lead to the consequent bias in the information,[55] as evident in internet usage in Korea. In this event, the researcher will tend to interpret only the information of persons who gain access to the CMC environment, while other and possibly more valid data exist in reality (as opposed to the virtual reality or articles represented in favour of one side). In particular, this will be the case where the sample articles provide subjective accounts in the sample. This position is legitimate according to the grounded theory approach, in which the emphasis is on the definition of properties and categories that have emerged rather than being the product of a pre-determined sampling strategy. Decision-making in the data analysis should be made through the researcher's full awareness of the research subject and by way of realising the data in terms of research themes. Furthermore, where the internet data are essential, the researcher will need to be open to multiple or different interpretations. Such necessities include approaches towards data that lead to a certain validity and the bigger cultural frame

and thus subsequently attain an impartial sampling in the research. As such, while the interpretation is claimed as valid, its account is yet to be explicated.

Finally, the cultural meaning in the discourse needs to be convincing. This is because internet communication discourses are produced by the symbolic meaning of written languages. The unobservable and underlying structures that compose the target culture exist within linguistic use. It is no less true in internet discourse that language use is a crucial element in shaping and measuring culture in a society.[56] Cultural studies cannot be adequately analysed without linguistic understanding of the target culture.[57] What people think about, their beliefs, their opinions and the consequent actions they have taken and are contemplating, are conveyed through the symbolic meaning of the specific language. It is the reason that many studies have investigated stereotypical representations of research subjects in print media and in films, in which language, both vocabulary and linguistic usage, defines and confines the research subject.[58]

Specifically, the honorific expression of politeness which is an outward demonstration of hierarchy in relationships, is prominent in certain languages like Korean. Accordingly, the analytic reference to 'politeness language use' is also necessary when research is based upon subtle human interactions. Linguistic usage will vary in relation to the closeness or distance of the relationship between interlocutors, one's relevant position to others and what the socially acceptable verbal uses are.[59] However, the presence of a specific structure in the linguistic paradigm means that applying linguistic analysis to internet articles is inevitably tentative.[60] In order to categorise items, inference and interpretation out of the situational background is inevitably required in order to obtain valid information in research.[61] The reliability rate, if not validity, is lowered when the researcher intervenes too much with her own interpretation. The background to an event or situation which the researcher catches and interprets might affect the base for objective data. Thus, it is difficult to shake off the assumption that in such a research setting, the success of the research largely depends on the researcher who deals with the data.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to discuss the viability of internet data in research, outlining their cultural manifestation in computer-mediated communication. It has argued for a broad view to be taken of internet material from cultural[62] perspectives in order to assess the methodological approach to research.

Grounded theory was also discussed to suggest a methodological approach in relation to collecting, coding and analysing internet data. However, the adoption of the grounded theory approach alone would not cover all necessary accounts of internet cultural research. The golden rule for researching cyber cultures is to take

data in the thematic representation which might have been veiled and minimised in social research conventions, and would therefore have not been accessible in the ordinary communicational discourse (Charmaz 1995:30). In relation to researching cyber cultures, Sterne (1999:276) stresses that "Internet research in general needs to be further integrated with research on other related phenomena. Cultural studies should apply its collective wisdom to the construction of the Internet as an object of research rather than continuing to abstract the Internet from the media environment of which it is a part."

As Sterne suggests, in order to implement cultural study on the internet, computer-mediated communication might require methodological flexibility from researchers in dealing with internet articles, as well as decoding them in a balanced way regarding the subject in which the social discourses surrounding the objects are encoded.[63] In this way, the internet will gain in verification and importance as a social research field, with 'electronic communication' recognised as a modern form of social discourse. While the best approach is related to the appropriateness of the research theme, the question of internet material is probably less about how fine the resources are; rather it is about how the researcher relates the diversity of the materials to the thematic concerns. This presupposes that researchers define their needs and select resources accordingly. It further presupposes that they need to monitor the effectiveness of their research procedures and adapt their methods if necessary.

From the panoply of internet resources, it is the researchers who go out and mine the treasure out of it with all the supporting evidence in order to achieve the realisation of their task. Although different insights apply to the different selections of research practices, any research material can only be used productively if it fits into the research theme and with key tasks organised around the theme.

In conclusion, a successful way forward in approaching internet material might rest on the realisation of thematic representation in the data. Realisation of the research will depend, furthermore, on the sensitivity of the researcher who deals with the data in such a way that he or she convinces readers of his or her thesis.

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Notes

1. Sharf 1999; Mann and Stewart 2000:39–62.
2. Sterne 1999; Smith and Kollock 1999. Jonathan Sterne (1999) puts forward a number of points in relation to cultural studies on the internet. In particular, he emphasises the meaningful representation of culture on the internet discourse which is realised through textual analysis (*ibid*:260–82). He maintains that internet mediated communication needs to be explored in order to have textual representation of social culture in the internet medium.

3. Sosnoski, 1999.
4. Mitra and Cohen 1999.
5. Kendall 1999; Wellman and Gulia 1999; Smith 1999; Bell 2001:chapter 5.
6. Mann and Stewart 2000.
7. Sharf 1999.
8. Balsamo 2000:272; Bell 2001:chapter 4.
9. Smith 1999.
10. Smith and Kollock 1999; Wellman and Gulia 1999; Miller and Slater 2000.
11. Miller and Slater 2000; Rheingold 2000.
12. Kendall 1999; Sharf 1999; Bell 2000.
13. Abstracted from junjashinmun (1/7); http://www.internetnews.com/bus-bews/articles.php/871421, accessed on 27 October 2003.
14. This publication (White Paper on Internet Korea 2003) reports that in December 2002, the number of internet users had reached 26.27 million.
15. Bell 2001; Smith and Kollock 1999.
16. Bryman 1993:1558.
17. Bell 2001; Sterne 1999; Smith and Kollock 1999.
18. Bryman 2001:383; Charmaz 1995.
19. Bryman 2001:383.
20. Bryman 2001:382–3.
21. Mitra and Cohen 1999; Kendall 1999; Sosnoski 1999.
22. In my research, some participants, when asked, were willing to contact me through personal email contacts. I have a database of email addresses for research back-up.
23. Reid 1999; Bell 2001; Wise 1997.
24. Smith and Kollock 1999; Rheingold 2000.
25. Bell 2001.
26. Sterne 1999; Kendall 1999.
27. Bell 2001.
28. Sharf 1999.
29. Bell 2001:chapter 9; Mitra and Cohen 1999.
30. Lindolf 1995:22.
31. Charmaz 1983,1995; Glaser and Strauss 1967.
32. The hypo-deductive positivist approaches aim to explain the research subject's 'outside world' and reduces qualities of human experience to quantifiable variables, largely relying on the observer's concerns and the research participants' behaviour, with all the logic and objectivity of a scientific tool. Such methods were claimed to be short of providing the basis for theory building (Charmaz, 1995).

33. Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990.
34. Charmaz 1995.
35. Glaser and Strauss 1967.
36. Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990; Strauss 1998; Charmaz 1995.
37. Brown and Levinson 1987.
38. Rheingold 2000; Wellman and Gulia 1999; Reid 1999.
39. Wellman and Gulia 1999; Smith 1999; Bell 2001:chapter 5.
40. Wellman and Gulia 1999.
41. Wellman and Gulia 1999:173; Kerr 1982.
42. Kendall 1999.
43. Wellman and Gulia 1999; Reid 1999.
44. Sosnoski 1999.
45. Bell 2001:chapter 9; Mitra and Cohen 1999:186–189; Sosnoski 1999.
46. Denzin 1999; Robson 1999:229.
47. Mann and Stewart 2000.
48. This aspect was no less true in the sites adopted in my research, because after announcing my research intrusion and the definitions of the objects of my research, several message posters were alienated from further involvement. My action subsequently had the effect of disrupting the natural flow in the communication. In the long run, therefore, such announcements could undermine the original function of personal discourse and the information shared among the internet community which has made internet research possible (Sharf 1999). For example, I contacted research informants in the sample articles in my research by email and asked if they agreed to their contributions to the forums being used as part of my research findings. The reason for this was my gesture as a researcher to be open with the informants, as the research follow-up might cause worries for those who had posted messages related to their own family members in such a public forum. Nonetheless, my intervention must have made the message posters hesitant. In general, posting messages are only open to members in such community sites. This is not to say that membership is exclusively for women only. On occasions male members' articles are also shown on the women's site in relation to women's issues. My action further suggests to women that their articles can be read by anybody and be potentially identified by their close circles, including other family members and their husbands. For instance, it is not a rare sight to spot an article on the bulletin board which is deleted later by the person who originally posted the message, resulting in the original content being removed while titles of the messages and replies to it still exist.
49. Sharf 1999.
50. Occasionally, members do get acquainted after reading each other's posted stories. However, a distinct line is drawn between people, resulting in two levels of contact, i.e. the publicly accessed message and personal contact by emailing.
51. http://daum.net, http://miztalk.daum.net/ and http://miclub.com/. http://daum.net is the most popular website for Korean net surfers.

52. Slevin 2000; Wellman and Gulia 1999.
53. Bell, 2001:chapter 9.
54. Mann and Stewart 2000:196.
55. Wise 1997; Mann and Stewart 2000:201; Silverman 2000:54–60.
56. Hodge and Kress 1988.
57. Brown and Levinson 1987.
58. Kuhn 1995.
59. Brown and Levinson 1987.
60. Gurevitch *et al*.,1988.
61. Robson 1993:276.
62. Internet use not only reflects an individual level, but also shows cultural notions of the individual in society, i.e. familial duties and expectations of familial life will be different according to the society and will reflect in a different way.
63. Hall *et al*.1980.

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DOMESTICATING COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES IN KOREAN FAMILIES

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Introduction

In recent media discourse in the Republic of Korea (Korea hereafter), new technology has been frequently equated with the loss of local identity in favour of an individualised mode of communication. In media representation, young people in particular tend to be described as moving rapidly out of a family-oriented social framework, assumed to be essential to Korean identity.[1] However, empirical evidence provided in cultural studies of youth and technology shows a different aspect. Indeed, it has been demonstrated in those studies (e.g. Facer *et al*. 2003; Holloway and Valentine 2003; Yoon 2003a), both in Korea and elsewhere, that most forms of technology are embedded within household and family contexts, rather than being consumed completely individually. In addition, such studies argue that the home has increasingly become the central place of youth culture, because of young people's extended period of dependency, and therefore of the provision of more material resources by the family than ever before.[2] In this regard, it is significant to keep in mind that technologies are incorporated into the 'moral economy' of the household, "operating according to moral and economic values more or less distinct from the dominant sets of public values."[3] This theorisation of technology in the process of 'domestication'[4] suggests that the internal dynamics of households are differentiated according to gender, generation and social class.

This study examines how young Koreans engage in the environment of 'new' and 'old' communication technologies, including the home computer, the domestic telephone and the mobile phone. In particular, it explores the way in which traditional norms and the material conditions of the family affect young people's access to, and ways of using, communication technologies and how power relations in terms of gender and generation are re-articulated in the domestication of communication

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technologies. The data used in this article were generated from qualitative research in Seoul, based on in-depth interviews conducted in 2002 with 33 young people aged 16–17, on a one-to-one basis or in small groups. The sample was collected in the urban middle-class area on the south bank of the Han river and among lower-middle-class families on the north bank.

The family and communication in the Korean context

Despite the nation's rapid urbanisation and subsequent changes in family structures, family-oriented society still remains crucial in every aspect of Korean everyday life. Indeed, while modernisation has resulted in the nuclear family becoming the most common form of household (82 per cent in 2000),[5] the majority of Korean nuclear families remain closely bound to extended familial networks.[6]

In the present study, the role of familial norms in young Koreans' everyday lives was noticeable, with the identification of an individual with his or her family in Korean society appearing in my respondents' narratives. Young people in the study noted that they were often being evaluated in public places not as individuals but as 'the property' of their family:[7]

> If old women or middle-aged women with heavy bags get on the bus, we think we had better give our seat to them. But some old people get angry and lose patience before I have even offered them my seat. Then I feel upset … They tend to say, "You, student! How dare you sit when there is an old person carrying heavy bags in front of you … What sort of family are you from?" It is really annoying. It hurts me when they criticise my parents rather than me. They always say, "You are badly educated! Where were you brought up?" (*North Bank female 10*, 16 years old)

It was also apparent in my research, as in the excerpt below, that young people themselves internalised this family-oriented value in that they perceived the family to be an indivisible extension of the self.

> Sometimes kids call their mum "that woman" without calling her "my Mum". I can't stand it when they talk like that. They even say, "Why is my Grandma [living in the same house] living so long!" when they are told off by their grandma. I am easily upset about these peers and I often argue with them about this … I am generally liberal, but, you know, I really hate someone who does not do what we should do.
>
> (*South Bank female 07*, 17 years old)

As such, criticising other family members was regarded as taboo, since the family was embodied as an extension of the self for many of my interviewees.

Interviewees also described the family not only as a place of emotional bonding but also as a place of material resources shared between the family members. The

sharing of resources within the family appeared evident in the use of physical rooms and of communication technologies, amongst other things. Above all, for most informants, especially those from the North Bank, home did not generally provide much personal space:

> My room is a section of my parents' room … [giggling a little bit as if he feels ashamed] … so, there is no question of any privacy [since I know my family cannot afford another room for me]. (*North Bank male 07*, 17 years old)

It should be noted that such physical restrictions as a lack of personal bedroom space are often combined with the cultural adherence to familism, militating against the establishment of clear personal boundaries in the home. For this reason, it was common for the respondents' parents to go into their children's rooms without warning. In the case of many respondents, a young person's room was normally open to other family members, such as parents and siblings, even without the young person's permission. Many of my respondents noted unclear boundaries between family members in terms of space in the home, but it seemed to be evident that the boundaries were applied differently to male and female:

> My Mum, Dad and elder brother don't knock on my door when they come in. But my Mum and Dad knock on my older brother's room. I don't know why. Maybe because he is a man, or because he is older than me. (*North Bank female 05*, 16 years old)

This implies that, although in previous youth studies the home has been considered as the place of girls' bedroom culture,[8] in contrast with boys' outdoor culture, boys tend in fact to occupy and control more physical space than girls in the home.[9] However, many young Koreans in addition did not have a clear sense of the possibility of the personal possession of space in the home. Several informants supposed that this vague boundary between members meant a sense of familial harmony and affection.

The restriction on personal space in the home also influenced access to communication technologies and therefore communication itself. In particular, access to, and the use of, the home computer, the telephone and the mobile phone were incorporated into the power structure of age and gender in the family, as discussed in the following sections.

The home computer

In my field study, as of 2002, it was common, with some exceptions on the South Bank, that families had a computer rather than allowing members to have individual computers. In most families, access to the home computer was likely to be managed and mediated by parents, and was fought over with siblings. In this process, the age and gender of individual family member played a significant role. This may be

similar to what a number of previous empirical studies (e.g. Lohan 2000; Na 2001) have shown: that there are significant differences in accessibility and use patterns of the home computer in terms of gender. In particular, Na (2001) has pointed out that in Korean families, access to a computer in the home has a certain hierarchy which generally consists of a chain from the father to the children and then to the mother, in terms of gender as well as age.

A home computer tended to be shared by family members, so that young people were in a position where they had to compete for access with mainly the father or siblings. This was reported by informants in the North Bank, or those having one or more siblings. For example, one informant, who shares a computer as well as a room with his younger brother, stated that sharing the computer had repeatedly resulted in tensions between them:

> It is not funny for us [the informant and his younger brother] to argue about going on the Internet. We each say, "I will go first. It won't take long." Always something like that. We have only one home computer and both tend to use it in the evening. It may be one reason why our relationship has recently been getting very much worse.
>
> (*North Bank male 06*, 17 years old)

In several cases in the North Bank sample, the lack of material resources discouraged young women from developing their interest in technology; the relatively restricted access to the home computer influenced young women's interests and literacy:

> I cannot actually use the home computer in my home very often because of my older brother! He always uses it … So, I am not interested in the computer any more … I use it only when my older brother is watching TV. (*North Bank female 02*, 17 years old)

It was frequently the case that an older, male child was given priority in the use of, and more individual access to, the use of a home computer, demonstrating how the practice of the sharing of resources operates within the strictures of an age and gender hierarchy within the family. That is, although the family was perceived as a place of affection and attachment, actual resources provided to each of the members were different, constructing gendered identities.

Eligibility to access a computer outside the home is also related to young people's gendered use of the computer. At least at the early stage of using a computer, there were some differences related to the user's gender in the area of leisure activities via the computer on which young people spent much time. While gaming was the main activity only for boys, chatting was one of the main activities for both girls and boys. These differences seemed to derive from peer-influences, which were likely to be gendered; information about the game, and the software itself, were often circulated only between boys. Indeed, for some male interviewees, a computer game, especially

an interactive game, played via the internet, meant having a pleasant time with their friends, rather than only being excited about the game itself. This implies that the different patterns of internet use are related to the fact that young men are allowed greater access to a computer outside the home (such as in an internet café) as well as in the home, while females are more likely to use it only in the home. Contrary to the stereotyping in previous studies[10] of players of computer gamer as young males, my field study shows that a certain content of technologies is not naturally gendered but is influenced by social context.[11]

While young people's access to the computer showed a familial power structure in terms of gender, age hierarchy in the family appears to be strong in parental control over the children's use of the computer. I found that young people constantly had to negotiate parental control over use of the home computer, a control that derives from the parents' awareness of the discrepancy between the initial motive for purchasing the home computer—education and actual uses—entertainment. Although the initial motive for purchasing a home computer was children's education, as time went on, it turned out in most families that the children used the computer not only for learning activities but also for other purposes such as gaming and chatting.

Young people's use of the home computer in general, with the exception of learning-related uses, brought about parents' concerns. Parents' worries led to control over the children's use of the computer in the home. In particular, in my respondents' narratives, parental supervision of children's use of the home computer was frequently described as a gendered activity. Technology-literate parents, often fathers rather than mothers, were inclined to control their children's use in subtler ways, while technology-illiterate parents were likely to focus more on the control of the time used:

> I cannot use the computer properly at the moment. I can only check my emails under the supervision of my Dad. The computer is in my parent's room and a password is necessary to access it [but only my father knows the password].
>
> (*South Bank female 08*, 17 years old)

> I used to do internet chatting a lot. But my Mum considers my chatting to be a terrible thing. She says "I have watched a TV programme and they said chatting was not a good thing. Don't do that", something like that. (*South Bank female 09*, 16 years old)

In the excerpts above, the informant described the mother as a person with a kind of technology-phobia, acting on the basis of uncertain knowledge from the media, while the father was literate enough to restrict the children's use by controlling the computer itself. Young people's description of their parents' supervision reflects the dominant representation of the computer as a masculine technology in Korea.[12]

To summarise, as young people adopt the home computer in competition with

other family members and negotiate parental control, the computer seemed to be incorporated with gendered and aged relations of power in the family.

The home telephone

Young people's access to the home telephone, in comparison with access to the home computer, was limited and mediated more directly by parents. This was due to the fact that, for North Bank respondents in particular, the home telephone was frequently used by parents and located in the living room or parents' room rather than in a child's room. Although most families had more than one home telephone, sharing one or two phone number(s), the handsets were not sufficiently allocated to all the family members. Some female respondents, not having their own home handset in their room, stated that their male sibling had a home telephone (although he had a mobile phone as well).

> I am not very happy with the fact that there are lots of good things in my younger brother's room. He has everything, the computer, the telephone, and so on. It may be because he's boy and I am a girl? (*South Bank female 02*, 17 years old)

In most cases, the home phone was located in the living room and parents' room first and then the older male child's room. For this reason, the use of the domestic telephone by many young people had to be mediated by family members. Parents tended to instruct their children not to make many phone calls on the home telephone, with the mother in general, and housewife mother in particular, controlled the children's use of the telephone. As previous studies (Frissen 1995: 85) have shown, women are frequently in a position to be 'operators' in the household's appropriation of the home telephone. In my study, it was also the case that mothers played the role of an operator for calls on the home telephone. In particular, in some families, the father did not answer the home telephone, even when he was near the telephone, so that other family members had to answer.

> My Dad is kind of patriarchal. He likes to show his authority. For example, even if the telephone rings just in front of him, he does not answer it if anyone is in the house. So, others have to respond. Unless my Mum picks up the phone, I have to go and do it.
> (*South Bank male 03*, 17 years old)

This comment suggests that someone's role as an 'operator' in the use of the home telephone is related to a division of labour by gender and age in the family. In particular, as a result of a hierarchy of power according to the gender, in the first instance, 'operating' the external to the internal is offered to women as a domestic labour which men are not supposed to do. However, it should be noted here that, while the telephone is often considered women's technology,[13] young women in my study,

in contrast to their mothers, had relatively limited access to the 'feminine' device. This may be because the Confucian habits in Korean families position young people as part of the family on the basis of the structure of gender and age; within the same gender, age hierarchy seems to play a role in prohibiting young women from accessing the domestic telephone. In controlling the children's use of the phone, the role of the mother as an operator implies her management of domestic power especially within the boundary of activities such as disciplining children. In comparison with the use of the home computer, housewife mothers are likely to play 'manager', strengthening their control over the children in their use of the home telephone. For instance, some mothers hid from their children the fact that a phone call had come for them during exam time.

In my study, it appeared that parental control inhibited young people's use of the home telephone to a considerable extent. Most respondents were reluctant to make a call to their friends' home telephone because of parental mediation. They claimed that they were unwilling to have a conversation with their friends' parents, either via the telephone or in person.

> *Interviewer*: Do your friends call your house to contact you?
> *South Bank male 02* (17 years old): No. But they may call my mobile phone and then, if I let them know that I can answer the home phone myself, they call me again on that one.
> *Interviewer*: Do you call your friends at home?
> *South Bank male 02*: No, because someone else [family members] may answer; [so I call my friends on their mobile phone] because the mobile phone lets me talk to my friends directly.

Because personal communication via the home telephone was interrupted by parents (their own and their friends'), young people preferred to use their mobile phones: "How can my friends call me if I don't have my mobile phone? Do you believe they can call my house? They will *never, never* do that!" (*North Bank female 08*, 17 years old). This implies that the familial use of the home telephone in families does not simply enhance familial bonding as previous studies have suggested,[14] since existing power relations are involved in the management of the home telephone.

Such familial mediation and control of the telephone may lead young people to have "a powerful desire to have technology that is personalized" (Lally 2003:165). Indeed, my respondents considered the mobile phone particularly useful for its role in reducing interruptions to personal communication by family members. As Ling and Yttri (2002:152) have argued, the mobile phone can provide young people with "the advantage of being outside the purview of authority figures". Personal ownership of mobile telephones can also be an alternative to familial competition for communal resources.[15]

The mobile phone

While young Koreans' initial motivation for ownership of the mobile phone is usually the quest for an individual communication tool, the actual use of the mobile is not entirely individual but is affected by the family in many ways. That is, the mobile phone is contextualised within family relations, although it is often used outside the household.

It became clear in my field study that, because of young people's financial dependence on their parents, the role of the family in their use of the mobile phone was apparent from the beginning of ownership. In the current research, parents bought the first phone for young people, in most cases, as a middle school graduation gift at the age of 15–16; otherwise, it was passed down from other family members as a second-hand phone. In addition, the respondents had their phone bills paid by their parents. As well as financial factors, cultural norms influence young people's ownership patterns. For example, a few respondents had tried to purchase and manage their own mobile phone by saving their pocket money, without their parents helping or even noticing. However, such attempts turned out to be unsuccessful, not only for the management of bills but also because of familial norms:

> When I bought my mobile for the first time, which was in final year of middle school [15 years old], I did not tell my Mum and Dad. I didn't feel I had to because I bought the mobile and managed it on my own. I saved my pocket money for that … I kept its use secret. But one day my Mum found out … My Mum said, "It's very rude behaviour to decide such a thing on your own. Stop using it!" So I had to stop. Then, a year later, when I entered high school [16 years old], I asked my Mum to buy me a mobile again. She said "Yes", so I had one. (*South Bank female 07*, 17 years old)

The implication in this excerpt is that access to, and the purchase of, their own mobile phone depends strongly on the parents' decision as to whether or not the child has the ability to manage his or her own mobile. Thus, mobile phone use without consulting parents is considered a break in familial norms, because a young person's ownership of a personal mobile phone means social recognition of their transition into a later stage of adolescence.

The importance of familial norms is also seen in the process of using the mobile phone following purchase. While the use of the mobile phone between peers appeared to be popular among my informants, their frequent communication with family members by text-messaging and calling also strengthened young people's family-oriented social activity. For most informants, calls and messages from parents were still more important than calls from other people, although they could be perceived as parental control: "I need to pick up my Mum's call. I knew it would be more important than the others." (*North Bank male 01*, 17 years old)

In this process of re-articulating social and psychological relationships via

telecommunication, young people's dependence on the family even outside the home is likely to increase more than ever before. Many informants tended to contact their parents immediately (especially mothers) whenever they needed any emotional help:

> My class teacher was a kind of old fox … who is very prejudiced and treated me harshly. I never really got used to her. She really hated me. She kept hating me. One day in school, I called my Mum, saying, "I don't want to attend this school. I hate this school."
>
> (*North Bank female 03*, 16 years old)

For some respondents, the mobile phone was used to increase security by being in touch with their family whenever they wanted. This increased emotional dependency may limit young people's involvement in an expanded scale of sociality. As the Sussex Technology Group (2001) has suggested, enhanced physical mobility via the mobile phone can result in "a lessening internal or psychological mobility".

It is the case that familial bonding strengthened via mobile communications re-articulates gender relations. Above all, I found significant gender differences in the ways of parenting via mobile phones. On the whole, keeping track of the child via mobile communication tends to be done by the mother, whilst the father is somewhat ignorant of the details. It appeared that the mother's role as 'manager' in the home was extended outside the home as far as her parenting via the mobile phone was concerned. In addition, the familial contact via the mobile phone leads young people to construct gendered identities as different rules are applied to children according to gender. Girls were more often instructed to speak quietly or to speak in specific ways on the phone by parents, especially by mothers. Male and older children had more freedom from parental control via mobile communication.

> *Interviewer*: Do you often have calls on your mobile from your Mum?
> *South Bank female 07* (17 years old): She calls me, saying, "Where are you?" "Why haven't you come home?" "You should know that you are still a high school *student* and a *girl*!" Something like that.

In my respondents' narratives, parents were inclined to attempt to confine daughters to the home for longer than sons. Accordingly, in mobile parenting, the time to come home was usually set differently according to a child's gender. In this process, young women were categorised by their parents (especially by their mother) as 'domestic' persons, while young men were allowed relatively free access to non-domestic locations. However, girls were not necessarily opposed to their mothers' rule. In using the mobile phone, despite being aware of the parental control, girls were more likely than boys to strengthen gender-specific solidarity with their mother. Indeed, some female informants, in comparison with male informants, noted that they kept in touch with their mother through the mobile phone more intensively than before.

> If my Dad goes for some external work, he does not come home for a while. My older brother [who is a university student] also sometimes does not come home [because he studies at his friends' house] when he prepares for term exams. Sometimes I hang out with my friends until late, which means my Mum is alone in the home all day long … She does not like such a situation very much. She is likely to say as a joke, "Why do I have to be alone? Am I a housekeeper?" (*South Bank female 07*, 17 years old)

For the respondent in this excerpt, exchanging messages with her mother had the aim of reducing her mother's loneliness. In a similar vein, other female respondents often expressed their appreciation of their mother who had devoted herself to family welfare and harmony. For them, their mother is a person 'inhibited' by familial norms: "From my viewpoint, my Mum's life seems so inhibited … The reason is that she has not been able to earn money … I think I should be a woman with the capability [to earn money]." (*North Bank female 03*, 17 years old). This underprivileged condition of women is considered to be due to the idea that women such as their mothers are not involved in paid labour and are located in the domestic sphere.[16] In this manner, young women internalise to some extent the dominant perception based on the binary division between 'public' men and 'domestic' women, while sympathising with their mother's position. There have been debates about whether communication technologies lessen the opposition between the public as a male-dominated sphere and the private as a female-oriented sphere.[17] In the current study, as shown above, the distinction was internalised and articulated by young women's use of technology.

To summarise, while it is true that young Koreans with their personal devices for communication are becoming more mobile than ever before, their increased physical mobility can be accompanied by re-articulated forms of familism. In this process of domestication, the mobile phone is constructed by, and is also constructing, certain identity positions in terms of gender and generation in the family.

Conclusions

This study has explored the role of the family, where gender and generation are articulated in the use of communication technologies. Traditional norms of family-oriented social relations are engaged in the 'moral economy' of the family, thereby familialising technologies on the basis of gender and generation. However, power relations arising out of family-oriented sociality may not necessarily mean the oppressive positioning of youth in the family. Representations of youth as victims in the use of technologies risk ignoring the active negotiation of young people in the family context. This reiterates what social studies of gender and technology are tempted to do—stereotype women as victims with no explanation of the "active practices of women themselves" (Frissen 1992:45).

In this regard, it should be noted that young people can appropriate the familial

norms as resources for affection, attachment and security. For example, in my study, the familial environment based upon traditional norms and the power structure did not mean directly the restriction of personal communication to outside the family. Many of my interviewees often considered family intervention in using communication technologies as an expression of familial affection. Therefore, it must not simply be assumed that new technology loosens traditional norms and ties. This was evident when my respondents were keen to reinforce attachment by being in constant touch with their family. Such familialising forces, which are likely to be exclusive rather than inclusive, may provide "crucial social and psychological support", while at the same time they may boost narrower social bonding rather than generate extensively social trust.[18]

The increased emotional bonding and articulated familism, viewed as exclusive social capital and accessed via communication technologies, reflect the ways in which young Koreans cope with their transition to adulthood in their "lived use of technology".[19] Young people's articulation of traditionalising forces in the family context without clearly searching for independence may echo the "mode of deferment"[20] as a strategy of coping with uncertainty and risk in their transition to adulthood.

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Notes

1. See Yoon 2003b.
2. See McNamee 1998; Mitterauer 1992.
3. Silverstone 1993:286; see also Silverstone *et al.* 1992.
4. Silverstone *et al.* 1992.
5. Korean Ministry of Culture and Tourism 2002:28–9.
6. Lee 1999.
7. See Kim 1991:112.
8. McRobbie and Garber 1976.
9. See McNamee 1998.
10. See Bryce and Rutter 2003.
11. See McNamee 1998.
12. See Na 2001.
13. See Moyal 1992.
14. Moyal 1989.

15. Haddon 2003.
16. Na 2001.
17. See Frissen 1992.
18. Putnam 1999:23.
19. See Facer *et al*. 2003:129.
20. Brannen and Nilsen 2000.

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IN THE EYE OF THE HURRICANE OF CHANGE: KOREAN CONTEMPORARY ART OF THE NEW MILLENIUM

JIYOON LEE

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Introduction

It is very difficult, if not impossible, fully to describe or highlight the art scene of any period, let alone the current period, in such a short paper, even for a small area such as the Republic of Korea (hereafter Korea). The aim of this paper is rather to provide a snapshot of the Korean contemporary art scene, in relationship to the current rapid changes that are being felt by the whole of Korean society, as seen by an art professional who has had the opportunity to live through some of the changes, as well as being allowed to be an observer to the most recent events.

Korea and Korean art in the 20th century

The half-century that followed the Japanese colonial occupation of the Korean peninsula from 1910 to 1945, a brief period of liberty, then division of the peninsula and the Korean War of 1950–53, was marked first by stuttering economic growth,

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then by a period of military dictatorship from 1963 to 1987. Authoritarian rule brought with it political stability, rapid economic growth and social changes, but also a stifling political climate and censorship. The first democratically elected president assumed office in 1988, and the Korean public was slowly introduced to the kinds of rights that are normally taken for granted in a Western democracy—freedom of speech, freedom of expression, freedom of travel. Since then, Korea has gone through an eventful period. If the socio-economic changes under the military dictatorship of Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan, rapid and substantial as they were, could be seen as planned and expected (as much as they could be planned), during the last 15 years Korea can be said to have experienced a hurricane of change, almost chaotic and unplanned**.** The vibrant economy, via gross mismanagement, went through a period of control imposed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), during which management style and methods had to change. It is said that Korea came out of IMF control in a record time. The freedom of travel granted to the general public in 1988 brought about a diaspora of people to Europe, the Americas, basically everywhere. The forcing of free market ideology on to an unprepared population during the IMF years allowed foreign companies and investors to gain a strong foothold in what was a sealed Korean economy. An increase in the number of young graduates, in combination with slowing economic growth, resulted in a high unemployment rate among young people, as well as a steady lowering of the 'retirement' age (the official retirement age remained the same, but company policies became such as to create an unfavourable attitude towards workers from their mid-forties upwards). The divorce rate increased dramatically, especially amongst those in their twenties and thirties, recently breaking the 50 per cent mark. The continuous change in the educational system brought about a mistrust of public education, resulting in the mass migration of teenagers to other countries, as well as the rapid growth of, and dependence on, extra-curricular tutorial schools. This period also saw increasing instability and corruption in the political system, which culminated in an attempt in 2004 to impeach Roh Moo-Hyun, a past lawyer and human rights activist, who when elected in 2003 was hailed as the 'people's president'.

The development of the art and cultural scene in Korea in the 20th century broadly reflected the country's history. Basically split into two main schools, art was divided between Eastern art forms, seen as more traditional, and Western art forms originally brought into Korea during the Japanese occupation period by Japanese practitioners. Western art in Korea was thus originally mediated by the Japanese. Artists such as Soo-Gun Park, KyungJa Chun, Joong-Sun Lee and Hwan-Ki Kim are recognised as the earliest practitioners of Western art in Korea. Limitations on travel, as well as geopolitical positioning, meant that the artist community, as well as the art market itself, mirrored the society of the Hermit Kingdom. Only a few artists were able to work outside Korea. The Academic School art tradition, heavily

influenced by Confucian and Buddhist philosophy and controlled by the government, was prevalent, and art was strongly self-referential in terms of visual language and topics. Furthermore, art and culture were basically seen to be limited activities for the enjoyment of the elite and the intelligentsia.

All this changed in the 1990s. The freedom of travel permitted to the general public allowed artists to travel to Europe and the United States. Since their return, they have exerted expanding influence on the Korean art scene, as well as increasing the influence of foreign art itself. Growing national affluence has resulted in a larger art market, which in turn has been able to support more artists. There has been a wider acceptance of underground art, e.g. *minjung* (People's) art, by academic and public institutions, and greater exposure of Korean art to the world in general (witness the first Korean Pavilion at the 1995 Venice Biennale). As a technophile people, Korean artists have embraced state-of-the-art technological tools and non-traditional media for creation of their work.

However, in contrast to the tools and medium they may use, the trend is emerging of subject-matter that appears to be drifting away from science and technological issues. Rather, it is moving towards the mundane, the self-referential, almost as a reaction to the technological development and rapid social changes going on around artists. Subject-matter is striving to create anchors in the whirlwind of change where nothing seems to last, seeking an area of calm, refuge, escape, dream, and to be the eye of the hurricane of change.

Art of the new millennium

The expectation of finding 'Koreanness', that is, of finding what makes Korean contemporary art Korean, comes really from an Orientalist view, in which one defines Oriental culture as something that is not of Western culture, or vice versa. Such a viewpoint, however, does not stand up when looking at the works of contemporary Korean artists. They now work beyond such scope and confront the fast changing present condition as witnesses. Their work cannot be said to hold a unique Koreanness, but still holds their own unique identity, in a global community, in the still moment of a chaotic inner circle. If anything can be said to be 'Korean' in their work, it is their obsession to find a message in it, a kind of obsession which can be found amongst Korean people in general. Some critics say that this is because of the demands of the global art establishment, which prides itself on a desire to see the third world or Asia in all of its quivering splendour-squalor. Of course, some artists deny this trend, once they have become more critical in their point of view.

Generally, one can see two current trends among artists. Firstly, they are attempting conceptually to develop traditional aesthetic values. Secondly, they are attempting to produce works that reflect reality as objectively as possible.

Table 1: Social phenomena seen in contemporary Korean society and artists' responses to them

Social phenomenon	Response by Korean contemporary artists
Loss of self-identity in a world of rapid technical and social changes	New place, new identity-making
Breakdown of traditional moral values and ethics	New value-making
Increasing breakdown and corruption of religion	Questioning and satirising religion
Increasing dependency on new technology	Increasing focus on handicrafts and 'making'
Social taboo against freedom of expression	Taboo-breaking
Increasing dependency on 'scientific' proof	Critical response to scientific proof
Breakdown of traditional women's role	New feminism

Table 1 lists some of the social phenomena seen in current Korean society and artists' responses to them. It should be noted that this list is by no means complete nor does it represent the responses of artists alone. Each item, moreover, deserves a detailed academic study on its own. More study would be required to make this list more accurate and extensive.

In the following discussion of some of the works which illustrate the responses in the right-hand column, it should, of course, be noted that most of them cannot be categorised into one section alone, as these divisions are not necessarily independent of or separate from each other.

New place, new identity-making

Nearly all modern Koreans are aware of a loss of a feeling of home, a sense of a place where they come from. In some instances, such loss is literally the case as the village or houses which they were born and raised in are physically not there any more. In other cases, this is the outcome of rapid changes that have resulted in a change of place and self to such a degree that home is not a home anymore.

Do-Ho Suh is one of the better known Korean artists in the international art

Fig. 1. Do-Ho Suh: *The Perfect House*



(a) (b)

Fig. 2. Do-Ho Suh: (a) *High School Uniform*; (b) *Someone*

scene. In 2003 he had a solo exhibition at the Serpentine Gallery in London. In his work he deals with issues such as loss of identity and loss of home. *The Perfect House***,** shown in fig. 1, is the life-size replica of Suh's studio in New York and is an elegiac rumination on a contemporary home. Hand-sewn from delicate, translucent fabric, this home appears as a luminescent box of colour and light. Every detail has been very carefully fabricated and then stitched into the weightless scrim of wall and floor. Rather than expressing a longing for a secure place, Suh's definition of the home is a perfect non-place which you can find anywhere.

His work in fig. 2 touches on the mass-identity culture of Korean society. Figs 2(a), made of now discontinued high school uniforms, and 2(b), an armour made of army dog tags, show how the social system leads to homogenisation of individual identity, hinting at the empty nature of the mass hero. This problem of man's identity in our globalised society in an age of technology and information is at the origin of our sympathy for such a passionate work.

Dream-making

A graduate of Goldsmith College and a recent entrant to the Kwangju Biennale, Yon-Du Jeong playfully attempts to create works where he acts like a film director. Merging artistic creativity and the dreams of people whom he meets, he creates a faux-version of the dream. His works show how the values of individual dreams have changed. Such dreams are not of making money or becoming a social somebody, but take, rather, a more individualistic focus. For instance, as shown in fig. 3, the dream of a girl in an icecream shop is to visit the North Pole, and the waiter's dream is to become a country singer. The artist almost becomes a film director, almost a wish-fulfilling god figure, preparing the sets and directing the person towards his dream.

Questioning and satirising religion

Atta Kim's work satirises religion as well as dismantling the framework of social stereotypes to seize the world of true liberty at the moment the body and the world come in contact with each other. In a transparent box, he has various people serving as relics in a museum: a newly wedded couple, young men and women, children, old

Fig. 3. Yon-Du Jeong: (a) *North Pole Travel*; (b) *Country Singer*

(a)

(b)

people, injured people from the Vietnam War, prostitutes and a Buddhist monk. In most cases, these models stand naked or with their hair shaven, looking straight to the camera, crouched, or sitting in the pose of Zen contemplation. These scenes, strong and provocative to the eye, linger long in our memory. Some of his religion-related photos almost seem obscene. He has always raised questions concerning the meaning of human existence. The transparent box signifies stereotypical social convention, norms and systems, material civilisation and the dominant ideology, as well as the boundary between the internal and external, the visible and invisible.

Increasing emphasis on handicrafts and 'making'

The title *Buyuhada* implies a dual meaning: drifting and wealth. The core of this work deals with the obsession with money and the absence of human value in the age of post-



Fig. 4. Atta Kim: *Museum Projects*

Fig. 5. JoonHo Jeon: *Buyuhada* (Drift and Wealth)

(a)

(b)

Fig. 6. Oh-Sang Kwon: (a) *Twins*; (b) *Death*

capitalist society. The artist projects himself in the image of Korean heritage-imbedded currency, wandering around inside the money. It is very paradoxical to find human beings who are trapped within the frame of the money, aspiring to an ideal world in the form of art. Here one assumes the work to be highly dependent on high technology, but the main part is mostly done by hand, with individual images hand-drawn and stored in a computer. Many artists seem to depend on this handcrafted, 'making'-orientated procedure, and although this seems to be a bit backward, one can see this as a reaction to the increasing dependency on technology in the everyday life of Korean society.

Oh-Sang Kwon's work also shows a seeming dependency on technology for its making. However, composed completely of photographs, his products are basically complex, three-dimensional origami composed of hundreds of photographs, heavily dependent on handicraft and 'making'. His works not only break down the division between the genres of sculpture and photograph, but also of science and art, as he 'clones' his friends over and over again, using copies of photographs.

Taboo breaking

Freedom of expression, freedom of speech: although in political rhetoric and social theory they were easy to say, in actual practice, going against mass culture, social prejudice and peer pressure turned out to be more difficult than was originally thought. People confronting this wall basically conformed, or left the country, or

Fig. 7. Inhwan Oh: *Where a Man Meets a Man in Seoul*

became social pariahs by breaking these taboos. *Where a man meets a man in Seoul* is an installation work by Inhwan Oh, who attempts to project his own integrity whilst commenting on the nature of homosexual relationships. The words appearing closely together on the ground are written in powdered incense, and the incense is slowly burning. Negatively predisposed as Korean society is toward homosexuality, by featuring the gay community he projects into the work a hitherto hidden confidence, in effect 'coming out' through its presentation. As the incense burns, the names associated with the closed-off, hidden-away and negatively viewed gay arena go up in smoke, blurring the walls of social prejudice. Neither part of a larger discourse nor just a personal tale, this work has more value than something absolute and prevailing or generalised. Rather it draws attention to the value of a contrasting minority, regardless of what one may think of it, in the context of one of today's social phenomena, disparity.

Works by Jun Kim can be seen in a similar light. Tattoos are still not accepted in Korean culture as a whole and those with tattoos, although not officially, are refused by the armed forces' selectors. Once it is remembered that people who have not served in the army are seen as social pariahs with reduced job and business opportunities, it is easy to see what a strong refusal this is. Jun Kim's work is based on his own tattoos, emphasising the social refusal of people who by having tattoos are seen as sub-people.

Fig. 8: Cho Duck-Hyun: 'Entering the Yseokuk' project excavation scene

Fig. 9: Bul Lee

Questioning and satirising scientific proof and mass media

One of the interesting aspects of the Korean mass media is that one finds a high density, almost an overuse, of words such as 'ultra-scientific', 'technological' and 'ultra-state-of-the-art'. It is almost as if use of these words will validate the related product or process, hinting at the 'gullibility' of the Korean public towards so-called 'scientific methodology'. There seems, too, to be an almost unbreakable trust in the media, especially the news programmes, amongst the general public.

Duck-Hyun Cho's projects, which it has been possible to see in the international scene since the 1990s, collaborate with experts and specialists in various fields to create fictional historical scenarios, and enact archeological digging scenes. His sculptures, which in this case are of dogs, are buried in a selected area, and these are then 're-discovered' by an actual archeological team going through an accepted process to find a new dig. The whole process is photographed and filmed as a performance. His works thus question and criticise the historical truth based on archeological evidence, as well as the scientific research methodology related to such evidence.

Kim Beom pokes gentle and less serious but effective fun at the mass media. His 'News' video shows news broadcasters from the 9pm news programme, well-dressed, manicured and not a hair out of place, saying something that is curiously out of place, such as:

> There are many surprising things in this world. I am sure that even now such things are happening. However, people should not speak about it, or act surprised, or shout. If you remain calm, it will be time for a meal, then time for sleep, and after a nice rest, it will be another day

What is interesting about this work is that it is a composite of hundreds of clips from the actual news programme. Although the words spoken seem humorous, it is actually the way the general Korean public looks at the world, and Kim Beom is satirising not only the mass media, but also the thought-processes of the public.

New feminism

Traditional Korean women held an almost matriarchal position in the household, but their reach was limited to that. The current outpouring of women into the 'outside' world has basically broken the traditional mould for women and is giving rise to the kind of feminism which is changed and moulded to Korean circumstances.

It is interesting to note that it is women artists who are better known in the international art field, such as Bul Lee and SuJa Kim, and this fact in itself has suggested a whole new paradigm in the art scene. Bul Lee boldly uses her body as part of her work. By making herself into a multi-limbed monster (fig. 9), she puts forward a critical view of the past male-orientated military government which led

to suppression and packaging of women to fulfill men's desires and purposes. Her work also comments on the nature of birth, and on the nation's obsession with bio-technology.

Conclusion

As discussed above, the current social, political and cultural changes experienced by Korean society are having a profound effect on the work of artists who by their very nature attempt to face up to and understand reality as they see it. Artists who have attempted to escape the modernist trend prevalent in 1980s and 1990s have now established their place in the Korean art scene. The use of various and unusual media, some technology based, has now become widely accepted.

The word 'Korean' as denoting a national identity is not seen as a topic of interest to these artists. Rather, in a world globalised by information, technology and rapid communication, the word 'Korean' signifies a 'reality' inferred in context to such a condition. This may be the reason for many artists leaving Korea to study and/or work in the United States or Europe.

One interesting arena in which artists are striving to reach towards the public is the mobile community (i.e. mobile telephone arena). The mobile industry in Korea is one of the most saturated, competitive and advanced in the world, and many artists have adapted their work or changed their working practice in order to utilise the medium available in mobile phones. In 2003, the Nabi Centre, an institution set up in order to facilitate new media art, organised an exhibition which allowed the public to view artworks via their mobile phones. Participating artists, some of whom had concentrated on traditional canvas media, produced flash-works and media-clips in order to adapt to such a medium. This new direction points to a new area in which artists can work, as well as allowing the artists to adapt and use new technological tools.

These Korean artists who have placed themselves in the centre of the hurricane of change have striven to adapt a viewpoint that is calm and objective. In contrast to artists in the 1990s, when heavy-handed *minjung misul* (People's art, based on realism and a serious social message) or ideology-focused works formed a main trend, the current batch of artists use humorous, ironic visual language to deal with the serious issues of the day. These issues are not limited to Korea. Rather, they can be seen and felt in most of the developed countries. Maybe because of this, Korean art is now coming out of its limited arena and becoming more and more acceptable to the international art scene.

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THE IMPROPER DESIRE FOR KNOWLEDGE: DE-GENDERING CURIOSITY IN CONTEMPORARY KOREAN WOMEN'S LITERATURE

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Female curiosity is here discussed in the context of traditional and modern Korean folktales and proverbs, and the ways in which these conceptualise the issue. These traditional ways of perceiving female curiosity are then juxtaposed with the way it is re-imaged in a contemporary feminist fairy tale. The aim of such comparison is to show how patriarchal ideology is being subverted in contemporary feminist rewritings of traditional Korean fairy tales.[1]

Traditional treatment of the theme of feminine curiosity

In the context of analysing the gender ideologies which inform fairy tales, curiosity is a particularly useful trope because of the gender-specific way it is often conceptualised in them. Curiosity is a common theme in fairy tales and folktales in many cultures of the world, and it is telling that many tales of curiosity function as warnings against female curiosity in particular. Laura Mulvey defines curiosity as "a compulsive desire to see and to know" and highlights the difference between the ways in which inquisitiveness in men and women is perceived.[2] There is a tendency to *gender* curiosity; curiosity in men is portrayed as a positive trait and as evidence of a heroic desire for knowledge; whilst curiosity in women is portrayed as interfering with the domain of knowledge that belongs exclusively to men. Female curiosity is often portrayed as transgressive or dangerous, and it is presented as a potential threat to the stability of existing social order. This point can be illustrated by the story of Pandora, whose curiosity caused her to open the box she was forbidden to touch. As a result, she released all the evils of the world from the box in which they had been securely stored. Another example is the story of Eve who gave in to the temptation

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to taste of the forbidden fruit and so caused the fall of mankind.[3] Similarly, the story of Bluebeard follows this narrative structure: the curious maiden was saved only at the very last moment by her brothers when, despite Bluebeard's warnings, she was overcome by her curiosity and looked into the forbidden chamber. The common theme in all of these tales is the suggestion of women's inability to heed sound advice because of their incurable desire for forbidden knowledge. Moreover, in almost all of these stories, feminine inquisitiveness is never allowed to go unpunished and hence the moral in these tales is often a warning against female curiosity.

Although Korean traditional fairytales and folktales do not follow exactly the plots of the stories mentioned above, the feminine desire to discover possibilities outside socially defined limits has nevertheless traditionally been perceived as negative. Accordingly, in pre-modern Korea, women were seen as needing protection from their own desire for knowledge about affairs outside the domestic sphere, since this was perceived as potentially harmful to them and their families. In general, it was believed that it was easier for women to lead a harmonious married life if they were ignorant of men's concerns. (We say 'in general' since even during the Chosŏn period there were many remarkable *yangban* women who were particularly well-educated and knowledgeable about political affairs.[4]) This negative attitude toward women's curiosity or interest in things beyond their domestic domain can be seen in proverbs such as:

> *Yŏja-ga nŏmu almyŏn p'alja-ga seda* (여자가 너무 알면 팔자가 세다): If a woman knows too much she will have a hard life.
>
> *Yŏja-nŭn sahŭl an tterimyŏn yŏu-ga toenda* (여자는 사흘 안 때리면 여우가 된다): If you don't beat your wife for four days, she becomes a wayward woman [keep her under control or you will be sorry].
>
> *Yŏja-nŭn che koŭl changnan-ŭl mollaya p'alja-ga chot'a* (여자는 제 고을 장날을 몰라야 팔자가 좋다): Keep your woman ignorant of the things outside the home, and she will have a good life.

Moreover, in some well-known folktales, female curiosity and the knowledge gained as a result of inquisitiveness were often portrayed as leading to a negative outcome, as the female protagonists were shown as not fit to be entrusted with the knowledge of non-domestic affairs. Women were perceived as too talkative for their own good, and therefore in many folktales we see an image of a wise husband who manages to keep secrets from his wife, who otherwise would bring the household to ruin. The Tale of the Wise Woodcutter is an example in point. In this story the woodcutter finds gold in the mountains, but knowing that his wife would brag about his discovery should she find out about it, he invents an alternative story to explain his sudden ability to bring more money home. The woodcutter tells his wife that

he has found a tree that grows rice cakes. As he expected, the wife promptly tells the people in their village about the magical tree, only to find that she has become the laughing stock of the village. Having thus outsmarted his wife and dented her credibility in such a clever way, he is free to tell her about the gold, as now no one believes a word she says. Thus the wise woodcutter's secret is safe. Tellingly, in this story the responsibility for not allowing women to share in the 'male knowledge' is shown as women's own fault, as they are deemed unable to deal with it wisely. Even women who otherwise might be perceived as ideal wives and mothers are warned in these proverbs and fairy tales that curiosity about what is going on outside their own domain is likely to lead to calamity and their own downfall. It is significant that the morals communicated through these texts simultaneously denote a sense of male abdication of responsibility of what happens to the female character.

However, what do fairytales and folk stories have to do with modern realities and gender issues in particular? Although in modern times folktales are often understood as stories written for children, it is generally accepted that in the past they were also told to adults. Lutz Röhrich points out that both contemporary and historical fairy tales "always reflect the society in which they are told", because they are effective in their ability to communicate beliefs and ways of perceiving the world to their readers.[5] Therefore, fairy tales were generally written not only to entertain, but also to help their readers to understand the nature of humankind and the historical origins of a society or nation.[6] This idea reflects Mircea Eliade's theory that myths and mythic events still hold an important place in modern people's consciousness because of their ability to ground identities in 'eternal truths'. Whereas primordial peoples looked for foundation myths to answer any ontological or existential questions they may have had, people now no longer believe that myths contain such concrete truths about the origins of humankind. However, Eliade argues that people still need to have a memory or understanding of their origins: "In the traditional societies it is recollection of *mythical events*; in the modern West it is recollection of all that took place in historical time."[7] Similarly, in modern Korea, when the original meanings of traditional values that were invaluable for the survival of small communities (for example reciprocal practices and traditions in village communities) are lost or blurred, there is still a need to connect the present with the historical past.

In addition to this, myths, and by extension stories such as fairy tales, can be utilised to reinforce social stability as they reflect prominent values in society. Barthes argued that this is done by presenting the values of a particular society as 'normal', 'natural' or 'real', and therefore such power structures as patriarchy can be maintained without the use of physical threat. The 'naturalness' of a particular social structure ensures that any deviation from the norm becomes socially unacceptable, and those who transgress are banished to the margins of society, often without the need to resort to physical violence.[8] With regard to women in particular, Luce Irigaray notes that

myths and other such wonder-tales function as tropes and philosophical statements that justify the ontological conditions of women's subordination. Moreover, she observes that in the Western world, people's imaginaries "still function in accordance with the schema established through Greek mythologies and tragedies."[9] In the words of Margaret Whitford, "myth or fiction is not simply, for Irigaray, a *reflection* of social organisation, it also gives a shaping force to the conceptualisation of rights and citizenship."[10] The 'historical truth' that myths offer is perceived as being rooted in people's primordial unconscious, and is used to justify the imbalanced power relations in society between men and women. For example, Pamela Norris asserts that the story of Eve has been used throughout history to justify blaming and punishing females for bringing evil and death into the world. This portrayal of Eve and her unforgivable curiosity as the reason for the suffering of all mankind has been a useful excuse for the continuing patriarchal repression of women.[11] Therefore, the historical nature of myths is used to validate the ideologies that sustain them. In this sense, the moral messages embedded in traditional fairy tales are often still accepted as part of common knowledge that has survived the test of time.

Consequently, although traditional fairy tales change over generations, stories that we have access to today retain basic elements of the ideologies and prominent social values that informed them when they were created.[12] As a result, even in modern retellings of traditional fairy tales, traditional attitudes can be clearly seen. In this way traditional values are discursively recreated in them and transferred to a new generation of readers or listeners, and myths and mythical events are thus presented as evidence of the historical past of a nation on which the existing knowledge is based. This notion is particularly significant in the context of conceptualising gender and curiosity in Korean fairy tales, as it calls for a radical rethinking of what should be perceived as 'commonsensical knowledge'.

Analysis of a modern fairytale

Bearing in mind that traditional fairy tales in Korea have not been significantly adapted to reflect the rapid socio-cultural change in the latter part of last century, feminist rewriting of a fairytale or a folktale can be perceived as an act of challenging the accepted received wisdom of the generations before.[13] In the case of female curiosity in particular, the issue at stake is who 'owns' or has rights to knowledge. This itself is significant, because branding female curiosity as 'bad' effectively shields male vestiges of knowledge by ensuring that such knowledge remains exclusively 'male'.

Within this context, a modern fairytale by a contemporary South Korean woman writer Chŏn Kyŏngnin, entitled *Saebŏnjje myoji, saebŏnjje kyegok, saebŏnjje p'okp'o* (The Third Tomb, the Third Valley, the Third Waterfall), represents an attempt to rewrite such negative portrayal of feminine curiosity in a positive light. She attempts

to achieve this by exposing the root of the masculine fear of feminine thirst for 'forbidden' knowledge. Her story emerges as an attempt to contest accepted ideas of femininity that have influenced women's lives and social roles in the past. In The Third Tomb, Chŏn blends myth and fairy tale in order to describe a woman alienated from her 'true' feminine origins through her confinement to the domestic sphere. The story borrows elements from various folk tales, but in general follows the structure of a well-known fairytale of a woodcutter and a *sŏnnyŏ* (a nymph or a heavenly maiden). However, it differs from the original tale in that the female protagonist herself is not a dutiful daughter of a heavenly ruler, but rather a wolf who loses her hide and is transformed into a woman. Moreover, whereas the nymph in the original version remembers her heavenly origins throughout her virtual imprisonment on earth as the woodcutter's wife, the woman in Chŏn's story has forgotten hers. The heroine's origins are therefore in the animal kingdom rather than in heaven, and in this sense it is assumed that for her, metamorphosing into a human would be a beneficial turn of events. Here a conscious reference is made to Korea's foundation myth in which the nation's progenitor was said to have born of the union between Hwan'ung (a son of the King of Heaven) and Ungnyŏ, a woman who was originally a bear but who was transformed into a human by Hwan'ung. As the story unfolds, it soon becomes clear that for the female protagonist her metamorphosis has disastrous rather than happy consequences, unlike as was perceived to be in the case of Ungnyŏ. The wolf-woman's animal origins become all the more significant in the light of other stories by Chŏn such as *Saenŭn ŏnjena kŭgŏs-e itta* (The Bird is Always in that Place), in which the protagonist laments the bear-woman's folly for having chosen domestic slavery over the freedom she enjoyed in the wild, and wishes that she herself could take the animal form instead of being a housewife. It can therefore be said that for Chŏn the animal kingdom represents a metaphor of femininity that is still in touch with itself, untainted by the requirements and roles of male-centred society that have caused women to lose touch with their 'authentic' feminine identities. On the contrary, she portrays the realm of humans as alien and oppressive to women; they exist in it as passive agents, but are not allowed to take an active part in it outside the domestic realm.

Moreover, what is particularly telling about this modern rewriting of a fairytale is the way in which Chŏn uses it to reveal why women are denied access to the knowledge of things outside the domestic sphere. In her fairytale, Chŏn describes how the woodcutter nurses the wolf-woman back to health and marries her. The woman herself does not object to any of this, but often wonders about her origins, which remain unknown as a consequence of her chronic amnesia which prevents her remembering anything about her past. However, she soon becomes aware that the moon is trying to tell her where her origins are. At this point, the woodcutter, worried that the woman's self-discovery might cause her to leave him, confines her

to the house in order to prevent her dreaded self-discovery. The narrator comments that his reasons for doing this stem from his fear of losing his wife, rather than from being uninterested altogether in her affairs, as is often the case in many books of contemporary women's literature. Herein lies the paradox posed in the story: the woodcutter attempts to make her happy *as his wife* and *on his terms*, little realising that this is never possible as the effect on his unfulfilled wife is exactly the opposite. The female protagonist accepts her confinement, but, troubled by her feelings of unhappiness, she remains curious about the moon's knowledge about her origins. She is haunted by a sense of not knowing whence she came, as without a reference point on which she could build her identity, she has simply become the mediator and the means of her family's happiness. Moreover, having no sense of selfhood as such, she accepts the situation of merely fulfilling a function within the family. Without subjectivity of her own, confined to the functions of the domestic and to the reproductive role, the female protagonist longs for what she is shown to have possessed before, a subjectivity albeit an animal one. Her longing is symbolised in her longing for the full moon that seems to beckon to her, wanting to speak to her if only she could understand what it wanted to say. Moreover, the woodcutter also loses his sense of happiness within their marriage in his anxiety of potentially losing her:

> "I do not know who I am," she said.
>
> "What does that matter," he replied. "To me, you are just a woman. To me, there is no other woman in the world."
>
> "I don't even know where I came from."
>
> "What does that matter? You are a woman of flesh and blood, warm and soft, you are the only woman in the world for me. Please marry me."
>
> He held her hand. She pulled her hand away and pointed at the moon which hung in the sky.
>
> "The moon is trying to tell me something. I will let you know my answer after the full moon."
>
> …
>
> Finally it was the day before full moon. As the evening drew closer, Chŏng could no longer contain his fear of losing her. As the early evening fell, the woman with her hair done up went out and knelt at the centre of the garden. The yellow moon rose from behind the mountains. Chŏng was shaking.
>
> "Whatever the moon says, she is my woman. I am the person who saved her and who owns her."
>
> He burst out in anger and threw the woman indoors. He nailed the door shut and covered all windows so that none of the moon's rays could penetrate inside the house.[14]

The negation of female curiosity causes the male subject to feel anxious about what the feminine might discover about itself and how this discovery might affect the male protagonist. Within this context, Irigaray argues that such male fear of women's

self-discovery is a common theme in patriarchal societies. She explains that patriarchal societies are based on a system that monopolises culture for the benefit of a positive self-representation of the masculine, at the expense of positive understanding of the feminine. Femininity and feminine sexuality in this system of representation require the feminine to appear as a symbol of lack or as that which simply complements the masculine. As a result, femininity, as it is understood in Irigaray's analyses of Western societies, exists as a male-imaged ideal of man's 'other,' but not his complete opposite. In fact, the feminine is seen as *the other of the same*, a poor carbon copy of the divine masculine which "does not recognise the feminine other and the self as other in relation to her."[15] In the context of this story, the desire to monopolise subjectivity is symbolised in the male protagonist's wish to thwart the female protagonist's efforts at self-discovery, and her curiosity about her origins. Chŏn describes how, barred from searching for her true origins through being confined to domestic duties, the woman consoles herself in housework and in having children. She labours for her husband and mother-in-law, who come to expect her skilful services as a matter of course. The narrative intention here is to show how, if allowed to discover her 'true' self, she would threaten the male protagonist's subjectivity by potentially rejecting her established position as a mirror for the masculine, against which the masculine can achieve a positive self-representation. Moreover, for Chŏn's female protagonist, the position of being this point of self-reference for the masculine requires her to stifle any desire for knowledge of her true identity and to conform to a role that he assigns to her, effectively defining her selfhood for her:

> "You are already my wife. You are already my children's mother. Even if you knew who you were, what would you do about it? No matter who you are, I will not let you go."
>
> …
>
> "I have already let you down. Please do not imprison me, just get rid of me," she said.
>
> Finally, Chŏng could not contain his rage, and with his fist hit the woman who seemed haughty like a king's daughter and unfeeling like an animal. When he hit her, he felt all the effort he had put into her had been in vain and as if his life was falling apart.[16]

Through this modern retelling of a fairytale, Chŏn suggests that it is often the masculine anxiety of losing control that causes a rift between men and women, rather than any innate feminine or masculine qualities that can make the two sexes so incomprehensible to each other. On this note, Neil Kenny has pointed out that representations of women in fairytales might reveal more about men's anxieties about what women might want, rather than what women are really like.[17] Similarly, in her story, Chŏn observes that the lack of curiosity in men about women, fuelled by the anxiety of losing control, is what causes misunderstanding of the nature of the

feminine other's true character or intentions, as well as the continual unhappiness of both sexes. It is therefore easy to suggest that Chŏn attempts to write against what could be called a 'discourse of exclusion' through inviting her readers to consider whether women's self-realisation or discovery would in fact be beneficial for *both* men and women.

Accordingly, the ending of the story is somewhat optimistic: the female protagonist eventually discovers her wolf origins and is offered the possibility of rejoining her wolf-sisters and living in a feminine utopia located outside the realm of culture governed by men. However, despite having been given this choice, it is telling that the protagonist chooses not to do so out of love for her husband, sons and even her abusive mother-in-law. Moreover, her husband chooses to accompany her as she roams all night long in the mountain in search of her wolf-sisters:

> But he no longer confined his wife on full moon nights. Instead, carrying his A-frame, he silently followed his wife who roamed in the dark forest between graveyards, valleys and waterfalls; and when the dawn broke and she collapsed, he would pick her up and carry her home on his frame down the slippery mountain path … Sometimes, because the wife was growing increasingly gaunt, there were occasions when he had to stop, unable to move another inch [because he realised how much weight she had lost]. In times like that, Chŏng felt as if his some part of his body had burst and as if blood was dripping from it to the dry ground. That was a moment when the pitiless time was telling him in a way he could not understand that a moment was approaching when he would have to say goodbye.[18]

In this sense, rather than the story reading as the woman's decision to conform to the Symbolic Order at the expense of her animal origins, it represents a rewriting of a myth that allows a space between the two main characters to develop, within which they can approach each other on an equal basis without having to deny themselves. Instead of a women-only utopia, Chŏn fantasises, therefore, of a world where men can allow women to discover their feminine identities that might well differ from those defined by patriarchal society. Furthermore, female curiosity in The Third Tomb is presented as a desire for self-discovery that will ultimately benefit both sexes, because it enables both men and women to live harmoniously together and removes the need to feel anxious about what might happen if women were to discover different roles and femininities to existing ones. In this sense, Chŏn's work suggests that female curiosity might not be as dangerous or destructive as the old wisdom would have us believe.

To conclude, the importance of this rewriting of a myth lies within its effort to create a new symbolic representation of the feminine. Ilmari Leppihalme asserts that writing against myths, uncovering forgotten feminine myths or even creating new myths can be a way of creating counter-discourses to the symbolic locations

that traditional myths provide for women.[19] In this sense, such activities can be seen as a useful way of reconceptualising femininity. From this perspective, Chŏn's The Third Tomb suggests a de-gendering of curiosity in the context of contemporary South Korean women's literature, which in turn allows women to reach their literary imaginations beyond the known feminine roles and images: a tendency that is all the more evident in Chŏn's own works.

Editor's note: All translations of quoted passages are by the author.

Notes

1. The term 'fairy tale' is used here loosely, as some of the stories discussed resemble folktales or wonder-tales.
2. Laura Mulvey 1996:64.
3. *Ibid*.:56–62.
4. It is probably worth mentioning here that this stricture applied mainly to non-*yangban* women, as most of these stories deal with working-class women who would not have had access to education, whereas many high-class women did in fact receive acclaim for their high level of educational attainment and knowledge of the Confucian classics (see John Duncan, 2004. 'The *Naehun* and the politics of gender in fifteenth-century Korea':26–53). However, it is telling that Queen Sohye, who herself was familiar with Confucian classics, admonished women in the *Naehun* not to ignore the teachings of scholars—an indication that the knowledge of men was not to be questioned. Moreover, she also advised that women should not take an interest in matters that did not directly concern their duties within the domestic sphere and should not "stealthily look into the secret place". The knowledge of women was acceptable if it mirrored that of men in defining womanly virtues, and women's power was seen as emanating from the "wisdom" of adhering to the rules that upheld the present social order, which in turn favoured men. (See Kim Chi-yong, 1986. 'Women's life in the Yi dynasty as reflected in *Naehun*':238–41.)
5. Lutz Röhrich, 1986. Introduction to *Fairy Tales and Society: Illusion, Allusion and Paradigm*:5.
6. Jack Zipes, 2001.'Cross-cultural connections and the contamination of the classical fairy tale':848–9.
7. Mircea Eliade, *Myth and Reality*, trans. Willard R. Trask, 1998:138. In discussing modern mythologies, Eliade argues that 'mythical behaviour' can still be observed in the modern world (see p. 183).
8. Roland Barthes, *Mythologies*, trans. Annette Lavers, 2000:137–9.
9. Luce Irigaray, 1991.'The bodily encounter with the mother':36.
10. Margaret Whitford, 1991:185.
11. Pamela Norris, 2001:111–34.
12. Jack Zipes, 1988:136.

13. See Ross King, 2004. 'Traditional Korean fairy tales and contemporary Korean fiction: a case study of "The Woodcutter and the Nymph"':1
14. Chŏn Kyŏngnin, 1997. 'Sebŏnjje myoji, saebŏnjje kyegok, saebŏnjje p'okp'o':237–38.
15. Luce Irigaray, 1991. 'Questions to Emmanuel Levinas', trans. Margaret Whitford, in *The Irigaray Reader*:178–81.
16. Chŏn 1997:241, 244.
17. Neil Kenny, 2004. 'French stories of female curiosity, 1582–1813'.
18. Chŏn 1997:251.
19. Ilmari Leppihalme, 1995. 'Penelopen urakka: myytin käytön ongelmia ja strategioita naiskirjallisuudessa' [Penelope's task: problems and strategies of using myths in women's literature]:22.

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ESCHATOLOGY AND FOLK RELIGIONS IN KOREAN SOCIETY

HYUN-KEY KIM HOGARTH

Introduction

Eschatology is best represented in practices of various folk 'religions' as well as mortuary rituals in Korean society. This paper analyses three of the most important Korean folk 'religions', namely shamanism, ancestor worship and geomancy, in relation to the Koreans' tripartite view of the human soul.

The concept that a human being possesses three souls is prevalent in traditional northeast Asian societies.[1] In some of these societies it is believed that after a person's death, his/her soul diverges into three; one soul goes to the other world, a second floats in the air near the home of the dead person, and the third stays in the grave.

This paper will examine whether modern Koreans also share the tripartite view of the human soul after death. Earlier students of Korean religions, such as Gifford (1892) and Clark (1932/1961), seem to confirm that a similar view existed in Korea. For example, Clark (ibid:113) states categorically that "Koreans believe that everyone has three souls." More recently, however, the concept of three souls seems to be less universally known and believed in. Janelli and Janelli (1982:59), for instance, appear to doubt the existence of such a belief in contemporary Korean society. According to them, it lacked both "conviction and consensus" in a small Korean village where they conducted fieldwork. Their view is also reflected, albeit obliquely, in other books and recent articles dealing with Koreans' views of death and of what happens to a human soul after death (O Hyŏnggŭn 1978; Kim T'aegon 1981; Chang Ch'ŏlsu 1995; Choi Joon-sik 1996; Lee Hyun Song 1996). My own field research would also indicate that many modern Koreans are not even aware of the concept of three human souls.[2]

I was therefore interested to come across an overt display of 'three human souls' in a *kut* (Korean shamanistic ritual) held for a man in his prime who died of a heart attack in his sleep. The kut was officiated by a group of *mudang* (Korean shaman) in Kangwŏn-do (Kangwon province), headed by a veteran called Kwŏn Mallye, a

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long-term acquaintance and informant of mine. An analysis of this kut will be the starting point for interpreting the meaning of three souls among contemporary Korean people. First I will examine the eschatology reflected in *musok* (Korean shamanism), based on comparisons with mortuary kut from various regions. Next a comparison will be made between kut and mainstream mortuary rituals. Finally, I will discuss how the concept could be linked to other seemingly unrelated folk practices, such as ancestor worship and geomancy. I will conclude by addressing the question of why the concept of three human souls does not appear to be so prevalent in contemporary Korean society.

A Kangwŏn province kut for the victim of a sudden death

Mudang from Kangwŏn province claim that their kut are the most 'orthodox' of all. Although such boastful remarks are common among all Korean shamans, kut from this province seem to retain many traditional features that have largely disappeared in rituals of other regions. A kut performed for the dead (*chinogi kut* or *ogu kut*),[3] particularly one held for the recently dead, called *chin chinogi kut*, contains paraphernalia and procedures which clearly reflect Koreans' popular views of death, dead souls and the afterlife.

I attended a classic kut of that kind on Thursday, 23 April 1998, held in Samgoksa, a commercial ritual hall (*kuttang*) situated on top of a mountain in Seoul. It was sponsored by the family of a 48-year-old man who had been found dead on early Sunday morning (12 April). He had been perfectly fit and well until the night before, when he had enjoyed cheerful conversations over beer with his son who had been on a weekend home visit. His son was in the army, doing his national service. Unlike most other kut, which are attended by mainly female members of the family, most of the close cognatic relatives of the dead man were present.[4] Playing the central roles in the kut were the 72-year-old father, 21-year-old son and 44-year-old wife of the deceased, in that order in terms of hierarchy. His mother had passed away some years ago. Other participants were his wife's mother[5], his wife's elder brother's wife, his wife's sister, his wife's younger brother, his elder brother's wife, his younger sister and her young son, and his father's sister. The kut was performed by the chief officiating mudang, Kwŏn Mallye (b.1950), together with other mudang called Ham Okcha (b.1934), Min Sungŭm (b.1946), Kim Ch'unja (b.1956) and Pak Okcha (b.1946).

The order of the kut was similar to that of other cognate kut from various areas.[6] It consisted basically of: first, purification of evil spirits and unclean elements (*pujŏng*) and the invitation of all the spirits to the kut; second, entertainment and direct interaction with the Village Guardian Spirit (Sŏnang), the Mountain Spirit (Sanshin), the Seven Stars Spirit (Ch'ilsŏng), the ancestral spirits (*chosang*), the dead man's spirit, the Death Messenger (Saja), Taegam (The Official Spirit) and the General

Spirit, and finally the dead man's spirit again; and third, sending off the spirits and the final tearful farewells between the dead person and his family, and final feeding of the sundry ghosts.

The kut conformed to the usual pattern, but with a few extra parts. After the purification and invitation, the sponsors lit candles and joss sticks, offered wine to the spirits and reverently kowtowed to them several times. A brief discussion about the order of parts took place among the mudang at this point. The mudang then prepared the symbol of the dead man, which was the most interesting part of the kut for the current discussion. A small rectangular straw mat,[7] measuring about 1.8 by 2.5 metres, was used to make the symbolic representation of the dead man. A new set of traditional Korean clothes was placed on it, on top of which Kwŏn put three white paper cut-out men, with the name and the date of birth of the deceased written on each one of them. The father and the wife of the dead man (his son arrived later) in turn poured spoonfuls of raw rice over each paper man, chanting 'thousand, ten thousand, a million sacks of rice'. Similarly, rice grains (or more rarely pearls) are put into the mouth of a corpse in Cheju island and other areas. I would interpret it as a gesture to give the dead man a means of spreading largesse on his difficult path to the other world, and obliquely to wish that he might bring great wealth to his surviving family in reciprocation. For the same reason, several 10,000-won notes were also deposited on top, after which the mat was rolled and tightly bound with three white pieces of cloth. Three pieces of white paper folded in triangular fashion were inserted through the binding cloths. Everything was done in threes, or in the triangular form, which confirms the importance of the number three in Korean shamanism.[8] The colour used throughout in connection with the dead was pure white, which symbolises 'west', or heaven.[9] The prepared mat looked as through it had a corpse inside it and was used throughout the kut to represent the dead man.

Then the spirits arrived in the order of the Village Guardian Spirit, the Mountain Spirit, the Seven Stars Spirit and the ancestral spirits. The ancestral spirits who appeared through Min were those of the dead man's great-grandfather, his grandmother, his grandfather and his mother. The scenes enacted between the living and the dead were reminiscent of psychoanalytic sessions. For example, his grandmother's spirit repeatedly attributed his untimely death to the family's regular eating of dog meat. His mother's spirit was severely rebuked by his still distraught father for "having so heartlessly taken her own son away". She defended herself against her husband's wrongful accusations, and they finally forgave and blessed each other. After venting all their grievances, grief, resentment, unfulfilled desires and such sentiments, everybody was reconciled with one another, and the spirits invariably ended up giving their promises of help to the sponsors.

After the ancestral spirits, the dead man possessed Min, who fainted on the ground in the front yard and was carried indoors by fellow mudang. When in the room, Kwŏn

castigated the spirit (the possessed mudang): "You unfilial person, how could you go so far away before your own parent?" The first thing he did, however, was to turn to his wife and ask for his wallet and passport. His wife replied, "Didn't we send them all off to you by burning them?" He then knelt in front of his father, with his head touching the ground and sobbing uncontrollably. His father asked Kwŏn who it was, and the mudang explained that he was lost for words, because he had passed away so suddenly and unexpectedly. When the old man realised who it was, he burst into a rage, and shouted at him, "You bad wicked creature! The most unfilial wretch! How could you, how could you die before your own father!" The old man continued to call him all sorts of names, with tears streaming down his cheeks. The most ironic profanity that he threw at his son's spirit was "*i chugil nom*", which literally means something like "you rascal, you shall be killed!" This particular phrase, which is equivalent to "damn you!", is employed by a person only on the greatest provocation. Its use in this context bears witness to the importance that Koreans put on life. The dead spirit could scarcely face his father and finally left the possessed mudang, who indicated the spirit's departure by jumping up and down with the rolled mat ('the body') held high over her head. The wife then took the 'body', stood at the altar holding it for a few minutes, and placed it there.

Then Ham, the old mudang, recited a few passages from the Buddhist Scriptures, beating the wooden gong. Another mudang rotated a glass of wine and a pair of small knives (*shink'al*) round everybody in the room. The two mudang walked around the widow, beating the gongs loudly and waving lighted joss sticks all around her. The Buddhist Scriptures are believed to have the power to keep the evil spirits at bay, and wielding knives and making loud noises to frighten and chase away the evil spirits which have gathered around the widow.

Death is believed to be not only 'pollution' in itself, but also highly contagious, hence anybody who comes into contact with it is touched by its potently dangerous forces. The most vulnerable are the closest relatives of the deceased, particularly his or her spouse, who is believed through their horoscope to be responsible for the death, which occurred because a person is destined to be a widow or widower. The deceased spirit descended on the mudang several times, and talked to the other members of his family, sharing greetings, tears and food. There followed the mudang's prayers for the wellbeing of the deceased spirit and the family. Ham chanted the prayers, which comprised passages from the Buddhist Scriptures and her own impromptu prayers.

Then the reciting of the ballad of Pari Kongju or Peridegi (the Abandoned Princess) took place. Min recited this story of the unwanted seventh princess of the King, who later owes his life to her. The princess, the epitome of unconditional, absolute filial piety, is an ideal guide of the dead on their difficult journey to the other world.[10] Towards the end of the long recitation of the epic, the dead man's son arrived and took his seat where his grandfather had sat before. A tender scene between the

'father' and son took place, the former giving various words of advice to the latter. The most emphatic advice was not to eat 'dirty things', i.e. dog meat. He said that his death was caused by his family eating it so often.

Now that the encounter between the dead man and his all-important son and heir had taken place, the former was ready to go on the long journey to the other world. Kwŏn performed the distribution of the 'three souls' of the deceased. With the father, son and wife of the dead man seated on the floor around the 'dead man' mat, Kwŏn unrolled it. A paper sailboat decorated with colourful paper cut-outs was brought in, and she put a large candle, a bowl of water, three triangular folded pieces of paper and some paper flowers into it. She lit some joss sticks and proceeded to transfer the money from inside the mat into the boat, using a pair of chopsticks and chanting "Chijang Posal", an invocation to Kshitigarbha, the 'Matrix of the Earth' and Guardian Bodhisattva of the Dead. She then picked up the three paper men with chopsticks, one at a time, dropping one each on to the knee of the father, the son and the wife of the deceased, in that order. After that she again picked up the paper cut-out men with chopsticks and burned them on the candle flame, one at a time. The ashes were placed in the bowl of water, and the family were told to water a flowering bush with it later.

This section of the ritual eloquently reflects Koreans' views of the dead soul and its journey into the next world. A boat of the dead suggests that the other world is far away from this world, separated by a huge watery obstacle such as a river or sea. Its path is pitch dark, hence a large candle to light it. A bowl of fresh drinking water is essential to keep the journeying soul alive. Paper money and flowers are needed to bribe the Death Messenger and many dangerous savage creatures that the dead soul will meet on the way.

More importantly, here we see clear manifestations of the three souls, represented by three white paper cut-out men. The three paper men can be interpreted as symbolising three human souls, signifying heaven, man and earth respectively. One is given to the father, who is often analogised to heaven, according to Korean folk beliefs. It could be interpreted as suggesting that one soul goes to the other world, which is often vaguely represented by heaven. The second is given to the son, the human heir who will carry on with ancestral offerings to the dead man. The second soul then could be interpreted as going into the ancestral tablet. The mudang gives the third to the wife, who personifies earth as in 'earth mother'.[11] Interestingly enough, my interpretations coincide in principle with Clark's view (1932/1961:113).

At long last, the time had come for the dead man to leave this world, but his spirit did not want to embark on his long, difficult journey to the other world. He bid a final farewell to his relatives, one by one, lamenting pitifully: "The path in front of me is so very lonely, and so sad. Do I have to go alone? I feel so sad I can't go. They say if I cry, the road to the other world is even darker, so I won't cry." The extreme reluctance

of the spirit to leave this world made this part very long. The spirit made all sorts of excuses to linger on. He even offered to sing for his father for the last time, and sang a song. His sister was startled to hear the song, which she claimed was the only one that her dead brother could sing reasonably well while alive. Apparently the mudang possessed by his spirit had not been told about it. This incident is an example of the mysterious coincidences that often occur in Korean shamanism.

Kwŏn performed various 'purifying' acts, such as tearing five differently coloured pieces of cloth and hemp to purify all sorts of evil spirits and forces. She also wielded a pair of small knives, symbolically 'killing' all the evil spirits around those present. Finally, the Death Messenger arrived to take the dead spirit away to the other world. Kwŏn personified the Death Messenger, wearing a hemp cloth headband and carrying a dried fish and three pairs of straw shoes. Dried fish apparently symbolise the dead; three pairs of straw shoes[12] imply the long journey that has to be faced ahead. The clothes bought for the dead man were taken outside in the yard and burned. It is believed that clothes and other possessions of a dead person are sent to him or her through burning them.

There followed a more cheerful part featuring fun-and-money-loving Taegam (The Official Spirit), who is the caricature of the Chosŏn-dynasty corrupt official, prone to taking bribes. This section eased the tension of the previous more serious parts, helping the sobbing relatives to dry their tears by briefly taking their minds off their tragedy.

Kim was then possessed by a series of General Spirits, which on this occasion included the spirit of Admiral Yi Sunshin.[13] Under this possession, she smoked three cigarettes simultaneously. What is inexplicable is that in the ordinary state of consciousness, she cannot normally even bear cigarette smoke.

A prediction of the next reincarnation then took place. Three bowls, each piled high with raw rice, were brought in, and Kwŏn declared that the deceased would be reincarnated into a bird, after examining the patterns made on the rice.

Finally, having dispersed all the grudges and grievances of the deceased through open dialogues and gifts, the participants were ready to send the dead spirit away. Amid loud lamentations of the dead spirit (possessing Kwŏn) and the surviving family, Kwŏn tore through a long piece of hemp cloth, which symbolises the dead man's journey to the other world. The cloth represents the bridge over the great river which is believed to separate this world and the next.

The mortuary kut from Kangwŏn province, described above, contains elements which clearly suggest the existence of the concept of three human souls after death. But before going on to discuss how a similar concept is reflected in the other two folk 'religions', it is necessary to present a comparative study of regional variations, lest I get accused of basing my argument on an isolated case study.

Korean eschatology reflected in mortuary kut: regional comparisons

Today, mortuary kut constitute the most important part of shamanistic rituals in Korean society, as Hwang (1985:76) observed. With the advancement of modern medical technology, healing, which used to be the raison d'être of kut, is no longer the main reason for performing such a ceremony. Since inexplicable illnesses are often attributed to the recently dead or the victims of past disasters, mortuary kut often take the place of the classic healing kut. Death generates so much grief in the bereaved that when they face with it, particularly when it occurs unexpectedly, as well as performing the usual elaborate mortuary rituals, they sometimes turn to kut to seek consolation or explanation.

At a financially insecure time such as the one following the sudden collapse of the Korean economy in late 1997 (popularly dubbed 'the IMF Age'), the most frequently performed kut seem to be the mortuary rituals. During my stay at the Academy of Korean Studies between September 1997 and August 1998, these were the kut that I was most frequently invited to attend. What is interesting is the fact that during my previous research trip (from September 1993 to April 1994), mortuary kut accounted for less than 20 per cent of the kut I was invited to attend,[14] although it was the most consistently performed ceremony with the least seasonal fluctuations (Hogarth 1998:62). Whilst rituals praying for good luck or community kut were noticeably less frequently held, in the event of a loved one's death, particularly an unexpected one, people did not seem to begrudge the huge expense involved. The importance of mortuary kut is well represented in the series of books published by Yŏlhwadang (1983–93).[15] Of 20 books describing various regional kut, eight, or 40 per cent, deal with mortuary kut.

It is considered fairly axiomatic that there are two types of mudang, namely an inspirational type called *kangshinmu* and a hereditary type called *sesŭmmu*. The main difference between the two is the issue of spirit possession and spirit descent; the former experience this, while it is absent in the latter. However, since the basic principles underpinning the ritual practices of both types do not differ greatly, I have maintained that there is no need to differentiate the two, or ignore one type in favour of the other, in discussing the basic ideology of Korean shamanistic rituals.[16] I shall therefore put emphasis on the underpinning principles, rather than on any specific behaviour *per se* of the mudang in kut.

Although I have attended and recorded various kut from different regions, for the sake of objectivity, in this section I shall analyse the material contained in the eight books dealing with mortuary kut in the *Han'guk-ŭi kut*—Korean Kut—series published by Yŏlhwadang. Four books (vol.5, *P'yŏngan-do tari kut*; vol.8, *Hamgyŏng-do mangmuk kut*; vol.17, *Hwanghae-do chinogi kut*; vol.20, *Seoul chinogi kut*) portray kut officiated by kangshinmu, and four (vol.4, *Suyongp'o sumang kut*;

vol.6, *Chŏlla-do ssikkim kut*; vol.7, *Chejudo muhon kut*; and vol.14, *T'ongyŏng ogwisaenam kut*) deal with those performed by sesŭmmu. (Throughout the rest of this section, references in the text are to the relevant volume and page number in the Korean Kut series.)

All kut start with the purification of evil spirits and unclean elements, but it is considered particularly important in mortuary kut, because of the implication of pollution and danger connected with death. Mudang enact various ritual gestures of purification on and around the bereaved several times throughout the ritual. Malignant spirits are generally anthropomorphised, hence the substances that cleanse, disinfect, repel or kill humans, such as water, fire (in the form of ashes), salt, ground red pepper, arrows (see 14:52) and sharp knives, are employed to chase away or kill them (see 4:18–19; 5:35, 79; 6:33–5; 7:19; 8:42–3; 17:50–51,56–7; 20:30–31). Loud noises and joss sticks are also believed to be effective in chasing way unclean spirits and purifying the ritual space. In the case of kut performed in Hwanghae province, officiating mudang stuff their mouths with *hami*/*hamae* (a piece of white paper folded into a triangle), to prevent pujŏng ('impurities') escaping or entering through the mouth (see17:79).

The soul container, that is, the symbolic dead person, takes various forms in mortuary kut. The modern trend is to simplify it as a large paper cut-out ball resembling a brain, or a series of paper cut-out men (often three in number). The paper cut-out soul sometimes resembles a Confucian-style ancestral tablet (see 5:78). Paper cut-outs are sometimes tied on to a pole and placed on top of raw rice in a rice container for the spirit descent. A close relative holds down the pole, and it is believed that when the dead person's spirit descends on it, the pole shakes (see 7:29, 34–5,106,108; 8:44–5, 86). As we saw in the Kangwŏn-do kut earlier, in some areas, a symbolic dead body is made with a straw mat with the dead person's clothes rolled inside it (see 14:38–49). In Chŏlla province, instead of a straw mat, straw is used to form a shape of a man (see 6:31–33) and is called *yŏngdon mari* (Hwang 1985b:87); in T'ongyŏng the shape is called *yŏngduk mari* (Chŏng Pyŏngho 1989:91). A paper soul house, or a basket containing the paper cut-out 'soul', is also used in conjunction with various other representations of the dead person (see 6:35–7, 69; 14:26–30, 54–8).

The shape of the symbolic 'soul', which resembles the brain tissues, suggests that the human soul is believed to dwell in the brain and leaves the body after death. The straw figure or the straw mat, which contains clothes, the 'soul' (or the three souls in the Kangwŏn-do case), money and rice represents the mortal body. The impure 'body', which has suffered a highly 'polluting' death, has to be cleansed before joining the sacred world of the spirits and ancestors. This concept is dramatically enacted as repeatedly washing the symbolic body with water and herbal water in the kut from Chŏlla-do and adjoining areas (see 6:33, 64–5; 14:42–5), hence the name *ssikkim kut* (cleansing kut).

The most important part of any mortuary kut is the direct encounter with the pole held firmly by a member of the sponsoring family; this is commonly called *taenaerim*, the spirit descent through the pole (8:44–5, 86; 17:29, 34–5,107). Sometimes the spirit of the dead person is supposed to descend on a lotus flower (5:54–5). The meeting and venting of the pent-up feelings of all those concerned has a highly healing effect through catharsis, which has a parallel to psychoanalysis. This psychotherapeutic aspect of kut has been dealt with by many scholars, and is beyond the scope of this paper (see Yi Puyŏng 1985).

The most universally found concept is the bridge over the watery boundaries that separate this world from the other. In most mortuary kut, if not all of them, there exists a part enacting this concept. The bridge is usually represented by a length of hemp or cotton cloth, which the mudang cuts through. Sometimes the representation of the dead person, such as a doll or a soul container, is slowly pushed up and down the 'bridge', the movement symbolising the dead person's journey to the other world (see 4:68–71; 5 *passim*; 6:36–7,68,101; 8:57–61,89). Money is put on the 'bridge' for the dead person to 'spread the largesse' (*injŏngŭl ssŭda*).

Money, which preoccupies most modern Koreans, is thought to be needed for the dead souls to pay their way out of difficulties encountered on the journey to the other world (Im Sŏkchae 1985:86,88).[17] High-denomination notes, usually 10,000-won notes, are placed everywhere, not only on the 'bridge', but also on ritual foods, artificial flowers, paper cut-outs, the five flags representing the five directions, musical instruments, fans, and elsewhere.[18] The ubiquity of these bank notes makes them appear to be essential props in contemporary kut. They are even stuck on mudang's brows, cheeks and chins, held by their hat strings, when they get possessed by the General Spirit and the Official Spirit (see 20:24–7). The Death Messenger also wears them around its headband and other places (see 20:52–3). The Death Messenger appears in most kut performed by kangshinmu. The dramatic sketch involving the Death Messenger trying to snatch the dead person from his protective family can be said to be a means of reconciling them with the inevitability of the death that has already taken place. Also by means of lavish gifts of money and food, the family hope that the dead soul has a comfortable journey to the other world (see 5:48–50; 17:20–22, 28; 20:52–5).

Mun kut ('door' kut) is sometimes performed near the gate of the house, particularly in rituals held for victims of accidents away from home (4:33–5; 8:54, 55, 87; 14:28–32). Its purpose is to allow the person to return home one last time, and also signifies the opening of the door to the other world. According to Im (ibid:85–6), this ritual takes place to clear the way to the other world so that he/she could have a comfortable journey. What is interesting is that in mainstream Korean society, the body of a person who has died away from home is not admitted inside the household lest it should bring in highly polluting malignant spirits.[19]

The *han*, unfulfilled grievances, resentment and desires, of the dead are often represented as a series of knots made with a length of white cloth, called *ko*. Undoing the knots (called *ko p'uri*) represents dispersing the han that is thought to nestle like a large bundle of knots. Ko p'uri is conducted for ancestral spirits in all kut, but it is considered the most important in mortuary kut to dispel the han of the recently departed (see 6:27–9, 59–62).

Paranormal acts performed by mudang to display the powers of the spirits are essential in a kut performed by a kangshinmu. They take the forms of running a sharp blade on the tongue (5:35–7; 17:78), standing barefoot on sharp twin blades (17:80–83) or having the lower lip stuck on a large earthen rice steamer (5:39–41), etc. Incidentally, sesŭmmu just imitate the kangshinmu's acts, in such gestures as briefly biting the rim of a basin before letting it go (see 4:56). The latter also test the spirits' satisfaction by standing an animal part (or a whole carcass) on a trident (see 5:43; 17:71; 20:29), called *sashil/sasŭl seugi*.[20]

Reincarnation, which derives from Buddhist *samsara* (the Eternal Wheel of Death and Rebirth, called *yunhoe* in Korean), is another frequently encountered concept. Many mortuary kut include a section in which the mudang interprets the dead man's reincarnation through examining the patterns made on a pile of raw rice (see 17:47–9; 20:61–2). Most frequently the person is fated to be reincarnated as a bird, a butterfly, a baby or a snake. The snake reincarnation is abhorred, and another kut is often recommended to alter the dead person's fate. However, the reincarnation represented in a kut is not in any way linked to the dead person's merit in this life, an aspect that reflects the non-judgemental nature of Korean shamanism.

Burning is considered a means of sending tangible objects to the dead. In most mortuary rituals, dead people's clothes and personal belongings are burnt at the end (see 5:72–3; 6:39, 70–71; 8:64–6; 14:72–3; 17:96).

Although a mortuary kut is no longer universally performed by modern Koreans, the shamanistic view of death and the afterlife still exerts great influence on general Korean eschatology (Choi 1996:11). Conversely, Korean eschatology can be said to be directly reflected in musok by virtue of the latter's long history and significance in the ideology governing the Korean way of life. Since the essence of musok is the belief in the existence of the spirits, the mortuary kut, which is performed at the point of division between the living and the dead, has always featured strongly.

In sum, first of all, death is universally accepted as final and separating. This world and the other are separated by vast watery boundaries over which there is a bridge of no return that the deceased have to cross. The passage to the other world is sad, dark, lonely, long and difficult, therefore often symbolised by an arch called 'the Thorny Gate'.

Second, death is viewed as pollution. It deprives a community of one of its established members, disturbing its equilibrium. Since life is valued above all else,

the dead do not want to go to the other world, but wish to linger on in this world. Their envy of the living may cause them to wield a noxious influence on their descendants. The closest relatives of the newly dead are believed to be the most vulnerable. To avoid such harm, the newly dead should be safely guided to the other world to join the ancestors. Special arrangements are required for victims of 'bad deaths' who harbour han (unresolved grievances and grief, unfulfilled desires, and so on). Bad deaths are all manner of untimely deaths, other than 'good deaths' of aged people who lived and died peacefully, and have left behind legitimate male descendants, thus becoming benevolent ancestral spirits. Victims of 'bad deaths' are believed to cling to this life and exert a harmful influence on the living out of pure jealousy for them. It is therefore considered important to perform a kut for them, during which everybody present lends a sympathetic ear to their venting of han and coaxes them to leave the living and enter the world of the dead. If there is any hindrance to their becoming ancestral spirits, it should also be removed by arranging a spirit wedding with another dead spirit whose horoscope is compatible.

Third, death is not viewed as the extinction of an existence. Although separated from this world, the dead are believed to 'live on' in their own realm and have close interactions with their living descendants. Their spirits return to this world from time to time to receive kut and ancestral offerings. They also let their descendents know of their displeasure or discomfort by inflicting misfortune on the living. Therefore the living must make sure that the dead come to terms with their new state and console them and keep them happy though feeding and watering them at regular ancestral rites, choosing comfortable dry gravesites and entertaining them at occasional kut, if deemed necessary.

Eschatology reflected in the mortuary rites in mainstream Korean society

In discussing mortuary rituals in Korean society, it is important to remember that shamanism is practised only by a specific group of people, mainly women, and often covertly. It is necessary, therefore, to compare kut with what are more widely accepted 'traditional' mortuary rituals performed in contemporary mainstream Korean society. These are based on Confucian ideology, which puts the emphasis on this-worldliness and the continuation of a person's life only through his agnatic descendants. Human souls after death were beyond the scope of the original Confucianism. Confucius famously dismissed the idea of the existence of dead spirits. He allegedly rebuked his students for asking questions about an afterlife, when they had so much to learn about this world. When asked about ancestral rituals, he remarked that one should merely act as though the spirits existed.[21]

However, traces of folk beliefs, manifested in kut, can be traced in mainstream mortuary rituals. First of all, in a ritual called *pok* or *ch'ohon* performed immediately after a person's death, a close relative carries the dead person's jacket to the roof top and waving it about, says his or her name three times to call the soul.[22] Calling the name of a newly-dead person three times is significant in that it suggests a belief in 'three souls'. Second, the body is ceremoniously washed after death, using three separate bowls of scented water, which again suggests the same belief. Han Chungsu (1981:148) describes this washing ritual and, third, the placing of a pearl or a bead in the mouth of the deceased (ibid:154), while Chang Chŏlsu (1995:153) describes a ceremonious pouring of raw rice into the corpse's mouth with a willow wooden spoon while reciting "Thousand, ten thousand and hundred thousand sacks of rice!" Sometimes money is put there as well. I have already discussed the significance of these ritual acts while discussing the Kangwŏn-do kut. Whether this act originated in kut or kut adopted it from the mainstream mortuary ritual is difficult to say categorically. However, it is fairly safe to say that the ideology underpinning it is of a shamanistic nature. Fourth, a coffin is usually placed behind a screen, which signifies the separation of the worlds of the dead and the living. Fifth, a brief ritual to the Mountain Spirit is usually performed as part of the funeral procedure (Chang, ibid:156,158). Sixth, a grave geomancer is usually employed in choosing an auspicious gravesite (Chang, ibid:156).

Conclusion

There is much phenomenological evidence to support Clark's remark (1932/1961:113) that "[a]t the funeral time, one soul stays in the dead body and goes into the grave; one goes into the prepared tablet, and the last one goes off to the realm of the shades …".

In the Kangwŏn-do kut, we see clear manifestations of the concept of three souls, which are symbolised by three white paper cut-out men, representing respectively heaven (realm of the shades), man (ancestral tablet) and earth (grave). The three paper cut-out men are given to the father of the dead man (representing heaven), the son (responsible for the ancestral tablet), and the wife ('earth mother').

Korean eschatology is thus closely linked to the concept of three souls, and manifested in the three of the most important folk religions, namely shamanism, ancestor worship and geomancy of the gravesite. One soul goes to heaven, that is, to the other world, and thus falls into the domain of shamanism. A second resides in the ancestral tablet, the emblem of ancestor worship.[23] The third soul is believed to reside in the bones of the dead in the grave. Therefore it is important to keep the dead person comfortable and happy. Geomancy, which originally determined the

auspiciousness of the location of a building or a room, has been developed further and applied to the gravesite.

Nevertheless, it is true that there is neither 'conviction' nor 'consensus' among modern Koreans as to whether the concept of three souls exists. I would argue that the main reason is the fast disappearance of traditional Korean culture in the face of globalisation, or more specifically westernisation. Today, especially in urban settings, even family elders and mortuary specialists are not sure what the traditional funeral procedures are, hence the publication of books giving detailed instructions on the 'correct' procedures for the rites of passage.[24] However, the concept of three souls is clearly and overtly displayed in some kut, which often serve as a receptacle of Korean traditional culture.

Notes

1. Shirokogoroff 1935:52,134; Eliade 1951/1964: 216
2. During my fieldwork, three souls were not usually mentioned spontaneously by my informants. It was only when I ventured to suggest the concept that many of them would tell me that there is such a notion.
3. There are basically two kinds of kut for the dead. One is held soon after a person's death, and the other some time afterwards. The former is called chin chinogi kut, and the latter, in the case of kut in Kangwŏn-do, *chosang haewŏn kut* (kut for dispersing ancestors' grudges). As we shall see later, the names, as well as the ritual procedures, have regional variations.
4. Most kut are instigated and attended by women. Men sometimes take part, but usually with extreme reluctance and awkwardness.
5. His wife's father was dead.
6. The order varies from kut to kut. For details, refer to Hogarth 1999:ch. 4.
7. Poor folk used to roll up a corpse in a straw mat for burial in the old days.
8. The number three has the same significance in shamanism in general, as well as in the cultures of the northeast Asian peoples (see Covell 1986; Hogarth 1998:27).
9. For colour symbolism in Korean shamanism, see Hogarth 1998: 29–30.
10. For full transcriptions of a Seoul area version of the ballad, see Hogarth 2003:251–66. The Kangwŏn-do version has some variations, but is essentially the same.
11. Kwŏn told me that the third paper man would have been given to the dead man's mother, had she been alive. But I think the wife would have still received it. In contemporary Korean society, a man's wife seems to feature more prominently than his mother on occasions like a funeral, particularly a shamanistic ritual for the dead. A man's wife seems also to take on the role of his mother in due course. In fact, one often comes across a man calling his wife 'Mum'.
12. Sometimes three straw shoes, rather than three pairs, are used. Some claim that it is because there are three Death Messengers (see Kim Inhoe 1985, Kut series 17:28).

13. Strictly speaking, Yi is an admiral, but the Korean word *changgun* does not differentiate between generals and admirals. Strangely enough, despite Yi's high profile in Korean history and society, in the main he features neither separately nor prominently in kut (see Hogarth 1998:83–87).
14. For details, see Hogarth 1998:62.
15. Although this series of books largely consists of photographs, they give readers vivid pictorial records of the kut performed in contemporary Korean society.
16. Hogarth 1998:92, 1999:225
17. For a discussion of the role of money in kut, see Hogarth 1998:66–7.
18. Pictures featuring money are in all the series volumes mentioned.
19. I have witnessed this several times. When a death occurs in hospital, the coffin is not allowed inside the house, but on the way to the burial site, the mourners take it to the house and let the dead person have a look at his or her home one last time.
20. For details of *sashil seugi* and its meaning, see Hogarth 1998:49,170.
21. In *Lunyu* (*Analects*), cited by Choi Joon-sik 1996:23.
22. Han 1981:140; Chang 1995:150.
23. In traditional Korean society, ancestral tablets were housed in a special room of the household, and food and drink were regularly offered them by the descendants. Even today, in some households, particularly in rural settings, male heads regularly pay tributes to the tablets, and even report their daily events to them, as though they were talking directly to living lineage elders. Moon (1998:156–7) describes how a man, who had just been dismissed, reported the unfortunate event to his ancestral tablets: "In spite of your benevolent caring, it was my own shortcomings that brought my dismissal …".
24. For example, Han 1981:140; Chang 1995:150.

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MUSIC OF THE FATHERLAND: THE NORTH KOREAN SOUNDSCAPE IN THE CONSTRUCTION OF CHONGRYUN IDENTITY IN JAPAN*

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Drawing on a field trip to the Tokyo area over a two-months' period in 2003, this paper aims to examine the role of music within Chongryun in the expression of identity building. The Korean zither *kayagŭm*, an instrument of unique historical symbolism for Koreans, has been chosen to illustrate the on-going musical exchange taking place between musicians affiliated to the Chongryun community and their counterparts in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK).

Introduction

The kayagŭm zither tradition spread with Korean migration to Japan in recent times, particularly since the early 20th century.[1] Since the political division of the Korean peninsula in 1948 and the succeeding Korean War (1950–3), both performance style and repertory have developed independently in South and North Korea, reflecting the somewhat different political and cultural orientation of each state. However, musicians of the Chongryun community, which largely consists of people forcibly settled in Japan from the Korean peninsula during the Japanese colonial period, particularly in the late 1930s and mid-1940s,[2] developed their musical proficiency by paying annual visits to Pyongyang during the summer months, thus directly replicating kayagŭm performance style as well as the musical repertoire from North Korea.

* Preference is given to the form Chongryun, which is the romanised spelling the organisation has chosen to use. Still photographic images included in the text are reproduced from the video recordings cited at the end of this paper.

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Meanwhile, a declaration announced during the visit by Kim Dae-jung, former president of the Republic of Korea (ROK), to Pyongyang in 2000 led to unprecedented cultural exchanges in the years that followed. The effect of such a political climate is far reaching, with an impact even on the cultural relationship between South Korea and the Chongryun community in Japan. Thus, we are currently witnessing a wide dissemination of kayagŭm repertoires across all three locations: the Korean peninsula and amongst Korean minorities in northeastern China and Japan. A further point is that the younger generation of Chongryun is being brought up in an environment directly exposed to Japanese culture as well as to the music that had become available for consumption as a result of a globalised music industry. The question arises, therefore, whether the soundscape of the Chongryun community will remain faithful to the musical imports from North Korea alone.

Chongryun and kayagŭm music

Chongryun is the common name of the General Association of Korean Residents in Japan (in Korean, Cheilbon chosŏnin ch'ong ryŏnhaphoe). Founded in 1955, it is a pro-DPRK organisation that takes as its mission the unity of Koreans in Japan around the government and leadership of North Korea (Ryang 1997:2). It consists of a complex of numerous associations affiliated to the main organisation. The central headquarters, situated in Tokyo, has authority over all the local chapters, covering the 48 prefectures of Japan (Ryang, ibid:3).

According to the *Korea Times* (30 September 2003), 700,000 Koreans currently live in Japan, forming the fourth largest overseas Korean community (an increase of about 50,000 compared to a report of 1993). In 1993, up to 90 per cent of Koreans in Japan were born in Japan (*Chosŏn sinbo*, 15 February 1993, quoted in Ryang 1997:3). Out of those who originally came from Korea, more than 97 per cent were from the southern provinces of the peninsula. Thus, North Korean identity in this sense, following Ryang (ibid), is not geoculturally pre-given; it is Chongryun's political projection.

As a number of ethnomusicological investigations suggest, the use of music in association with 'identity building' is not an unusual phenomenon. My observation of various presentations of performing arts put on by musicians and artists alike affiliated to Chongryun also echoes the underlining motivation of the organisers. To illustrate the point, I would draw readers' attention to the kayagŭm performance presented in a 2003 concert as part of an ensemble piece at the Korean Cultural Centre in Tokyo.

The concert, entitled Oh! T'ongil Korea, was presented over two days on 6 and 7 June 2003 in celebration of the third anniversary of the South-North declaration of 15 June 2000. It was a joint concert presented by the South Korean Yun Tohyŏn

Band and a group called Hyang, whose membership was drawn from third- and fourth-generation Koreans from the community, primarily the musicians from the Chongryun-affiliated Kŭmgangsan kagŭkdan (Diamond Mountain Theatre Troupe).[3] The concert was divided into three parts: the first part by the Hyang group, the second by the Yun Band and the third and last by both. Hyang's musical repertoire was a mixture of traditional and contemporary popular/jazz-style music, whereas the Yun Band's was very loud pop music. The finale, however, culminated in the well-known traditional folk song 'Arirang' and a song 'Oh! T'ongil Korea', widely sung in recent years in the context of reunification of the two Koreas.

With great anticipation from an audience of a couple of thousand gathered in the Centre, Hyang started off the concert with an arrangement of 'Arirang'. The initial silence was broken with a very slow, monotonic introduction to Kim Yongshil's kayagŭm solo, but the tune was soon layered by four additional musicians playing *chotdae* (transverse flute), Western drum kit, base guitar and piano. The music adhered closely to a mixture of traditional music and jazz in terms of musical styles and instrumental components. The musical structure unfolded in a folksong style, which was familiar to many Koreans, moved swiftly on to mosaic segments from *sanjo* ('scattered melodies),[4] a North Korean-style arrangement, then jazz improvisation and finally progressed to the end of the piece by returning to the North Korean style of playing.[5]

The performance style of the kayagŭm player, Kim Yongshil (b.1980), as presented in Hyang's 'Arirang', is somewhat different when compared with the style that might have originally been cultivated in North Korea. The difference is clearly marked in a performance by school children (Pyongyang haksaeng sonyŏn yesuldan) playing the kayagŭm trio presented in Tokyo in 1986.[6]

Fig. 1. Kayagŭm player Kim Yŏngshil playing 'Arirang'

Fig. 2. Kayagŭm player Kim Yŏngshil in ensemble with Hyang members playing 'Arirang'

Kim Yŏngshil's performance is much internalised and composed, whilst that of the school children from Pyongyang is externalised in terms of the artistic expressions manifested in their gestures, bodily movements and especially in their faces. South Korean audiences would strongly associate somewhat 'choreographed' outward expressions such as these with 'typical' North Korean style. To Kim Yŏngshil, her performance style still remains an area that demands her concerted effort for improvement. Whenever Kim Yŏngshil visited Pyongyang for training as a distance-learning student (*t'ongshin haksaeng*), her teacher Kim Kilhwan (b.1936), one of the best recognised kayagŭm players and educators in North Korea, frequently pointed out the way she projected herself in performance. Kim Yŏngshil recalled: "My body and hands are big. So, the condition for playing is not bad. [However], I am lacking in the way I deliver emotion to the audience. Outward appearance [*hyŏngsang*], feelings and emotions [*kamjŏngjŏkin kŏt*]."[7] Presumably, Kim Yŏngshil's facial expressions would have been considered rather 'clouded' (*ŏdupda*), implying they were not expressive enough and her bodily movement too restrained compared with what would be normally expected from a performer in North Korea.

Notwithstanding the difference in playing styles, both of the performances mentioned above employ reformed kayagŭms, with either 19 or 21 strings, that were constructed to generate a broader spectrum of registers and a larger volume, thus introducing the capacity to play the repertoire in the diatonic scale and the compatibility to perform together with Western ensemble and orchestras when necessary.

The question is: how and when did kayagŭm music take root in the Chongryun community, thus becoming an integral part of instrumental teaching in schools affiliated to Chongryun in the early years? In the 1960s and 1970s, or even earlier, there might have already been some traditional music performances on a small scale by musicians from South Korea who came to stay in Japan only temporarily. However, it seems that an active instrumental music scene (of traditional music) did not happen until, in the 1960s, the Chongryun community adopted a much more organised music education policy. By then, the community had been under constant pressure by the Japanese government, which scrutinised Chongryun's growing interest in establishing schools to promote not only the Korean language but also traditional culture with an underlining nationalistic sentiment.

The reason for the concerted efforts made then could well lie in an explanation offered by Ko Ch'angil, since 1998 chairman of the North Korean Literature and Arts League in Japan (Cheilbon chosŏn munhak yesulga tongmaeng, commonly known as Munyedong):

> During 1961 to 1964, when I was in charge of a class at the 9th School, a social movement had developed that placed strong emphasis on three dimensions for youth

Fig. 3. School child from Pyongyang playing in the kayagŭm trio, Tokyo 1986

Fig. 4. One of a large collection of musical instruments presented by North Korea to Chongryun schools in 1966

> education: these consisted of knowledge, virtue and sports [*chi, tŏk and ch'e*]. This idea was addressed by Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader at that time, in a speech on 3 May 1962 (known as *Osam kyoshi*), and came to dominate about half of the youth projects. One of the important issues in the speech was his emphasis that everybody should be able to play more than one musical instrument. Since then, the instrumental training movement became the core enterprise of education as a whole.[8]

Since then, the Chongryun community was to follow the policies of Osam kyoshi enunciated in Pyongyang in 1962, which included the requirement that musical education for everybody should be taken up strenuously.[9] The policy was adopted in the Chongryun community without question. However, being physically separated from the mainland, the community had to face many practical difficulties in carrying out the tasks at a local level in terms of a shortage of human resources—such as trained music teachers or musicians—and of musical instruments, without which neither musical transmission nor promotion was possible.

A teacher visiting Pyongyang in the early 1960s soon reported the situation in Chongryun to North Korea. Before long, a large collection of gifts, including funds to establish schools, and textbooks as well as musical instruments (a total of 97 items of 22 kinds), was presented on 4 May 1966.[10] Without doubt, these grand gifts facilitated one of the educational agendas that were to set about cultivating national consciousness through cultural learning and experience.

Prior to the arrival of the gifts, North Korea had supported Chongryun by providing instrumental training in an effort to ease the community's situation, where an adequate number of locally based qualified instrumental teachers or practising musicians, who could train the younger generation, was absent. It was not until the mid-1960s that some basic training took place secretly in a port, about several hours

away from Tokyo. At that time, a North Korean ship (known as the *kwiguksŏn*) made a regular monthly visit to the Japanese port to transport people and goods. Some musicians affiliated to the Kŭmgangsan kagŭkdan troupe, originally trained in Western music or in what was known as *kyŏngŭmak* (light instrumental music), were dispatched to undergo extensive training on the ship. The mission for learning was also necessary as North Korea considered their cultural presence at the forthcoming Olympic Games, to be held in 1964 in Japan, important in promoting the country in a positive way to the worldwide participants. Since then, Chongryun was to follow a musical performing style that closely resembles that of North Korea. The kayagŭm tradition and other traditional instrumental playing gradually made their way to Japan.

Kayagŭm learning

One of the most interesting features noted during my fieldwork in 2003 was the way the tradition is being transmitted. The process differed greatly from that of Chongryun's counterparts, such as South Korea and the Yanbian Korean community in China. Whereas transmission in these two locations takes place within a formally organised system and an educational framework, such as teacher-pupil school lessons, within Chongryun it happens as one of the extra-curricular activities (*sojo hwaldong*) in their affiliated schools. Furthermore, learning and teaching take place primarily among peer group members in school, with students usually learning from senior students or a peer group who have already achieved an advanced level of proficiency.

Having said that, there is another unique learning practice to mention here. That is, to visit Pyongyang as distance-learning students. The students are selected in Japan and spend one summer month, usually August, each year to go through vigorous instruction from a designated teacher in Pyongyang. The learning period is not really sufficient to allow them to level themselves with the music students in Pyongyang. Nonetheless, it provides a fundamental learning period for these visiting students, not only to meet the teacher and gain access to a deeper level of musical knowledge, but also to witness and observe the performances of many excellent performers based in Pyongyang. From the point of these visiting students, according to Kim Yŏngshil for instance, the period of a month allows them only to "review the things they've learnt in the previous year and to grasp all the technical details of the repertoire under study; not necessarily mastering them but to squeeze as much as they possibly could into their brains."[11]

In spite of such an under-equipped learning situation, the Chongryun community has in recent years produced some excellent musicians who have been awarded one of the highest honours at the annually held music competition in Pyongyang. One

of the finest examples of this is Ch'oe Yŏngdŏk, a *changsaenap* (oboe) player.[12] While musicians in the Chongryun community are able to achieve an unexpectedly high level of artistic ability especially through distance-learning in Pyongyang, the musicians, like many other Chongryun youth, are not entirely free from the cultural environment that surrounds them and which further removes their musical aesthetics from the direct and indirect influences of learning the musical products from North Korea.

Constructing an identity through music

Indeed, if the social context is taken into account, in terms of both the general music education scene in Chongryun schools and the cultural environment to which Chongryun youth is accustomed, the community at large is exposed to diverse musical influences that are not confined to the traditional musical repertoire originating in the Korean peninsula. Thus, the community is continuously revising the curriculum to reflect the on-going social and cultural changes in the Japanese context as much as what is happening in the DPRK. For example, although the emphasis tends to be on rearranged traditional songs and Korean rhythms (cf. the song about the kayagŭm included in the primary school third-year music textbook), music textbooks used at primary school level broadly cover music from other cultures (thus, the primary school sixth-year music textbook introduces world music through CDs). Exposure to South Korean pop music or Western-style music concerts cannot be underestimated. When talking about Chongryun youth or the community at large, we need to consider not only these musical encounters but also the cultural exchanges that frequently happen between Koreans in Japan, South Koreans and Japanese, such as the unprecedented musical exchange marked by a Chongryun school performing troupe that visited

Fig. 5. Performance of Changsaenap on G by Ch'oe Yŏngdŏk with Hyang

Fig. 6. Yun Tohyŏn singing 'Arirang' with Chongryun musicians

South Korea on 4–6 September 2002. The younger Chongryun generation shares a distinctively different political outlook, let alone cultural experience, to the first-generation Koreans in Japan. Hence, the presentation of a musical repertoire rooted in tradition but fashioned to a contemporary outlook, such as Oh! T'ongil Korea, is considered even more instrumental in bringing out the apparent differences among the generations and thus promoting collective identity.

Ryang (1997:197–8) suggests a radical distinction should be made between the migrational experience and the diaspora one: the former is a dynamic displacement and thus deconstructs one's identity; the latter is a stable building of the homeland connection, which serves to construct one's identity. The destiny of the first generation in Japan became tied to their homeland, North Korea, to which they would eventually return. As the sojourn in Japan has prolonged itself, North Korea as a homeland has become increasingly remote from reality. Ryang (ibid) further elaborates the identity of the successive generations living in Japan by stating that the second-generation's identity as Chongryun Koreans rests on the premise that Chongryun is a North Korean organisation. The third generation's experience is more individual-oriented because of its members' awareness that they may continue to live in Japan and that they can sever their North Koreanness from state-level politics and become Japanese residents whose fatherland may be North Korea but who may not support it as a state.

Although it would be possible to say that the third and fourth generations of Koreans in Japan hold views that are sympathetic to Ryang's observation, the unification of the two Koreas is an issue deeply shared among all generations. Two video excerpts from the Oh! T'ongil Korea concert vividly demonstrate the community's fervent hope for an identity rooted in history but situated in Japan. Here, a mixture of one of the best known traditional songs, 'Arirang', and a song 'Oh! T'ongil Korea', representing the theme of the event, binds not only the performers from South Korea and Chongryun singing on the same stage, but also the audience closely together as one. In the centre of the stage, a flag known as *hanbando ki* (flag of the Korean peninsula) is symbolically placed as a backdrop.[13]

Closing remarks

As seen above, the kayagŭm performance practices of this region can only be reasonably assessed when they are placed in their political relationship to their surroundings as much as in their ongoing political relationship with the DPRK. The situation in the Chongryun community in Japan differs to that of other regions in terms of its cultural, political and economic contexts. The unique context contributed to the framework in which the kayagŭm tradition flourishes and is performed and listened to.

The kayagŭm music tradition in Chongryun, although situated in Japanese society,

does not bear any trace that would suggest the incorporation of Japanese musical traits into its style of playing. Rather, it still adheres closely to what is happening in North Korea, as the fatherland. However, in both performance style and repertoire it has distanced itself from North Korea by developing a unique strategy for survival to counter the ever decreasing number in the Korean population who are sympathetic to their school education or to the faithful replication of a political structure.

Nevertheless, a traditional musical element, as mounted in a contemporary concert such as Oh! T'ongil Korea, remains integral for fostering 'identity' across the generations of Koreans living in Japan. Here we may note the processes by which the necessary connection is made between the old traditions, which Nairn (1977:144) refers to as the cultural raw material for nationalism, and contemporary culture, and how 'tradition' is articulated and formulated in the formation of identity-building. The performance traditions in Chongryun in Japan have inevitably changed in response to encompassing social and cultural movements. The way traditions are realised and mounted in performance all differ: whilst traditions are presented at one level as conscious reinvention for the creation of a new identity or political ideology, they are also found in the form of "living expressions of collective experience in aesthetic form" (Coplan 1991:41) in the circle of performing musicians, whose search for 'Korean' musical idioms is manifested in the blending of the contemporary world and the traditional.

Musical practice, as illustrated above, can play a powerful role in the reproduction and transformation of social order (Waterman 1990a and 1990b), as the musical style employed not only evokes a Korean identity and sentiments firmly rooted in traditional culture, but also serves to articulate and define communal values in rapidly changing societies such as Chongryun in Japan.

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Notes

1. The instrument had also featured in the earliest musical exchanges between Korea and Japan during the Three Kingdoms period (*c.* AD 300–AD 668). Early examples, described as *Shiragi koto* (zithers from Shilla, one of the Three Kingdoms) are preserved at the 8th-century Shōsōin repository in Nara, Japan.
2. According to Kim Sanghyŏn (1988:16), about 720,000 people were forcibly taken to Japan between 1939 and 1945.
3. The video excerpts of the performance cited in the text are available to view on the University of Sheffield website: http://www.shef.ac.uk/music/ethnomusicology/leverhulme.html
4. Sanjo is a solo instrumental form comprising three or more sections in progressively faster tempos. The soloist is accompanied by the *changgo* (double-headed hourglass drum). It is most frequently played on the kayagŭm.
5. See video track 1 of the University of Sheffield website.
6. See video track 2 of the University of Sheffield website.
7. Interview with Kim Yŏngshil, 24 July 2003, Tokyo.
8. Interview with Ko Ch'angil on 2 July 2003, Tokyo.
9. See also *Kim Il Sung chŏjakchip* (vol. 6:521, n.d.), which calls for a wide dissemination of traditional music and national musical instruments (quoted in Ham Tŏgil 1987:14).
10. See video track 3 of the University of Sheffield website.
11. Interview with Kim Yŏngshil, 24 July 2003, Tokyo.
12. See video track 4 of the University of Sheffield website. In the Oh! T'ongil Korea concert, Ch'oe captured the audience's undivided attention and loud acclamation with his truly astonishing musicianship. He performed a piece called *Changsaenap on G* in ensemble with Hyang members playing percussion band music known as *samulnori*. Through a successive change of beat, the samulnori team created an interesting dynamic soundscape juxtaposed with Ch'oe Yŏngdŏk's wind sound. When arriving at the cadenza, with a subtle change of lighting on the stage, Ch'oe was in full control, playing a much-prolonged solo section managed only on a single breath. At this point, the audience responded to him with hearty cheers and a roar of applause.
13. See video track 5 of the University of Sheffield website.

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WHERE IS THE KING BURIED? LEGITIMACY STRUGGLES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

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Introduction

Since they were established in 1948, the two Koreas have been busy building their internal and external legitimacy. Each of the Koreas, while consolidating its internal regime, has struggled with the other for international recognition as the sole legitimate representative of the Korean peninsula. The legitimacy struggles have lasted for years, changing in complexion in response to changes in the international arena and in the two Koreas' interests and goals. The delegitimacy struggles between the states have prompted the leaders of both Koreas to release printed and verbal statements over the years that aim to undermine their rival's legitimacy. North Korea, in particular, has invested immense resources in its attempt to delegitimize the leaders of the South and South Korea as an independent entity.

In 1991, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) agreed, for the first time since they were established, to join the United Nations. By so doing, they granted each other external legitimacy. The June 2000 summit of the leaders of the two Koreas led to another significant improvement in relations between the two states. However, the North Korean nuclear crisis, which erupted two years later, raised the tension in the Korean arena, chiefly between North Korea and the United States.

In the past two years, a new historical debate that has created diplomatic problems among several countries in the region—the DPRK, the ROK, the People's Republic of China (PRC), and others—has been brewing. At its centre stands the Koguryŏ kingdom (37 BCE–668 CE). The debate concerns two issues: the ethnic identity and the history of the Koguryŏ kingdom itself and the authenticity of royal tombs from the Koguryŏ era that are located in North Korea. The debate erupted after the DPRK

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asked UNESCO to recognize the Koguryŏ royal tombs on its territory as a World Heritage Site.[1]

The PRC responded by challenging the North Korean claim about the location of the graves and their authenticity as well as the Korean arguments about the history of the Koguryŏ monarchy. Beijing also applied for recognition of Koguryŏ tombs on *its* territory as a World Heritage Site. China's claims presented South Korea with a quandary: should Seoul side with North Korea, with China, or with neither side, in other words, remain neutral? South Korea decided to favour the North Korean stance, viewing the issue as a general Korean one, while bearing in mind that Pyongyang might exploit Seoul's support to aggrandise the legitimacy of its leader and strengthen its status versus the South.

In view of the ROK's decision and the change that it represents in its behaviour towards the legitimacy struggles between the Koreas, a larger issue needs thorough discussion: has a change taken place in the legitimacy struggles that have characterised the two Koreas' relations since the time the two states were founded? This article presents first theories on legitimation and delegitimation, then briefly reviews the history of the legitimacy struggles between the Koreas since they were established in 1948. It goes on to deal with the issue of the Koguryŏ tombs and the current historical debate—the borders and origin of the monarchy and the policy with which South Korea has decided to tackle the Koguryŏ issue. In conclusion it examines the background of the change in ROK policy on this issue and its implications for the essence of relations between the Koreas today.

Legitimacy

What is legitimacy? Dictionaries define it as confirmation of the lawfulness of a situation or object, legal validation, or the obtaining of judicial, legal, or principled authorisation or authority to rule.[2] Lipset regards legitimacy as the performance of a regime. Legitimacy represents a regime's ability to create a set of beliefs that affirm the suitability of its institutions to preserve a society.[3] The present study uses a definition proposed by Robertson,[4] who regards legitimacy as having both a normative and an empirical meaning. At the normative level, the issue is whether a regime or a ruler should be obeyed. This question is closely related to legal concepts of *de jure* or *de facto* legitimacy. At the empirical level, the theme, from the political and sociological aspects, is how a given political system becomes 'legitimate' in the eyes of its citizens.

There are two ways of testing the legitimacy of a regime:

- On a *procedural* basis: a regime is legitimate when it attains rule by legal means, irrespective of the substantive value of the nature of the regime.

- On a *substantive* basis: a regime is legitimate when it has 'good intentions' and uses good means, i.e. when it serves its citizens' interests and is receptive to their changes and demands, irrespective of how it attained power.

The leaders of the ROK (Syngman Rhee, Park Chung-hee)[5] and the DPRK (Kim Il Sung),[6] claimed that the set of norms that they created and passed on to Korean society was amenable to Korean society at large. From this paternalistic perspective, the ruler knows his citizens' interests and, therefore, has to ensure his survival in power because only he knows how to attain these interests, even if he needs to commit illegalities in so doing.

In a certain respect, this approach corresponds to the view of the legitimacy concept as the ability of a political or social system to develop and maintain a set of general beliefs that posit the existing social order as the one best suited to a society or the political system.[7]

External legitimacy

No state is alone in the international system. Any state's geopolitical location and/or political importance, problems of resources and power struggles with other states create situations in which it forms relations with other states. These relations may take shape within the state's proximate sub-system or between more distant players. In these cases, too, the legitimacy issue may be tested at two levels:

- On a *procedural basis*: a regime is defined as legitimate if governance is attained legally. External legitimacy is manifested in several ways: diplomatic recognition, alliances with other states, membership in international organisations, international agreements, etc. Often it is derived from the political interests of an outside power. The change of attitude in the international arena toward China in the 1970s and the degrading of Taiwan's status are examples of changes in the granting of external legitimacy that take place through international political and strategic considerations, irrespective of procedural internal change.
- On a *substantive basis*: a regime is called legitimate if it has good intentions and uses good means. The government serves citizens' interests and is receptive to their changes and demands.

In US considerations in respect to South Korea and other countries, for example, the procedural level has not always been the decisive factor. Different US presidents have brought different attitudes toward the ROK at various periods of time. President Jimmy Carter detested Park Chung-hee's regime in Seoul and was loath to legitimise it on a substantive basis. In contrast, his successor, Ronald Reagan, gave the ROK almost unlimited legitimacy on the basis of the same parameters.[8]

How important is external legitimacy at the internal level? In certain cases, a leader may invoke external legitimacy to consolidate his status in internal political struggles and present it to his people as an incentive for their support of his regime as opposed to his rivals. The quest for legitimacy from an outside player may sometimes become an internal political problem, as with Korea and Japan in 1965.

Ways of obtaining legitimacy

A government may attain legitimacy by several ways and means:

- *Symbols*: Symbols may be manipulated in the legitimation process.[9] By identifying with symbols culled from the array that the society accepts, a leader may try to generate political and/or personal support. Symbols and symbolic terms such as 'national security', 'economic development', 'national pride' and 'nationhood' may serve as means of attaining legitimacy.[10] The symbols chosen may be rooted in the realities of the target audience's life and should trigger associations among the audience. The set of contexts that is formed in the listeners' minds will induce them to associate the symbol with a set of responses that will cause them to legitimise the party that uses it. Unless a connection with reality and an association is made, the listener will not receive the symbol in the way the speaker intends. The policy that the leader identifies with the symbol should be associated in the listener's mind with 'patriotism', 'national pride' and values of security that will lead to support. The use of symbols to establish the legitimacy of monarchies is as old as antiquity.
- *Religion*: Korean kings in antiquity invoked relations with Chinese dynasties as an important source of legitimacy.[11] They used the acceptance of Chinese religions and philosophies in their quest for outside legitimacy from the Chinese kingdoms.[12]
- *Clothing*: To establish continuity and bolster the regime's legitimacy, kings and nobles wore clothing that had been customary in early Korean and Chinese monarchies.[13]
- *Historical sites*: Leaders use the geographical location of historical sites—shrines and archeological ruins—to reinforce the legitimacy of the state and the regime. In 2001, the government in Pyongyang announced the discovery of the remains of Tan'gun, the mythological ruler said to have founded Korea in 2333 BCE.[14] The announcement was intended to bolster the legitimacy of the DPRK and the Pyongyang regime. If the remains really are those of Tan'gun, it could be argued that North Korea is situated on holy soil and that its legitimacy is unchallengeable.[15] Another example is Park Chung-hee's emphasis on archeological excavations in the vicinity of Kyongju, where the Silla dynasty had its capital. Park's purpose was to bolster the legitimacy of his regime and of South Korea vis-à-vis North Korea.

- *Metaphors*: A metaphor is the borrowing or transference of a name, action or concept to some other object, or the use of an idiom in a sense other than the ordinary one and borrowed from another topic to create a picturesque impression. A leader may use metaphors to justify a problematic domestic or foreign policy, because metaphors allow him to discuss part of the topic and to disregard problematic parts.
- *Myths*: A myth is a belief that is shared without challenge by a large group of people who endow events and actions with a certain meaning. Myths are used to shape people's values, attitudes and outlook in ways that invest them with a strong emotional impact.

Throughout his reign, Kim Il Sung, ruler of North Korea until his death in 1994, built and reinforced the legend of his glorious past as a guerrilla fighter during the Japanese occupation. His son, Kim Jong Il, is also associated with a myth related to his place of birth, which was changed in order to create an account that would further the goal of establishing the legitimacy of the "son."[16] By linking a leader or an action with a myth, a leader may perform manipulations for the enhancement of his or her own personal or political legitimacy. Both Koreas have invoked the unification of the peninsula as a myth in the sense that the populace should unite around the leader who is fighting for it.[17] When the military junta acceded to power in the ROK in 1961, unification was one of the main values that it proclaimed as an aim of its putsch: to attain the goal of *unifying Korea,* to which the Korean people aspire, the leadership will invest its energy in developing the state in order to contend with communism.[18]

In sum, a regime may seek legitimacy by using one method and/or a combination of methods. The choice depends on the situation and the goal for which the regime seeks legitimacy. In making this choice, the regime has to consider the effectiveness of the tactics and their suitability for the target and goal at issue. If these devices are misused, the result may be the opposite of that intended.

Means of delegitimisation

Means of delegitimisation may be divided into two groups: *verbal* and *physical.*

Verbal

A rival may use several verbal tactics to create delegitimacy:

- *Propaganda*: a method that aims to change others' attitudes, views and behaviour. Methods of propaganda vary according to need: symbols, written texts, oral statements and/or the propagandist's behaviour. The target population is the group whose views the propagandist wishes to modify. An example of a

propaganda tactic is the placement of loudspeakers on the North Korean side of the Demilitarised Zone between North Korea and South Korea. The purpose of the speakers is to communicate North Korean messages and propaganda to South Korean soldiers serving in the area.

- *Adoption of methods from the legitimisation process*: the rival exploits the very devices that the target state uses to build legitimacy, but in the opposite way. While a government attempts to use myths to build up its legitimacy, for example, the rival tries to debunk the myth by showing the 'other side of the coin', as in South Korea's attempts to challenge the hero myth of Kim Il Sung.

Physical

A physical attack on the target country's institutions undermines the legitimacy of the government in its citizens' eyes by striking at the government's basic duty to citizens: security and defence. The range of physical activities in this respect is quite wide:

- *Terror attacks*: the government of the DPRK has carried out many acts of terror that inflicted direct or indirect damage[19] on South Korea (such as blowing up a Korean jetliner in 1987, causing 115 fatalities).[20]
- *Direct attacks on the establishment*: violent attempts to attack leaders directly. The DPRK has tried to assassinate South Korean heads of state several times. The ROK President Park Chung-hee was the intended victim on several occasions in the 1960s and 1970s. In 1983, an attempt was made to eradicate the ROK cabinet and its president, Chun Doo-hwan, while they were visiting Rangoon. Each of these attempts failed.[21]
- North Korea also used *anti-government subversion and the infiltration of agents* for this purpose in order to create a state of illegitimacy in the South.

In sum, a government may choose between verbal and physical devices or may choose both. It may use one method or a combination of several. Verbal methods are free of the severe risk of a violent response by the other side. In certain cases, however, physical means are preferable because of their efficiency in attacking the rival's systems. The methods used vary in accordance with the situation and the target that the attacking government wishes to delegitimise.

Legitimacy struggles between North and South Korea

In 1945, when the Japanese occupation ended, Koreans expected the Western powers to help them to re-establish their own state after the lengthy gap imposed by the occupation.[22] Their expectations were dashed, however, as domestic and, mainly, international interests led to the partitioning of the Korean peninsula into two

separate states in 1948—the Republic of Korea in the south and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea in the north.[23]

From the moment of their establishment, the North and South Korean regimes began to cultivate their internal legitimacy.[24] In the north, Kim Il Sung went about this with Soviet assistance and put a maximal array of legitimation devices to use. Symbols were drawn upon: the importance of 'national security' in view of the threat from the 'imperialistic South', emphasis on 'economic development' and the cultivation of Korean nationalism and values as against the Western values that the South had adopted. Later on, the administration in Pyongyang tried to cement the internal and external legitimacy of North Korea by invoking the 'bones' of Tan'gun.[25]

In the South, the governments of the first four republics of South Korea also busied themselves at internal legitimation. The enterprise of building internal legitimacy under Syngman Rhee (in office from 1948 to 1960) was influenced mainly by the Korean War and the president's anti-Communist ideology. The fight against communism, which included struggle against non-Communist opponents of Rhee's regime, was one of the prime motifs of his tenure. Additional symbols were the 'march to the north' and struggle against those who threatened the regime and, by extension, the stability of the state. The government of Park Chung-hee (president from 1961 to 1979) stressed the need to build a 'strong Korea' and to further the country's 'economic development', which would be tested on the basis of its functioning and economic success. Economic successes did ensue, but Park did not perform impressively at the ballot box. 'Unification of Korea' and 'economic independence' were additional rallying calls that Park often mobilised to solidify internal legitimacy.

As the leaders of the two Koreas consolidated their political status, their governments applied policies geared to develop their external legitimacy and delegitimise the 'other' Korea. In both of the first two decades of their joint existence, both Koreas practiced a 'one Korea' policy. They maintained diplomatic relations only with countries that recognised one of the Koreas as the sole legitimate representative of the Korean peninsula, mirroring the 'one China' policy that the PRC practised against Taiwan.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the ROK began to widen the circle of states that recognised it and turned its attention to non-aligned states. This marked a major change in Seoul's foreign policy, since the non-aligned states had traditionally favoured the DPRK. Since the non-aligned bloc had been a source of support for Kim Il Sung's regime, the normalisation of relations with the bloc was one of the achievements of the South Korean regime. The appeal to the non-aligned countries symbolised the end of the 'one Korea' policy and the onset of an approach to new markets.[26] The change reached its climax in the late 1980s and early 1990s when Roh Tae-woo's *Nordpolitik,* a policy of outreach to and normalisation of relations

with the DPRK's historical allies, was applied.[27] The obtaining of legitimacy from North Korea's traditional allies, the PRC and the USSR, was significant for relations between the two Koreas. Recognition of the ROK's legitimacy by Pyongyang's allies dealt a severe blow to North Korea's efforts to undermine the legitimacy of the South. From the standpoint of South Korea, the normalisation of relations with the PRC and the USSR not only conferred legitimacy but also opened up new markets and gave Seoul additional leverage over North Korea by means of its allies.

President Kim Dae-jung attempted to change the 'balance of costs' between the Koreas. He instigated a revision of the attitude towards the DPRK and was willing to legitimise the Pyongyang regime in order to change the rules of the game from zero-sum to win-win.[28] The process peaked with a summit between the leaders of the two Koreas in June 2000 in Pyongyang.[29] Study of the leaders' joint statement reveals the components of legitimation. The statement contained 'symbols' that reinforce Korean identity or, as the text says, "the Korean people". It is the "Koreans" (as opposed to outsiders) who control the Korean peninsula, who are to solve its problems.[30] Thus, throughout the summit, the two leaders used symbols that unified and reinforced the legitimacy of both Koreas.

The historical debate between China and the two Koreas over the Koguryŏ kingdom and its history serves as a litmus test. Was there a change in policy on the part of the two Koreas, especially South Korea, in the struggles for legitimacy, or was the summit merely a 'time-out', after which the two Koreas reverted to their zero-sum game in the struggle for legitimacy?

The Koguryŏ kingdom and the struggle over tombs and borders

The Koguryŏ kingdom was the first Korean kingdom to establish itself as an autonomous monarchy. It was the northernmost kingdom among three, the other two being Paekche and Silla. Its geographic location, spanning what is now North Korean and Chinese territory, is indicative of one of the main problems between the countries.

In July 2003, the DPRK applied to UNESCO for registration of the Koguryŏ tombs on its territory, in the vicinity of Pyongyang and in South Hwanghae province, as a World Historical Site (WHS). Its first application was turned down on technical and procedural grounds.[31] Pyongyang was asked to amend the application, re-examine several issues related to the preservation of sites, and reapply a year later.[32] However, the decision-makers' considerations were not solely technical and procedural. One of the opponents of North Korea's application was the PRC. Beijing opposed the registration of the Koguryŏ tombs on principle and rejected North Korea's claim that one of the tombs for which it sought recognition was that of the founder of the Koguryŏ kingdom, Tongmyong Songwang. The monarch's tomb, China claimed, was



Map 1. Comparative extents of the Three Kingdoms

on Chinese soil, even though its exact location had not yet been determined. Some time later, China applied for recognition of several sites on its territory, including fortresses and tombs from the Koguryŏ era.

Each member country of UNESCO may submit only one WHS application per year. The PRC's choice of the Koguryŏ sites in the very year that the DPRK did the same—even though China had a lengthy tentative list of additional sites that it wanted UNESCO to recognise—was puzzling to South Korea, North Korea and other countries. The two Koreas' concerns were reinforced by China's decision to challenge not only the authenticity of the Koguryŏ tombs in North Korea but also the history and validity of the Koguryŏ kingdom itself. Various Chinese representatives claimed that Koguryŏ originated in Chinese kingdoms and not in Korean antecedents, as both Koreas argued.[33]

In February 2002, the Centre for the Study of Borderland History and Geography, an agency under the purview of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, launched a five-year national project called 'Studies of History and Geography of Northeast Borderland'. The purpose of the project was to examine historical issues related to the Chinese borders in the northeast region and the ethnic identities of the inhabitants of the region.[34]

What were China's reasons in challenging the history of the Koguryŏ?

- The Three Kingdoms map reveals the reasons for China's concern. The geographic location of the historical Koguryŏ kingdom includes a large piece of China, the northeast area. China's concern is that a unified Korea, if and when constituted, will demand the restitution of territory that had belonged to the historical

Koguryŏ. If China successfully disproves Korea's claim to Koguryŏ, it will be able to thwart future territorial demands.[35] The DPRK's claim for recognition of Koguryŏ tombs may explain why this issue has come up now.

- A Sino-Korean ethnic minority inhabits the provinces that border the DPRK. The Chinese fear separatist tendencies among them.
- There has been an increase in the number of North Korean refugees in the PRC–DPRK border area, prompting concern that the fall of the regime in Pyongyang may set off a flow of additional refugees, further exacerbating China's fears of separatism in this area.[36]

South Korean policy

Various parties in Korea consider the Koguryŏ history crisis with China more serious than the Japanese textbook crisis, the contretemps between South Korea and Japan concerning the disregard in Japanese textbooks of Japan's injustices against Korea.[37] During the textbook crisis, the ROK suspended some of its diplomatic and political relations with Japan and expressed its views on the matter in very hostile terms.

In view of the complex relationship between the PRC and the ROK and the variegated historical relations between the cultures over the millennia, the South Korean administration found it difficult to adopt a policy identical to that taken toward Japan in the textbook crisis. The problem that Seoul faced was how to tackle the Koguryŏ issue. Should it side with North Korea and oppose China's claim, apply a neutral policy, or favour China's policy over North Korea's?

The ROK chose to deal with the legitimacy crisis that it faced by means of a composite policy. At the official diplomatic level, the administration expressed its objections to China's claims in regard to the Koguryŏ.[38] Ban Ki-moon, the ROK foreign minister, delivered a measured diplomatic response that avoided ferocity. The government in Seoul did not wish to aggravate relations with Beijing over the Koguryŏ issue in view of the complexity of bilateral interests and the PRC's central role in the nuclear crisis with the DPRK.[39] In response to Seoul's protest against the policy of Beijing on Koguryŏ, the Chinese government described the matter as not an official Chinese policy but an initiative of non-governmental academicians.[40] The ROK government accepted Beijing's statement and responded in kind, claiming that the dispute was not between governments but between non-governmental groups of citizens. A remark by the ROK foreign minister provided an illustration: "We believe the attempts [on Korea's ancient history] have been made by academic circles and lack any political motivation."[41]

Thus, both governments wish to keep the Koguryŏ dispute from flaring into a bilateral diplomatic confrontation. A deeper look at the matter, however, shows that the Chinese government is directly in charge of the Centre for the Study of Borderland

History and Geography. Combining this with China's arguments to UNESCO against North Korea's assertions when the latter applied for WHS registration of the Koguryŏ kings' tombs in 2002, we find reason to suspect that China's initiative is not solely the action of independent academicians who have nothing to do with the administration.

Notwithstanding Seoul's declaration that this is an issue to be managed by academicians, all important web sites of the ROK government present South Korea's claims in regard to the Koguryŏ clearly and emphatically. Concurrently, non-governmental groups in South Korea have begun to organise academic conferences and protests against China's claims in the matter.[42] Officially, these initiatives belong to groups of citizens who have no connection with the ROK government. At the informal level, however, the government supports these initiatives extensively. Both government and academicians are labouring to deflate the claims of the regime in Beijing and of Chinese academic organisations about the history of Koguryŏ and the tombs of the Koguryŏ kings. Koguryŏ is not part of the Chinese Han dynasty, they say, and its tenure and borders are as taught in Korean schools and universities over the years and not as China alleges. To be more precise, the Korean spokespersons have accused Chinese scholars of *distorting* history for political purposes.[43] China's behaviour in the affair created a situation that forced Seoul to treat the Koguryŏ issue as a challenge to the legitimacy of the Korean people, in contrast to legitimacy struggles that the government in Seoul had waged with Pyongyang over the identity and legitimacy of the respective Koreas. For the first time, Seoul finds itself embroiled in a struggle for the legitimacy of the Korean identity. By challenging the history of ancient Korea, China is challenging the legitimacy and historical origins of both Koreas. Since Seoul is examining the historical debate not at the present-day level, through the prism of the struggle between the two Koreas, but from the perspective of a Korea that will eventually be unified, it is invoking for the first time a 'post-unification' foreign policy towards China.

Conclusion

The change in the patterns of the legitimacy struggle that typified South Korean policy for years attest to the profound shift that the 2000 summit of the two Koreas wrought in the consciousness of the government and people of South Korea. One of the fundamentals of this change, it would seem, is the realisation that the legitimacy struggles are injurious to both Koreas in the present and the future alike. The combined actions of citizens and government in South Korea also give evidence of the democratisation processes that this society is undergoing. This, too, is related to the fact that the ROK government no longer fears for its status and its external and

internal legitimacy and no longer feels that it has to use delegitimation tactics against the DPRK in order to solidify its own status.

In June 2004, UNESCO held a conference in China and approved the DPRK's application for recognition of the Koguryŏ tombs on its territory as World Heritage Sites. UNESCO also accepted the PRC's application for recognition of Koguryŏ tombs on *its* territory as World Heritage Sites of the Koguryŏ dynasty. UNESCO's decision to accept both applications strengthens the two Koreas' claims about the Koguryŏ heritage in Korean history, in contrast to the arguments raised by Chinese spokespeople in the past two years.

Notes

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6. Suh 1995.
7. Yawnghwe 1992:178–80.
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9. Auerbach 1989:337–8.
10. K. O. Kim, 1988:4–16; S. C. Kim, 1992:377–411.
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COALITION THEORIES AND THE DYNAMICS OF COALITION PARTY POLITICS IN JAPAN AND THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA

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Introduction

Debates on the causes of coalition (in)stability date back to more than a century ago; coalition governments have at times been referred to as "structurally weak and unstable" (Lowell, 1896), whereas others (Lijphart, 1994; Rokkan, 1970; Sartori, 1976) have repeatedly emphasised that "multi-party coalition systems are not necessarily unstable and ineffective". Coalition-building has been seen as coming out of bargaining and compromise between political parties, often as a strategy to achieve electoral success. Research on the relationship between political parties and coalition-building has mainly privileged coalition-building *among* parties and government formation, rather than exploring how the parties' internal dynamics influence the stability of the coalition itself, and how this affects policy performance.

Searching for causes of instability, scholars have traditionally focused on issues of coalition size, or government duration and termination, and typically in parliamentary systems. This, however, does not tell us much of the cases of minority governments or even oversized governments. Italy and Japan, for instance, well illustrate the case where a party's longevity in office (Christian Democracy Party and Liberal Democratic Party) has been also characterised by the continuous 'making and breaking' of governments. In sum, a size-centred approach (such as minimal winning coalition theories) seems to neglect important dimensions of coalition governments, in particular intra-party dynamics, namely the negotiations that take place between political factions and power groups *within*, rather than outside, the political party.

Examples of coalition governments that are stable in terms of duration and size, but unstable through internal factionalism (i.e. Korea, Japan), would hardly fit into the theoretical frameworks designed to explain Western/Western European cases. One of

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the main problems with coalition studies lies in the uncontrolled comparisons of large samples of cabinets. Most data used for existing cross-country studies are actually overused and outdated. Single or small-N comparison case studies (N signifying the number of cases under investigation) should occupy a more central place. In fact, De Winter *et al*. (2002) argue that the weakest part of coalition research lies in the lack of 'thick' descriptions (in-depth qualitative studies) and that explanations using mathematical expression predominate.

This paper discusses coalition politics in Japan and the Republic of Korea (ROK). First the 'fission and fusion' of political parties and factions in Japan are reviewed through the lens of minimal winning coalition theories. Second, the Korean case is introduced as it raises a series of questions about (1) the applicability of coalition theories to minority coalition governments, (2) presidential systems and (3) non-Western settings. The paper will then argue that research should go beyond the size of government, government type or party system as explanatory factors of government stability or instability. When parties build coalitions to win office, government stability may be dependent on intra-party mechanisms, the cultural and historical legacy of Confucianism, regionalism, personal networks and the degree of party institutionalisation.

With reference to the situation in Europe, coalition-building is defined by Laver and Schofield (1990:2) as "the interaction between legislative and executive power when no one party wins a majority of seats and the interaction is the essence of the politics of coalition in Europe." In a recent work on West European political systems, moreover, Müller and Strøm (2000) have pointed out that 13 of the 16 major parliamentary governments have built coalitions to win office. In other words, more than 90 per cent of majority governments built coalitions in the postwar era.[1] Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the spread of democracy to Latin America, the politics of coalition-building have extended well beyond Western political systems. The politics of coalition have recently 'spread' to East Asia—Korea, Taiwan and Japan—as well.

Japan

Japan has been an exception for scholars because of its long history of coalition-building in contrast to other countries in East Asia. Along with Italy, Japan has often provided an exceptional case of coalition-building with a high flux of fission and fusion; but within the context of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), its longevity has allowed it to survive in the longest terms of office, and the building of coalitions between factions within the governing party has been more common than between the party and other parties. Since democratisation, the ROK has added another case of coalition-building with high rates of defections. As coalition theories are mainly elaborated on data taken from Western settings, cases like Japan and the ROK do not

easily fit into existing coalition theories. As a consequence, looking at the two cases of Japan and the ROK will help to identify what the existing coalition theories can explain and what possible variables are to be added to explain and understand the dynamics of coalition-building.

The fission and fusion of political parties and factions have been the main feature of party politics in Japan. Except for the period from 1993 to 1994, the LDP has regularly been the ruling party. Despite constantly dealing with a high level of factionalism it has managed to remain in power since 1955, although in the period since 1994 this has often involved the building of a coalition with one or more other political parties. To explain the puzzle of 'high instability out of stability', scholars have applied rational choice theory, relaxing the assumption of the party as a unitary actor, and have looked at a party or faction with office- or policy-motivated behaviour and at the level of institutionalisation.

On the basis of office-seeking theory with non-unitary actors in the dynamics of party politics, Laver and Kato (2001) focus on the making and breaking of governments in Japan. Through the lens of minimal winning coalition theories, these two authors first relax the assumption of the party as a unitary actor and try to explain the splits and comings together of party members or factions. In the case of minimal winning coalition theory, if one party defects, the winning coalition will lose; on the other hand, if a party receives defectors either from other parties or from former members of coalitions, a winning status will be assured. It is also important to be reminded that minimal winning status mainly implies either a bare majority, or majority status. If we consider a party as a non-unitary actor, there are many potential defectors or factions acting within a party. Therefore, the independent party members or factions will ultimately seek to win office or to implement a specific policy or set of policies, as their own rational choice leads to and moves around the party system. As they join or split with parties, the political actors will try to maximise their bargaining position with each one's own rational choice. If actors defect from a coalition party, the winning coalition will lose, but if a coalition party attracts more defectors from other parties or factions the winning coalition will maintain its winning status. Therefore actors' behaviour will be dependent on the cost and benefit of making or breaking the government. The same situation based on benefit and cost concerned will apply to the coalition parties that attract defectors and lose actors.

Laver and Kato provide a solid explanation with regard to the rational choices of defectors in Japan. One of the main features of Japanese politics is the presence of a predominant one-party system over the long term. In terms of coalition building, Japanese politics can be divided in two periods: from 1955 to 1993 and from 1994 to the present. The previous coalitions were often built among five factions within the LDP, and in the later period the LDP built a coalition with the socialist party to win back government after being defeated by the non-LDP coalitions in 1993. The LDP managed

to handle the political crisis by forming a coalition with two other parties in 1994 and won back governing power. Focusing on internal party splits and fusion, Laver and Kato examine gains in synergy from party fusion and fission. In contrast to other coalition parties, the LDP has remained a predominantly one-party system since 1955 except for a few years of retreat in 1993 and 1994. Therefore, coalitions were mainly built within the party among five or six factions until 1993 and with other parties since 1994.

Although the LDP has remained in power as a ruling party for almost half of last century, "15 different prime ministers presided over 48 Japanese cabinets formed between 1955 and 1993, whose average duration was 9.4 months" (Bouissou 2001: 581). The constant cabinet reshuffles and re-allotment of cabinet portfolios weakened the executive power of the party and provided fundamental instability. It is obvious that high rates of reshuffling and re-allocation of cabinet portfolios will result in an unstable policy performance and this will also affect government stability. In a previous study, Laver and Underhill (1982, cited Laver and Kato 2001) argue that generic incentives for party fusion may attract more defectors when it is not a major party. For the authors, two kinds of decisive structure would bring stability when there is no possibility of party fusion and fission in terms of synergy gains. One is having two parties relatively equal in terms of size—the two share nearly half of the seats. This means that the two parties do not ensure synergy gains for defectors through splitting and joining other parties. The other structure is a single majority party controlling all the bargaining and small parties with no bargaining power. As neither case would yield many synergy gains for defectors, the two types are more stable than other structures in a legislature. However, considering that a single majority party with absolute bargaining power has not often been found in recent democratic political arenas, these cases for stability sound fairly unrealistic.

In the case of intra-party politics in Japan, Laver and Kato (2001) develop further research including a minority government case. They discuss the generic incentives for party splits that are derived from both majority and non-majority parties. Taking the case of Japan in terms of office-seeking theory with non-unitary actors, they argue that a near majority or a bare majority attracts more defectors and that the synergies from the fission or fusion produce mutual gains for both defectors and the party receiving the defectors. For Laver and Kato, when the party does not reach near majority or bare majority status, the small party cannot yield enough incentives for fission and fusion. In other words, the incentives from fission and fusion can only be productive and fulfilling when the party can reach a near majority or a bare majority so that the party can win a threshold position in the legislature or ally with other small parties. However, if small parties are to build a coalition, this has to be big enough to challenge the majority party, otherwise the incentives for defectors who join the small party will not be enough to satisfy those defectors and they would then be attracted again to go back to their old party or defect from the small party to find

bigger incentives. It is fairly rational for them to seek bigger incentives to meet their ultimate aim, either office, policy, or votes in the future.

This high flux of legislators in party politics may bring generic instability. To secure ruling power the LDP extended its willingness to compromise, relinquishing a considerable portion of its own executive power to its coalition partners or to members of the partner factions. Presenting 12 different party systems from July 1993 to October 1999, Laver and Kato (2001) explain the dynamic flux of bargaining power among parties as defectors join and split parties. The authors applied the Shapley-Shubik index to measure each party's bargaining power. According to the table, the LDP faced a dramatic decline in its bargaining power from 0.69 in July 1993 to 0.37 in January 1995. Considering its number of seats decreased from 223 in 1993 to 208 in 1996, the decrease in bargaining power needed some other explanation than mere size in seats. Laver and Kato argue that decreased bargaining power was due to the emergence of the New Frontier Party (NFP) as the second largest party with 176 seats. The NFP had gradually grown from non-LDP coalition parties since 1993 when the Sakigake faction defected from the LDP and formed a coalition with the Japan Renewal Party (JRP). In dealing with this big opposition party, the LDP had less bargaining power; meanwhile, the third biggest party, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), gained increased bargaining power from 0.058 in 1993 to 0.283 in 1995. The remarkable point is that the SDP did not extend its size in terms of numbers of seats, as it had 70 in 1993 and exactly the same number in 1995, but gained increased power to negotiate with coalition partners. The emerging threat of the opposition party meant that the SDP could enjoy increased bargaining power within the coalition. However, the NFP's position as the second biggest party did not last more than three years as it suffered defections. In 1998, the NFP was scattered among the LDP, the Democratic Party (DP), the Peace Party and the Liberal Party 2 (LP2). With this dramatic flux the LDP was able to secure a threshold majority and enjoyed solid bargaining power, as the Shapley-Shubik power index indicates, from 1998 to 1999.

Laver and Kato explain how, after the elections in 1996, the LDP with 239 seats—which represents a near majority out of a total of 500 seats—became very attractive to defectors from other parties. As the LDP has more possibility, by gaining defectors from other parties, to become a threshold majority party, it is in a position to yield synergy gains for both defectors joining the party and also the rest of the LDP members as the party enjoys the benefit from the defectors. The more defectors the LDP receives from other parties the higher possibility it has to win a majority. Therefore, when the party achieves the status of a near majority party, it becomes more attractive to other legislators, encouraging them to defect from their parties and join the LDP.

As a consequence, this still means more shares to offer to the new defectors. The shares can be office seats in executive positions, a potential premiership or policy allocations that will secure their future votes from satisfied voters. Considering the high

frequency of fission and fusion among the number of defectors, this means a high flux of executive seats, reshuffled cabinets and widened policy portfolio. Such activity actually makes it impossible for the government to implement every single portfolio in their agreement and this failure will again lead to potential disagreement and dissatisfaction among legislators or coalition partners. That irritation will continue to lead to future defections. The problem is that this flux in the party system is endemic. To stem this continuous flux, Laver and Kato advance the possibility of blocking defectors by law from coming back to the old party once they have left institutionally. If the parties were to refuse to accept back those who had previously defected from them, this would allegedly bring more stability. If there were a rule preventing defectors from rejoining the party they previously left, this would reduce the high level of flux by limiting defectors' opportunities. It is a very different case from European countries where, once party members leave, their parties are not willing to forgive them or accept them back.

If the party is small and far behind a near majority in size, it cannot produce sufficient incentives capable of satisfying both defectors to it and its own party members. The result is less shares for every legislator in the party, as a small party cannot create synergy gains. As the Shapley-Shubik power index shows with the case of the LDP in 1996, when a party has a near majority or a bare majority, the synergy gains it creates are greater than the actual increase in numbers. Therefore, according to Laver and Kato, the small party could not produce enough benefits to satisfy as it showed increased numbers of defectors joining the LDP after the election result in 1996. The LDP won 239 out of a total of 500 total seats, which is a near majority; the second largest party, the NFP, got 156, the third largest party, the DP, had 52 and the fourth largest party, the SDP, gained 15 seats. As a result, defectors were more attracted again to the near majority party and the small parties were constrained by losing defectors to other parties. As the LDP, in near majority status, had the greatest attraction for defectors, it actually gained the most defectors and won 265 in 1999, reaching more than the threshold majority.

This research tends to overlook the case of small minority ruling parties as attractors of potential defectors. In fact, the near-majority or bare-majority lure cannot explain why minority ruling governments still attract many defectors and minority governments are not always unstable. Defectors might move around for the sake of actual power rather than possible size with potential bargaining power. In other words, defectors will be attracted even to a minority government if it offers greater benefit than the party they belong to. In July 1998 election the LDP fell far short of a threshold majority but swiftly allied with Komeito the third largest party, and with the LP, the fourth largest party, to secure its ruling position. Komeito gained much more bargaining power with a crucial leverage role and on the other hand the DP, the second largest party, remained alienated. With this coalition agreement in 1999 the LP and Komeito managed to attain one ministerial position each; however, this coalition

lasted only six months. The LP defected, and then the LDP swiftly allied with Komeito and a newly formed conservative party which was a splinter party of the LP. The LDP gained a majority through the coalition. However, on its own the LDP remained far below the majority threshold. The very recent phenomenon of the LDP as a minority party could not be sufficiently explained. The main work of Laver and Kato focused on a near-majority or a bare-majority party, assuming that such parties are more attractive to defectors as they can create synergy incentives for both defectors and the parties accepting the defectors and that therefore, the whole body of party members can enjoy greater benefit from the fusion. Laver and Kato have opened the possibility for future work on the subject, looking at the dynamics of the minority ruling party.

To sum up, if Laver and Kato's research into the politics of coalition in Japan is extremely important and insightful, it still appears to neglect two aspects of coalition-building. First, the incentives created by fission and fusion do not seem to provide a clear explanation. To what extent can the incentives be explained in exact numbers? Is it actually possible to explain the cost of changing policy or executive seats in numbers? Though the precise numbers of incentives were calculated in the highly scientific methods that the Shapley-Shubik index devised in 1954, it might miss some parts that cannot actually be calculated in numbers. This does not explain why some actors do not 'move around' for their own individual rational ends but simply out of loyalty to factions or leaders. In coalition theories what is needed is a thick description with a fundamental understanding of cultural, historical and social perspectives. Second, incentives are assumed to be bigger when fission and fusion operate for at least a near- or a bare-majority party. This does not explain the recent LDP case that resulted in a minority party remaining far behind the majority threshold without building coalitions. Therefore, research within a rational choice framework still limits itself with minimal winning coalition theories as it still clings to the idea of a majority threshold. Minority government seems inevitable in modern democratic countries (as it represents various groups of people with different ideologies, values and cultures). This needs to be considered in a multi-dimensional space rather than clinging to size itself.

Considering inter-party politics and interaction between coalition party members, Bouissou (2001) provides a thick description of party factions and coalitions under the 1955 system in Japan in terms of internal party competition. Japan as well as Italy has often been characterised by a long-lived government, frequent cabinet reshuffles and a high flux of fission and fusion. It has long been puzzling how both states retain such record-breaking long terms in power out of such high cabinet instability. On average, an Italian government lasted ten months and the Christian Democracy party governed between 1944 and 1994 (Bouissou 2001:556). As mentioned earlier, the case of Japan is analogous; there the average duration of cabinets was 9.4 months between 1955 and 1993 (ibid:581). The question arises here of how both governments were able to sustain the high cost of reshuffling cabinets and re-allotting cabinet portfolios.

Bouissou explores internal party politics and observes that "the consequent weakening of the executive power cannot have been seen as having imposed a heavy cost … And the cost was successfully managed" (2001:581). Looking at the historical and cultural factors, the LDP dates back to 1955 and started by having many different *habatsu*, or factions. In the early period of faction studies, Michael Leiserson started off by exploring factions in Japan in 1968 and provided remarkable data on the inter-relationship among factions and leaders, explaining the situation in terms of bargaining propositions with minimal winning coalitions. He argued that if the smallest numbers of actors join a coalition it can more efficiently reach agreement (Leiserson 1968). The LDP has in the main five factions, besides the early period of the system of 1955. Generally, two dominant factions participating in coalition control relatively more bargaining power than the rest. The habatsu do not execute policy, but play their main role in recruitment and the allotment of incentives. In other words they recruit potential candidates for forthcoming elections or help to get existing legislators re-elected, raise funding through negotiations with business organisations and support the campaign during election time. The habatsu are less interested in government policies but represent a solely office-motivated, uni-dimensional actor. In comparison with party coalitions in West European countries, the share of incentives is quite disproportional and the dominant party in a coalition might have a large share of benefits and, as the dominant party in a uni-dimensional space, stay at the core.

However, Bouissou (2001) points out there is no domination of the core group in terms of proportional shares. The coalition does not share out equally in proportion to the numbers within a faction, but each faction's share is very proportional. In other words, the system is highly institutionalised in terms of proportions of incentives. The dominant faction will have more chances to provide the prime minister from its own ranks and in doing so the habatsu can raise more funds from business organisations or from other funding sources such as Buddhist groups, the Komei party or the Farmers organisation. If a habatsu has a small portion of shares it can still benefit from policy allotment. However, with the very proportional division of shares, the cabinet executive seats including the premiership have to be shared in turn.

When the Sato-Tanaka-Obuchi *ha* (lineage) built a coalition, they shared the premiership in turn for twenty years, even though each ha provided different prime ministers from their own factions. This resulted in an extremely high level of reshuffling. While the habatsu exercised post-sharing, the cabinet, the leadership and executive power were undermined. Policies were another victim of the proportioned sharing exercise. For instance, Sato was prime minister for nearly eight years, from 1964 to 1972, with notable longevity; however, a series of fierce fights among factions resulted in a yearly re-allocation of cabinet and party posts. Sato therefore paid a high cost in cabinet instability and took a long-term ruling position in return.

In terms of cost, Bouissou raises the question of why ruling governments tolerate

such high-cost coalitions. The author offers an answer in terms of historically and culturally embedded clientelism focusing on sub-space factional relationships. Japan has deep roots of clientelism in what may be called the sub-space. The sub-space binds labour unions with the Socialist Party, the Buddhist sect Sokagakkai with Komeito, and the agricultural cooperatives and over 500,000 building and public works companies with the conservative sub-space (Woodall 1996, cited in Bouissou 2001). As the LDP comprises factions, support from the sub-space through the habatsu and the pay-off with position and policy allotment are inevitable. Bouissou explains how the power triangle of the political and economic decision-making process is engaged between the LDP, the *zaikai* (the big business establishment) and the bureaucracy. The incorporation of these three allows them to enjoy a huge amount of resources. 'Sacrifices' by the ruling party (required by coalition-building among factions) may seem puzzling, as it appears that the LDP is paying an extremely high price in terms of cabinet instability. However, with an understanding of embedded clientelism, to the eyes of the LDP, at least, it is not costly. As Bouissou points out, "LDP politicians did not feel that they were 'giving away' their power to a 'foreigner'. Rather, they shared it with the co-managers of a strongly institutionalised and sympathetic community, whose smooth and efficient functioning was vital for the very survival of the politicians themselves" (2001:599).

The cost for the LDP was therefore not considered as high as it has appeared to outsiders. Bouissou, however, argues that this kind of cost leads to large-scale political damage. First, the subjugation of the decision-making role to the sub-space brings government instability, and politics becomes merely an arena of battle among office-seekers. The fearful internal fighting over stakes among factions damages the legitimacy of the ruling party. In the elections of 2000, many non-party legislators were elected and this shows that people are already very tired of watching the fights in the legislature. Finally, the LDP runs the ultimate risk of the break-up of the party as an ideological melting pot as some are close to other parties outside the coalition. If, for the sake of office, the party sacrifices policy by allocating as many portfolios as possible to the factions, this means a lack of possibility of implementing policies in the long term as the executive leaders are frequently changed with more unrealistic policy allotments. This makes it difficult for the party to satisfy voters in the future. If factions fight for office, this means the need to win elections by carrying out policies in favour of the majority of people. However, in reality, with the LDP sacrificing its executive power in the long term and its leadership, it secured a coalition for the party to remain in the ruling position. In doing so, the sub-space has been able to share out amounts of resources among the factions it supports. The LDP has been in power for more than a half a century. This means that only some privileged groups belonging to the sub-space have enjoyed the benefit of the state and the rest, with no connection to the sub-space, have been either ignored or isolated by the incentives the coalition government creates.

Overall the LDP factions share offices in turn. This means that if the party were to succeed in bringing about the end of coalition members fairly with institutionalised rules or by-laws, the cost of coalition could decrease remarkably in return for the dominant party remaining in ruling position. Coalition members would receive a fair benefit of the interest and the ruling party would remain in office. This might bring generic instability in terms of accomplishing policies or leadership. However, with the focus on office-driven theory, the ultimate end of politicians was achieved as they all remained in office for record-breaking terms.

The Republic of Korea

The puzzles over Japanese coalition politics have been explained with various approaches in the postwar era. However, making sense of government instability through existing theories has proved difficult in the case of the ROK. Since the start of democratisation,[2] coalition-building has been a constant phenomenon in every presidential election and a fundamental part of political and party life in Korea. Although it was widely unpopular for its continuous party merges and splits, coalition-building gradually moved the military regime to a process of bargaining and compromises. The then ruling party (Democratic Justice Party, hereafter DJP) merged in 1990 with two opposition parties: the Reunification Democratic Party (hereafter RDP) led by Kim Young-sam and the New Democratic Republican Party (hereafter NDRP) led by Kim Jong-pil. The three merged parties later renamed themselves as the Democratic Liberal Party and agreed to nominate Kim Young-sam as presidential candidate for the then approaching elections. The politics of coalition-building turned out to be successful and led to the electoral success of Kim Young-sam, who became the first non-military president after a long period of authoritarian military rule.

A second moment where coalition-building seemed to be decisive in Korea's political life was before the 1997 presidential elections, when the ruling party faced internal factions and the political environment was under mounting pressure from the outburst of the Asian financial crisis and the simultaneous condemnation by public opinion of the party's perceived inefficient governance. Kim Dae-jung, the leader of the opposition party, National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) entered an alliance with the United Liberal Democrats (ULD) led by Kim Jong-pil. After a life-long history as opposition leader in the 1960s, Kim Dae-jung finally became president. Since 1987, coalition-building has played a main role in determining electoral success in presidential election in the ROK. This might well become a permanent characteristic of the South Korean political system. A serious drawback, however, as will be shown later, is the fact that electoral success is no guarantee of effective governance or of stability either. As a matter of fact, stability has been constantly undermined by permanent factionalism internal to the coalition and to the parties themselves.

Coalition governments have often proved relatively stable. Among the few exceptions, Italy and Japan have traditionally featured as examples of unstable coalition politics. The ROK is now a 'new entry' in the list. Making sense of government instability in South Korea through existing coalition theories has been by and large insufficiently studied. When the three parties merged in 1990, Choi Jang-jip (1996) saw the merger as an application of 'transformism'. The concept of transformism or *trasformismo* derives from the behaviour of political elites in late 19th-century Italy. The legislature was dominated by elites and the minority party members strove to gain power by reaching a stable majority. In so doing the minority party actors are engaged in an informal patron-client system and were not ideologically stratified, lacking, as they did, strong social support. Competition between highly organised parties was absent.[3]

For Choi, Korean party politics are characterised as follows: on the ideological dimension, most parties tend to converge towards the right; regional cleavages dominate political life, and social movements tend to bypass political parties in relation to the executive. In fact, Choi points out that social movements triggered the breakdown of the old system of authoritarian government. However, political reform was accomplished from the top, by the political elites, not from the bottom by social movements, despite the latter playing a major role in the democratisation process.

As the opposition party leaders have strong regional support in their own home town, regionalism represents a fundamental social cleavage. When the parties did not have clear divisions in policy terms, the conservative elite factors came into conflict with progressive groups from the Honam region—the southwest part of Korea and an economically and politically marginalised rural area. Choi argues that the conservative hegemony permits the elites' 'fission and fusion' through *trasformismo* as they are corrupted by seeking their own political and personal advantage.

Another factor hindering Korea's democratisation is arguably its Confucian background. Strong leadership within the party, parochial ties and cronyism are characteristics of Confucianism. As a result of democratisation, the ROK faces divided government or a small ruling party. On the other hand, the elite groups, not yet democratised and less institutionalised, manipulate the size of the ruling party to avoid big opposition parties. Choi's research provides an insightful explanation of the dynamics of party politics in terms of social, cultural and historical perspectives. As a consequence, he sees intra-party politics through the lens of Korean culture and the context of the country's democratisation.

Kim Hee-min (1997) explains the three-party merger of 1990 through the rational choice of each party and discusses the coalition size in terms of a minimal winning coalition. Following democratisation in 1987, President Roh Tae-woo, the successor of the old authoritarian government, won power with only 125 seats out of 299. The ruling Democratic Justice Party (DJP) gained only 34 per cent of the votes, far below

the majority threshold. To secure the party's political power and leadership, President Roh explored the possibilities for a merger with the remaining three opposition parties. In consideration of regional homogeneity and similar ideological positions, the DJP merged with the New Democratic Republican Party (NDRP) with 35 seats and the Reunification Democratic Party (RDP) with 59 seats. The NDRP incorporated the former conservative party that had provided authoritarian government during Park Chung-hee's presidency, and the RDP is from the same region—Yongnam, the southeast part of Korea—as the DJP. The main coalition agreement among the three parties was to change the party system from a presidential to a parliamentary system. To pass constitutional amendments, a two-thirds majority of votes is required in the National Assembly. The party merger increased the ruling party's share, as it gained 222 seats out of a total of 299 seats.

Kim Hee-min explains this merger as a minimal winning coalition. If one of the coalition parties defects, the coalition party will lose its winning status that requires two-thirds of the total legislative seats to amend the constitutional law. In terms of size only, applying the concept of minimal winning coalition seems appropriate in explaining the coalition. The winning threshold to amend the law was achieved by party merger, but the coalition member Kim Young-sam, the next president in 1992, did not seem to be interested in changing the party system. The primary agreement of the coalition had been to change the party set-up from a presidential system to a parliamentary bi-cameral system; but after the coalition was formed, attempts to change the system faded away. If a parliamentary system had been the ultimate goal of the coalition, then one would have expected Kim Young-sam to have pushed for change in the political structure after achieving the more immediate goal of attracting party defectors. If the coalition was not aiming at legislative amendments, it did not have to reach two-thirds of the total seats. In terms of size, 222 out of 299 can be excessively large to consolidate party members and reach agreement efficiently. The 222 seats generated a surplus majority party. As a result, internal conflicts caused endless problems to be solved in the coalition government.

Existing research has suggested that a surplus party is less stable than a bare-majority party.[4] To secure internal cohesiveness and consolidation the coalition size should have been reduced to a bare majority or to one or two seats above the threshold. In other words, Riker's minimum winning coalition (Riker 1962) or Leiserson's bargain proposition theory (Leiserson 1968) might suggest that a more stable coalition government appears more likely to solve internal conflicts. In fact, the Korean coalition was built without influence from minimum winning coalition or bargaining proposition theories. In terms of minimum coalition theory, the size of the coalition should be 50 per cent plus one or two, and the bargaining proposition theory suggests that the smaller the number of parties joining the coalition the less potential conflict it contains. In such a scenario, the DJP should have built a coalition

with the NDRP. Both parties were heirs to presidents in the authoritarian period—the NDRP was linked to President Park Chung-hee after his military coup and the DJP to President Chun Doo-hwan—and the NDRP also leant ideologically to the conservative sector. If the DJP had built a coalition with the NDRP, their total seats would have been the 125 of the DJP plus the 35 of the DJP: in other words, 160 seats out of 299. This figure would appear closest to the predicted number for a minimal or minimum winning coalition. Minimum coalition theory requires 50 per cent plus one or two seats. This means that the coalition parties' number of seats should be 150 or 151. If the DJP had joined with further parties, the size of the coalition would have reached a surplus majority. Considering that cabinet instability has been a main feature, a surplus majority coalition appears unfeasible. Given this, for the DJP to join the NDRP might have been the best option as they both converged on the right end of the political spectrum, shared a similar history and views and displayed anti-democratic sentiments among their members, heirs of the authoritarian regime legacy.

Considering that in terms of size the Party for Peace and Democracy (PDP) led by Kim Dae-jung and the RDP are also similar, they would be expected to form a coalition according to minimum winning coalition or bargaining proposition theory. Both parties fought against authoritarian regimes for more than three decades. Yet the actual coalition was formed by the RDP, the NDRP and the DJP. On the basis of rational choice, the merger in reality was puzzling. The merger of the three parties in 1990 can be explained by minimal winning coalition on a theoretical level. However, this does not explain why the coalition parties could not achieve their main goal of agreement in practice. Was it only to win office? Was it really to change to a cabinet system? Minimal winning coalition theory does not explain intra-party politics. Although Kim Hee-min (1997) looks at the preferences of political actors, the party merger can be studied in terms of many different aspects such as divided government, the leader's individual rational choice or lack of institutionalisation in party politics right after democratisation. The aesthetics of numbers does not explain the socially and culturally embedded or historical factors and why three parties merged and not two, as discussed above. Kim explains ideological and regional closeness among the three parties; however, he overlooks two important factors: time and the political system. The merger came right after democratisation, which itself followed a long experience of authoritarian regimes.

According to Park Chan-pyo (1999), rational choice theory based on size does not explain why the number of defectors from political parties dramatically increased after democratisation. From the sixth to the twelfth National Assembly elections the flux rate of defectors who joined the major party was under 6.5 per cent during the authoritarian regimes; however, between the thirteenth and fourteenth National Assembly elections the rate of increase in the major party's number of seats was 30.9

per cent (from 41.8 per cent in 1988 to 71.8 per cent in 1991) (Park 1999:14). The rate of seats held by the major party increased by 9.4 per cent between the fourteenth and the early fifteenth National Assembly elections, and during President Kim Dae-jung's administration, seat numbers of the major party increased from 41.1 per cent to 53.3 per cent from 1998 to 1999. The flux rate of defectors toward the major parties was 12.4 per cent (ibid:12).

Park argues that this high flux rate of defectors can be explained by institutional factors when electoral democracy started. He suggests that electoral democracy under the presidential system brought a 'divided government' facing a big opposition party and that parties are strongly supported on a regional basis. Another factor to explain the puzzle, as Park points out, is the different electoral period for parliamentary members and the president. Parliamentary members are elected every four years and the president every five years. The different electoral terms systematically bring a negative effect for the ruling party to govern as the party can receive either more or less support from the public. This means that the ruling party's seat numbers will affect the government's ability to implement its policies. Where the ruling party becomes smaller in terms of legislative seat numbers, the government has to struggle with big oppositions. Then the ruling party either has to build a coalition to remain in power or secure future electoral votes, or has to attract more defectors from other parties by offering greater benefits in order to gain more seats in the legislature. This will also bring instability for the government. To remain in a ruling position the government may offer more positions or benefits to defectors from other parties, who may have different policy or ideology orientations. This means the share of the power or benefit for the ruling party gets smaller and also brings the possibility for more conflicts of interest among the ruling party members, as Axelrod (1970) contends. Therefore institutional factors and intra-party politics need to be taken into account in order to provide a more insightful explanation of the high flux of defectors and coalition-building.

As democratisation became consolidated, voters' preferences split along regional lines. Even though the two parties won office after building a coalition, the government reached far less than a majority threshold and faced a large opposition party. When Kim Dae-jung became president in 1998, NCNP, the president's party, had 77 seats (26.3 per cent) out of a total of 293 seats, his coalition partner, the ULD, had 43 seats (14.7 per cent), and the opposition Grand National Party with (GNP) had 161 (54 per cent). Combining the two ruling coalition parties, the coalition government had 120 seats (41 per cent) out of 293, which is still far below a majority.

As already seen, Laver and Kato (2001), working on the case of Japan in terms of office-seeking theory with non-unitary actors, argue that a near majority or a bare majority attracts more defectors, and the synergies from fission or fusion produces mutual gains for both defectors and the party receiving defectors. When the party

does not obtain a near majority or a bare majority, the small party cannot yield enough incentives for fission and fusion. In light of Laver and Kato's argument in term of size, the opposition party—the GNP—should be more attractive than smaller parties. In fact, fission and fusion did materialise in the ROK, and within six months after President Kim took office, the ruling parties (NCNP and ULD) gained 105 seats and 55 seats respectively and achieved a majority government with 160 seats (Son 1999:5). However, this research overlooks the case of a small minority ruling party as attractive to potential defectors. In fact, the attraction of a near majority or a bare majority cannot explain why minority ruling governments still attract many defectors and why minority governments are not always unstable. Defectors might move around for reasons of actual power rather than for possible size with potential bargaining power. They are myopic office-seekers. In other words, defectors will be attracted to the minority government, if there is any better benefit in the ruling party than in the party they belong to.

In the case of the ROK, many defectors from the largest opposition party joined the small minority party for more power as the ruling party could still offer better benefits such as executive positions or the promise of future appointment as a candidate for a parliamentary seat. As of 1999, 73 parliamentary members (24 per cent) out of a total number of 299 had defected from their original parties since April 1996 when the legislature started (*Chosun Ilbo*, 18 October 1999:4). For Laver and Kato defection is derived from individual rational choice, which is dependent on self-interest; when defection can bring more incentives than remaining in the same party, the defector will take an action towards fission and fusion. The party benefiting from the defection will also accept the defector as a member when they see more incentives than before in receiving this defection. However, regardless of size, if a party is in a ruling position, then it can offer not only policy allocations but also potential executive positions.

The small ruling minority party had to secure its political stability but also to accomplish political reform. The president introduced the term 'Jeongkye gaepyun' ('reorganisation of the political system') as a way of legitimising his efforts to ensure the ruling party maintained a majority of seats and to smooth the legislative process without disruption from the large opposition party. What the NCNP did was to attract as many defectors as possible from the opposition GNP. Within six months of the president taking office the NCNP had achieved 105 seats and the ULD had 54 seats. The high flux of party members changed the small minority ruling party into two majority coalition parties, with 159 seats versus the 134 seats of the opposition party. Fighting off the opposition in the legislature was getting worse. Park Chan-pyo (1999) argues that Jeongkye gaepyun was a costly form of fusion.

Many scholars such as Larry Diamond, Kim Byung-kuk and Choi Jang-jip point out that this manufactured majority government is working against consolidating

democracy. If a small ruling party is the result of democracy, the government should seek out democratic ways of running the government rather than clinging to the magic number of a majority to pass legislative laws without the opposition party's co-operation. How can this high flux of party members and the ruling party's struggles that even violate democratic and moral rules be explained? This new phenomenon in non-Western settings in the process of consolidating democracy is a problem not only for Korea but also for Taiwan, Singapore, Mexico and other countries. It is pervasive and endemic. Coalition party politics in non-Western contexts need to consider consolidating democracy in internal party organisation, electoral laws, at the level of institutions and with regard to historical, cultural and social factors. As has been shown, a high flux of mobilisation among party members threatens political stability, which in turn threatens the consolidation of democracy where democracy is relatively new compared to Western countries.

When the ROK faced the trauma of the 1997 Asian crisis, many among the public showed nostalgia for authoritarian government. Choi Jang-jip (2002: 5) argues that the quality of Korean society has actually deteriorated since democratisation. The gap between rich and poor has become much bigger and social pressure under competition has been severe. The opportunities to increase one's own social status through education and diligence have dramatically decreased. Democracy in South Korea does not seem to be perceived by the broader public as a tool of social and political stability. Scholars, on their side, see democracy as an institution with a long way to go before being defined as consolidated (S. S. Kim, 2003). The puzzle over unstable coalition governments may be a part of the process of consolidating democracy.

Research needs to be able to predict or explain, not necessarily making use of Western theories, as these are mainly framed and tested in different political systems with different historical, cultural and social backgrounds. A new framework is therefore required to take into consideration the cultural specificities of the newly democratised countries in non-Western settings. The extent to which it is possible to accommodate explanations building on rational choice theory with cultural specificities is discussed in the following section.

The problems with rational choice theory

Studies of coalition governments have for the most part been framed within a positivist paradigm and have arguably gone too far in drawing from quantitative methodology. In terms of case selection, coalition studies have relied on a large-N comparison of cases mostly selected from Western European countries. As Bäck (2003:15) notes, coalition studies have mainly developed in answer to questions such as: "What type of government will be formed?", "What type of systems make minority or oversized governments more likely to be formed?", or "What type of

parties will get into government?" However, questions like "how does a government run the administration after winning office?" or "why does coalition government fail in stability?" have received far less attention. Existing studies on government termination and duration do not focus much, either, on what is actually going on inside the party, privileging study of the government's stability by the length in office of governments. Despite the flourishing research on coalition theories, such theories in their traditional form have in general shown a poor empirical performance. Michael Laver ascribes this to the fact that theories are tested against a high number of cases while neglecting the specificities of each. Laver (1989 cited in Bäck, 2003:16) argues that because "the differences between the national systems are 'so significant', sensible tests of coalition theories must be conducted on a country-by-country basis." As discussed in the previous section, what coalition research seems to be lacking is in fact 'thick' descriptions, or in-depth qualitative studies (Bäck, 2003: 32). Instead of focusing on "who gets in" (the coalition), research should now extend to investigate questions like "why does it [the coalition] fail?", "what are political actors bargaining for?" and "how do coalitions work?" in different countries.

Coalition research has traditionally downplayed the importance of context, focusing instead on the motivation and behaviour of individual actors acting out of self-interest, i.e. a rational choice approach. Very briefly, rational choice theories are based on the assumption that an individual strives to maximise utility on the basis of the information available and of a cost/benefit analysis. If an individual acts to maximise his or her interests after calculating all the possible gains and losses, this is considered to be rational. However, if an individual acts the way she or he does because of the influence of cultural norms, then action cannot seemingly be explained by rational choice and behaviour. At the very least, rational choice theory seems to have no place for culture, a consequence of the universalistic premise of the view of human agency and the parsimony of the 'thin' approach.

Rationality, however, differs depending on cultural context. Can rationality indeed be separated from the culture it is embedded in? Individual belief is socially structured and the calculation of cost and benefit is based on the person's preferences, which are influenced by the society and culture that the person belongs to and has originated from. Human behaviour is not always the outcome of calculation based on individual utility maximisation in the economic market. Francis Fukuyama (1995:35) notes that "choices arise out of habit". He illustrates this through the example of the use of chopsticks for Chinese people. Chinese use chopsticks simply because all Chinese use chopsticks for their food rather than calculating the cost and benefit of using chopsticks compared to Western forks and knives. Using a fork and knife for Chinese noodles would look odd for Chinese.

Fukuyama argues that culture can have its own rationality in each different society. Culture is not irrational but "a-rational", that is, it is not derived from a

cost and benefit calculation; however, this a-rational behaviour actually shows a high degree of rationality that is embedded in society. Non-Western culture such as the behaviour of following 'seniors' from the same high school or university regardless of rational choice looks very irrational. This is because rationality has so far been highly developed with an eye on the economic market, ignoring the fact that human beings are socially structured and belief and values in each society are not universal but contingent. Fukuyama argues that "[i]t is an act of considerable intellectual hubris to believe that only economic goals in the narrow sense can be considered rational" (ibid:37).

The Korean case (as well as Japan's and Italy's), with seemingly non-rational factionalism, regionalism and continuous splitting of political parties, well illustrates the problems rational choice theorists have in coming to terms with culture. These Korean patterns of behaviour were assumed rather than explained, or even relegated to the condition of the 'structural problems' of the ROK's political system. Furthermore, Korean scholars seemed unwilling to explore the extent to which these 'non-rational' phenomena could actually be explained in a way that recognised both their specificity (out of the Confucian legacy, for example) and the rationality of such behaviour from the vantage point of individual political actors in the specificity of the Korean socio-political and cultural context: what is rational in one culture may not be rational in another. Can rational choice and culture be accommodated in an explanation of the formation, instability and collapse of Korean political coalitions?

Rational choice theories in coalition studies have gone too far in their search for parsimony, and as a result many crucial variables, most notably culture, have not been included to explain *what is actually going on* in the cases under investigation. In explaining ROK political parties or coalition party politics in non-Western settings through established Western coalition theories, it is crucial to add cultural variables such as regionalism and cronyism or Confucianism as important factors influencing political actors' behaviour or voters' behaviour. Fission and fusion among parties in the last two decades has been the main feature of Korean party politics and has often been considered as a barrier to consolidating democracy and maintaining government stability. To explain the fission and fusion of the parties it is important to examine to what ends politicians or parties are gathering and separating and how they form parties and defect from previous parties. To explore the procedures within the government or parties causing them to implement party policies or to make or break government among parties, socially embedded culture is a very important factor to look at. In the case of the ROK it is not difficult to identify the rigid vertical hierarchy within party members from the top to the bottom: Confucianism is pervasively embedded in society.

The possibility of overcoming the dichotomy between rational choice theory and culture is also suggested by Daniel Little (1991:36). Little maintains that rational

choice theory can be legitimately applied to non-Western culture because "the notion of goal-directed rationality is not an ethnocentric concept". The original rational choice theory is based on individual self-interest, which neglects the influence of social norms and values in the cultural context. This is simply characterised as a 'thin' theory of human action, which provides an abstract description of goals in an economic market environment. As human beings are goal-directed, calculating the costs and benefits of each possible choice, rational choice theory could not convincingly counter claims by interpretivists that human action needs thicker descriptions than accounts of norms, values and beliefs. Little argues the dimension of rationality needs to be extended. For the concept of economic rationality and the model of maximising egoism, individuals calculate the costs and benefits of each possible choice in the most abstract way. However, when individuals need to make their optimal choice, utility does not always reflect narrow self-interest in strictly economic terms. If individuals have a list of goods that they value in accordance with their own preferences, individual choice will not always be the same as when they value the same good in many different strategies. Individuals can choose their own utility without assuming precise or quantifiable estimates of probabilities, for cost and benefit can be assessed not only by narrow economic calculation, but by social norms and values. Utility can be valued or calculated differently as a result of the "local normative commitment" of each individual, i.e. voting for regional leaders can be rational in South Korea rather than following emotional ties. Individual actors will make a choice dependent on their own strategy and the social and cultural context. Little refers to this concept as "broadened practical rationality". Through this approach, Little manages to relax restrictive egoistic assumptions based on utility maximisation while still retaining one fundamental pillar of rational choice theory—calculation of the costs and benefits of various possible actions.

Critiques and directions for future research

This paper has shown that empirical studies on coalitions have been mainly conducted in West European countries, whereas quantitative and theory-driven studies have been carried out mostly by scholars in North America. In their paper, De Winter *et al.* (2002:3) point out that "rational choice theories have always dominated the study of government formation, but … despite considerable advances these theories still lack predictive precision, and also leave many crucial variables under-explored because of its focus on only one aspect of coalition formation: the party composition." In the same paper (ibid:32), the authors succinctly display the main problems regarding what we are actually missing in coalition studies. The general problems they discuss can be briefly summarised as follows:

- Data sets are usually collected from Keesing's *Historical Archives* and the *European Journal of Political Research*. This means data are collected for empirical testing on the existing theories. Other variables such as factions or institutions are therefore missing, as previous studies were mainly concerned with size and party composition.
- Poor operationalisation of theoretical variables is leading to unreliable and unstable conclusions or lack of expert surveys.
- Basic assumptions are oversimplified. (The authors argue that good coalition theories should be multi-motivational, not only office- or policy-motivational).
- Selection is biased by an over-restricted choice of countries and limited time periods. Cases should be extended regardless of cabinet types or party systems and regardless of geographical distance.
- Some essential components of coalition formation and governance are traditionally neglected. There is, for instance, a lack of attention to formation failure, bargaining failure and personal selection or a too exclusive focus on parties. Investigation should be extended to the head of state, pressure groups, foreign powers, or informal veto power.
- Another crucial problem with coalition studies lies in uncontrolled comparisons of large samples of cabinets. Most data used for existing cross-country studies are actually overused and outdated. Single or small-N comparison case studies should occupy a more central place in coalition studies. De Winter *et al*. argue that the weakest part of coalition formation studies is a lack of 'thick' descriptions, as mathematical explanation predominates in coalition theories.

Coalition research fundamentally lacks in-depth qualitative studies. It needs to include explanatory variables other than size, extend to non-Western political systems and non-parliamentary regimes. It also needs to be extended from a study of parties as monolithic organisations to individual members or other political groups (i.e. trades unions) influencing governance.

As established coalition theories have gone too far in parsimonious explanation, it is now time to pay more attention to the conventional methods such as thick descriptive analysis or the introduction of provocative trials such as amalgams of rational choice theory and cultural variables to refine existing coalition theories. By looking at non-Western countries, the study of coalition theories can also add new data set to refine established coalition studies and in doing so it will make findings more robust and explanations more sensitive to the context.

Notes

1. Müller and Strøm 2000, cited in De Winter *et al*. 2002:3.
2. The result of rapid economic development by authoritarian governments from 1960 to 1987 (the Park Chung-hee and Chun Doo-hwan governments) was to increase demands for democracy from a civil rights movement and brought the regime to an end. This is often called 'a crisis of success' in Korean politics (Diamond and Kim 2000:69). Nationwide demonstrations from civil society movements forced the demise of the Chun presidency and of the government. The succeeding presidential candidate Roh Tae-woo announced on 29 June 1987 that he would basically accept fair presidential elections. This signalled the start of the democratisation era in Korea. Despite his unpopularity (as still essentially authoritarian), Roh Tae-woo succeeded in the presidential elections in December 1987 and practically continued a military government despite his claims of being a "man on the street".
3. Choi 2002:110.
4. Laver and Schofield 1990.

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Newspapers (South Korea)

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THE MYŎNJUJŎN: A SILK MERCHANTS' GUILD IN LATE CHOSŎN KOREA

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Introduction

This paper is part of a broader research project attempting to understand the role of commerce in Chosŏn-dynasty Korea, a project that will hopefully contribute something to our general understanding of the position of commerce in pre-capitalist societies. Commerce has clearly played an important role in human societies since long before the rise of capitalism. The anthropologist Eric Wolf pointed out the rarity in human history of societies "where all surpluses are siphoned upwards and redistributed downward through the echelons of a hierarchically organized elite without the participation of commercial intermediaries or merchants."[1] Likewise, although the political economy of Chosŏn Korea was fundamentally based upon the extraction of tribute and a highly developed system of state-controlled redistribution, merchants had an increasingly important role as intermediaries in those processes.[2] So, in a society like that of Chosŏn Korea, the relationship between state and merchants is absolutely central to understanding commerce.

Within this context, this paper will be limited to examining one particular commercial institution—the *sijŏn* 市廛 or licensed guilds of late Chosŏn Seoul—and will make a specific case study of the Myŏnjujŏn or Domestic Silk Merchants' Guild. Korean research on the sijŏn merchants is fairly scarce and information in English-language texts is almost non-existent, so I will give a brief outline of what sort of institution the sijŏn were.

The sijŏn system

In one form or another, this system of city commerce lasted for around a thousand years from the beginning of the Koryŏ dynasty (918) right up until the end of the

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Chosŏn period (1910), providing the government and the citizens of the capital with the goods they required. As the early 19th-century government manual *Man'gi yoram* notes:

> The King's city is organised such that Chongmyo [the royal ancestral shrine] lies to the left and Sajikdan [altar to the guardian deities of the state] to the right, while the court is at the front with the markets behind. Since the sijŏn are concerned with the commerce of the common people and at the same time provide goods needed by the state, the rulers of the country consider them to be important.[3]

Although government policy and Confucian ideology tended towards the suppression of commercial activities in favour of agricultural production or at least the strict control of merchants and markets, the above quotation shows that in practice the Chosŏn ruling class also recognised the importance of commerce. It therefore consistently tried to maintain the sijŏn system as a way of channelling commerce so that it could simultaneously control it and benefit from it. This was especially true after the introduction of the *taedongbŏp* 大同法 system in the early 17th century, whereby taxes and tribute were exacted from the population in easily convertible form (cloth, cash or rice) and then used to pay *kongin* 貢人 (tribute merchants) and *sijŏnin* for other goods required by the government.

In practice the sijŏn of late Chosŏn, as described in the *Man'gi yoram*, consisted of around 74 separate guilds specialising in everything from umbrellas to toffee and sandals to pheasants. Each of these was made up of a number of individual merchants or groups of merchants with their own businesses, sometimes operating from joint premises (*chŏnbang* 廛房) mostly located on or around Chongno in central Seoul, sometimes from their own homes and sometimes as street hawkers. From at least the 17th century, the government had divided the sijŏn into those that had to provide a fixed level of tribute (*yup'un kakchŏn* 有分各廛) and those that did not (*mup'un kakchŏn* 無分各廛). At the apex of the system the Chosŏn government designated those sijŏn which it considered most important and from which it required the most tribute as the 'Six Guilds' (*yugŭijŏn* 六矣廛 or *yukchubijŏn* 六主比廛). This was actually a constantly changing group of sijŏn, but in the second half of the 19th century it seems to have consisted of the Ipjŏn 立廛 (Chinese Silk Guild, also called Sonjŏn 線廛), Paengmokjŏn 白木廛 (Cotton Cloth Guild, also called Myŏnp'ojŏn 綿布廛), Myŏnjujŏn 綿紬廛 (Domestic Silk Guild), Naewae'ŏmuljŏn 內外魚物廛 (Inner and Outer Dried Fish Guilds), Chijŏn 紙廛 (Paper Guild) and the Chŏp'ojŏn/P'ojŏn 苧布廛/布廛 (Ramie Cloth Guild / Hemp Cloth Guild).[4]

The guild organisations of sijŏn merchants were known as *tojung* 都中 and probably varied greatly in their complexity according to the size and importance of the sijŏn. Generally speaking, it is known that each had a headman called a *taehaengsu* 大行首, who often seems to have been elected by the membership. They also had a

guildhall called a *toga* 都家, where meetings were held and merchandise and other sundries such as stationery were stored. This tojung, in common with the pattern of pre-capitalist guild organisations in many countries, was responsible for protecting the commercial privileges of the guild merchants, minimising internal competition and, perhaps most importantly in the Chosŏn context, regulating relations with government.

From the government side, the administration of the sijŏn system fell under the jurisdiction of a number of government departments, but the offices most closely concerned with its operation were the Hansŏngbu 漢城府 (Capital Administrative Bureau) and its sub-office, the P'yŏngsisŏ (Office for Market Regulation). Besides the prevention of fraud, these offices were particularly responsible for the administration of the monopoly rights of the sijŏn, known as *kŭmnanjŏn'gwon* 禁亂廛權, which forbade non-sijŏn merchants from selling sijŏn commodities within the area of the capital. Although this monopoly right was supposedly removed from all but the Six Guilds with the *Sinhae tonggong* (commercial equalisation) declaration of 1791, documents dating from the late 19th century provide evidence to the contrary.[5] It seems that even after the apparent 'liberalisation' of commerce in the late 18th century, many sijŏn could still rely on the government to defend them against competition from private merchants or to arbitrate in disputes between different sijŏn.[6]

Evaluation of sources

In the past, scholars studying the sijŏn have largely relied on government annals and other government sources such as the administrative manual *Man'gi yoram*. Recently, however, Ko Tonghwan has done much to elucidate the inner structure of the sijŏn guilds, the tojung, using a number of original sources created by the guilds themselves.[7] My research on the Myŏnjujŏn will also concentrate on these sorts of sources and will attempt to look at both the inner structure of the guild and its relationship to the government. Fortunately, a large number of account books belonging to the Myŏnjujŏn have survived in the Kawai Collection[8] held at Kyōtō University. These books appear to have come from the Myŏnjujŏn's guildhall and the earliest (bar one or two) date from late 1864. This dating is apparently due to the fact that the hall had burnt down earlier that year and most of the guild's account books had gone with it.[9] The surviving documents include quite a variety of account books relating to the guild's dealings with the government as well as accounts of daily expenses and various books recording payments by guild members and rotas for official positions and duties within the organisation. There are also copies of government documents relating to the Myŏnjujŏn, which presumably were kept by the guild for reference purposes.

Although these documents contain a large amount of data on the activities of a

group of late Chosŏn merchants and are thus very valuable sources, it is also worth noting their limitations. What stands out particularly from even an initial look at them is the lack of information on the activities of individual merchants within the Myŏnjujŏn. These documents deal exclusively with the activities of the guild and its various sub-units and therefore are largely concerned with the guild's relationship with the government and its numerous offices and officials. In addition, there appears to be little or no information about the guild's activities in relation to distribution, in other words how the silk that it provided to the government got from producer to guildhall.[10] This paper will therefore concentrate on what I have learnt so far from these documents about the internal structure of the Myŏnjujŏn and its relationship to the government. Unfortunately, it is not possible at this stage to say anything about the distribution structure utilised by the Myŏnjujŏn merchants or to make any comparison between the guild's trade with the Chosŏn government and the overall amount of trade being carried out by its individual merchants.

What sort of organisation was the Myŏnjujŏn?

By the late 19th century, the Myŏnjujŏn already had a history of at least 400 years behind it, with the earliest reference to the guild dating from 1485.[11] It appears periodically in government records from then onwards, often in relation to commercial disputes, as in 1788 when there was a dispute between the Myŏnjujŏn and the Chokturijŏn (Jewellery Guild) over the right to sell black silk, or 1847 when it came into conflict with the Mojajŏn (Hatters' Guild) over Western cotton.[12] When the guild is mentioned in government texts such as *T'akchiji* or *Man'gi yoram*, it always appears in the list of the Six Guilds and is consistently near the top, either in third or sometimes second position. While these texts give no concrete information about the scale of the guild's activities, they do indicate its position as one of the most important and powerful economic organisations in pre-modern Korea and an organisation with considerable value for the Chosŏn government.

Government records also indicate that sections of the guild's shops or guildhall were burnt down on a number of occasions. In fact the Myŏnjujŏn seems to have been particularly unlucky on this account, suffering catastrophic fires in 1761, 1844 and 1864, and on each occasion receiving assistance from the government to rebuild. The entry in the *Ilsŏngnok* annal relating to the last fire is useful in that it gives us some idea of the size of the Myŏnjujŏn's buildings. It relates that the guild lost 50 *k'an*[13] of guildhall (presumably the whole building) and 40 *k'an* of shops.[14]

Plans drawn in the early 20th century also tell us something about the location and layout of the guild. According to a map which is reproduced by Pyŏn Kwangsŏk,[15] the buildings of the Myŏnjujŏn stood on the south side of Chongno, to the west of the Posin'gak bell tower. Facing on to the main street were three main sections of shops

called *pang* 房, each subdivided into a further ten smaller units. Two more pang were situated behind these on the small alley that ran parallel to Chongno, and hence called *hubang* ('back shops'). Unfortunately, the map does not show the location of the guildhall, although the fact that it burnt down with a number of shops in 1864 would indicate that it was close to the various Myŏnjujŏn pang.

In terms of its merchandise, we can get a good idea of the types of silk that the guild dealt in from its own documents, which outline all its trade with the government.[16] The generic term for the domestically produced silk in which the Myŏnjujŏn had a monopoly was *myŏngju* 明紬 or *myŏnju* 綿紬, but the specific varieties of silk that the guild sold to the government were *suju* 水紬, *t'oju* 吐紬 and *sangju* 上紬. Suju was a type of high-quality silk gauze, known in Korean as *kip* 깁. Besides plain suju the guild also dealt in red (*taehong* 大紅), green (*ch'orok* 草綠) and indigo (*nam* 藍) suju. T'oju was the name for a heavy, rather expensive type of Korean silk which could also be plain (*paekt'oju* 白吐紬) or dyed indigo, red, green, yellow (*hwangt'oju* 黃吐紬), black (*hŭkt'oju* 黑吐紬), purple (*chajŏkt'oju* 紫的吐紬) or blue (*ach'ŏngt'oju* 鴉靑吐紬).[17] The term sangju apparently refers to a high quality type of myŏngju, which the guild provided to the Myŏngnyegung (today's Toksugung palace). The Myŏnjujŏn documents seem to indicate that the guild also dealt with raw silk (*paeksa* 白絲), although it is not clear how.

As with the other members of the Six Guilds, the Myŏnjujŏn merchants appear to have had a social status similar to that of the Chosŏn *chungin* 中人 or middling class of technical staff and petty officials.[18] They dealt on a regular basis with the lower echelons of the government bureaucracy, appear to have eaten and dressed well and were organised into lineages where legitimate sons could inherit the business and guild position of their fathers. Organisations such as the sijŏn guilds usually had a set of regulations—called *ibŭi* 立議—governing the conduct of members and in particular entrance into the guild. Unfortunately the Myŏnjujŏn's ibŭi has not survived,[19] but the Myŏnjujŏn documents show indirectly that entrance regulations were similar to those found in the Ipjŏn's, that is, the Chinese Silk Guild's ibŭi.[20] It is clear that the guild discriminated between new members who had relatives already in the organisation and those that did not. In the latter case the new entrant, known as a *p'ansillaein* 判新來人, had to pay a membership fee at least twice as large as that levied on those who had a father or uncle who was already a guild member, and as with the Ipjŏn, they probably had to be recommended by an existing member too.[21] This demonstrates that the Myŏnjujŏn, like other sijŏn, was a largely lineage-based organisation where the inheritance of a place within the guild was written into its regulations. This is further supported by even a brief look at the names which occur in the guild's documents. One can find many examples of contemporaneous members with the same surname and generation name, indicating that they are brothers or paternal cousins; interestingly, it is also possible to find examples of members who

may be maternal cousins, as indicated by their sharing of a generation name but not a surname.[22]

A more detailed analysis of the documents might reveal the exact number of members of the guild at a particular point in time; however, at the moment it is only possible to give a rough idea. In the 1870s and 1880s, the guild's membership was certainly at least 120, as this is the number of subscribers to one of its mutual funds.[23] But it is also quite possible that the actual membership was considerably more than that. On the basis of a different source, Ko Tonghwan estimates that each of the Six Guilds consisted of between 600 and 1200 individual members.[24]

How the Myŏnjujŏn functioned for its members

While it appears that the Chosŏn government played a major role in the early formation of the sijŏn and saw them as existing largely for its own benefit, it is also clear that for us to call an organisation a guild, it must have existed at least in part for the benefit of its members. This was certainly the case for the Myŏnjujŏn, which, like the other constituents in the yugŭijŏn, or Six Guilds, sought to represent its members to the government and perhaps most importantly to protect their monopoly over their specialist commodity: myŏngju. We know from government records that the guild regularly took its grievances to the authorities and became embroiled in disputes with other merchants on a number of occasions in the 19th century.[25] The Myŏnjujŏn documents reveal that the guild appointed an official to deal with cases of *nanjŏn*—that is non-sijŏn merchants dealing in sijŏn products—who was called the *nanjŏn ch'aji* 亂廛次知. Although it is unclear exactly how the Myŏnjujŏn caught or reported illegal traders, there is evidence that the nanjŏn ch'aji had close relations with two particular government offices, the Hansŏngbu and the Hyŏngjo 刑曹 (Board of Punishment).[26] It is known that both of these offices were involved in the process of catching and punishing nanjŏn merchants.[27] So unless the post of nanjŏn ch'aji was some sort of sinecure, charged only with delivering bribes to government offices, it would seem that the guild continued to be involved in the active protection of its monopoly in the late 19th century.

As with guild-type organisations in other parts of the world, the Myŏnjujŏn had an important financial role to play in the lives of the merchants who made up its membership. It operated on the basis of a number of separate mutual funds or syndicates called *kye* 契 and *so* 所, each of which would provide funds to cover the funerals of merchants or their close relatives. In the guild's expenses books (*sangyongch'aek* 上用冊) we can find many examples of such payments for the funerals of parents, wives, uncles and the merchants themselves.[28] These mutual funds also provided loans to the merchants either with no interest or with rates varying between 1 and 5 per cent per month.[29] While this was one way for the guild to raise funds so as

to fulfil its obligations to the government, it could also be understood as a form of mutual insurance for the merchants, allowing them to get through hard times and avoid bankruptcy in a society where other forms of financial institution were non-existent.

Besides its role in mediating between merchants and government, protecting their monopoly and providing for the general welfare of the merchants, the Myŏnjujŏn had important ritual and social functions that seem to have been designed to strengthen the internal hierarchy of the guild while promoting harmonious relations between members. The sijŏn merchants in general carried out annual and perhaps more frequent rituals at the shrines dedicated to the Chinese god of war Kwanu 關羽. This deified fictional/historical figure from the famous novel *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* was (and still is) a god of wealth worshipped by Chinese businessmen.[30] By the end of the Chosŏn dynasty there were five Kwanu shrines in Seoul—north, east, south, west, and one small central shrine next to the Posin'gak, which must have been frequented by the sijŏn merchants. The Myŏnjujŏn merchants made a sacrifice, presumably for the well-being of the guild, in the tenth month of every year at the Nammyo 南廟 (South Kwanu shrine). This cost them 40 *nyang*, plus a further three nyang for an officiating priest, with these costs rising massively to more than 180 nyang by the late 1880s.[31] The guild also carried out a sacrificial ritual to the tutelary deity of the guildhall, which appears to have taken place annually in the fourth or fifth month. The guild account books record that this ritual cost 20 nyang.[32] Besides these annual rituals, there also appear to have been monthly *kosa* 告祀 rituals in the guildhall.

The social order within the guild was reinforced by a great variety of gifts and allowances given to members for carrying out certain duties or to express condolences or congratulations on particular occasions. The accounts of the guild's junior administrative body, the Pibang, regularly include *munan* 問安—gifts of tobacco given to officials as a courtesy on certain occasions. Examples of such occasions include the death of a niece;[33] the wedding of a granddaughter;[34] or a visit to the family grave.[35] The same accounts also show that tobacco was required at the regular meetings of the guild, which must have been important social as well as administrative occasions.[36] In the accounts of the Myŏnjujŏn's senior administrative body, the Taebang, there are similar expenses for condolences or congratulations, apparently involving wine or feasting, called *wibae* 慰盃 and *chujŏp* 酒接.[37]

Alongside the various irregular gifts outlined above, the officials of the guild also received regular monthly or annual allowances of tobacco and other goods, creating a complex system of redistribution within the guild. Such allowances include *ch'iwi* 致慰 which seems to have consisted of food granted to newly appointed officials in either the Taebang or the Pibang. In the case of the latter body, the account book *Susŏk ch'iwi ch'aek* records that the officials of the Pibang were given various kinds

of seafood including octopus and sea cucumber as well as tobacco and chickens. The Myŏnjujŏn's 'manual of operations', called *Tŭngnok*, also stipulates numerous other allowances that the high officials of the guild were to receive on a regular basis, sometimes in cash, sometimes in food or tobacco and sometimes in the form of other goods such as hats, needles and incense.[38] The regulations laid out in the *Tŭngnok* for this system of distribution clearly reinforce the strict hierarchy of the guild, with a scale of remuneration starting at the top with the taehaengsu, or headman, and descending through the various grades of officials. It is worth noting that age and length of service to the guild were also important in the organisation's internal order, as those members with the highest age seniority, known as *samchwa* 三座, were high up in the pecking order for allowances even if they did not hold an official position.[39]

The other side of the coin to these allowances and gifts were fines levied on guild members for breaking rules. A part of the Pibang's income came from fines collected from members for transgressions such as using disrespectful language to elders,[40] or disobeying orders.[41] A more serious offence seems to have been making mistakes in an account book or other record. If a member acting as a clerk omitted something from an account book (*nangnu* 落漏) or recorded something twice (*ch'ŏmnok* 疊錄), this could bring a fine of three nyang.[42] Fines levied on the senior members of the Myŏnjujŏn can be found in the account book of the Taebang, although they are less frequent and costly than those levied by the Pibang on the junior members. Obviously these fines must have been important for maintaining the order of the organisation, but they also seem to have been a useful source of income, at least in the case of the Pibang, where they could often amount to more than the expenditure for a specific accounting period.

Responsibilities of the Myŏnjujŏn to the government

As has already been noted, the sijŏn served a two-fold purpose for the Chosŏn government. They were both a way of securing goods needed by government offices and royal palaces and a way of controlling commercial activities in the capital.

The Myŏnjujŏn documents indicate that, in line with the general Chosŏn taxation system, the merchants of the guild had to provide tribute to the government in three forms: tribute in kind, labour services, and cash taxes or tributes in various forms. In general these duties were called *kugyŏk* or *siyŏk*.[43]

A) Chinbae 進排

For the sijŏn merchants, like the kongin, or tribute merchants, the bulk of the goods provided to the government were not actually given as tribute but took the form of trade carried out between guild and government, where the guild received a fixed

price for goods, called *suga* 受價. In general, this provisioning of goods to the Chosŏn government was known as *chinbae*. In the case of the Myŏnjujŏn this meant regularly providing large quantities of silks such as t'oju and suju to various government offices and palaces. In addition to this general chinbae, the guild had to provide silk for the Chosŏn government to give as tribute to the Chinese emperor. This came in two forms: *sep'ye* 歲幣, which was sent in the tenth month of every year, and *pangmul* 方物, which could be sent at various times of the year with missions to China. As well as sep'ye and pangmul, the Myŏnjujŏn supplied the silk that envoys to China had to give as gifts to the government offices they stopped at en route to Beijing—this was called *ch'ŏngin yedan* 淸人禮單. The guild was also expected to provide silk for diplomatic missions to Japan, to be given as presents to the 'King of Japan' (日本王). This was known as *waein yedan* 倭人禮單 and was provided regularly up until 1876, when the formal relationship between Chosŏn and Meiji Japan changed with the Kanghwa Treaty.

Table 1 gives an outline of all the Myŏnjujŏn's annual chinbae duties and the suga it was supposed to receive in return. It shows that the guild's responsibilities to the

Table 1: Outline of Myŏnjujŏn chinbae burden

Type of chinbae	**Quantity of silk in bolts[44] (*p'il* 疋) per year**	**Suga in bolts of cotton (*hajimok*) per bolt of silk**	**Notes**
Sep'ye 歲幣	400 p'il	9 p'il (*taedongmok*)	
Pangmul 方物 (*chinhŏn yemul*)	900 p'il	8 p'il	
Suju 水紬	?	7 p'il	Quantity of chinbae seems to have varied according to government demand
Myŏngnyegung sangju 明禮宮上紬	30 p'il	4.5 p'il	
T'oju 吐紬	80 p'il[45]	10 p'il	The T'ojugye (吐紬契) also provided a varying amount of dyed t'oju on demand, for which it received a 'dyeing price' (染受價)
Waein yedan 倭人禮單	155 p'il	3 p'il	
Ch'ŏngin yedan 淸人禮單上紬	283 p'il[46]	*paek myŏnju* 2.5 p'il sangju 4.5 p'il	

Sources: To compile this table I have primarily used the Myŏnjujŏn's *Tŭngnok*, supported by entries from the guild's actual account books relating to chinbae (*sugach'aek* / *hoegyech'aek*). The figures for sep'ye and pangmul can also be found in the *Man'gi yoram,* 'Chaeyongp'yŏn'.

government were quite considerable, running into thousands of bolts of silk in some years.

B) YOYŎK 徭役 / KUNYŎK 軍役 (CORVÉE LABOUR)

In keeping with the rest of the more common population of Chosŏn Korea, the sijŏn merchants were required by the government to perform various kinds of corvée labour. Since they were residents of the capital, this usually meant carrying out repairs to royal palaces and shrines or papering walls and doors as *suri tobaegun* 修理塗褙軍. There are a number of Myŏnjujŏn account books that confirm that members of the guild were regularly required to carry out this kind of work. In particular, one account book titled *Haenggun* lists day by day the members assigned to various jobs. From this we can see that besides repairs and wallpapering, members of the Myŏnjujŏn were often assigned to set tables of sacrificial food for official rituals (*sangjokkun* 床足軍). And when pangmul, sep'ye or other tribute items were to be taken by diplomats, members could be called upon to wrap the gifts (*ponggwa'gun* 封裹軍). In the intercalary month of 1884, for example, eight guild members were required to prepare gifts for an American diplomat.[47] Another common job was the mending of tents used by members of the royal family (*makch'a pongjogun* 幕次縫造軍). It also seems that guild members were called on to work at the royal tombs twice a year, once in the spring and once in the autumn (*nŭnggun* 陵軍).

Compiled from the records in *Haenggun* for the year 1884, Table 2 shows clearly that members were overwhelmingly required for work as suri tobaegun. It also shows that the burden on the merchants was quite heavy, with a total of 983 person/days of labour provided by the Myŏnjujŏn to the government.

Another account book, *Kunbanggu ch'aek*, appears to relate to cash payments made as a substitute for providing actual corvée labourers. Under a system called *koripche* 雇立制, which was common in late Chosŏn Seoul, the cost of labour was paid for in cash by the persons or institutions responsible for providing it.[48] In the case of the Myŏnjujŏn, the Pibang's *saengsikkye* fund paid a standard fee of 2 *chŏn* (raised to 3 chŏn or 1 nyang for certain types of work) called *panggumun* 防口文 for every person/day of labour. This appears to have applied to between a third and a half of the labour that was nominally required of the Myŏnjujŏn merchants. For the year 1884 the *Kunbanggu ch'aek* records a total of 313 person/days of labour costing 109 nyang 8 chŏn. This represents around a third of the guild's total corvée labour duties for this period.

These data certainly seem to corroborate the findings of other scholars who have argued that labour services were giving way to wage labour in late Chosŏn. However, if we take at face value the evidence that a half to two-thirds of *yoyŏk* could not be avoided by making a cash payment, then the burden of actual forced labour on the guild was quite substantial. The Pibang, which controlled the junior members of

Table 2: Pibang corvée records for 1884

Month	**Number of workers by job**						
	sangjokkun 床足軍	**suri tobaegun** 修理塗褙軍	*ch'angho tobaegun* 窓戶塗褙軍	**makch'a pongjogun** 幕次縫造軍	**ponggwa-gun** 封裹軍	**nŭnggun** 陵軍	**other**
1st	8						
2nd	15	66				19	
3rd	7	56		16			8
4th		37	2		16		
5th	19	49			8		
Inter-calary		30			22		
6th	4	30			8		
7th	5	56					
8th	11	37				19	48
9th	1	96	39	16			7
10th		34	8		20		16
11th	7	58	5				
12th	9	7		64			
Totals	**86**	**556**	**54**	**96**	**74**	**38**	**79**

the guild, seems to have existed largely to ensure that the Myŏnjujŏn fulfilled its corvée labour obligations, whether in cash or in actual labour. So, despite a general trend toward the replacement of corvée with cash payments, the younger Myŏnjujŏn merchants were still having to perform labour services in royal palaces and offices in the last decades of the 19th century.

c) Cash tributes

The Myŏnjujŏn was required to pay a great variety of cash tributes ranging from the regular fixed monthly tax of 6 nyang required by the P'yŏngsisŏ (Office for Market Regulation) to annual tributes collected by officials from each government office in the capital. These might be provided at certain times of the year on special occasions such as the *Yudu* festival of the sixth month or as an annual tax divided into spring

Table 3: Outline of cash tributes paid by the Myŏnjujŏn[49]

Type of tribute	Occasion	Recipients	Amount
Sangmi 朔米	Monthly	P'yŏngsisŏ	6 nyang
P'yŏngsisŏ changmu yech'a 平市署掌務例次	Monthly	Officers of the P'yŏngsisŏ's senior department	2 chŏn each
Hansŏngbu changmu yech'a 漢城府掌務例次	Monthly	Officers of the Hansŏngbu's main department	1 chŏn each
Yudu tanja 流頭單子	Sixth/seventh month	22 government offices	1 nyang 3 chŏn
Paekchong tanja 百種單子	Sixth/seventh month	28 government offices	1 nyang 8 chŏn
Kosa tanja 告祀單子	Tenth month	21 government offices	4 nyang 3 chŏn
Sehwa tanja 歲畵單子	Twelfth month	25 government offices	1 nyang 6 chŏn
Kakch'ŏ kyebang yesong 各處契房例送	Once or twice a year, in the spring and autumn	Different offices within a variety of government bureaux such as the Sŭngjŏngwon, Sahŏnbu, Hojo, Ŭigŭmbu etc.	401 nyang (annual payments to each office varied between 5 and 20 nyang)
Naryech'ŏng yesong 儺禮廳例送	Payments made in spring and autumn	Naryech'ŏng	4 nyang
Subodan 修補單	Irregular payment, perhaps notionally as a contribution to building repairs	Various government offices	5 chŏn–1 nyang
Sinsadan 身死單 + Pu/mosangdan 父/母喪單	Irregular payments, apparently made on the death of a govt. officer or one of his parents	Officials in various offices	5 chŏn
Chinbae injŏng 進排人情	When providing chinbae	A variety of officials involved in the process of providing chinbae silk	Varied widely according to the type of silk and the agencies and officials involved
Suga injŏng 受價人情	When receiving suga	Various officials involved in the process of receiving suga payments	Variable, but often around 500 nyang in total

and autumn payments. Table 3 gives an overview of some of the regular tributes that can be found in the guild's operating manual *Tŭngnok* and account books such as *Taebang hoegye ch'aek*. This is by no means an exhaustive list of such cash tributes paid by the guild to government offices.

The variety and complexity of payments made by the Myŏnjujŏn to officials and offices seems quite bewildering and raises the question of how these various payments should be understood. Although there was no official commercial tax as such, the monthly sangmi payment to the P'yŏngsisŏ seems to be the closest thing to such a tax, as it was collected regularly by the office most closely related to the sijŏn, presumably for its own running costs.[50] Many of the other payments seem to have the character of bribes collected regularly by the officials of government offices, many of which can have had little regular contact with the Myŏnjujŏn. At the same time, these payments were a very fixed and normal part of the guild's obligations, recorded in a number of account books and carefully detailed in the *Tŭngnok*. These were not abnormalities or the *ad hoc* exactions of greedy officials, but seem to have been an integral part of the guild's tributary relationship with the government.

This does not mean to say that this was the ideal state of affairs to which either the guild or the government aspired. The kyebang yesong, one of the Myŏnjujŏn's heaviest burdens of cash tribute, seems to have been a type of abuse that was recognised by the government as early as the mid-18th century. The Chief State Councillor (*yŏng'ŭijong* 領議政) described it as a form of collusion between merchants and petty officials, whereby the former would pay the latter to exempt them from certain tax and corvée duties. This was essentially a usurpation of the taxation system for the private profit of officials and the yŏng'ŭijong advised that it be severely forbidden.[51] At least one hundred years later it still seems to have been in existence, although in the case of the Myŏnjujŏn it is not clear exactly what the guild received in return for its numerous payments.

Structure of the Myŏnjujŏn

The structure of the Myŏnjujŏn appears to have been rather complex and bureaucratic, with a relatively large number of official positions and a number of mutual funds, each with their own set of accounts. Since the guild's book of regulations (ibŭi) is missing from the surviving Myŏnjujŏn documents, any understanding of the internal structure of the organisation must be based on indirect evidence from the surviving account books and inference from what is known about other sijŏn.

In common with the organisations of other sijŏn and the organisations of *pobusang* (back and pack peddlers), the Myŏnjujŏn had two administrative sections, the Taebang 大房 and the Pibang 裨房. The former was the senior governing body of the guild, while the latter seems to have been largely responsible for providing corvée

labour to the government and controlling the ordinary members. Besides these, the guild also maintained a number of so and kye which are probably best understood as mutual funds, each one with specific income and expenses and a specific function, often associated with the provision of chinbae in one form or another. There were also a number of officers, called *ch'aji* 次知, who had responsibility for particular aspects of the guild's operation, such as receiving payment from the government or preparing pangmul. Besides the ch'aji there were *yusa* 有司, who appear to have been selected from the membership on a rotating basis and were responsible for the everyday accounts of the Taebang for a five-day period. The guild also had two—or possibly more—clerks called *chosa* 曺司. The Myŏnjujŏn had another official, called a *p'yemak* 弊莫, whose function has not yet been determined. This official was obviously important, as he were always listed in a senior position in lists of allowances and also a received a monthly cash allowance of five nyang, which is recorded in the guild's *Taebang hoegye ch'aek*.

Table 4 gives an outline of the hierarchy of the Myŏnjujŏn, based on charts in the *Tŭngnok* detailing allowances for members. It should be noted that some of the categories are actual official positions, while others, such as samchwa and *kunjung*, are ranks and therefore indicate the position of non-office-holding members according to their age-based status within the guild.

The Taebang

A) Personnel and function

Forming the senior body of the guild, the Taebang had an executive of six members in three grades. Acting as representative for the whole organisation was the taehaengsu, who was appointed at least once every two months from among the senior members of the guild. This was possibly done by a vote of the whole membership, as was the case in other sijŏn such as the Ipjŏn. Along with the taehaengsu, two *kongwon* (*sanggongwon* and *hagongwon*) were appointed to take care of general business with him. The most senior members of the Myŏnjujŏn, though, appear to have been the permanent executive of three yŏngwi 領位, headed by the *toyŏngwi*. Below him were the *puyŏngwi* and *samyŏngwi*. They all held their positions for life and when one died, the yŏngwi immediately below would step up to take his position.[52] The yŏngwi also presumably had some control over the appointment of the taehaengsu, and acted as his advisors.[53] It seems that other senior members of the guild without official positions were also part of the Taebang and had the right to be appointed to its positions.[54] These senior members were those who had attained one of the three membership ranks of *sipchwa*, *ojwa* and samchwa, which were almost certainly related to age, and therefore also to length of membership.[55]

The fact that the most of the account books for the Myŏnjujŏn's various funds

Table 4: Structure of the Myŏnjujŏn

Taebang 大房		
taehaengsu 大行首		
toyŏngwi 都領位	puyŏngwi 副領位	samyŏngwi 三領位
sanggongwon (上)公員	*hagongwon* (下)公員	
samchwa 三座		
p'yemak 弊莫		
ch'aji 次知		
nanjŏnch'aji 亂廛次知, *pangmulch'aji* 方物次知, *sujŏngch'aji* (2) 修正次知, *sugach'aji* (2) 受價次知, *ch'anjŏngch'aji* 饌正次知		
ojwa 五座		
sipchwa 十座		
Pibang 裨房 (耳目)		
Susŏk 首席 (*kunjung haengsu* 軍中行首)		
(*sang*) *soim* (上)所任	(*ha*) *soim* (下)所任	
kunjung 軍中 (ordinary guild members)		
chosa 曺司 (2)		

Source: *Tŭngnok*

are signed off 'Taebang' with the stamp of the guild underneath indicates that the six executive members of the Taebang oversaw the majority of the activities of the guild. In many cases, particularly in the books recording payment received from the government (*suga ch'aek* 受價冊), the names of all six members are listed above the guild's stamp, perhaps showing a higher degree of direct supervision over these accounts and reflecting the large amounts of money often involved. The Taebang therefore had overall control of the guild's main function: the provision of chinbae, a task that was carried out through a number of kye or mutual funds which collected membership fees and silk from members and then returned dividends to them once the government had paid for the silk supplied.

b) Income and expenditure

The Taebang also had its own accounts, recording the general expenditure of the executive. These were recorded in the first instance every five days in an account book called *Iryongch'aek* and then copied up, usually every two months, to the *Taebang hoegye ch'aek*. The Taebang's principle income was the 'rent' it levied on the Myŏnjujŏn's various individual shops, called *pangse* 房稅/房貰. In the early 1880s it received 108 nyang every two months from this source. In addition, the Taebang received money made as commission from the sale of cotton received as payment from the government[56] as well as money left over from funds set aside for the purchase of silk for chinbae.[57] Occasional fines levied on members of the Taebang also added to its income.

The everyday expenditure of the Taebang recorded in the *Iryongch'aek* includes such items as charcoal, presumably for heating the guildhall, paper for account books, paper for wrapping silk to be provided to the palace, writing brushes, monthly spirit sacrifices in the guildhall (*ponch'ŏng kosa* 本廳告祀), and many other miscellaneous items required for the running of the guildhall and the guild in general. Regular expenses also included an allowance of tobacco (munan) for the Taebang executive plus special tobacco allowances given out at certain times of the year such as *ch'usŏk* or *tano*, or to express condolences or congratulations to members of the Taebang on the occasion of marriages, deaths or other important family events. As well as tobacco, the Taebang paid for allowances of food for officials such as the suga ch'aji and a cash allowance for the p'yemak. As mentioned above, the Taebang was also responsible for the guild's annual rituals; usually a sacrifice at the Nammyo shrine in the tenth month and a purification of the guildhall in the fourth or fifth month. Finally, the everyday expenses include a variety of tribute payments to various government offices, both the regular tancha and others collected on an irregular basis such as sinsadan and subodan, as outlined in Table 3 above.

At the end of every two-month accounting period, when the Taebang's income and expenditure were written up into the *Taebang hoegye ch'aek*, it was usually the case that there would be a small deficit (實不足文). This would then be made up by the guild's main reserve fund, the *poyongso* 補用所 ('Office for Financial Supplementation'). If, on the other hand, there was money left over (實余文), this would go into the poyongso.

The Pibang

a) Personnel and functions

If the Taebang had overall responsibility for chinbae and the payment of tributes to government offices, then, as we have already seen, the Pibang was responsible for mobilising ordinary members of the Myŏnjujŏn for corvée labour in palaces, government

offices and shrines. The Pibang therefore included all those members who had not yet attained the status of sipchwa or above, and were referred to as kunjung. Like the Taebang, the Pibang had its own executive, with the susŏk (who also seems to have been referred to as the kunjung haengsu) in the equivalent position to the taehaengsu, and two soim, most likely playing assisting roles similar to the taehaengsu's two kongwon.

Although the Taebang controlled the majority of the guild's funds, the Pibang does seem to have had two funds under its control. The principle one was called the *saengsikkye* 生殖契 and appears to have performed roughly the same function for the Pibang that the poyongso performed for the Taebang. The Pibang also controlled a second fund called the *mujugye* 貿紬契, the specific purpose of which is unclear. Like the guild's other mutual funds, it collected membership fees, paid for members' funerals and loaned money. Both of these funds were ultimately subordinate to the poyongso and periodically had to borrow extra funds from it.[58]

b) Income and expenditure

The general accounts of the Pibang were kept in a single book called *Pang hoegye ch'aek* and entries were made at irregular intervals. The accounts show income and various kinds of expenses; however, unlike the Taebang, the Pibang did not have 'everyday' (*iryong* 日用) funds, rather, income was paid into the saengsikkye and then expenses paid out of the same fund. General expenses included similar items to the Taebang such as ink, brushes and various kinds of paper. Most entries include a number of payments for munan tobacco as described above, as well as tobacco for meetings of the Pibang and Taebang and for daily use. It appears that the Pibang sometimes had to pay for tobacco or food for members carrying out corveé labour, although it seems that this was not usually the case.

The only income recorded in the *Pang hoegye ch'aek* is from the fines levied on the ordinary guild members that have already been discussed above. However, it seems from the rent book *Chungbu pangse ch'aek* that the saengsikkye also received money from the rent collected from guild merchants for the use of the Myŏnjujŏn's shops, although it is not clear how much this amounted to or how it was divided between the Taebang and Pibang.

The *Pang hoegye ch'aek* was signed off by the three members of the Pibang's executive and stamped with the Pibang's own seal rather than that of the Myŏnjujŏn used by the Taebang. Interestingly, the accounts were also verified by two further members after each entry, presumably as a way of preventing fraud or embezzlement.

*The Myŏnjujŏn's mutual funds (*so *and* kye*)*

The majority of the Myŏnjujŏn's surviving account books belonged to one or another of the guild's many mutual funds. Six of these were termed *so*, while the remaining

seven were kye, as outlined in Table 5. However, it is not easy to distinguish clearly between the functions of the two types of funds, and in some cases the terms seem to have been interchangeable.[59] Most of these funds had a book recording income (*ch'ahach'aek* 上下冊), which was mainly in the form of membership fees of one type or another. The size of these fees varied from fund to fund, but the most common type was called *sinch'amnye* 新參禮 or *ipch'amnye* 入參禮, literally 'newcomer's fees', and amounted to a few nyang.[60] The funds' expenses books were called *sangyongch'aek* 上用冊 and mainly recorded expenses for the funerals of members or their families. Most funds also had a third book called a *chŏnchang tŭngnok* 傳掌謄錄, which recorded the periodic transfer of the fund to a new officer, giving information on total income and expenses during the preceding period and also outstanding loans to individual members and the interest received on them. Interestingly, it seems that in some cases new members did not immediately pay their fund membership fees but would pay them later with interest, thus making more money for the fund.[61]

It might seem from the above description that the Myŏnjujŏn's mutual funds were little different to the typical funeral or lineage kye found throughout late Chosŏn Korea and performed a similar redistributive function. In the case of some of the funds, such as the Hosangso, this was probably the case: they existed solely to provide funds for funeral expenses or loans for the businesses of individual merchants and were basically the equivalent of a modern credit union. However, many of the funds appear to have had a specific purpose. As we have seen, in the case of the poyongso and the saengsikkye, that purpose was to ensure the smooth day-to-day running of the guild's two administrative departments. In the case of certain of the other funds it is fairly clear from their names what their purpose was; so, for example, the *sep'yegye* was organised for the purpose of collecting silk for sep'ye from the membership and providing it to the government, while the *waedanso* did the same for the waein yedan tribute. How exactly the guild collected and then supplied the various types of tribute silk through the mechanism of its kye and *so* is a question for future research.

However, we can get some idea of how this worked by looking at the operation of the sep'yegye. This kye had 80 members, each contributing a variable proportion of the 400 bolts of silk that the guild was required to provide every year for the tribute to the Qing emperor. According to *Sep'ye kongan*, a document dating to the 1830s, the number of bolts provided by members depended on their status, with the six members of the Taebang executive each providing four bolts, while 15 members at the bottom of the list of 80 only supplied half a bolt each. It appears that the members actually sold the silk to the kye for a fixed price.[62] When the Myŏnjujŏn received payment from the government (suga), it got two-thirds in cash and one-third in cotton cloth amounting to 1,200 bolts. Shares of this cloth, called *kit* 衿 (깃), would then be returned to the 80 members. They would each usually receive 13 bolts, with the

Table 5: The Myŏnjujŏn's *so* and kye[64]

Name of fund	Function	Income (nyang/chŏn/*p'un*)	Expenses
Poyongso 補用所	Main financial reserve fund for the Myŏnjujŏn.	Surplus suga funds received for various types of silk	Various: cash tributes, sangmi, supplementing Taebang funds and other mutual funds
Waedanso 倭單所	Provision of silk for waein yedan. Possibly also played a role as a secondary reserve fund	Surplus suga funds. These were often split 50:50 between this fund and the poyongso	?
Suju iso 水紬二所	Not known	sinch'amnye 新參禮: 5 *chungsangnye* 重床禮: 6/2/5	Funeral expenses for members and their families plus ch'iwi expenses
Hosangso 護喪所	Funeral kye for guild members	?	Funeral expenses for members and their families
Yesonso 預先所	Not known	?	?
Pop'yeso 補幣所	Not known	Surplus funds from sep'ye suga	?
Saengsikkye 生殖契	Main fund for the Pibang	Fines from members of the Pibang	General expenses of the Pibang
Mujugye 貿紬契	Paid for member's funerals and loaned money. Pibang's second fund	sinch'amnye 新參禮: 3	Funeral expenses
Sep'yegye 歲幣契	Provision of sep'ye silk. It had a permanent membership of 80	ipch'amnye 入參禮: 5	Funeral expenses
Paeksagye 白絲契	Not known	?	?
Chobigye 措備契	Not known	sinch'amnye 新參禮: 5-7/5 chungsangnye 重床禮: 4/2/5-9/3/8 *p'ansillae ipch'amnye* 判新來入參禮: 18/5	Funeral expenses for members and their families
T'ojugye 吐紬契	Provision of chinbae t'oju	?	?
Sujugye 水紬契	Provision of chinbae suju	?	?

Source: This information is compiled from information in the income (*ch'ahach'aek*) and expenses (*sangyongch'aek*) books of the various funds.

Taebang executive getting an extra two each, although this could vary according to current market conditions. Remaining cloth would be sold off and the proceeds added to the suga cash already received. This money would then pay for the *injŏng* tribute payments that were a part of the suga process, with any remainder being split between the guild's two principle funds, the poyongso and the waedanso.[63]

The other kye may not have worked in exactly the same way as the sep'yegye, but it seems likely that they worked on a similar principle, whereby members were expected to provide silk for the guild to supply to the government.

Conclusion

The Myŏnjujŏn was a complex guild-type organisation, protecting the interests of the domestic silk merchants of the Chosŏn capital and managing their relations with the government. As we have seen, it had not one, but two administrative bodies, each with their own functions and executive members. It also ran not one financial fund but around 13 kye-type mutual funds, each existing for a different purpose. The guild kept large premises in the centre of the capital, alongside the other main sijŏn, of which its guildhall formed a significant part. By the late 19th century, the surviving documents show that the Myŏnjujŏn was a sophisticated organisation that had developed over a period of at least 400 years to meet the demands of both the Chosŏn government and its own members.

As a number of scholars have pointed out, the role of the sijŏn changed considerably after the upheavals of the late 16th and early 17th centuries, and particularly with the introduction of the taedongbŏp (see above).[65] Within this context, members of the elite yugŭijŏn guilds—the Six Guilds—like the Myŏnjujŏn became especially important as suppliers of luxury items both for tribute to China and Japan and for provisioning royal palaces and government offices. As we can see from the Myŏnjujŏn's account books, most of the guild's activities were related to the provision of chinbae silk (especially sep'ye and pangmul), corvée labour and the many cash tributes that were largely incidental to the process of supplying chinbae. The guild's position as a privileged government supplier thus explains much about the organisation itself. In fact, it seems unlikely that it would have had anything like as complicated a structure if it had not been for its large and complex burden of tribute trade. The Myŏnjujŏn's close ties with state power and patronage probably also help to explain the persistence of corvée labour in the guild. At the same time, it seems that the structure and activities of the Myŏnjujŏn can tell us much about the government's system of procurement.

This paper has also looked at functions of the Myŏnjujŏn that were not directly related to government procurement. From this angle, the organisation has many features in common with guild-type organisations found all over the world, and particularly with

those of Qing China.[66] It protected the monopoly of its merchants, lent them money, looked after their funerals, held regular rituals for the well-being of its members and kept order between the merchants with a strictly hierarchical system backed up with rules, fines and regular meetings. In some aspects, the guild also had things in common with the pre-modern lineage or household organisations of China and Korea. It was in fact a complex of a number of different lineages who limited access to non-lineage entrants, and its internal organisation was one of "hierarchized persons with a differential access to a cluster of economic rights and duties."[67] This is very clearly illustrated in the Myŏnjujŏn documents, with the carefully stipulated allocation of resources—in the form of allowances of tobacco, food and sometimes cash—based on a hierarchy of age and experience, as well as the differentiation of duties between senior and junior members. So although these merchants were engaged in a somewhat heterodox activity in a bureaucratic, Confucian society, their mode of organisation closely reflected the ideological and political-economic structures of Chosŏn society at large.

To take this a step further, the Myŏnjujŏn appears to offer a window on to pre-industrial tributary society at a number of different levels. At the level of the internal organisation of the guild itself, we can see a microcosm of the relations of production and distribution within society as a whole. The level of government-guild relations demonstrate the manner in which the late Chosŏn state collected and distributed a part of the surplus through commercial intermediaries, at the same time making numerous tributary exactions on those intermediaries. As Yi Hŏnch'ang notes, after the disturbances of the late 16th and early 17th centuries, the "state came increasingly to rely on the market for the extraction and redistribution of surplus."[68] Simultaneously, the chinbae system, of which the Myŏnjujŏn and the other members of the yugŭijŏn were part, was itself intimately connected with the broader international tributary order of pre-modern East Asia. Much of the guild's existence depended on the suzerain-vassal relationship between China and Chosŏn as reflected in its sep'ye and pangmul obligations and the peer relationship between Chosŏn and Tokugawa Japan reflected in its waein yedan burden.

As was noted at the beginning of this paper, there are limitations to what the Myŏnjujŏn documents can tell us about the activities of these 19th-century Korean merchants. However, there is much more that these detailed and complex records can reveal. This paper has ignored the broader historical context of the period in which they were created, but future research will need to look at how the guild was affected by worsening government finances, the opening of the ports and increasing Western imports. It will also need to look at the question of how the organisation reacted during this period to price fluctuations and other upheavals and how government policy attempted to deal with problems that arose in the sijŏn during Korea's decades of 'opening'. Detailed analysis of the Myŏnjujŏn's account books alongside government sources will hopefully be able to tell us more about these issues.

Notes

1. Wolf 1982:82.
2. See Yi Hŏnch'ang 1996.
3. *Man'gi yoram,* 'Chaeyongp'yŏn: kakchŏn': 王都之制左祖右社前朝後市.市者小民之貿遷係焉公家之需用資焉治國者重之.
4. Pyŏn Kwangsŏk 2001:240.
5. Ko Tonghwan 1995.
6. For general information on the sijŏn system and its development see: Pyŏn Kwangsŏk 2001; Ko Tonghwan 2002; Ch'oe Pyŏngmu 1958; Yu Wondong 1994.
7. Ko Tonghwan 1995.
8. Kawai Hirotami 河合弘民 (1872–1918) was a Japanese historian who collected a large number of documents relating to Korea's economic history. It is likely that he was able to obtain the Myŏnjujŏn documents at around the time that the guild finally collapsed in the early 1910s. At that time he appears to have been assistant principal of the Technical School of the Oriental Society in Seoul (*Japan Biographical Encyclopaedia and Who's Who,* p.552).
9. *Ilsŏngnok,* Kojong 1st year, 12th month, 26th day. See note 14 below.
10. This, along with some other clues, would seem to indicate that the guild itself did not have a role in the buying of silk, but rather that each individual merchant had to provide a certain quantity of silk to the guild so that it could fulfil its duties to the government.
11. *Sŏngjong sillok* book 181, 16th year, 7th month.
12. *Sŭngjŏngwon ilki*, Chŏngjo 12th year, 11th month, 5th day; *Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok* book 234, Hŏnjong 13th year, 1st month, 25th day.
13. A *k'an* is a traditional measurement equivalent to the space between two columns or roughly 1.8 metres.
14. *Ilsŏngnok,* Kojong 1st year, 12th month, 26th day: 綿紬廛市民等訴則以爲日前失火時居接都家五十餘間及坐市守直房四十間合九十餘間盡爲被燒各項進排措備物種與擧行文簿一未收拾云矣.
15. Pyŏn Kwangsŏk 2001:265.
16. Here I have referred to the document entitled *Tŭngnok*.
17. *Tŭngnok,* p.46.
18. Pyŏn Kwangsŏk 2001:40; Ch'oe Pyŏngmu 1958:383.
19. It is clear that the guild did have such a document, as it is recorded in their guildhall inventory *Chammul torok ch'aek*.
20. Ko Tonghwan provides an outline of the entrance requirements of a number of sijŏn; see Kop Tonghwan 2002:68–70.
21. Table 5 below gives figures for *p'ansillaein* fees for entering one of the guild's funds called the *chobigye*.
22. This can be seen in documents such as *Sep'ye kongan,* which list names of members**.**
23. See, for example, *Waein yedan sugach'aek*, 1870, 2nd month. It states that shares of *suga* were given to 113 current members plus seven new members and five deceased members.

24. Ko Tonghwan 2002:72.
25. See note 12 above.
26. The Myŏnjujŏn's *Tŭngnok* stipulates that the nanjŏn ch'aji is responsible for delivering cash 'gifts' to these two offices. The guild also paid another sort of annual cash tribute directly to the Hyŏngjo's Kŭmnanbang 禁亂房, an office apparently associated with the prevention of illegal trade.
27. Pyŏn Kwangsŏk 2001:51.
28. Books recording funeral expenses include *Sujuiso sangyongch'aek, Sep'yegye sangyongch'aek, Chobigye sangyongch'aek*.
29. Ko Tonghwan 2002:83–4.
30. ibid:81. It is interesting to note that there is often a Kwanu/Guan-yu shrine where Chinese people are doing business. Accounts from the 1960s state that long after the sijŏn merchants had disappeared it was mostly Chinese who visited the Tongmyo (East Kwanu shrine) in Seoul.
31. *Taebang hoegye ch'aek,* 1888, 10th month: 南廟致誠文壹佰捌拾兩.
32. *Taebang hoegye ch'aek*, 1885, 5th month: 誠主致誠都家辦備貳拾兩.
33. *Pang hoegye ch'aek*, 1881, 7th month, 27th day: 劉首席姪女慘慽時問安南草壹斤價文肆分.
34. ibid, 1880, 11th month, 21st day: 吳三領位孫女婚禮時問安南草壹斤價文參錢貳分.
35. ibid, 1881, 4th month, 28th day: 朴上任楸行時問安南草價文參錢貳分.
36. ibid, 1880, 11th month, 21st day: 種種大裨房희좌時南草價文壹兩貳錢.
37. *Taebang hoegye ch'aek*, 1888, 10th month, 6th day: 池副領位患候平復後酒接拾伍兩; 1883, 5th month, 2nd day: 白上公員兒慽慰盃拾兩.
38. *Tŭngnok*, pp.13–20.
39. Ko Tonghwan 2002:70–72.
40. *Pang hoegye ch'aek,* 1884, 5th month, 2nd day: 白在度座上前言語不恭故損徒罰壹兩伍錢.
41. *Pang hoegye ch'aek,* 1884, 10th month, 2nd day: 崔光錫大房使喚全不顧見故房令拒逆罰壹兩.
42. *Pang hoegye ch'aek,* 1884, 1st month, 24th day: 壬午十二月等內任席金錫賢劉鎭奎中部房稅錢拾壹兩各房上下冊子落漏故毋過永損徒罰參兩.
43. *Man'gi yoram*, 'Chaeyongp'yŏn: kakchŏn, yubun kakchŏn'.
44. A Korean bolt of cloth (*p'il*) was roughly 12 metres of cloth with a width of 61 centimetres (see Lee Ki-baik:225).
45. Based on entries from *T'oju suga ch'aek* for the period 1873–1881.
46. This figure is approximate and was not supplied annually. Ch'ŏngin yedan was only provided on certain occasions such as a state funeral in Chosŏn or China when a special envoy would be sent to Beijing. The amount of silk could vary but according to figures given in *Ch'ŏngin yedan suga ch'aek,* it was typically 283 bolts. The government diplomatic manual *T'ongmun'gwan chi* also gives details of yedan, but seems to vary from the figures found in the above account book (*T'ongmun'gwan chi, kugyŏkp'yŏn,* pp.226–31).

47. *Haenggun*, 1884, intercalary 5th month, 8th day: 美國使臣出去時封과軍捌名.
48. Ko Tonghwan 1997:99; Pyŏn Kwangsŏk 2001:72.
49. This information comes from a variety of Myŏnjujŏn documents, including *Tŭngnok, Taebang hoegye ch'aek, Ilyongch'aek, Poyongso sangyongch'aek, Kakch'ŏ kyebang yesong*.
50. *Tŭngnok:* 本署〔平市署〕所納朔米十斗代錢六兩補用所直下事.
51. Kang Man-gil 1973:174.
52. As in 1885 for example, when puyongwi Kim Yunsik 金潤植 replaced Chŏn Tŭgyun 田得潤 as toyongwi, after the death of the latter (*Taebang hoegye ch'aek, Pang hoegye ch'aek*).
53. See Ko Tonghwan 2002:72–4.
54. ibid:73.
55. Ch'oe Pyŏngmu 1958:384.
56. For example, *Taebang hoegye ch'aek*, 1882, 11th month, 2nd day: 先受木拾同放賣口文拾兩.
57. For example, *Taebang hoegye ch'aek,* 1884, 6th month, 2nd day: 染藍水紬陸同措備余文拾壹兩捌錢.
58. *Mujugye ch'ahach'aek*, 1879, 2nd month, 14th day: 本契補縮次大房淸得補用所移來文壹佰兩上下.
59. The front page of one of the Waedanso's account books is titled *Waein yedan'**gye** hoegye ch'aek*.
60. For example, *Mujugye ch'ahach'aek*, 1883, 7th month, 20th day: 千一煥新參禮參兩上下.
61. *Mujugye tŭngnok ch'aek*, 1882, 1st month, 21st day: 十一月日金東郁新參禮參兩二朔邊玖分本邊合參兩玖分.
62. Entries in *Sep'ye suga tŭngnok* always record the cost of the 400 bolts of silk as 2,400 nyang, giving a cost price of 6 nyang per bolt. Considering that the government appears to have paid a fixed price of 18 nyang or 9 bolts of cotton cloth per bolt of silk, this is a very low price.
63. Based on entries in *Sep'ye suga tŭngnok* for the mid-1870s.
64. This table is compiled from the income (*ch'ahach'aek*) and expenses (*sangyongch'aek*) books of the various funds.
65. Yi Hŏnch'ang 1996:473.
66. See Brian H. A. Ranson 1998.
67. Hill Gates, *China's Motor.* p.246.
68. Yi Hŏnch'ang 1996:471.

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Government documents

Man'gi yoram 萬機要覽
Chosŏn wangjo sillok 朝鮮王朝實錄
Ilsŏngnok 日省錄

Pibyŏnsa tŭngnok 備邊司謄錄
Sŭngjŏngwon ilgi 承政院日記
T'ongmun'gwan chi 通文館志

Myŏnjujŏn documents

Tŭngnok 謄錄
Taebang hoegye ch'aek 大房會計冊
Iryongch'aek (1878 and 1880) 日用錄
Pang hoegye ch'aek 房會計冊
Kakpang pangse ch'aek 各房房稅冊
Kakch'ŏ kyebang ch'aek 各處契房冊
Chammul torok ch'aek 雜物都錄冊
Mujugye ch'ahach'aek 貿紬契上下冊
Mujugye tŭngnok ch'aek 貿紬契謄錄冊
Poyongso sangyong ch'aek 補用所上用冊
Poyongso ch'aha ch'aek 補用所上下冊
Chobigye sangyong ch'aek 措備契上用冊
Chobigye ch'aha ch'aek 措備契上下冊
Hosangso sangyong ch'aek 護喪所上用冊
Sep'yegye ch'aha ch'aek 歲幣契上下冊
Sep'yegye sangyongch'aek 歲幣契上用冊
Sep'ye kongan 歲幣貢案
Sep'ye suga tŭngnok 歲幣受價謄錄
Chinhŏn suga ch'aek 進獻受價冊
Suju suga ch'aek 水紬受價冊
Sujuiso sangyongch'aek
T'oju suga ch'aek 吐紬受價冊
Waein yedan suga ch'aek 倭人禮單受價冊
Ch'ŏngin yedan suga ch'aek 淸人禮單受價冊
Haenggun 行軍
Kunbanggu ch'aek 軍防口冊

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FASCINATING AND DANGEROUS: JAPAN IN KOREA'S ENLIGHTENMENT THOUGHT IN THE 1900s

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Historical introduction: Meiji Japan and Korean reformists, 1881–1905

Throughout the troubled history of Korea's post-traditional transformation, Japan has served as an important reference point from the very beginnings of Korea's opening to the West up to the present. However diverse the meanings which 'Japan' as a semantic unit could be charged with, it always played the role of an 'essential Other' in almost all post-traditional elite discourses in Korea. A symbol of decay and barbarisation for the conservative Confucians, it became quite the opposite—a model of progress and civilisation—for most of Korea's pro-modern ruling-class progressives, beginning with the masterminds of the aborted 1884 Kapsin *coup d'état*. And a model of sorts it remained: even those progressives who, for various reasons opposed Japan politically, were almost universally supportive and positive so far as the import of Japan's modern institutions was concerned. Pan-Asianism, another important import from Japan, played a role too: it positioned Japan's Other as closer, more intimate, more congenial, than the faraway and culturally and racially heterogeneous primary sources of modernity. The process of creating a modern nation-state and its enlightened ruling classes in Korea can well be described as a kind of dialogue with the Japanese Other. While the language of Korean modernity (first of all, Chinese logographic combinations for translating borrowed Western terms) and its key institutional and ideological structures were consciously learned from the Japanese interlocutor, the latter's colonial ambitions and pejorative views of Korea's ethnicity and history were largely responsible for provoking in the end many influential Korean intellectuals to a nationalist reaction—the creation of a venomously anti-Japanese nationalist ideology, that still remains an important underpinning in the national consciousness of both

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North and South Korea. The 'Korean nation' created in that dialogue was often defined in distinctively Japanese-sounding terms ("unique homogenous blood lineage", "possessor of the virtues of loyalty and patriotism", etc.), while being simultaneously described at the more radical end of the political spectrum as a single unit involved in a mortal combat with its colonial oppressor. As often happens when (post-)colonial nationalisms simultaneously copy and reject the imperial masters, the intensity of anti-Japanese venom was directly proportionate to the intensity of the cultural/institutional borrowing[1]. And, concurrent with this, some of the early modern historical figures with rather explicit pro-Japanese sympathies and a known record of political alliances with Japan, such as Kim Okkyun (1851–1894), mastermind of the 1884 Kapsin coup, were continuously hailed as patriots and revolutionaries by political and cultural figures with avowedly anti-Japanese or broader anti-imperialist agendas: Korean *émigré* nationalist leaders of the 1910–20s[2], North Korea's official historiographers after the mid-1950s[3], or Korean-Japanese and South Korean leftist nationalist historians of the 1960–70s[4]. Anti-Japanese patriots, paradoxically enough, had a tendency to perceive the late 19th-century admirers of Meiji reforms and political allies of Meiji government as their revolutionary and anti-feudal—that is, modernising—predecessors.

The beginnings of the institutional and ideological borrowings can be traced back to the 1881 Courtiers' Observation Mission to Japan, secretively sent by King Kojong (r. 1863–1907) at the palace's expense in order to get realistic accounts of the degree of Japan's success in strengthening itself. The accounts provided by the more radical members of the 12-strong mission (Ŏ Yunjung, 1848–96; Hong Yŏngsik, 1855–84) and the moderately conservative members (Sim Sanghak, 1845–?; Cho Pyŏngjik, 1833–1901, and others) differed substantially in their final judgement on the value of Japanese reforms, but the points of general agreement rested on the desirability of the limited use of Japanese experience for Korea's own adjustment to the new times, and the belief that the possibility of Japanese aggression was contingent on Korea's own reformist efforts. Japan, at this initial point of Korean-Japanese 'modern dialogue', was seen as an important reform model—although, as some of the mission members did not fail to mention, plagued by deep social and fiscal problems as well—and hardly any immediate threat to Korea's security.[5] After the start of broader cultural and institutional contacts in 1881, a group of cultural intermediaries arose. It consisted of two elements: senior Korean officials (Kim Okkyun; Pak Yŏnghyo, 1861–1939; and others) who frequented Japan on diplomatic occasions, developed a large network of Japanese acquaintances and supporters and generally were willing to accelerate Korean reforms forcefully along Meiji lines; and some students, who came to Japanese institutes of higher learning for much longer periods to obtain the secrets of Japan's wealth and power in practical details. While the first group was soon decimated by the failure of the Japan-supported Kapsin coup, some key members of the early Korean student community in Japan—Yun Ch'iho (1865–1945, studied at the Keiō Gijuku and

Dojinsha schools in 1881–3), Yu Kiljun (1856–1914, studied at Keiō in 1881–2), Yu Sŏngjun (Yu Kiljun's younger brother, 1860–1935, studied at Keiō in 1883–4), Hyŏn Yŏngun (1868–?, studied at Keiō at 1883–5), Sŏ Chaep'il (1863–1951, studied at Toyama Military School in 1883–4), An Kyŏngsu (1853–1900, studied textile production in Okayama Prefecture in 1883–4) and others[6]—soon rose to positions of leadership in Korea's modernisation efforts. Most of them were forced to keep a low profile during the decade of Chinese hegemony in Korean politics (1884–94), but as soon as the Japanese ousted the Chinese influence from Seoul at the outbreak of Sino-Japanese hostilities in the summer of 1894, the modernisers with Japanese experience were suddenly bought to the forefront. The State Deliberative Council (*Kun'guk kimuch'ŏ*), launched on 25 July 1894 to become the main engine behind the 1894 (Kabo) reform drive, consisted mostly of the reformers, whose only exposure to modernity was to its Meiji version: according to Yu Yŏngik's analysis, only three of thirteen key members of the 1894 reform faction had never been to Japan before, while the rest included three members of the 1881 Mission and three diplomats who had spent prolonged stints in Japan.[7] Not surprisingly, their vision of modernised Korea—a Cabinet-centred strong central government with the King as a largely symbolic figure, streamlined and uniform local administration instead of a diversity of traditional administrative units, rudimentary local self-government, monetarisation of taxes, a Japanese-trained army and police, and abolition of the traditional class system—more or less followed Meiji lines. In correlation, the Japanese-installed cabinet was often obliged, unlike its Meiji loyalist prototype, to compromise its ideal of national independence and reluctantly rely on foreign (that is, Japanese) money and troops.[8]

The downfall of the pro-Japanese administration that came after the Triple Intervention (23 April 1895), the barbaric slaying of Queen Min (20 August 1895), and, finally, King Kojong's historic flight to the Russian Legation (11 February 1896) did not bring any cardinal changes to the dominant position that Meiji ideals and inspirations—in the broad sense of the word—had already occupied in the mind of Korea's radical reformers. Court diplomacy in the late 1890s vacillated between Russia and Japan in an attempt to secure as much room as possible for the realisation of Kojong's sovereign rights.[9] By contrast, the main organisation representing Korea's fledgling modern civil society, the Independence Club (*Tongnip Hyŏphoe*, July 1896–December 1898), headed by, among others, the Japan-educated An Kyŏngsu (who held the chairmanship before March 1898) and then Yun Ch'iho (chairman after March 1898), undoubtedly favoured Japan much more strongly, especially after that country's highly successful and popular campaign against Russia's concession demands had begun in earnest in late February 1898. Japan's elder statesman, Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909) was given a famously lavish reception by the Independence Club leadership while on a private tour in Korea in August 1898, and was praised by the then Club's chairman, Yun Ch'iho, and its judicial commissioner (*sabŏp wiwŏn*),

Chŏng Kyo (1856–1925), as "the hero of Europe and Asia".[10] A steady stream of Korean students, state-sponsored and private, began to flow to Japan with renewed strength from 1895—approximately 160 arrived in 1897 alone, 64 of them on Korean government stipends.[11] As, according to new regulations for recruitment to official posts (*Chup'animgwan sihŏm kŭp immyŏng kyuch'ik*) announced in December 1898, graduates of Japanese and other foreign institutions of higher learning were given the prerogative of being appointed to such posts after passing a simplified examination, younger officials with a Japanese educational background by the end of the 1900s constituted a small (7.5 per cent of all officials), but very vocal and energetic group among Korea's bureaucrats. Before 1904, they were mostly employed in lower- and middle-ranking, often technical, posts, but many of them were promptly promoted to positions of responsibility and control following the establishment of Japan's protectorate over Korea on 17 November 1904.[12] By way of comparison, only 64 Koreans studied in the United States between 1882 and 1905 (many of them went to Japan for study first, and embarked on their American journeys from there),[13] and only a few of them (Yun Ch'iho, Pak Hŭibyŏng, Yŏ Pyŏnghyŏn and several others) acquired any prominence in officialdom, civil society and/or the modern media before 1910.[14] The number of those heading for Russia or France for study was negligible.

Japanese influence continued to dominate Korea's emerging modern bureaucratic and civil society into the early 1900s as well. So far as Kojong's diplomacy was concerned, it aimed at manoeuvring and balancing between Russia and Japan, and between pro-Japanese and pro-Russians factions at court. Attempted subversion by the *émigré* groups in Japan (Pak Yŏnghyo's bid to use Hwalbindang rebels in 1900 and Yu Kiljun's attempted *coup d'état* in 1902) were subjects of the utmost anxiety, and Korea's permanent neutralisation with US help and under great power guarantees emerged as the most important political objective.[15] But in the realm of wealth accumulation and knowledge production, Japan's supremacy was undisputed. In 1901–05, it absorbed between 87 per cent (1901) and 78 per cent (1905) of Korea's exports and provided it with 60–70 per cent of all its imports, thus claiming the largest share of Korea's growing foreign trade.[16] The sudden deficit of available Japanese coins triggered by Japan's switch to the gold standard and the withdrawal of the silver currency in 1897, occasional violent behaviour on the part of Japanese merchants in Korea, and Japan's blunt demands to Korea to accept Dainichi Bank certificates as a common legal tender in 1902 provoked understandable anger among some sections of Korea's emergent entrepreneurial class;[17] yet Korean merchants were at the same time heavily dependent on their Japanese colleagues, who bought most of Korea's exports, used many Korean entrepreneurs as intermediaries, and patronised Korea's fledgling private banks—typically, the Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank, founded in 1899.[18] It is of little surprise that trade with Japan was generally viewed by the reformist intellectuals of that period as a factor greatly contributing to Korea's prosperity.[19] In the sphere

of knowledge production—where the relationship, known in Gramscian terms as *hegemony*, the ideological dominance "accomplished at the unconscious as well as the conscious level",[20] is usually negotiated and shaped—reliance on the models of modernity supplied by the Japanese Other was even more pronounced. Even among the early 1900s textbooks of civic ethics (*susin*)—the sphere that any nation-state has obvious reasons to keep independent from direct foreign influences—the textbooks by Japan's Inoue Tetsujirō (1855–1944), the famed nativist advocate of 'Oriental values'[21] occupied a prominent place as a model for ethics textbook-writing. And in the spheres where foreign knowledge was more desperately needed, Japanese books in translation, or Korean compilations based on Japanese works and/or Japanese-translated works of Western authors, were virtually dominant. A good example is supplied by *Miguk tongnip sa* (The History of American Independence, 1899), a book that played a crucial role in acquainting the intellectuals of the 1900s with the basics of American history and constitution. This was, in fact, a translation by Hyŏn Ch'ae (1886–1925) of what appears to be Shiozawa Ichitarō's digest of the influential work *Beikoku dokuritsu senshi* (History of the American Independence War, 1895) by Shibue Tamotsu (1857–1930).[22] As a modern Euro-American system of knowledge was being introduced through the more easily comprehensible medium of Japanese, peppered with Chinese logographs perfectly recognisable for Korean intellectuals, Japan rapidly came to acquire the ideologically hegemonic position of the main purveyor of modernity in the Orient and the country Korea had to emulate once it wanted to enter the modern international system. In such an atmosphere, some radical Pan-Asianist projects of Korea's high-speed development through massive injections of Japanese capital and technology emerged and gained public attention. For example, the Japanese-educated An Kyŏngsu wrote a seminal treatise entitled *Samguk tongmaengnon* ('On the union between three states'), which was posthumously serialised in a conservative Tokyo journal, *Nihonjin* (issues 116–123, 5 June to 20 September 1900). (An, a former chairman of the Independence Club, had been obliged to flee to Japan again in 1898 after his alleged plot to dethrone Kojong in favour of one of his princes was reported to have been revealed. He was executed in May 1900, after having returned voluntarily to Korea.) The union An proposed—considering it ultimately beneficial for Korea's own interests—had to be based on Japanese-financed and Japanese-managed railroad construction and mining in Korea and Japanese-aided financial and military reforms in both Korea and China, and was to remake East Asia into a Japanese-led financial, political, economical and cultural block fully able to withstand the "White European aggression".[23] This degree of Japanese-style Asianist radicalism was still somewhat exceptional for the Korean intellectuals of the early 1900s, but the modernising elite's internalisation of the Asianist forms of Meiji hegemonic ideology was progressing speedily throughout the period between the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars.

Of course, the modernising elite's fascination with Meiji patterns was hardly

shared by many among the underprivileged, who had to bear the brunt of the Japanese military's predations during the Sino-Japanese War and the ensuing suppression of the Tonghak peasant rebellion by the Japanese army, and who suffered from the constant rise in rice prices caused by the growing rice exports to Japan.[24] Colonel Karneev and Lieutenant-Colonel Alftan, who travelled throughout the country in the troubled times of 1895–6 as military agents of the Russian Chief of Staff, described vividly the "almost fanatical hatred of the Japanese by the ordinary people" and their willingness to join the Confucian-led anti-Japanese righteous armies (*ŭibyŏng*).[25] But the conflicting attitudes towards Japan were simply a part of the sharp, painful cleavages that emerged within Korean society as the weakened Korean monarchy was forcibly dragged into the capitalist world-system, and the new status of Korea as a peripheral supplier of agricultural products and mineral resources to Japan enriched only very few while impoverishing even more the already impoverished majority. The Confucian righteous army leaders, mostly local small- and middle-size gentry landowners, usually never had any chance to advance to a noticeable position in the corruption-ridden bureaucracy of the later 19th century. They were able to win a peasant following as the opponents of both the Japanese invaders and the Seoul oligarchs and scolded the reformist party, well represented among Seoul officialdom, as "corrupt careerists" and "Japanese stooges" at the same time.[26] The Japanese question, in a way, aggravated the pre-existing rupture between the nexuses of money and power in Seoul and its vicinities, and deepened the discontent of both local elites and impoverished masses in the provinces. Thorough alienation from the native society—the righteous armies in the provinces were often as merciless towards the reformists in European clothes as they were towards the Japanese traders[27]—was one more factor strengthening the intellectual and political dependence of the radical reformers upon their Japanese counterparts. However, there were historical limits to the degree of cohesion between Korea's patriotically-minded admirers of Meiji progress and the Meiji state they so strove to emulate. The Japanese could be accepted as senior partners in commercial and intellectual exchanges, but as soon as they would attempt to put Korea under their political dominance, the core of the admired Meiji pattern—the preservation of political independence of the state—came under obvious threat. That is why Japan's thrust to colonise Korea eventually turned large groups of Pan-Asianist Japan-admirers into what is glorified in nationalist history-writing in both Koreas as independence fighters: although even at the point of violent struggle against the Japanese, the old enmity between modernising nationalists and righteous army Confucians was still, as a rule, not overcome.

The process of the political subjugation of Korea, initiated by the humiliating agreement with Japan that Kojong was forced to sign on 3 February 1904, at the very beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, culminated on 17 November 1904, when Itō Hirobumi coerced the Korean cabinet into accepting the so-called Protectorate

Treaty, which made Korea into a Japanese possession in essence, if still not in form. These acts of naked aggression had the effect of sharply dividing the reformist groupings into a much-hated pro-Japanese wing, the middle-of-the-road majority who were still willing to hope that gradual progress would restore Korea's independence at some point, and radical nationalists, often Japan-oriented Pan-Asianists in the past, who felt cheated and betrayed.[28] The latter group, which eventually produced some of the leaders of the *émigré* independence movement of the 1910s and 1920s, is well represented by the figure of An Chunggŭn (1879–1910). A reformer who vocally supported Japan in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) as "the defender of the yellow race against white predators", in terms strikingly similar to An Kyŏngsu's Asianist 'Unionist' theories,[29] he came to perceive Japan's subsequent steps as "betrayal" and became a Korean nationalist hero by assassinating Itō Hirobumi, a national hero of Meiji Japan and the driving force in Korea's colonisation, on 26 October 1909. An Chunggŭn's complicated conglomerate of ideas (developed in the unfinished treatise on 'peace in the Orient' he was writing in prison before execution on 26 March 1910), with its nuanced combination of an uncompromising nationalist line (the assertion of Korea's sovereignty) and continuing belief in the "competition between white and yellow races" with the ultimate necessity of an equal alliance between Korea, Japan and China, shows very well the complicities of the Korean-Japanese modernisation dialogue.[30] A positive interest in Japan as the flagship of Asia's revival and the bulwark of its anti-Western defences, in combination with the record of heroically punishing Japan's hero of modernisation and imperialism, were all substantial elements in making An into a symbolic figure for Korea's modernising nationalism. Violent rejection of Japanese colonialist ambitions was one of the possible logical conclusions of enthusiastic adherence to the Meiji project of self-strengthening state nationalism.

Ideology for export: Meiji ideas in the context of Korean Enlightenment, 1905–10

The focus of this paper is on the perceptions of Japan in the Enlightenment publications of the later 1900s: such are leading early nationalist newspapers (*Taehan Maeil Sinbo* especially) and the journals of scholarly societies (*hakhoe*) (especially *Taehan Hakhoe Wŏlbo*, *Taehan Hŭnghakpo*, *Sŏu Hakhoe Wŏlbo* and *T'aegŭk Hakpo*), as well as pamphlets and brochures (such as Yi Sŭngman's famous *Tongnip Chŏngsin*). One object of analysis will be the dissimilar emphases put by the different Enlightenment activists who tended to view Meiji reforms as a success and a model for Korea's own transformation. Those less liberal, and politically more strongly pro-Japanese (such as Ch'oe Sŏkha), had a tendency to admire Japan's 'patriotic education' and the elements of Confucian moralism in the statist (*kokkashugi*) versions of Meiji ideology. In fact, elements of this ideology deeply impressed even the avowed liberals, especially those

of them who began their journeys into the world of modernity from Japan. As one example, Yu Kiljun, already mentioned above, one of the first Koreans ever to study in both Japan and the USA and a leader of the 1894–5 reform drive, in his 1907 *Nodong Yahak Tokpon* (Book of readings for working men's evening schools) described the Korean state as the Meiji *kazoku kokka* or 'family state', likening it to the "house of His Majesty the Emperor of Korea inhabited by 20 millions of his grandsons, for whom the Imperial family is like their familial clan"[31]—and that despite his declared sympathies for Great Britain's liberal and constitutionalist ideals.[32] Common to most mainstream reformers in Yu Kiljun's milieu was a keen interest in the ideas on "organic statehood" of J. K. Bluntschli (1808–81)—that is, an understanding of the state as a "juridical person", in which both rulers and the ruled are inseparably bound by an "organic relationship" that is legal, "spiritual" and "historical" in character. Bluntschli himself, in such masterpieces as his encyclopaedic *Lehre vom modernen Staat* (three vols, 1875–6)[33], saw this theory as a sort of middle-of-the-road position between the "extremes" of Rousseau's contractual visions of the state and uncompromising monarchism. His statist popularisers and commentators in East Asia, notably Katō Hiroyuki (1836–1916) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929), emphasised the "organic" state's "majestic dignity" (*statshoheit*), the cohesive "togetherness" (*die Zusammengehörigkeit*) of its citizenry, and the right of the former forcibly to impose sacrifices on the latter.[34] For example, Korea's earliest modern textbook of law, compiled and published by Yu Sŏngjun (younger brother of Yu Kiljun) on the basis of Bluntschli-influenced Meiji legal texts, explicitly defined the state as an "organic entity" and its ruler as "the person who is customarily treated as a sacred and inviolable figure".[35] Similar ideas—namely, the distinction between the historically formed *volk* (*inmin*), and the nation (*kungmin*) as both a legal and "organic" entity unified "as one individual" not only by a common "spirit" and "will" but also by a "shared awareness of its belonging to one state"—may be found in one of Korea's earliest textbooks of politics, compiled by Na Chin (1881–1918) and Kim Sangyŏn (1874–?) with ample use of Bluntschli texts in Japanese translations as well.[36]

However, the younger pro-Japanese reformers, influenced by the Asianist emphasis on the 'Oriental spirit', usually went much further in their sympathies towards the conservative statism of late Meiji times. This group believed that the introduction of a strong state-centred ideology comparable with the Meiji credo of *Yamato tamashii* ('Japanese spirit') would be the only way to push Korea into self-strengthening along the already well-chartered Japanese road. For example, Ch'oe Sŏkha, writing in the *T'aegŭk Hakpo* (the mouthpiece of the T'aegŭk Academic Society formed by Korean students in Japan in September 1905) argued in an article entitled 'Chosŏn hon' ('Korean spirit', in *T'aegŭk Hakpo,* issue 5, December 1906) that Koreans should develop and articulate their own version of Yamato tamashii to survive on the international Darwinian battlefield:

> To regard one's life just as a bit of straw that can be always sacrificed for the state's sake following *bushido*'s canons—that is what Japanese spirit is about! … If the Japanese would not have had their Japanese spirit, how could that small East Asian state have obtained the position it has today? … Of course, it would be a mistake to say that Koreans don't possess Korean spirit entirely … Consider: doesn't our Korea have the independent and proud history of 4300 years? Once there is a state, its spirit does not disappear even for a moment, and had not such spirit existed for 4300 years, how could this country preserve its independence? … Alas, possessing such a heroic spirit, for what reasons do we stand now where we stand? … The problem is that our Korea has suffered from incessant external invasions and internal discord for more than a century, its politics being emasculated by literary weakness [*munyak*], its morals having degenerated to a simple formality, and education having stopped at literary exercises. That is why our state's spirit decayed … and people cannot witness its glory … But, if our compatriots will develop and foster our Korean spirit, we can recover political, economic and international rights we have lost![37]

While Ch'oe evidently defined the "spirit of state" (*kukhon*) as a universal, rather than specifically Japanese or Asian concept (the "spirits" of the US, Russia and France are mentioned as well), the context shows that Meiji experience in its "developing and fostering" was serving as an obvious point of reference. That "developing and fostering" of the Japanese "spirit" led the "small East Asian state" into perpetrating exactly the sort of "invasions" Korea was evidently "suffering" from, did not stop Ch'oe from praising Japanese ways: he obviously did not regard imperialism as an evil in itself. In his programme article for the first issue of *T'aegŭk Hakpo* (August 1906), entitled 'Kukka ron' ('On the theory of statehood'), he boldly stated:

> As today's 20th century is an epoch of the struggle for survival when only the fittest survives and the weak are devoured by the strong in accordance with Nature's laws, all the civilised powers, pressured by the growth of their populace and shortage of land, are forced, because of the limitations of their internal natural resources, to colonise overseas territories in order to guarantee the well-being of their citizens. That is what is called imperialism.[38]

Evidently, imperialism was understood as a necessary social extension of natural laws and an indispensable feature of "modern", "civilised" statehood. Japanese imperialism, following this logic, was to be carefully studied and, whenever possible, reproduced in Korean experience, rather than be denounced; and Korea's misfortune was not the era of imperialism in itself, but the country's inability successfully to develop its own imperialism, mostly ascribed to the legacy of "literary weakness". But, Korean imperialism on the scale of Western ones being obviously rather a theoretical possibility than a practical solution, what should the country do in the era when "the strong" were "devouring the weak"? As Ch'oe Sŏkha's group was leaning towards racist variations of Pan-Asianism, to rely on racially close Japan

for protection and guidance was a logical solution. Ch'oe and the like-minded pro-Japanese progressives considered it also fully viable, in view of Japan's military triumph over Russia in 1904–05, seen as a victory of the whole yellow race. For example, a student publishing under the pseudonym of P'ousaeng ('One embracing the universe') gave the following definition to the Russo-Japanese War in the article with a tellingly Darwinist title, 'Kyŏngjaeng ŭi Kŭnbon' ('The basics of competition', *T'aegŭk Hakpo*, issue 22, June 1908):

> Up to the present, there were two main different currents in the activities of humanity, each clearly discernible from the other: one was the Western stream of expansion, and the other was the Eastern one. Before, they had had almost no opportunities to meet each other, but in the 19th century their interaction became more frequent, and in the 20th century their mutual competition is becoming increasingly intense and fierce. That is what events like the Japanese-Russian war express. One the one side, there were voices warning about the 'yellow peril', and on the other side there were voices warning about the 'white peril'. That means that in future, history will witness an inescapable all-out struggle between the yellows and the whites, and even today, the most urgent international issue is that of interracial competition. Under such circumstances, the members of the same race usually tend to protect and help each other, while simultaneously rejecting the advances of the alien races—that is what catches our sight today.

But, while evidently viewing the Russo-Japanese imperial rivalry as a part of the global interracial struggle, where Korea's place was supposed to be on the yellow side, P'ousaeng did not seem to regard Japanese intentions as exclusively benign: he finished his article by telling readers that "the question is also whether there are no yellows possessing what we consider 'white' characteristics".[39] What he wished to allude to was, in fact, quite clear: predatory whites had been a subject for Korean journalism for a long time already, and hinting at the 'white characteristics' of the Japanese was intended to emphasise that their protection and help towards Korean racial brethren could be also a mixed blessing.

That an article, which generally followed the theses of Japanese Social-Darwinist Pan-Asianist thought, also contained certain elements of doubt towards Japanese *Realpolitik*, is not surprising. In the 1900s, at the early stage of formation of Korea's still pre-colonial nationalism, ideological and political boundaries between the various camps did not necessarily match: even those opposing Japan's political designs on the ground could still in theory agree with racialist taxonomies and racialised Social-Darwinist views originating in Japan. For example, *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* (5 September 1898–30 August 1910), commonly known as a moderately anti-Japanese mouthpiece of nationalist reformist Confucians, published an editorial entitled 'Injong ŭi kwang'gye' ('Racial relationships, 15 January 1910) in which it contrasted "Occidentals, who are thoroughly imbued with the ideals of racial solidarity and awareness of interracial struggle for survival" and "Orientals, who just pay lip service to the cause of racial

cooperation", and also predicted a "great racial war" between yellows and whites, where only an enhanced spirit of "racial love" might help the former to win over the otherwise stronger competitors.[40] Moreover, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (18 July 1904–28 August 1910), which earned a reputation for vociferous anti-Japanism, also published some articles pointing to the supposedly "brighter" sides of Japan's "protection" over the country. For example, its series of articles on Japanese influence on Korean affairs, published between 2–7 September 1904 (and available also in English in the newspaper's English version, the *Korea Daily News*), concluded, after listing numerous instances of Japanese "arrogance" and "overbearing behaviour" in the country, that, to a certain degree, Japanese "excesses" were caused by the Koreans' own "corruption" and ineffective ways of government; and, after all, Japan, which itself just recently entered the "civilised world", could be "the best teacher" for Korea's "progress".[41] Not only a racialised vision of the world, but also a positive interest towards the Meiji model of speeded-up, "compressed" development seemingly transcended the moving, inconsistent boundaries between the different political camps.

Of course, differences in political and social persuasions accounted also for a dissimilar, sometimes mutually contradictory understanding of what actually should be learned from the Japanese 'teachers'. For example, Yun Hyojŏng (1858–1939), no less sympathetic to Japan than Ch'oe Sŏkha but somewhat more liberally inclined and more keenly interested in constitutionalist ideas, preferred to view Meiji success as a "triumph for constitutionalism and people' rights" rather than just a "victory of bushido-based patriotism", emphasising the role of popular empowerment and representation for the social cohesion and ultimate Darwinist "survival of the nation". With a somewhat different political emphasis, but still in similar vein, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo,* the staunchest opponent of Japan's policy of accelerating Japanese migration to Korea, nonetheless, in an editorial of 22 April 1910 ('Hanirin chach'iryŏk ŭi pigyo'—'Comparison between the Korean and Japanese abilities for self-rule") praised the Japanese residents of Korea for their ability "to raise the flag of their associations wherever they come to live" and for their penchant for "building schools, hospitals, and other public facilities through public efforts". As both Korea and Japan entered an age of competition, Koreans had to advance "exactly as much as the other side" in order to ensure their survival, the newspaper admonished, while talking very pessimistically about Korea's "dilapidated old systems of self-rule" and conspicuous absence of any new ones.[42] In these cases, modern Japan was seen in the light preferred by Japan's own liberals, as the only Eastern country that had succeeded in harnessing the energies of popular political and social participation in the service of the state's survival and progress.

As already seen, views emphasising the role of patriotic ideologies, education and popular mobilisation in Japan's success and those advocating adoption of similar ideological practices in Korea as a prerequisite for the country's survival,

were popular not only among Japan's political allies, but on the other side of an increasingly hardening political divide as well, among those refusing to compromise with Japan's growing presence in Korea. As a typical reformist Confucian (who became afterwards one of the most prominent nationalist leaders in exile), Pak Ŭnsik represented this tendency. Pak used to express his admiration for Japan's bushido spirit and patriotic courage and wanted his compatriots to learn from them. In an editorial article in *Sŏu Hakhoe Wŏlbo* (issue 10, September 1907), entitled 'Munyak chi p'ye p'ilsang ki guk ('Those affected by literary weakness necessarily lose their states'), he forcefully argued for the advantages of making a war-like (*sangmu*) spirit into the foundation of state ideology:

> War-like states … are strong and powerful enough not to allow others to infringe upon them. By contrast, those ruled by the literati are always passive, as if they are sleeping or terminally ill. Almost every muscle in their bodies is atrophied, and the body of state as a whole is too corrupt to be able to fence off attacks by outsiders.

After describing in the strongest possible tone the dilapidated state of the military in literati-ruled Korea, Pak took Japan as an example of what a really war-like state could achieve:

> Let us look now at Japan's most recent history. From the time of the Kamakura shogunate that existed more than 700 years ago, Japan developed at state level its war-like spirit called bushido, and that is why the Japanese are characterised by bravery. That is why, in the past thirty years, with the development of education, the Japanese have advanced in patriotism and the collectivist spirit much more than any other country. As a result, they were able to defeat China and throw back Russia, enhanced greatly their national prestige and joined the ranks of great European and American powers. Oh, how great the effect of war-like spirit is![43]

Famous for his bold editorial in *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* (20 November 1905) protesting against the Protectorate Treaty forced by Japan, Chang Chiyŏn (1864–1920), another prominent reformist Confucian, considered Japanese-style patriotism a necessary check-and-balance mechanism for any country venturing into the uncharted waters of party politics. Writing in *Taehan Chaganghwe Wŏlbo* (issue 5, November 1906) in an editorial entitled 'Tanch'e yŏnhu minjok kabo' ('Only if the collective exists can the nation be preserved'), Chang deplored the Korean "predilection towards selfish factional struggle" and chose Japanese parliamentary politics as an example of how patriotism could lead party politicians to "transcend" their differences and "selflessly serve the country":

> In Japan, the *Jiyūtō* [Liberal Party] and *Shimpotō* [Progressive Party] initially confronted each other, for each had dissimilar opinions. But after the dissolution of [purely] *hanbatsu* [oligarchic cliques]-based government, the two parties began to cooperate in the Diet.

> On one side, they once allied their forces into the *Kenseitō* [Constitutional Party]; on the other head, their [former members] continued to oppose each other. All this was done out of disinterested patriotism! Is party struggle possible in a state, if not in such a form? Oh, how pitiful it is that this wisdom does not reach us![44]

Constitutionalism and party politics were popularly viewed as the cornerstones for Meiji success among Western-oriented and Christian converts politically opposed to Japan: typically, Rhee Syngman (Yi Sŭngman: 1875–1965) praised the "democratic achievements" of the Meiji emperor. On the other hand, more conservative reformist Confucians were, as we have been able to see, more interested in learning how to check ideologically what they perceived as a destructive side of parliamentary rivalries. It is important to point out that their political opposition to Japan's designs against Korea's independence did not prevent Pak Ŭnsik, Chang Chiyŏn or Yi Sŭngman from looking towards Japan for various kinds of modernising experience, institutional and ideological. While their politics in the 1900s were distinctively anti-Japanese, their discourse of modernity and civilisation doubtlessly used Meiji experience as one of the main reference frames. However much they could be opposed to Ch'oe Sŏkha or Yun Hyojŏng's political line, their discursive affinity allowed them to collaborate with those overtly pro-Japanese figures while working together in *Taehan Chaganghoe* (Korea Self-Strengthening Society, April 1906–August 1907) and *Taehan Hyŏphoe* (Korea Association, November 1907–August 1910).

However, even though they were generally influenced in varying degrees by racialist Pan-Asianist ideas, both those politically opposed to the Japanese and those willing to accept the Protectorate's phraseology at its face value largely agreed that, although Japan could provide a good example to Korea through cultural and/or racial proximity, its civilisation was still very much a second-hand product. Even those strongly favouring pro-Japanese Pan-Asianist ideas—not to mention Japan's political opponents—still tended to perceive Western countries as somewhat superior to Japan's secondary civilisation. At its best, Japan was perceived as simply one of the civilised countries. For example, one of *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*'s early editorials on enlightenment, entitled 'Sisa mundap' ('Dialogue on current affairs', 27 September 1898), explained to its readers that those countries employing cruel punishment should not be called enlightened and generally did not last for too long. After mentioning the swift downfall of the "cruel Qin" (221–206 BC) and the longevity of the more "humane" Han dynasty (206 BC–AD 220) in China, it shifted to more recent examples:

> In today's world, the Later Roman Empire [*sic,* V.T.], Turkey, Mexico, Spain and China are states that enjoy inflicting cruel punishments. They are either falling down, or are weak and decaying. But in Britain, America, Germany, France, Italy and Japan, the punishments are not cruel, and that is why these states are advancing forward daily … And how can our country today be compared with the civilised lands?[45]

Japan was not praised *per se*, but just taken as one example of the worthiness of civilisation. In the same way, in some cases Japan's trademark patriotic spirit was seen not as Japan's own particular feature, but as an important element of civilisation, which Japan managed to acquire on the same level as all the other civilised powers—but not in a much higher degree. For example, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* editorialised on 28 June 1910 on 'Patriots' ideas' ('Aegukcha ŭi sasang') in the following way:

> The people of the foreign powers begin to recite patriotic verses as soon as they enter school, grow while hearing patriotic stories and anecdotes, with the fathers admonishing their sons in the truths of patriotism, and with brothers offering patriotic advice to each other. The people there sport patriotic badges on their clothes, use the word 'patriotic' even in naming recreational associations, call their drinks 'patriotic vines' and their keepsakes 'patriotic souvenirs'. They bow to the directions of their kings' palaces even during their merry-makings … That is why French female entertainers, even pressed, used to refuse to escort the Germans, and that is why Japanese children used to refuse to take cookies as gifts from the Russians.[46]

Opinions in Korea generally converged on the point that Japan had achieved a certain measure of success in civilising itself through the acquisition of power and wealth, but its position was not seen as something too high and advanced for Korea to emulate. On the question of whether Korea's successful adoption of civilisation could make it Japan's equal partner, a certain optimism existed even in 1906–07, when the protectorate regime was already in full force. For example, Hwang Ŭnyong, then a student in the USA, sent a letter, reprinted in *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* on 20 October 1906, to the San Francisco-based *Kongnip Sinbo* (established on 12 November 1905 by Korean immigrants), in which he discussed Korea's future and concluded:

> Oh, how great and laudable is the acquisition of wealth, power and independence by a state! And how deplorable the state today of [our] collective strength! Today's Korea looks like the America of a century ago. But, if our compatriots would unite their minds in the collectivist spirit, we could overcome Japan's strength and achieve wealth, power and independence. But, if the government bureaucrats continue, as before, to struggle among themselves day and night for power and influence and trade openly in official appointments, and the people will not reform their selfish, egoistical, jealous minds full of evil intentions towards their neighbours, we will not avoid ruining our state and becoming Japanese slaves.[47]

Japan's position was evidently not seen as one totally beyond Korea's reach: efforts in the right direction could secure Korea the wherewithal to fend off Japan's imperialistic demands. This belief was even stronger among reformist Confucians, more accustomed to thinking of the 'island barbarians' in condescending terms. Yi Ki (1848–1909), for example, maintained that Japan, however strong its army might grow, would never obtain hegemony in East Asia because of its inability to secure

foreign good will through acts of "benevolence" and "sincerity".[48] For the Christian converts—for example, the prominent Christian intellectual An Kuksŏn (1879–1926), An Kyŏngsu's adopted son, who studied in Japan in 1895–9 and is credited with introducing the basics of Western political studies, mostly via Japanese translations, to Korea in the late 1900s—the failure of the Japanese ruling class to convert to Christianity *en masse* was evidence that Japan progressed "only materially, but not yet spiritually" towards Western ideals.[49] It was not only the supposed lack of traditional or Christian virtues that was considered a crucial shortcoming in Japan's drive towards civilisation and enlightenment: Korea's reformist Confucians also followed the lead of Liang Qichao (1873–1929) in also claiming that Japan was far from reaching the top position in introducing Western social and political institutions. An article by Liang entitled 'Spenser speaks on the Japanese Constitution' dealt with the famous advice by Herbert Spencer to Mori Arinori (1847–89) not to rush forwards with constitutional reforms in Japan because of the "low civilisational level" of the Japanese people (who were said just "to be standing near the foundation of the glorious tower of progress, still unable to climb up too high"). The article was reprinted in its entirety in the first issue of *Taehan Hyŏphwe Hoebo* (April 1908) and was well known to Korea's progressive Confucian intellectuals.[50] Some of them contributed in various journals their own critical appraisals of Japan's civilisational standing. For example, on the eve of Japan's final annexation of Korea, *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* published an indignant pro-independence editorial entitled 'To the Japanese' ('Ilbonin ege', 28 December 1909), which clearly stated that "Japan, which traditionally was backward in comparison with us,has just outstripped us recently in acceptance of the new civilisation—something that we can do as well with no less success provided we are given time." The relationship between Japan and Korea, the editorial maintained, was to be compared with that between Turkey and Greece, or Sweden and Norway, and not with the position European states had towards their African or Pacific colonies. The editorial concluded prophetically that Japan, "a small East Asian island", should understand that bigger and stronger European and American rivals would inevitably check its continental expansion.[51]

Dilemmas of race, state and nation: the ambiguities of a modernisation dialogue

As we have seen, Japan's modernity, being unmistakably a key reference point for the whole of Korea's modernising elite (often led by Japanese-educated modernisers), also provided the conceptual space for many of Korea's early debates on modernity. Various features of Japanese modernity were hotly contested, and the features of Korea's own modern project gradually became clearer in the process of such an

ideological contest. In some of the discussions, political affiliation determined ideological position: for example, Japan-inclined adepts (Ch'oe Sŏkha and others) of the Pan-Asianist, anti-white theory of race preservation (*pojong*) were strongly censured by increasingly anti-Japanese reformers of the Sin Ch'aeho type, who prioritised nation or state preservation (*pojok*, *poguk*). Both views were thoroughly grounded in Social Darwinist logic, but while the first led to the acceptance of Japanese rule, the second grew afterwards into one of the ideologies of the anti-Japanese independence movement. In the same way, An Kyŏngsu's and An Chunggŭn's views on regional and racial cooperation, while differing principally in their political implications, were both solidly grounded in rather similar Asianist beliefs in the inescapability of interracial competition and the consequent imperative of intra-racial cooperation. The fracture between the *political* and the *discursive* components in attitudes on Japan was prominent in many cases of the middle-of-the-road modernisers, who, while negative in principle about Japan's colonialist politics, found it either impossible or undesirable to actively resist them. Yu Kiljun, for example, considered the Meiji kazoku kokka model of the 'family state' a practical model for Korea, but was simultaneously repentant about relying on Japan's protection and loans during the 1894–5 reform drive and negative about Korea's gradual loss of sovereignty. In the situation where the Meiji project dominated Korea's progressives *ideologically* while being intensely contested in its concrete *political* implications, the ideological boundaries did not necessarily match the political ones. Ch'oe Sŏkha's rhetoric of "sacred state" and the "absolute priority of patriotic duties over private life" found its way on to the pages of the consistently anti-Japanese *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* and was a distinctive feature of Sin Ch'aeho's fiercely anti-Japanese editorials. Such a prominent feature of Japan's contemporary view of modernity as the racialist contrasting of yellows and whites was also ostensibly present in the minds and speeches of some *politically* anti-Japanese personages. One good example is Yun Ch'iho, *politically* opposed to Japan's infringement upon Korea's independence in the 1900s. Nevertheless, on hearing the news of Russia's complete defeat in the landmark Tsushima sea battle (27 May 1905), he wrote in his English diary (entry for 2 June 1905):

> What a glorious campaign this has been to Japan! As a Korean, I have no special reasons for rejoicing over the uninterrupted successes of Japan. Every victory is a nail in the coffin of the Korean independence … Yet as a member of the Yellow Race, Korea—or rather I—feel proud of the glorious successes of Japan. She has vindicated the honour of our race … The Japanese have compelled the proud West to acknowledge the military and naval genius of the Far East.[52]

Hardly any other phrase from any of the contemporary Korean sources shows better the deeply contradictory nature of the perceptions of Japan by the 1900s Enlightenment elite in Korea.

Editor's note: With the exception of the excerpt from Yun Ch'iho's English diary, all quoted passages, including that from the *Taehan Maeil Sinbo*, have been translated from the original Korean by the author and have been edited where necessary.

Notes

1. A thoughtful analysis of the process of implanting Meiji structures in Korea, as well as the formation of anti-Japanese nationalism on the base of the traditional Confucian pejorative view of Japan, can be found in Kwŏn T'aeŏk 2000:115–140.
2. See, for example, the relatively positive characterisation of Kim Okkyun's 'revolutionary attempt' given by Pak Ŭnsik (1859–1925), Korea's famed early nationalist scholar and second president (1925) of the Shanghai Provisional Government, in his seminal account, *Hanguk t'ongsa* (*Painful History of Korea*: 1915). See *Hanguk t'ongsa* (translated into modern Korean by Kim Tohyŏng) 1997: 80–81. Pak Ŭnsik, however, also voiced his disapproval of Kim Okkyun's "reliance on outside forces".
3. Han'guk yŏksa yŏn'guhoe pukhan sahaksa yŏn'guban (ed.), 2003. *Pukhan ŭi yŏksa mandŭlgi*:68.
4. See, for example, the article by Kang Chaeŏn entitled 'Kaehwa sasang, kaehwap'a, Kansin chŏngbyŏn' (originally published in Japanese in 1968), published 1982 in *Han'guk kŭndaesa yŏn'gu*, Seoul: Hanbat ch'ulp'ansa:59–133. South Korean left-wing nationalist historian Kim Yŏngjak, who initially published his groundbreaking study of early modern Korean nationalism in Japanese in Tokyo in 1975, declared that he subscribed to Pak Ŭnsik's view of Kim Okkyun's movement. See Kim Yŏngjak, 1989. *Hanmal naesyŏnŏlijŭm yŏn'gu*. Seoul: Ch'ŏnggye:175.
5. Hŏ Tonghyŏn 2000.
6. Yi Kwangnin, 1986. 'Kaehwa ch'ogi han'gugin ŭi Ilbon yuhak', in *Han'guk kaehwa sa ŭi chemunje*:39–64.
7. Yu Yŏngik (Lew Young-ick), 1990. *Kabo kyŏngjang yŏn'gu* [Kabo reforms]. Seoul: Ilchogak:186–7.
8. ibid:178–224.
9. Hyŏn Kwangho 2002:40–47.
10. Chŏng Kyo, 2004. *Taehan kyenyŏnsa*, vol. 3:123–4.
11. See the statistics compiled by Korean students in Japan, later published in the article entitled 'Ilbon yuhaksaeng sa' in issue 6 of the student journal *Hakchigwang* (July 1915), and cited in Kim Kiju 1993:22–3. See also the statistics on the governmental dispatch of state-supported students cited in Kim Yŏngmo 1972:166–7. At the same time, Tsuboe Senji, in his *Chōsen minzoku dokuritsu undō hishi* (Tokyo: Kōrai shorin, 1986:46), refers to only 155 known cases of Koreans studying in Japan in 1897. These and other discrepancies in the statistics concerning the numbers of Koreans who studied in Japan are largely caused by the difficulties in tracking down all cases of self-financed study, including the short-term ones. At the same time, the statistics on the governmental dispatch of students are relatively

reliable, and show that around 30–40 students were sent for state-sponsored study to Japan every year. See Pak Inhwa, 1982. 'Kuhanmal toil kwanbi yuhaksaeng e kwanhan koch'al' [Study of the Korean government-financed students in Japan in the Korean empire period], in Yihwa yŏja taehakkyo, Sabŏm taehak sahow saenghwalkwa (eds), *Nogu yŏn'gu nonjip*, 24:89–91.

12. Kim Yŏngmo 1972:169–81.
13. Warren Y. Kim 1971:23.
14. Hŏ Tonghyŏn 2004:39–63.
15. Hyŏn Kwangho 2002: 46–126.
16. *Tōkanfu tōkei nenpo*, Chōsen Tōkanfu, 1910:401.
17. Kim Yunhŭi 2003:7–36.
18. Kim Yunhŭi 2001:88–117. See also Kim Yunhee (Kim Yunhŭi), 2003. 'Credit transactions and co-dependence strategy adopted by three countries' merchants in the foreign settlements of Seoul and Inch'ŏn (1897–1905)', (*International Journal of Korean History*, vol. 4:167–216), on the symbiotic relationship between Korean and Japanese traders, which included, among other points, a well-developed system of deferred payment and credit transactions.
19. An Pyŏngjik (ed.), 2001:190–95.
20. Stuart Hall, 1982. 'The rediscovery of ideology: return of the repressed in media studies', in M. Gurevitch *et al*., *Culture, Society, and the Media*. London: Methuen:95.
21. Inoue Tetsujirō, Takayama Chogyū, 1898. *Rinri kyōkasho: shinpen*, vols 1–2. Tokyo: Kinkōdō shoseki; Inoue Tetsujirō, Ōshima Gishū, 1903. *Chūgaku shūshin kyōkasho*, vols 1–3. Tokyo: Bungakusha.
22. Kim Ponghŭi 1999:134–7, 200–208.
23. Song Kyŏngwŏn 1997:201–75.
24. On the early stages of the formation of modern Japanophobia among Korean plebeians, see Park Eunsook (Pak Ŭnsuk) 2003:53–85.
25. Tyagai, G.D. (ed.), 1958. *Po Koree: Puteshestviya, 1885–1896*. Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury:134–265.
26. Although there were certain exceptions, in general even those who had once had the comparatively low post of *ch'ambong* (9th grade lower class) were a rarity among righteous army leaders: for example, 68 per cent of the *ŭibyŏng* chieftains of T'aein county (North Chŏlla province) in 1906 were never in government service at all. See Pak Sŏngsu, 1990. 'Hanmal ŭibyŏngjang ŭi sahowjŏk paegyŏng':159–189.
27. See, for example, the righteous army leaders' declarations in *Han'guk tongnip undong sa charyo*, vol. 19 (*ŭibyŏngp'yŏn* 12), Kwach'ŏn: Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 1988:566–7.
28. Pak Ch'ansŭng 1990:81–140.
29. An Chunggŭn lamented, even after his shift to an anti-Japanese position after 1904, that Japan had not wrested "the whole of Manchuria up to Vladivostok to the North" from the influence of "Russia's white race", and, in his anti-white outrage, accused even US President Theodore Roosevelt of being unfair, "as a white person", towards Japan's claims during the

US-sponsored negotiations that eventually led to the Portsmouth Treaty between Russian and Japan (5 September 1905)—otherwise, why hadn't Japan received a contribution from Russia? "If Russia's white race had been the victor, wouldn't Mr. Roosevelt have made much more effort to get a contribution from the defeated yellow race country, Japan?", An asked. See 'An Chunggŭn ŭi *Tongyang p'yŏnghwa ron*', in Ch'oe Kiyŏng 2003:93–119. Even after having "betrayed" its "yellow Korean brethren" and forcing Korea under its "Protectorate", Japan remained for An Chunggŭn a less malicious neighbour than "Russia's white race".

30. On An's Pan-Asianist views, and Japanese influences on Korean Pan-Asianism in general, see Yi Kwangnin 1989:138–55.
31. *Yu Kiljun chŏnsŏ*, 1971, vol. 2:319–20.
32. On Yu Kiljun's idealisation of British constitutionalism, see Kim Hakchun 2000:64–83.
33. See the English translation: *The Theory of the State*, 1898. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
34. See Ishida Takeshi 1976:174–6. On Liang Qichao particularly, see U Namsuk 2000: 113–45.
35. *Pŏphak t'ongnon*, 1905. Hansŏng (Seoul): Pangmunsa:74–5.
36. *Kukkahak*, 1906. Seoul:7–13.
37. *T'aegŭk Hakpo*, issues 1–7, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 13: 301–04.
38. *Ibid*:18–19.
39. *T'aegŭk Hakpo*, issues 21–26, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 16:109–110.
40. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* (reprint), 1974, vol. 20:236.
41. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 1:137.
42. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 6:6483.
43. *Sŏu*, issues 10–17, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 6:6–9.
44. *Taehan Chaganghwe Wŏlbo*, Issues 1–7, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 1:331.
45. Cited in: Chŏng Sŏnt'ae, 1999:424.
46. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 6:6695.
47. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 3:2395.
48. See his 'Ilp'aeron' ('On Japan's defeat', 1904) in digitalised form, available as part of an on-line edition of Yi's collected works, *Haehak Yusŏ* (*kwŏn* 3): http://www.koreanhistory.or.kr/cgi-bin/ku/ku_ju_frame.cgi?id=F00001
49. 'An Kuksŏn ŭi saengae wa kyemong sasang', in Ch'oe Kiyŏng 2003:140–200.
50. *Taehan Hyŏphwe Hwebo*, issues 1–7, in *Han'guk kaehwagi haksulji*, 1976, vol. 3:38–40.
51. *Taehan Maeil Sinbo* (reprint), 1977, vol. 6:6119.
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KOREAN PERCEPTIONS OF JAPAN DURING THE MODERN REFORM PERIOD (1876–1910)

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Introduction

The Kanghwa Treaty of 1876, and the cultural exchanges between Japan and Korea that followed—exchanges that had been brought to a halt in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration of 1868—paved the way for Japan's invasion of its neighbour. While some sections of Chosŏn officialdom strove to reform and modernise the system, their efforts to transform the country into a modern nation-state eventually failed, and Chosŏn became a protectorate of Japan in 1905, before becoming a full-fledged colony of Japan following the Annexation Treaty of 1910. As a result, Koreans suddenly found themselves being subjects of the Japanese emperor. This paper takes the period from 1876 to 1910, during which the Chosŏn dynasty unsuccessfully attempted to reform itself in order to ward off invasion from foreign powers, as the opening period in that process.

The opening up of the country in 1876 marks both the point at which the traditional flow of culture was reversed, with Japan suddenly becoming the diffuser and Korea the recipient, and the official starting point of the Japanese imperialists' invasion of Korea. Japan invited the *Susinsa*—special diplomatic envoy—in 1876 and 1880, as well as the Korean Courtiers' Observation Mission (also known as *Sinsa yuramdan*—Gentlemen's Observation Mission) of 1881, in order to introduce Koreans to its Westernised culture and modern military facilities. Japan hoped to entice Chosŏn into reforming its system along the lines of the one which it had adopted, by taking such steps as donating modern weapons and luring Korean students to study in Japan. In addition, whenever it had the opportunity, Japan would warn the Chosŏn government about the need to prepare against a Russian invasion. Japan intervened in Korea's internal affairs in 1880 in order to insure that the latter would establish diplomatic relations with the United States (US). Moreover, Japan actively promoted

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Japanese-style modernisation movements such as the Kapsin coup of 1884 and the Kabo reforms (1894–6). On the other hand, Japan violently put down anti-Japanese groups, such as the Tonghak peasant rebels in 1894 as well as several revolts launched by the so-called righteous armies. In addition, Japan provoked the Sino-Japanese War (1894–5) and the Russo-Japanese War (1904–05) in order to establish its control over Korea. Put simply, from 1876 onwards Japan portrayed itself as the protector and champion of Chosŏn's opening and independence. In reality, however, Japan's interest in Korea was, rather, imperialistic.[1]

When it came to the perception of Japan, significant differences emerged between the reformist group, who had visited Japan and experienced Japanese culture and civilisation, and the traditional intellectuals' group, who continued to abide by Confucian ideals. To date, very few studies have focused on this dichotomous perception of Japan which existed during the modern reform (*kaehwa*) period, usually placed between Korea's opening to Japan in 1876 and its full colonisation by Japan in 1910. As such, this paper will focus on the negative and positive perceptions of Japan which emerged during this period in order to analyse how the stereotypes of Japan were introduced into and formed in Korea. Such sources as newspaper articles, reports, travel writings, diaries and petitions made during the opening period, have been drawn upon to introduce the various perceptions of Japan that emerged at that time.

Negative perceptions of Japan

*Japanese as 'Barbarians as savage as the Westerners' (*Waeyang ilch'eron*): a new extension of the traditional Sinocentric worldview*

One of the fixed notions of Japan present during this period was that of the Japanese as barbarians of the same ilk as those found in the Western world; a perception that was based on a Sinocentric understanding of the world. This Sinocentric viewpoint was one in which the world was divided into those countries within the Chinese sphere, in which Confucian ethics were abided by, and those barbarian countries in which Confucianism was not present. As such, Japan was regarded as having lowered itself to the level of the barbarians by removing itself from the Chinese cultural sphere and 'cavorting' with Western countries. Until the middle of the 19th century, the great majority of Koreans adhered to the Sinocentric view of the world in which a country's degree of 'civilisation' or 'barbarity' was based on Chinese notions of culture, and as such looked down upon Japan as a country of barbarians. Throughout the Chosŏn dynasty, Japan was negatively perceived as a country of marauders, a "crowd of *wae*" (the latter a derogative name for the Japanese).[2]

Korean defenders of *wijŏng ch'ŏksa*—'[Movement] to defend orthodoxy and reject

heterodoxy'—, who continued to adhere to a Confucian-oriented worldview, regarded the newly modernised Japan as having left the Chinese cultural sphere, and as such lumped it together with the Western barbarian nations with which no intercourse was deemed to be possible. However, this negative perception of Japan began to weaken gradually among certain sections of the Chosŏn government in the aftermath of the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 and the subsequent advent of the West-centred international order. Nevertheless, the influence of this China-centred viewpoint, which refused to recognise Western culture, including that of the now westernised Japan, remained pervasive. In fact, this perception of Japan and of Japanese culture as being barbaric remained strong among the general public; in particular among those Confucian leaders who led the righteous army revolts of 1896, 1905 and 1907, and the Tonghak peasant rebels who advocated an anti-Western and anti-Japanese platform in 1894.

Japan mobilised its military forces and thoroughly crushed any group engaged in anti-foreign and anti-Japanese activities. During the Imo Soldiers' Riot of 1882, Japan dispatched a military vessel to the Korean coast in support of China's efforts to suppress the anti-foreign conservative followers of the Taewŏn'gun. Moreover, Japan used military force to suppress the Tonghak peasant soldiers in 1894 and the anti-Japanese campaigns launched by the righteous armies between 1896 and 1907, in the process killing thousands of peasant soldiers and righteous army members. These actions, in which Japan exposed its imperialistic designs, led the Wijŏng ch'ŏksa factions, the conservative and anti-foreign Taewŏn'gun, and those involved in the Tonghak movement to develop a strong impression of Japan as an invader.

Let us now take a closer look at the Wijŏng ch'ŏksa factions' perception of Japan. In a petition which he submitted to the government, Kim P'yŏngmuk criticised Japan's invasion of Korea within the framework of the waeyang ilch'eron—the notion that Japan and the Western world are composed of the same kind of barbarians[3]: "Japan has become a puppet of the Western world. This is not the Japan of old." Moreover, in a petition filed right after King Kojong's flight to the Russian Legation in February 1896, Ch'oe Ikhyŏn claimed that:

> Since the opening of the country in 1876, attempts have been to reform all of the legal institutions by which we have abided since the days of our ancestors. All of this has been undertaken under the leadership of the barbarians, which has led us to denigrate China and its people as a country of barbarians, and turned all humans into barbarians … This is the most serious disruption we have experienced since the foundation of the dynasty.[4]

In a petition submitted in January 1899, Ch'oe expressed his disdain for Japan, which he considered to be a barbaric country, and had the following to say about the Japanese-style reforms of 1894:

> If your excuse is that you were trying to reform the country by simply transforming little China into a little Japan, and you believe that we have reformed our system and destroyed little China, then you have deceived yourself into ignoring the ignoble act which you have committed by following these barbarians. This is nothing more than deceptive behaviour.[5]

The Tonghak peasant rebels, whose perceptions were shaped by the Sinocentric worldview, also regarded Japan as an aggressive, predatory power. Their perception of Japan is well exhibited in a petition which Tonghak members from Chŏlla province submitted to the Chŏlla provincial government in 1893, as well as in the *Munjang*, or appeal to the public, which called for an anti-Western and anti-Japanese struggle, submitted following the large Tonghak congregation that gathered in Poŭn.[6]

> As a result of the Japanese and Western barbarians' further encroachment into our country, the national turmoil which we find ourselves in has reached fever pitch. Look at our capital. It has already become the haunt of these barbarians. How can we even mention the Hideyoshi invasions of 1592 and the disgrace caused by the second Manchu invasion in the same breath as the current situation? How could such disgraceful events occur? Presently, our country has become a base for these barbarians, who are hell-bent on destroying 500 years of history. The whole nation will be turned into a useless wasteland. Where have all the faithful subjects gone? Although our Japanese enemies fully intend to cause a calamity of epic proportions in our country and a dark dangerous spectre has descended upon us, our people continue to make nothing of it and to cling to the belief that everything will be fine …
>
> The raising of righteous armies is designed to defeat the Japanese and Western imperialist powers. How could this be regarded as a serious crime? … In addition, although the threats to our king emanating from these barbarians have become extremely dangerous, no member of the government has taken it upon himself to avenge this dishonour. Where has their loyalty gone? … Although we are from the lower classes, we know that the Japanese and Western barbarians pose a serious threat to our nation. As such, all of us who have been enlightened by the Tonghak teachings would prefer to die trying to defeat these barbarian enemies than live a humiliating life. Our resolve should be encouraged by the state, not seen as something to worry about.

These hostile views spread beyond Confucian scholars and Tonghak peasant rebels to include the general public as well. This fact is well exposed in a public notice which was hung in front of the Japanese Legation in March 1893.[7]

> Listen carefully you Japanese merchants. When the sky and earth were first formed, borders were created and humans set about establishing countries. From that time onwards the *samgang* [the three human relationships] and the *oryun* [the five moral principles] have been in place. At the centre of the world are those humans who understand humanity, while the rest of the world is composed of barbarians who know nothing about humanity. Chinese civilisation spread to barbarian countries, and people were enlightened the world over … Don't you know that you also received the gift of

> civilisation even though your country was located on the periphery of the world? The natural order of things is for civilised countries to rule over their own country in order to protect their land and their people, while respecting their ruler. Why are you now invading other countries and killing and attacking other people? What good will such barbaric behaviour do you in the end?

A similarly hostile depiction of Japan is clearly exposed in a secret letter which the Taewŏn'gun sent to Confucian scholars and Tonghak peasant soldiers in which he exhorted them to raise a righteous army in the name of King Kojong in order to repel the Japanese invaders.[8]

> You have continued to exist as a people because of the benevolence of our ancestors. Those presently in government are closely allied with our enemy. I, who have nobody to trust, can only lament the situation in silence. The Japanese marauders have invaded the palace. Under the current circumstances, the destiny of Chosŏn is no longer clear; how can I handle the imminent calamity if you do not come to my aid? I instruct you to begin an uprising at once.

This assessment of Japan was accepted by everyone, from the conservative Confucian scholars to the ordinary people and the Tonghak peasant soldiers, with the exception of the enlightenment group. This fact is further demonstrated in the will written by Hwang Hyŏn, who committed suicide to protest against the imminent demise of the Chosŏn dynasty.[9]

> I do not have any particular reason to die. However, 500 years of history will fade away once the destruction of our country is complete. Who will be able to understand the sadness that we feel at the loss of our country if no one loses their life over this? I have decided to kill myself so that the Heaven-given human ethics and the principles which I have read so much about are preserved. Please do not be sad.

However, this perception of Japan as a nation of barbarians disappeared with the collapse of the Chosŏn dynasty. With an increase in the 1880s in the number of moderate reformist scholars who advocated the *Tongdo-Sŏgi* school of thought, which argued that while the Confucian order should be preserved, the advanced military and scientific technologies developed by Japan and the West should be accepted, the view of Japan as a nation of barbarians was gradually weakened, even among Confucian intellectuals. Over time, some Tonghak supporters joined pro-Japanese groups such as the Ilchinhoe, while others saw their previous perception of Japan and the West as barbarians altered as a result of their acceptance of new schools of thought such as the Ch'ŏndogyo. For example, Son Pyŏnghŭi, who was the third leader of the Ch'ŏndogyo, travelled to Japan in 1901 ostensibly to experience 'new culture'. While there, he struck up a friendship with some members of the exiled reformist groups

such as Pak Yŏnghyo. Thereafter he began to recommend that his followers study in Japan and that they do away with their Sinocentric view of Japan.[10]

Western-based perception of Japan as an underdeveloped modern nation

Another fixed perception of Japan which emerged during this period was of it as a second-tier country, whose experience Korea should not, at least, follow in its entirety. As such, Japan was considered to be a peripheral state removed from the centre of Western civilisation. This idea originated from individuals such as Sŏ Chaep'il (Philip Jaisohn) and Rhee Syngman (Yi Sŭngman) who had received their education in the West. Sŏ and Rhee regarded Confucianism and the monarchic system as being unable to guarantee the prosperity of a state under the international order which prevailed at the end of the 19th century, an order which, they argued, was ruled by the Social Darwinist 'struggle for survival'. As such, Korea should establish a new state founded on the acceptance of Christianity and an American-style democratic system. To these people, Japan was an example of a state from whose mistakes Korea could learn. As such, Japan was not a model which should be fully emulated, but an underdeveloped modern country.

The pro-American reformist group, which promoted the modernisation of Korea in the early 1900s, regarded Christianity as the best possible spiritual foundation, and accepted American-style democracy as the preferred alternative to a ruling structure dominated by the monarchy and *yangban* gentry. As is well demonstrated in the retrospective essay written by Sŏ Chaep'il (1863–1951) after his conversion to Christianity, these individuals regarded the religion and the political system of the US as the model which Korea should emulate.[11]

> I went to a Presbyterian church located on Mason Street every Sunday … This was after I had sworn to give my heart to Jesus Christ, our Lord who preached the gospel of love and hope to man. Religion has provided me with great strength throughout my whole life … When I heard from Pak Yŏnghyo about the state of our country, I realised that this was my opportunity to do something for my homeland. As such, the time for our country to achieve the ideals of freedom and independence, which is something that I have been thinking about for a long time, has finally come.

This pro-American group's perception of Japan as a nation that should not be emulated, and as a country whose mistakes should be learned from, is also reflected in the works of Rhee Syngman. In his *Tongnip chŏngsin* [Spirit of independence], Rhee argued that the reason why the Western nations had been able to become militarily powerful was because their people were free.[12] Moreover, in an essay in the *Sinhak Wŏlbo* (Theological Monthly), which he wrote from prison in 1903, Rhee held out hope that Korea's revitalisation would come from Christianity:

> Reform is an integral part of Christianity. Anywhere Christianity spreads, changes are brought about … Once these changes occur the country begins to develop … Koreans should realise the existence of such a relationship and have the strength to spread Christian teachings throughout the land. By doing so, a new national strength will emerge. While this strength cannot be used immediately, it will serve as the basis on which the future of our nation is built.

Furthermore, in an essay which he apparently wrote at the beginning of the 1900s, Rhee pushed for the country to be re-established on the basis of Christianity. In this essay, Rhee pointed out that Japan was an underdeveloped country for the following reasons:[13]

> In those countries where Christian churches are allowed to take root, people have the power; as such there are no evil practices such as rebellions, uprisings, impositions, deception, or fraud. The US is a perfect example of such a country. In the case of countries that prefer constitutional law to enlightenment, the king and his subjects appear to be involved in politics. Although these countries have established great laws and regulations, all kinds of discrepancies occur during elections as a result of the acts of corruption and demands made by those with the financial ability to corrupt others. The perfect example of such a country is Japan. There are other countries which do not even attempt to enlighten their people. Although they expand their power abroad, these nations are hard pressed to keep their countries from falling apart because of domestic upheavals. Russia is a good example of such a country. Does this not prove that we should enlighten our people on the basis of the law?

Although this group regarded an American-style democracy as the ideal model for Korea, they were of the opinion that under the circumstances which prevailed at that time, such a model could not yet be introduced in Korea. As such, they argued that a constitutional monarchy should first be established. Sŏ Chaep'il, in his capacity as one of the leaders of the Independence Club's efforts to establish a legislative assembly in 1896, became one of the main proponents of the establishment of a constitutional monarchy.[14] In his book Spirit of Independence, published in 1904, Rhee Syngman also promoted the establishment of a constitutional monarchy. "Democracy is the best system in the world. However, it would be very dangerous to introduce such a system in Korea right away."[15] However, what is also clear is that this pro-Western group regarded American-style democracy as the ideal model for Korea, and Japan and Russia as countries from whose mistakes lessons should be learned. For this pro-Western group, Japan, whose emperor system was enshrined in its constitution, was regarded as an example of underdeveloped modernity.

Positive perceptions of Japan

Japan as the defender of Chosŏn's independence and opening

In Article 1 of the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876, Japan clearly recognised the independence of Chosŏn. Japan invited diplomatic envoys and observation missions such as the Susinsa and the Courtiers' Observation Mission as a means of introducing its modernised culture and to promote the opening of Korea. As a result, Japan came to be seen as the foreign power which supported the independence and modernisation of Korea. Japan refrained from taking any action during the period of direct Qing intervention in Korean affairs. This period spanned the years from the 1882 Soldiers' Riot, which the Qing government used as an excuse to reassert its suzerainty over Korea and strengthen its secondary imperialism, until 1894, when the Qing were finally forced to retreat from the Korean peninsula as a result of their defeat in the Sino-Japanese War. In reality, however, Japan simply pretended to support the independence and opening of Korea. Japan proceeded to force Chosŏn to sign the unequal Kanghwa Treaty in which it secured special rights—including trade concessions, leasehold and extraterritorial rights, a conventional tariff of 8 per cent, as well as the right to station the Japanese military in Korea—that served as necessary prerequisites for any invasion of Chosŏn. As a result, Japan was able to enjoy special rights equivalent to those which Korea, as a vassal state, had granted to China until 1894. Japan, which successfully managed to remove China from the Korean peninsula by defeating it in the Sino-Japanese War, intended to turn Chosŏn into its protectorate. However, its efforts were frustrated by the intervention of Russia.

The pro-Japanese reformist group, which led the Kapsin coup (December 1884) as well as the leaders of the Kabo reforms (July 1894–February 1896) regarded Japan as the true supporter of Chosŏn's independence and opening. However, Japan failed to provide full support to its Korean admirers at the time of the Kapsin coup. Furthermore, in the aftermath of the Japanese victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan's intention towards Chosŏn became further evident, as shown by its actions during the period of the Kabo reforms. After the Tripartite Intervention of Russia, France and Germany in April 1895 (forcing Japan to give up the Liaodong peninsula), Japan and the pro-Japanese reformist faction, which had been removed from power by Russia and Queen Min, refused to go quietly, even taking such drastic steps as assassinating Queen Min in order to hang on to power. However, King Kojong's flight to the Russian Legation (11 February 1896–20 February 1897) changed the situation on the ground completely. Kim Hongjip and Ŏ Yunjung, who were members of the pro-Japanese reformist faction, were killed. Yu Kiljun was forced into exile in Japan. The Japanese advisors to the king were replaced by Russian advisors and Russian schools and the Russo-Korean Bank were established. A pro-Russian cabinet centred around such pro-Russian figures as Yi Pŏmjin and Yi Wanyong was inaugurated.

However, the Russian advisors were forced to leave and the Russo-Korean Bank was closed down as a result of the movement launched by the Independence Club to oppose foreign aggression and exploitation on the peninsula and to restore the sovereignty of Korea. King Kojong then made his way back to Kyŏngun palace and on 16 August 1897 proceeded to proclaim the establishment of the Taehan empire, thus doing away with Korea's status as a vassal of China once and for all. Although Japan was engaged in a fierce battle with Russia for the control of Korea from 1895 to 1904, it nevertheless managed during this period to secure an economic foothold for itself on the peninsula by expanding its number of mining concessions, establishing new ports, and setting up new financial organisations. Japan's long-cherished goal of establishing a monopoly over Korea was finally completed with its victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. However, right up until the point that Japan officially made Korea its protectorate, the majority of the members of the pro-Japanese faction continued to regard Japan as a friendly power protecting Korea from Russian attempts to usurp its independence.

What was it that made those who led the movement to modernise Korea, who were also those who played a central role in such important events as the Kapsin coup, Kabo reforms, and the activities of the Independence Club, regard Japan as a power which would defend the independence and opening of Korea? In essence, these men became absorbed by the concepts of Pan-Asianism and of the superiority of the yellow race. The strategy which modern Japan used to extend its control over the mainland was premised on the notion of Pan-Asianism and the imminent threat emanating from the Western powers. In fact, the need to secure the Asian mainland, which translated into Japan's overseas expansion, as well as Pan-Asianism, which was a movement to resist the encroachment of Western powers by forming an alliance with other Asian empires such as China, started to spread within Japan at the same time.[16] This notion of Pan-Asianism began to gain a foothold in Korea in the 1880s. The 'Rise Asia Association' (Kōakai), established on 10 March 1880, which consisted of Japanese, Chinese residents in Japan, and Korean envoys to Japan, called for the creation of an Asian tripartite alliance designed to deter Western powers, especially Russia, from encroaching in Asia. Japan concentrated on using this Pan-Asianism to spread a sense of Russophobia among Koreans.[17]

Based on this concept of Pan-Asianism, the pro-Japanese faction's perception of Japan as a friendly foreign power that would protect the independence of Korea from Western encroachment, and which would support the modernisation of Korea, remained a fixed one from 1885 to 1910. The persistence of this notion is well demonstrated in the official apology submitted to the Japanese emperor by Pak Yŏnghyo, who had been dispatched as a special envoy to Japan in August 1882 in order to restore relations which had been severed as a result of the Soldiers' Riot. "Please let us cooperate with each other in a manner that is similar to how the teeth

and gums depend on each other. Let our two countries enjoy mutual benefits and happiness."[18] This perception is also evident in an article published in the *Tongnip Sinmun* on 8 February 1899 and in another published in the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* on 9 January 1910:

> Sincerely, all Asian countries should follow our Japanese brothers' courage and strategy when it comes to re-establishing our independence. Presently, Japan is the centre of the future of all Asian nations, the mirror which we should hold our political systems and constitutions up to, and our protector. Japanese leaders, who have been so upright and persistently remained committed to their goals no matter what, should lead all Asian nations' relations with the Western powers. Japan should establish a Pan-Asian plan to protect the Asian region and to keep the peace in Asia. These obligations have been sent to Japan from above.[19]

> Japan has strived to support the independence of Korea and China, to cooperate with them in their modernisation drives and to increase their economic development, so as to achieve eternal peace and wellbeing in Asia. Japan does not have any ambition to cause problems.[20]

This notion of Pan-Asianism, indulged in by the pro-Japanese Koreans during the opening period, which led them to misperceive Japan as the foreign power that would protect Korea's independence from Western encroachment, was eventually integrated with the notion of the superiority of the yellow race in the early 1900s. The most representative proponent of these beliefs is Yun Ch'iho (1864–1945). Yun had experienced firsthand in Japan and the US the racism which pervaded Western society. He became an advocate of the 'weaker' oriental nations of Korea, Japan, and China joining hands and creating a defensive form of racism designed to counter the encroachments of the racist West.[21] Moreover, he was one of the main actors in the Independence Movement, a group which developed into an anti-Russian movement once Russia's attempts to encroach on the peninsula increased after 1895. Yun resented the fact that Koreans residing in Vladivostok were being treated as slaves by the Russian people. His anti-Russian sentiment was made evident in comments such as the following: "The meanest Japanese would be a gentleman and scholar compared to a vodka-drunk, orthodox Russian."[22] Meanwhile, as we can see from his words quoted below, Yun promoted a sense of allied, community consciousness with the people of China and Japan that was based on the notion of the superiority of the yellow race. "Between a Japanese and a Korean there is community of sentiment and of interest, based on the identity of race, of religion, and of written characters. Japan, China and Korea must have one common aim, one common policy, one common ideal—to keep the Far East the permanent home of the yellow race, and to make that home as beautiful and happy as nature has meant it to be."[23] Influenced by

these notions of the superiority of the yellow race and Pan-Asianism, Yun praised the victory of Japan in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905.

> What a glorious campaign this has been to Japan! As a Korean, I have no special reasons for rejoicing over the uninterrupted successes of Japan. Every victory is a nail in the coffin of the Korean independence … Yet as a member of the Yellow race, Korea—or rather I—feel proud of the glorious successes of Japan. She has vindicated the honour of our race. [24]

> I am glad Japan has beaten Russia. The islanders have gloriously vindicated the honours of the Yellow race. The white man has so long been the master of the situation that he has kept the Oriental races in over [*sic*] for centuries. For Japan to break this spell single handed, is grand in its very conception … I love and honour Japan as a member of the Yellow race; but hate her as a Korean from whom she is taking away everything independence itself.[25]

Yun Ch'iho had already stated in his diary record written in the end of 1893 that "[i]f I had means to choose my home at my pleasure, Japan would be the country. I don't want to live China with its abominable smells or in America where racial prejudice and discrimination hold their horrid sway, or in Corea as long as its infernal government lasts. O blessed Japan! The Paradise of the East! The Garden of the World!" As we can judge from this record, his favorable impression of Japan was based on an outlook already blatantly racist in the 1890s.[26] However, this racism originated from the concept of Social Darwinism.[27]

This belief that the Russo-Japanese War was in fact a competition between the races is also visible in an essay written by a Korean student in Japan: "The Russo-Japanese War was the result of the international competition which began in the 19th century. Posterity will record this war as one between the yellow and white races. The biggest international problem today is this competition between the races."[28] This positive perception of Japan as the defender of the independence of Chosŏn was not limited to a few intellectuals. The argument is supported by a passage from the novel by Yu Wŏnp'yo (1852–?) entitled *Mongkyŏn Chegallyang* which was written immediately after the Russo-Japanese War.[29]

> Presently the Western powers are occupying Asia. The yellow and white races are involved in a struggle for supremacy. Therefore, if we—Korea, Japan, and China—do not cooperate with each other, this would be the equivalent of an internecine war. However, let us look at the mindset and strategies of these three countries' governments right now. The time has come to seek out bigger advantages, not to be jealous of others or think only about trivial interests … If Japan really starts a war and constructs a Pan-Asian structure in the Eastern hemisphere, a great society in which many Asian countries, such as China, Chosŏn, Vietnam, Burma, and Thailand, cooperate with each other will be established. The unified yellow race, with Japan at the centre, will separate the world

> into the Eastern and Western powers. As such, despite the fact that the white race is now inundating our shores with weapons and soldiers, we, the members of the yellow race do not have to be scared.

The pro-Japanese group did not understand the true nature of Japanese expansionism. As a result, they overlooked Japan's chauvinism and imperialistic designs which were contained in these notions of Pan-Asianism and the superiority of the yellow race. In particular, the racism embedded in this concept of Pan-Asianism, as can be seen from Yun Ch'iho's pro-Japanese activities, was connected to Korea's willingness to reach a compromise with the Japanese, and the sense of national inferiority which was used to justify Japan's invasion of Korea.[30]

Japan as the ideal model

Japan, which was considered to be on the periphery of Asia under the traditional Sinocentric East Asian order, rapidly responded to the Western impact that accompanied the advent of the international era, and created a Japanese-style nation-state which allowed it be reborn as the centre of Asia. From that point on, it was the Japanese who developed a negative image of Korea. The perception of Japan possessed by Korean progressives who were striving to respond to the new world order rapidly changed. The progressives, who after the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 had witnessed firsthand Japan's modernisation in their roles either as diplomatic envoys and members of observation missions or as students, were forced to reassess their perception of Japan as a barbarian country. As we can see from the title of the travel piece written by Pak Yŏnghyo—*Sahwakiryak* [Brief record of my embassy to Japan]—who went to Japan as a Susinsa in 1882, Japan was no longer the country of culturally inferior 'wae'—Japanese marauders, but of 'hwa'—high-class culture, which could be learned from. As such, modernised Japan was regarded as the ideal model for the progressive leaders of the Kapsin coup, the Kabo reforms and the Independence Club to learn from.

After the Meiji Restoration of 1868, Japan introduced the methods and tools of modernisation that had been developed in the West since the French Revolution. As a result, a uniquely Japanese modern state was created which combined Western-style modernisation with the emperor system of ancient Japan. The modernity of Japan possessed inherent differences from the one that developed in the West, differences which stemmed from the former's imperfect acceptance and misunderstanding of Western modernity. For example, the devices which this Japanese-style nation-state, characterised by a non-democratic government and a lack of a civilian society, used to integrate the nation were fundamentally limited in their ability to create a modern civil society. Looking back on Japanese history, the origins of Japanese militarism can be traced back to this non-democratic government which was in place

at the beginning of the Meiji Restoration. Nevertheless, this Japanese ruling system, partially based on the Western concept, was a transitional one which was supposed to give way to a constitutional monarchy. As the ruling system was based on the separation of the legislative, executive and judicial branches, Japan's appeared to be a modern political system. As such, it was seen as the ideal model and alternative for Korea, a country in which a civilian class also did not exist.[31] Moreover, for Korean progressives the Japanese nation-state model was the only option available.

Ŏ Yunjung, who experienced the modernised culture of Japan as a member of the Courtiers' Observation Mission of 1881, highly praised Japan's modernisation and political system. "The Japanese people were able to establish a modern state because they resolutely carried out policy measures without taking personal profit or loss into account. Meanwhile, the Chinese are wasting their time abiding by outdated traditions. When all of this is taken into account, it becomes clear that anybody who acts without taking personal interest into account will succeed."[32] According to Sŏ Chaep'il's own recollections, Kim Okkyun, the leader of the Kapsin coup, wanted to adopt the Japanese modernisation model for Chosŏn: "Kim realized that Western civilisation had not been formed in an instant, but had gradually come about as a result of the centuries-long competition between powers. However, Japan had achieved modernisation in one generation. As such, Kim felt that Japan should be used as the model to modernise Chosŏn."[33] In a petition which he wrote following his exile to Japan after the failure of the Kapsin coup, Pak Yŏnghyo also argued that Japan's modernisation model should be adopted.[34]

> There is a neighbouring country [Japan] whose people are of the same race as the people of Chosŏn, a people who have received the same benefits from the rains and dew, and on who the same light emanating from the sun and moon shine. Moreover there is not much difference between the size of these two countries, or in their production capabilities. However, there is a big difference in the way these matters are managed. Japan has accepted modernisation as a means of catching up with the outside world in the realms of culture and technology. Meanwhile, our country has still not awakened from its drunken stupor, and has failed to understand the changed nature of the international situation. As a result, we are now being humiliated in front of the entire world. Yet, our country acts as if it were oblivious to this humiliation. Although I am ignorant and know little about the current international situation, I cannot help but be seriously concerned about our country. In addition, if Chosŏn lets other countries view it as a stupid, drunken country, how can we not be humiliated?

Kim Okkyun, Pak Yŏnghyo, and Ŏ Yunjung were members of the progressive faction that attempted to establish a modern nation-state in Korea that was based on the model adopted by Meiji Japan. These leaders of the Kapsin coup and Kabo reforms hoped to implement the following: the establishment of a system of constitutional monarchy centred around a cabinet and the introduction of limited representative

mechanisms; creation of a police system and the modernisation of legal institutions; the establishment of a standing army to achieve national integration; an increase in government revenues through rectifying the financial system adopted by the royal family; improvement of the taxation system; creation of new taxation sources; the promotion of a government-led private commercial and industrial sector in order to achieve economic integration; and the securing of the necessary finances from Japan. Furthermore, they planned to educate the public by abolishing the traditional social status system, and to introduce a modernised school system in order to facilitate social integration. They also planned to secure the independence of Chosŏn and end its vassalage to China. As such, they strove to establish a nation-state which would be based on the Japanese model.[35]

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to look at the perceptions of Japan in the modern reform period in all their complicated combination of sympathies and hatreds, from a long-term historical viewpoint, through the available written record. In way of conclusion, the following points may be emphasised:

First, cultural exchanges between Korea and Japan have taken place since the days of the ancient kingdoms. Since the cultural centre of East Asia before the 19th century, when the Western world began its global takeover, was China, the flow of culture went from the Korean peninsula to Japan. Koreans, as the diffuser of high-class culture, were accustomed to regard Japan and Japanese culture as barbaric. In addition, Korean scepticism towards Japan remained strong because of the lingering sense of hostility caused by the Japanese invasions at the end of the Koryŏ dynasty and the Hideyoshi invasions of 1592.

Despite the fact that this cultural relationship between the two countries was reversed, and Western powers entered Korea, conservative groups such as the Wijŏng ch'ŏksa faction and Tonghak peasant soldiers continued to hold on to their traditional perception of Japan, which was based on the Sinocentric worldview, as a nation of barbarians. Meanwhile, the members of the Enlightenment faction, who realised that a new world order was taking shape, had a positive understanding of Japan, a nation which they regarded as offering the ideal modernisation model for Korea and which they saw as the defender of the independence of Korea.

This conflicting love-hate perception of Japan nurtured during the period of modern reforms, in which Japan is regarded as both an imperialist power and an ideal nation for Korea to learn from, still permeates contemporary Korean society. Koreans hate the Japanese for their refusal to atone for their misdeeds of the past, but imitate their economic development model.

Second, throughout the whole modern reform period Japan played in Korea the

role of an 'imperialist aggressor' under the mask of 'supporter for Korea's progress and independence'. While this point was painfully clear for the conservative Confucian intellectuals and peasants, they were clinging to an outdated traditional worldview and did not wish to know about the changes in the wider world governed now by Social Darwinist principles of 'might is right'. On the other side, the reformers, while cognisant of the new tendencies in the world, were falling into the trap of Pan-Asianist ideology based on Social Darwinism and racism and were thus unable to recognise Japan's aggressive designs. This inability realistically to identify Japan's intentions was one of the factors contributing to Korea's colonisation.

Third, while Yun Ch'iho and some other Japanophile reformers, fascinated by Pan-Asianism, were considering Japan's modern experience a viable model for Korea's own development, for Yi Sŭngman, Sŏ Chaep'il and other pro-American reformers of the 1900s, who idealised Christianity and American democracy, Japan was no longer an ideal model—it was a "backward modern country" to be perceived critically, and often as a model of how one *should not* modernise. This divergence in views on Japan was, from a macro-historical perspective, continued after 1945, as Rhee Syngman or Chang Myŏn strove to follow the American model, while Park Chung-hee and his acolytes followed the Japanese one.

Finally, why have Koreans had such a love-hate perception of Japan since the opening period? One of the reasons for this may very well be that Koreans' perception of Japan was based on the dominant ruling ideology during the opening period. Koreans who were influenced by Chinese culture regarded Japan, a nation, which while having accepted Chinese culture, maintained its own cultural uniqueness, as barbaric and its culture likewise. For contemporary Koreans who have accepted Christianity—and form the only nation to have accepted Christianity on a national scale in East Asia—and who are presently striving to rectify the past by building a Western-style civil society, Japan, a country that has maintained an emperor system despite the influence of Western culture and which has glorified its imperial past, cannot be seen in a positive light. As such, Japan has simply been regarded as something that Korea can criticise or as a nation from whose mistakes Korea can learn. Meanwhile, Korea established Yusin-style militarisation, which was based on the model adopted after the Meiji Restoration, and has copied the economic development plans laid out by the Government-General of Chosŏn. The country, moreover, is still dependent on Japan for its industrial technologies and capital.

Editor's note: Professor Huh's text was translated from the Korean by Michael Bujold and Yu Yŏnggi of Somang Translation. Their translation includes all quoted passages, with the exception of the citations from Yun Ch'iho's English diary, and have been edited where necessary.

Notes

1. Lew Young-ick (Yu Yŏngik) 1983:136–42.
2. Ko Pyŏngik 1992:53–56,71.
3. Kim P'yŏngmuk introduced four points to support his argument that Japan had designs on Korea. "First, the Japanese marauders, in their capacity as the puppets of the Western powers, have been trying, in conjunction with their Western overlords, to gain a foothold in China for a few years now. Second, that Japan and the Western countries are of the same barbarian stock can be ascertained by the fact that Japan uses Western-style ships and weapons. Third, the action of dispatching 4000 soldiers under the guise of 'protecting' another nation is one without historical precedence. Such barbaric behaviour is usually associated with Westerners. Fourth, according to Chinese documents, the 'Western forces' who invaded Kanghwa Island in 1866 were in reality Japanese marauders sent to threaten Chosŏn." Kim P'yŏngmuk, *Chungamjip*, vol.5:2–3, in *Han'guk munjip ch'onggan*, 2003; O Yŏngsŏp 1999, quoted on p.106.
4. Ch'oe Ikhyŏn, *Myŏnamjip*, vol.4:11, in *Kugyŏk Myŏnamjip*, 1977:148.
5. Ch'oe Ikhyŏn, *Myŏnamjip*, vol.4: 44–45, in ibid.:192.
6. Nihon Gaimushō 1936, vol.5 (Korea):457; Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe 1959. *Tongnak nan kirok*, vol.1:117
7. Nihon Gaimusho 1936, vol.5 (Korea):423
8. Yi Sangbaek 1962:13
9. Ch'oe Sŭnghyo 1985:36.
10. Ŭiam Son Pyŏnhŭi sŏnsaeng kinyŏm saŏphoe 1967:6–7.
11. Kim Tot'ae 1972:153, 167–168.
12. Rhee Syngman, 1993:31
13. Rhee Syngman, *Okchung chapki* [Prison writings], cited in Lew Young-ick 2000:37.
14. Lew Young-ick, 'Pak Yŏnghyo wa Kabo Kyŏngjang': pp. 101–102; Sin Yongha 2003: 149–151.
15. Rhee Syngman 1993:110–112.
16. Pak Chungsŏk, 1985. 'Ilbon chisigin ŭi taehan'gwan: 1872–1894':64–75; Pak Chungsŏk 1996:107–110; Hatada Takashi 1983:17–21; Kang Ch'angil 2002:27–40, 298–317.
17. Yamada Shoji 1969:43–45; Yi Kwangnin 1989:140–141.
18. Pak Yŏnghyo 1977:343.
19. *Tongnip sinmun nonsŏlji*, 1970:881–892
20. 'Siguk e taehaya maengsŏngham i kaham' [Evaluation of the present situation], *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 9 January 1910.
21. Yu Yŏngnyŏl 1985:265–267.
22. Kuksa P'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, 1971. *Yun Ch'iho Ilgi*, vol. 5:327 (7 May 1902).
23. *Yun Ch'iho Ilgi,* vol. 5:327 (7 May 1902).

24. *Yun Ch'iho Ilgi*, vol. 6:112 (2 June 1905).
25. *Yun Ch'iho Ilgi,* vol. 6:143 (7 September 1905).
26. *Yun Ch'iho Ilgi*, vol.3:204 (1 November 1893).
27. Hŏ Tonghyŏ, 2002a:185–188; Ch'oe Kiyŏng 2003:32. After the Russo-Japanese War Yi Jun and An Chungkŭn began to express notions of a "peace in the Orient" and Asianism that were based on the concept of Pan-Asianism. The fact that Yun Ch'iho was influenced by Social Darwinism is well demonstrated in his diary. *Yun Ch'iho Ilgi*, vol. 2:418–419 (20 November 1892): "'Might is right' in international or interracial dealings? So I always thought … [W]e find the stronger has been almost always better or less corrupted in morals, religions and politics than the weaker. Thus we see that what seems to be a triumph of might over right is but a triumph of comparative—I don't say absolute—right over comparative wrong. So after all, right is might even in interracial dealings, isolated and minor exceptions of course admitted."
28. P'ousaeng, 'Kyŏngjaeng ŭi kŭnbon' [The nature of competition], *T'aekŭk Hakbo*, vol. 22:24–28. Amongst the Korean students in Japan racist notions were all too common; Kim Tohyŏng 1994:67–68.
29. Yu Wŏnp'yo 1908:84–99; Chŏng Hwan'guk 2003:208.
30. Intellectually, Yun Ch'iho admired the powerful cultures of England and the US. However, emotionally, he possessed a fervent hostility towards the notion of the superiority of the white race and racial discrimination. Yun used this racism as an excuse to justify his pro-Japanese activities. Yu Yŏngnyŏl 1985:152–161, 223–231; Kim Sangt'ae 2000:128, 133–135.
31. Hŏ Tonghyŏn 2002b:509–512.
32. Ŏ Yunjung, *Sumunrok*; Hŏ Donghyŏn 2000:7.
33. Sŏ Chaep'il 1947:82.
34. Kim Kapch'ŏn 1990:252.
35. Ch'oe Yŏngho 1990:61–75; Lew Young-ik 1990:204–219; Wang Hyŏnjong 2003:427–441.

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CHOSŎN PERCEPTIONS OF THE WORLD AS REFLECTED IN THE KOREAN-BRITISH TREATY OF 1882

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In June 1832, the British merchant ship the *Lord Amherst* sailed into Kodaedo, Hongju-mok in Chungchŏng province and proceeded to ride at anchor for twenty days as it waited for government officials to forward its letter to the King demanding the conclusion of a commercial treaty and an agreement on the fair treatment of shipwrecked sailors.[1] It was in 1832, the same year the *Lord Amherst* demanded the opening of Chosŏn, that the British government abolished the East India Company's monopoly over trade with China and started to pursue actively the opening of the Chinese market. Britain quickly let it be known that when it came to the opening of markets in East Asia, not only China and Japan, but Chosŏn as well would also be pressured to open up. As such, Western demands that Korea open its domestic market ostensibly started at the same time as pressure began to be put on China and Japan to do the same: in the middle of the 19th century.

Although Western pressure to open the Chosŏn market began approximately at the same time as efforts to open neighbouring countries, the results in Korea proved to be quite different from those that occurred in China and Japan. The First Opium War between China and Britain led to the conclusion of the Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. Japan was similarly forced through gunboat diplomacy to conclude the Kanagawa Treaty of 1854, following the arrival of Commodore Perry of the United States (US) and his "black ships" off their shores. These two treaties marked the official opening of China's and Japan's markets to the outside world. Chosŏn was also attacked when the French Far Eastern Fleet stormed Kanghwa island in 1866 and again in 1871 when a mini-war broke out with the US. While the modern armed forces of France and the US caused serious damage to Chosŏn and its people, the Chosŏn government steadfastly refused to give in to their demands. In the end, French and American efforts to open up Korea came to naught.

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To this day one can find a large number of so-called *ch'ŏkhwabi* monuments (stone tablets carved at the instruction of the Taewŏn'gun) spread throughout the nation. On each of these ch'ŏkhwabi the following inscription can be found: "Failure to fight against the invasion of Western barbarians is to advocate appeasement, and to advocate appeasement is to betray the nation". To strengthen the people's willingness to resist foreign encroachment, the following was also included at the bottom of these tablets*:* "prepared in the year of Pyŏngin (1866) and erected in the year of *Sinmi* (1871)".

France's attack on Kanghwa island in 1866 came as a form of retaliation for Korea's execution of Catholic missionaries. For its part, the US attack on Kanghwa island was designed to force Korea to pay restitution for its destruction five years before of the *General Sherman* (the US-owned steamship burnt on the Taedong river in 1866). France mobilised seven warships and 1,500 soldiers for its operation on Kanghwa island and proceeded to occupy Kanghwa for one month. During that period they plundered cultural treasures and properties, including 340 volumes from the Outer Royal Archive and 19 chests of silver bullion containing the equivalent of 197,231 francs. Meanwhile, the US mobilised five naval ships (three coastguard vessels and two gunboats), 85 pieces of artillery and 1,230 marines for its fact-finding mission concerning the fate of the *General Sherman*, the largest mobilisation of military power since the Civil War. The US forces landed on Kanghwa island after having destroyed the Chosŏn military. According to a report published by the US, this battle resulted in three American casualties and in more than 350 for the Chosŏn forces. However, despite the inordinate amount of damage caused by the powerful French and American forces, the Chosŏn government was steadfast in resisting their demands, an outcome that surprised even the French and American soldiers. Immediately after the conclusion of these wars with the Western powers, the Korean ruler issued his proclamation of the government's refusal to open the country, which was enshrined in the above-mentioned stone tablets.

Where did Chosŏn's strong refusal to open the country even after having been violently attacked by France and the US come from? Chosŏn's military power was much weaker than that of China or Japan during this period. For both Chosŏn intellectuals and commoners, perception of the world was based of the notion of self-cultivation, which in turn was founded on the quest to discover the nature of humanity and to live a life that was based on righteous human conduct. As such, Chosŏn people believed that those who abided by the five virtues—benevolence, loyalty, propriety, wisdom and trust—and the five moral principles (*oryun*) were true humans. Therefore, for Koreans, the Western countries, who used their military power to kill innocent people, plundered properties and even damaged ancestors' graves, were sub-humans who were not even worthy of the appellation of barbarian. Chosŏn's refusal to open its doors to the Western world has its origins in these perceptions.

The task of bringing Chosŏn, which had strongly resisted Western demands to open the country, into the capitalist world order, fell indirectly into the hands of Japan. However, Chosŏn continued to show different patterns even after joining the capitalist market system. While China and Japan proceeded to open their markets immediately and sign treaties with other Western powers following their opening to the outside world, Chosŏn continued fixedly to refuse to yield. It took six years from the signing of the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876 before Chosŏn finally ceded to the Western powers, a process which only began in earnest in the aftermath of the conclusion of treaties with the US and Britain in 1882.

As such, it was only half a century after the *Lord Amherst* had first appeared off the shores of Korea that a treaty with Britain was finally signed. However, the Korean-British Treaty concluded in April 1882 proved to be a provisional one. The conclusion of treaties with the US and Britain resulted in further fanning of the flames of the resistance orchestrated by the conservative faction opposed to the government's policy of opening up, and eventually led to a temporary change in the political power structure. As the British merchants active in East Asia vehemently objected to the treaty's provisions dealing with tariff rates, the Korean-British Treaty of 1882 was quietly abandoned without ever being ratified. The provisions for a new Korean-British Treaty began to be negotiated in the aftermath of the Chinese military intervention in Korea, which restored the original framework of power. Final agreement was reached in October 1883. The new Korean-British Treaty of 1883 came into effect after having been ratified by both countries and became the model on which the Chosŏn government based its treaties with other Western powers.

This paper analyses the conflicting nature and characteristics of the *yangban* intellectuals' perceptions of the international scene from 1880, when the Chosŏn government actively began to pursue an opening policy toward the West, until 1882, when the first Korean-British Treaty was concluded.[2]

Japan's role

As mentioned above, Chosŏn's inclusion in the Western capitalist order was indirectly brought about by Japan, not directly by Western powers such as the US or Britain. The Korean-Japanese Treaty, or as it is more commonly known, the Kanghwa Treaty, was signed on 6 February 1876. The treaty was the result of seven years of negotiations between the two countries, which had as their goal the restoring of diplomatic ties in the aftermath of the Meiji Restoration. While Japan sought to restore diplomatic relations with Chosŏn right after the establishment of the Meiji government in 1868, Chosŏn consistently refused throughout those years to accept the diplomatic credentials submitted by Japan. The Korean refusal was made on the

basis that these credentials were different from the ones traditionally used to govern relations between the two neighbours.

In 1875, by which point diplomatic negotiations had broken down, Japan decided to use the same method of getting Korea to yield which the US had employed on them. It chose to use gunboat diplomacy to get Chosŏn to open its doors. Japan's forced opening of Chosŏn came at a time when the political currents were changing within the Meiji regime itself. This process of opening Korea by force began in earnest in 1873 following an uprising by the so-called Conquer Korea faction, which advocated the notion of *Seikan ron* (military conquest of Korea).

In January 1876, Japan dispatched an envoy to confront Chosŏn about what Japan argued were its military provocations. As their own envoy, the Chosŏn government sent Sin Hŏn, the general who had fended off the two previous Western attempts to encroach on Korea's sovereignty. However, the Japanese demand that Chosŏn sign a treaty to open its ports caught the government completely off guard. This Japanese demand, backed by military force, resulted in the advent of a nationwide opposition movement to the signing of such a treaty. The Taewŏn'gun and his supporters had set about mobilising public opinion against the opening-up policy from the moment King Kojong first announced that he was actively considering the adoption of such a policy during a meeting of the legislative assembly. However, the most influential person in the formation of public opinion and the most vehement opponent of the government's decision to follow this course proved to be Ch'oe Ikhyŏn. Three years earlier, Ch'oe had provided King Kojong with the opportunity to restore his authority, but now he criticised Kojong's policy of establishing diplomatic relations with Japan. In a petition to the King, Ch'oe made his opposition to the opening policy clear:

> If we view the issues before us from the standpoint of the Cheng-Zhu school of Confucian thought, then there are five reasons why we will be faced with an unforgettable calamity if we sign a treaty with the enemy … If we simply grant their demands without making the necessary preparations to oppose them, then how will we satisfy their endless greed in the future? This is the first reason why we will be faced with a calamity. The enemy is awash with luxurious and strange things. Our people are hard-pressed to make ends meet. The whole country will go bankrupt within a few years if people are allowed to indulge in such luxuries. This is the second reason why a calamity will befall us if we go through with this. Although the enemy appears to be *waein* [Japanese], these are in reality Western barbarians. If we establish relations with these barbarians, heretical schools of thought will spread throughout the nation. This is the third reason we must oppose this treaty. If we allow them in because we do not have any reason to refuse them, these barbarians will rape our people and plunder our treasures. This is the fourth reason … These barbarians are only interested in fortune and women. As they do not have any perception of humanity, they are considered to be beasts. I do not understand why we must form relations with such beasts. This is the fifth reason … Your Majesty, you said, "since I have stated that those who have come over this time are Japanese and not

> Westerners, what is so harmful about adhering to tradition?" In my opinion, there are several reasons why we should not perceive them as simple Japanese … These Japanese came in a Western-style ship, wearing Western-style clothes and hats. This proves that they are the same as the Western barbarians … The day we make relations with Japan will be the day that we become friends with the Western barbarians.[3]

During this period in which King Kojong and his government were debating the opening up of the country, Ch'oe Ikhyŏn listed these five reasons why such a policy should not be adopted. His objections were in large part based on the notion of the *waeyang ilch'eron* (barbarians as savage as the Westerners). In a memorial to the king, Ch'oe directly criticised King Kojong's justification for implementing an opening policy, asking, "Didn't you say, 'since I have stated that those who have come over this time are Japanese and not Westerners, what is so harmful about adhering to tradition?'" King Kojong responded to Ch'oe Ikhyŏn's criticism by clarifying his position and ordering that Ch'oe be exiled to Hŭksando:

> Restraining the Japanese is restraining the Japanese. Rejecting Westerners is rejecting Westerners. How can we know for certain that the Japanese boat that came this time was in collusion with the Westerners? Even if the Japanese are scouts for the Westerners, we can take necessary steps as the situation demands.[4]

King Kojong justified his own stance on the basis that Westerners were Westerners and the Japanese were Japanese. As such, Kojong refused to accept this notion of waeyang ilch'eron. Basing itself on advice from China, and its own belief that it was better at this point to avoid military conflicts in order to forestall the occurrence of more outrageous demands such as those that had been made in the aftermath of the *Unyō* incident (when a Japanese naval vessel approached Kanghwa island in 1875 and was fired upon), the Chosŏn government forged ahead and concluded the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876. The most important issues which emerged for the Chosŏn government in the aftermath of the signing of this treaty were to find ways of lessening the resistance of those opposed to the opening policy, and to craft measures to respond to the changes in Korea's international situation which had been wrought by the signing of the treaty. However, the biggest problem for the Chosŏn government proved to be the relentless attacks of those opposed to the opening policy.

As this criticism of the Kanghwa Treaty, which had been concluded under duress from the Japanese military, transformed itself into a more general political attack on government officials, King Kojong increasingly felt the need to justify the treaty. He argued that "this treaty is nothing more than the simple reestablishment of relations between our two countries. As the actions taken by my loyal subjects were natural, the treaty was easily concluded." Unlike the notion of waeyang ilch'eron advanced by Ch'oe Ikhyŏn, King Kojong's and the political forces' understanding of opening was one that separated Japan from the Western powers. As such, they saw the signing of

a treaty with Japan as the simple restoration and extension of traditional ties between the two countries, a perception that in essence did not mesh with the actual provisions of the treaty which resulted in opening the country to the capitalist world.

Aftermath of the Kanghwa Treaty

The actual signing of the Kanghwa Treaty based on this notion of *waeyang pulliron* (separation of Japan and Western barbarians) did not result in quelling the spread of the opposition to the opening policy. The first *Susinsa* (special diplomatic envoy), whose objective it was to learn about the political situation in Japan, was dispatched to the island nation a mere two months after the signing of the treaty. However, it would take another four years, to 1880 to be exact, before the second Susinsa would be sent. In December 1880, the Chosŏn government completed its reorganisation of the central government system, brought about as a result of the opening of the country, by establishing the *T'ongni kimu amun* (Office for the management of state affairs). In January 1881, the Chosŏn government decided to dispatch the Korean Courtiers' Observation Mission to Japan with the goal of laying the groundwork for the establishment of Korea's own reform policy. China also decided to send an observation mission to Japan. 1881 was the year in which the reform policy that the Chosŏn government hoped to bring about began to be publicised to the general public. It was during this period as well that the activities of those opposed to the opening policy reached their zenith.

The activities of the Susinsa who travelled to Japan in 1880, and more particularly those of Kim Hongjip, can be seen as having introduced several important issues related to the opening policy adopted by the Chosŏn government after the Kanghwa Treaty. In particular, the second Susinsa, through exchanges with Ho Ju-chang (He Ruzhang) and Huang Tsun-hsien (Huang Zunxian) of the Chinese Legation in Japan, helped to establish the foundation for the new assessment of the international situation that would eventually emerge within Korea. Huang gave Kim Hongjip, to bring back with him to Korea, a book which he had written, the Korean title of which was *Chosŏn ch'aeknyak* (A Strategy for Korea). In this book, Huang identified Russian invasion as the biggest threat Chosŏn faced and proceeded to suggest the diplomatic strategy which Korea should adopt in order to ward off an invasion from Russia: "stay close to China, associate with Japan, and ally with America". As Chosŏn already had relations with China and Japan, Huang's suggestion can be viewed as the extension of Korea's existing policy. The new diplomatic policy put forward in Huang's work was in essence based on China's belief that Korea should establish relations with the US. China, which had grown weary of the growth of Japanese power on the Korean peninsula in the aftermath of the Kanghwa Treaty, saw such a policy as the best means of restraining Japanese expansion.

However, this suggestion that relations should be established with the US was bound to meet with serious resistance from the yangban intellectuals. Chosŏn had refused to open its doors to the US in 1871, even when threatened with war by an American ship. However, the Chosŏn government, having decided, after discussions among government officials on the report presented by the Susinsa, that the policy direction put forward in A Strategy for Korea was appropriate, was now advocating the forging of such ties with the US. Chosŏn, agreeing that Russia was its biggest threat, decided to adopt a policy of staying close to China, associating with Japan, and allying with America. The Chosŏn government rapidly set about distributing the provisions contained in Huang Tsun-hsien's work to its people in order to gain public support for its new stance. However, as the contents of this book spread so did the resistance emanating from Confucian circles. The 'Ten thousand people's petition to the King' (*Yŏngnam maninso)*, instigated by Confucian scholars in the Yŏngnam area, was a representative example of this resistance.

The debate about the provisions put forward in A Strategy for Korea created political conflicts and confrontation among the ruling class itself. The emergence of such opposition within Korea had been expected by the Chinese, who were the main proponents of this new policy direction. China justified its suggestion that Korea forge ties with the US on the following grounds: the US was not a country embracing Catholicism, a religion which the yangban intellectuals had been rabidly opposed to; as the US was located at the other end of the Pacific ocean, the possibility of its invading Chosŏn was non-existent; the US moreover was only interested in advancing its trade and commercial interests. The yangban Confucian class repelled this line of argument, maintaining instead that signing a treaty with the US would mean establishing treaties with other Western powers, all of which would result in Chosŏn being abandoned to these barbaric countries which did not even have any notions of propriety.

Despite the resistance from this group of people, as exemplified by the Yŏngnam maninso, the will of the Chosŏn government to see this reform policy through was very strong. As a result, 1881 can be regarded as an important year in the formation of Chosŏn's domestic and international policies. Vehement yangban objections notwithstanding, the Chosŏn government forged ahead with its policy and concluded the Korean-American Treaty on 6 April 1882, which was followed a month later by a treaty with Britain. However, one month after the signing of this Korean-British Treaty, a rebellion led by soldiers opposed to the opening policy broke out, more widely known as the *Imo kullan* (Soldiers' Riot of 1882). The soldiers began by attacking high-positioned administrators close to Queen Min. Urged on by the lower classes, they proceeded to expand the targets of their wrath to include the Japanese Legation in Seoul. The worsening of the rebellion, which had by now spread to the

lower classes, led King Kojong to diffuse this potentially explosive situation by bringing the conservative-backed Taewŏn'gun back to power.

The return of the Taewŏn'gun and his supporters, all of whom were fervently against efforts to open up the country, meant that King Kojong's opening and reform policy was forced to grind to a temporary halt. On hearing about the situation unfolding in Chosŏn, China proceeded to send troops to restore the king to power, thus breaking its long-held policy of non-intervention in Korean internal affairs. China quickly set about organising a military force of 3,000 soldiers, an advance unit of which was dispatched to Seoul through Namyang Bay on the west coast a mere six days after the outbreak of the rebellion. The Chinese military force arrested the Taewŏn'gun, who was seen as the central figure of the conservative faction, and brought him back to China, while also quelling the insurgency. This rapid and unsolicited deployment of troops to Korea by the Chinese was an incident that had never before occurred in the history of Qing-Chosŏn relations. As a result of this Chinese military intervention, King Kojong was restored to power and Seoul was once again quiet.

During the Soldiers' Riot, four Japanese officials from the Japanese Legation who had been invited to Korea as military advisers and interpreters were killed. The Japanese government painted this incident, which had been the result of the resistance to the Chosŏn government's policy of opening up, as the first anti-Japanese movement to emerge overseas since the Meiji Restoration. By depicting it as such and issuing dire warnings about the possibility of war with China, the Japanese government was able to establish the institutional devices it needed to control the anti-government faction which had been gaining support since the Meiji Restoration. The Japanese government was able to use the political events in Chosŏn to proclaim new laws on the military, thus establishing the measures that it needed to control its own anti-government faction. Japan followed China's lead and sent 1,500 of its own soldiers to Seoul. Suddenly 3,000 Chinese soldiers and 1,500 Japanese ones were squaring off against each other in the streets of Seoul.

It was under such circumstances that King Kojong proclaimed the royal edict, which made clear to the international community the Chosŏn government's will to forge ahead with its opening and reform policy:

> Chosŏn, being located on the periphery of Asia, has never had the opportunity to negotiate with foreign countries. While we do not have a wide knowledge of the world, we have been able to preserve our country for 500 years by keeping the door closed. However, the world of today is nothing like the one of the past. Western countries such as England, France, Russia and the United States have developed weapons and implemented projects designed to develop and strengthen their countries. They have concluded treaties with all the countries they have come across during their travels by land or sea. These countries have abided by international law and restrained each other from using military force. This is reminiscent of the Chinese Spring and Autumn Warring States of the past. As a

result, even China, which for long was considered to be the dominant country, concluded equal treaties. Japan, another country which long opposed any intercourse with Western countries, eventually gave in and established treaties and opened its doors. Such things did not magically occur. They occurred because there was no other option.

It was under these circumstances that Chosŏn signed the Kanghwa Treaty with Japan in 1876 and opened three of its ports. Recently Chosŏn has concluded treaties with the United States, England and Germany. As this represents a first for our country, it is natural for the public to be curious and speak ill about these treaties. However, as the principle of these treaties is based on the notion of equality, no further justification for these treaties is required. The intention of these two countries with regard to their stationing of troops here is ostensibly to protect their merchants. As such, there is no need to worry about the present situation … The people who oppose these treaties argue that establishing treaties with Western countries will eventually lead the whole country to be taken over by heterodoxy. Such a situation would create a serious problem for Confucianism, and the enlightenment of the world. Nevertheless, to establish relations with Western powers is to establish relations with Western powers. Heterodoxy is heterodoxy. These are two different things. The commercial trade established through treaties is based solely on international law. These treaties do not call for the introduction of heterodoxy; as such, why would a people who have learned Confucianism and maintained the Confucian culture for such a long period of time change their attitudes and accept heterodoxy? … In addition, a perception has been formed in which anybody who learns the Western technologies needed to manufacture a machine is considered to have been taken over by heterodoxy. This is a very wrong attitude to take. While Westerners' religions, as they are considered to be heterodoxy closely related to temptation and sensuality, should be kept at arm's length, their machines are highly developed. If we can use their technologies to develop our economy and to improve our people's living standards, then why should we not use them to produce agricultural equipment, medical supplies, weapons and means of transportation? It is possible for us to accept their technologies, while refusing their religions … I am well aware that these people, who are difficult to enlighten, and the instability they cause among the public have led to the disastrous incident which broke out here in June …

Fortunately the incident was resolved and the previous amicable relationships were restored. In the future, England, and the United States will come to our country. The conclusion of commercial treaties is a common practice which countries engage in. As this is not the first time that Korea has signed such an agreement, there is no need for the people to panic. Please do not be scared or worry about these things. Scholars should study and the people should engage in their respective occupations. Do not create any turbulence by spreading incorrect information about Westerners and the Japanese … Furthermore, as we have already established relations with Western powers, the chŏkhwabi should be removed. You, the people, should keep such things in mind.[5]

As can be seen, Kojong's order that the chŏkhwabi erected nationwide after the war with the US in 1871 be removed was conveniently placed at the end of this edict. Meanwhile, in the opening section, King Kojong pointed out how Chosŏn had

been closed off to the outside since its foundation. However, just as China eventually entered the era of the Spring and Autumn Warring States, all countries were now attempting to develop their economies and strengthen their military might on the basis of international law. King Kojong also pointed out that Chosŏn had been forced to conclude the Kanghwa Treaty with Japan in order to respond to this international trend. Although he recognised the existence of objections to the Kanghwa Treaty based on the notion of *ch'ŏkhwa* (that is, defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy), the king deemed such worries to be unnecessary and emphasised the need to negotiate with Western countries.

The King's understanding of the international scene began with his order that a review be undertaken with regard to the diplomatic credentials provided by the Japanese, a move which met with fierce opposition domestically. However by the time the Kanghwa Treaty was concluded, Kojong had begun to emphasise the notion of waeyang pulliron over the notion of waeyang ilch'eron, supported by the majority of the members of the ruling class. In the end, however, he accepted the notion of *Taeseron,* which was based on the belief that the establishment of relations with Western nations was a global stream that could not be reversed. King Kojong, who separated politics from commerce and advocated the separation of politics and religion, believed in the inevitability of the opening of the country. Furthermore, by ordering the removal of the ch'ŏkhwabi nationwide, which had served as the symbol of the government's anti-opening policy until that point, he completely did away with the justification for refusing this opening policy and showed his acceptance of the reality of the international situation.

Conclusion

This paper has focused on the changes in the ruling power's and King Kojong's perception of international trends in order to analyse the process through which the Chosŏn government opened up the country to the West. Previous studies have for the most part concentrated on examining political and diplomatic relations during this period. This paper emerged as a result of the fact that previous studies, while considering the process through which Chosŏn opened up towards the West, have overlooked the correlation between changes in the political power structure and the diplomatic policymaking process. In addition, previous studies have also failed to analyse sufficiently the ruling faction which played the leading role in implementing understanding of the policies of opening up.

The process through which Chosŏn opened up toward the West can be summarized thus:

First, Chosŏn hung on to its existing order for twenty years longer than China and Japan, both of which succumbed to increasing Western penetration of East Asia

during the middle of the 19th century and opened their doors. Western demands that Chosŏn open its market started with the military provocations initiated by the US and France during the period from 1866 to 1871. However, the country remained closed to the West even after the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876. It would take another six years after that treaty was signed before Chosŏn started to actually open its market to the West. This opening came in the form of the Korean-American and Korean-British treaties of 1882.

The opening of Chosŏn towards the West came much later than in the case of China and Japan, and can be regarded as having been carried out in an incremental manner. In addition, the major powers which emerged to first demand the opening of Chosŏn were France and the US, two countries which developed capitalism later on, and not the pre-eminent capitalist nation with the strongest navy in the world, Britain. However, it was Japan who played the leading role in getting Chosŏn to join the capitalist market order.

Previous studies on Chosŏn's opening process have concentrated on the bureaucratic power which emerged in Korea, and its influence on the acceptance of the opening policy. In contrast, this paper has focused on the relationship between King Kojong and his leadership group's political standing and their perception of Japan and of the Western powers. Even in the period immediately preceding the signing of the treaty with Japan in 1876, opposition to the opening policy remained widely prevalent among those holding political power, Confucian scholars and the lower classes. It was against such a backdrop that King Kojong and his closest aides pursued their opening policy, which eventually resulted in the Kanghwa Treaty of 1876.

The question may be asked why King Kojong and his aides, faced with such strong resistance from this anti-opening group, actively pursued their policy? Immediately on his ascent to power King Kojong set about removing his father's influence and establishing diplomatic relations with Japan. King Kojong carried out this opening policy toward Japan based on the notion of waeyang pulliron and not on the more widely accepted concept of waeyang ilch'eron promoted by the conservative faction opposed to the establishment of such relations with Japan. In the 1880s King Kojong refused the notion of *ch'ŏksaron*, the doctrine of defending orthodoxy and rejecting heterodoxy, while supporting the idea of setting up diplomatic ties with the US, which was a Christian country, before establishing them with other Western nations. In addition, King Kojong addressed the fear that the establishment of diplomatic relations would result in damage to the domestic market by stating that politics should be separated from commerce.

The political position of the Chosŏn government can be exemplified by the ch'ŏkhwabi which were erected nationwide after the French (1866) and American (1871) attacks. The Chosŏn government's opening policy towards the West became

more invigorated from the time the political resistance of the conservative group opposing King Kojong and his policies was eliminated as a result of the intervention of the Chinese military in Korea. This occurred six years after the signing of the Kanghwa Treaty with Japan.

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Notes

1. *Sunjo Silrok*, July, the 32nd year of King Sunjo. In 1968, the National History Compilation Committee published an edition of the *Sunjo Silrok*.
2. For more about the treaty process with Japan, see Deok-Soo Choi (Ch'oe Tŏksu), 2001. 'King Kojong's perception of the West during the period of opening of ports', *International Journal of Korean History*, vol.2:12.
3. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn Ilgi* [The daily records of the Royal Secretariat of the Chosŏn dynasty], 23 January, the 13th Year of King Kojong. In 1995, the Korean Classics Research Institute published an edition of the *Sŭngjŏngwŏn Ilgi*.
4. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn Ilgi*, 27 January, the 13th year of King Kojong.
5. *Sŭngjŏngwŏn Ilgi*, 5 August, the 19th year of King Kojong.

PRO-JAPANESE ECONOMIC ALLIANCE THEORIES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE TAEHAN EMPIRE

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Introduction

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5 brought about the official end of Korea's status as a vassal of China. Thereafter, the Chosŏn government began increasingly to assert its independence from China. The abolition of the traditional *yŏnho* system (under which a year was dated by reference to the corresponding year of the reigning Chinese emperor) in favour of the *kaeguk yŏnho* system (which was based on the corresponding year of the reigning Korean king), and the ceremony held to celebrate the first year of independence in 1895 are examples of the emergence of a perception among Koreans that they were now an independent state no longer subordinated to China.[1] However, growing foreign encroachment in all three East Asian countries, and the subsequent division of China created a serious crisis in East Asia. Increasingly prevalent foreign penetration led to the creation of a view of Korea, China and Japan as a community with a shared destiny, a view that was based on the existence of shared cultural and racial attributes.[2] The nascent threat stemming from the Western powers resulted in the materialisation of such concepts as the *Samguk kongyŏngnon* (co-prosperity of three countries), a concept that became one of the dominant international perceptions to emerge during the Taehan empire.[3]

Previous studies have focused on the political and diplomatic aspect of this Samguk kongyŏngnon. Moreover, as the Samguk kongyŏngnon eventually gave way to the notion of a Japanese-led East Asian alliance, many scholars have faulted advocates of the concept for being shortsighted regarding Japan's true intentions and for having an imperfect understanding of the concept of Chosŏn's independence.[4] As a result, they have tended to regard Samguk kongyŏngnon as another example of the pro-Japanese diplomatic policies that emerged during the Taehan empire.[5] However, Samguk kongyŏngnon was based on preconceived notions of alliance and economic

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development. The Samguk kongyŏngnon, which was based on the need to achieve parity between the three East Asian countries in terms of wealth and military power, contained realistic rather than idealistic measures of economic development. This theory of alliance was based on the need to expand the three countries' military power by increasing their wealth. Such increase was to be achieved through the expansion of trade between the three East Asian countries, in order to fend off the growing Western threat and ultimately assure the independence of all three nations. The appearance of the concept of Samguk kongyŏngnon, which was first introduced as an economic development measure for underdeveloped countries, can be regarded as proof of the Taehan empire's gradual inclusion into (or at the very least of its willingness to join) the East Asian capitalist order centred around Japan. In addition, large-scale capitalists, who were the dominant force within the Korean market at that point, became the driving force behind Korea's move to join this Japan-oriented capitalist order.

This paper analyses the approaches to economic development introduced during the Taehan empire from 1894 to 1905 and reviews the economic orientation of large-scale capitalists, who were already by that point the main actors of the economy.[6] It focuses on the pro-East Asian capitalist order that characterises the economic development measures advanced by advocates of the Samguk kongyŏngnon, measures which were regarded as having their origins in the interests of Korean capitalists. It also analyses the link between Samguk kongyŏngnon as the conceptual framework through which relations with overseas markets were established, and the economic development measures of the royal household of the Taehan empire, the *Kaesin yuhak* group. This group consisted of An Kyŏngsu and those who had experienced the so-called 'new culture', often while studying overseas (such as those who worked for the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*), and reflected the activities of large-scale capitalists.

Samguk kongyŏngnon as an economic development theory

As trade between the three East Asian countries expanded during the Taehan empire, an increasing number of distribution companies began to be established by large-scale Korean capitalists. Such entrepreneurs, believing that the establishment of a sound currency system was the key to the development of commerce, also set up the Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank.[7] In order to garner support for the bank and its activities, powerful merchants from all three East Asian countries were invited to take part in the bank's grand opening held in Seoul. These large-scale capitalists were pleased to hang the banner given to them by a Chinese merchant as a symbol of his desire for the bank's sound development, from the rafters of the bank building.[8] In addition, a social club was established by the managers of the Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank and those of Japanese banks, with this club set to meet four times a year. A meeting of the

bank's administrators was held on 11 December 1899, at which measures related to the operation of the bank were discussed. This meeting also served as an opportunity for the large-scale merchants to discuss the securing of business advantages for themselves as well as the development of measures to strengthen the relationship with the Japanese banks operating within the foreign community.[9]

The Taehan government—believing that the expansion of trade would result in a concurrent increase in wealth—set about establishing monopolies in order to secure its own finances. The government promoted the circulation of currency and minted the so-called *paektonghwa* (white copper) as a means of securing profits. The Taehan government also introduced the electric train and the Kyŏngin (Seoul-Inchŏn) railroad, and expanded the road network in and out of Seoul in order to improve the distribution of commodities. What is more, the advent of telephone and electricity systems resulted in visibly changing the outward appearance of Seoul.[10]

Those who came to Seoul saw these changes as the symbol of Korea's modernisation. Intellectuals in Seoul came to perceive that, in accordance with these changes, Koreans now had the duty to become diligent and upright economic actors in order to acquire wealth for the nation and state.[11] They also viewed the state as the entity responsible for promoting economic activities at the individual level and for collecting taxation from the income accrued through these activities. This perception of the state as the main economic development unit led these intellectuals to engage constantly in comparisons of the three East Asian countries. In this regard, these individuals came to view the need for the economies of these three countries to achieve similar levels of development if this notion of Samguk kongyŏngnon was to be brought to fruition.[12] The concept of Samguk kongyŏngron, which started to spread after the Sino-Japanese War, was closely related to the belief that trade and commerce were the sources of a nation's wealth. The formation of an alliance between the three countries as a means of achieving economic development gained further steam in the aftermath of the signing of a contract for the construction of the Kyŏngpu (Seoul-Pusan) railroad with Japan.

An Kyŏngsu's 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon' ('The formation of a tripartite alliance between Japan, China and Korea') is a perfect example of a work which advocated an economic development theory based on the formation of a tripartite alliance.[13] An Kyŏngsu held the position of vice-minister of finance in of Kim Hongjip's government at the time of the Kabo reforms. An, in his role as president of the Independence Club, was exiled to Japan following his spearheading of a campaign to get King Kojong to abdicate his throne. Before his exile to Japan in 1896, An Kyŏngsu had also been a large-scale capitalist. He used 40,000 won of foreign capital and 35,000 won of domestic capital to establish the Chosŏn Bank in 1896 and a company named Taechosŏn Chŏmajesa the following year.[14]

An's 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', which was published while he was in

exile in Japan, appeared in 1900 in seven instalments in a magazine entitled *Nihonjin* (Japanese people). His essays, which were based on his perception that the political changes wrought by the Boxer Rebellion in China in 1900 would eventually spread to threaten the Taehan empire and Japan, argued that Japan, China and Korea would have to form an alliance to assure their survival. An maintained that both military and commercial alliances would have to be formed, a notion that was closely related to his understanding of the achievement of the independence and development of these three East Asian countries. He argued that the establishment of a tripartite alliance was necessary because of the intertwined nature of these three countries' interests; as such, if one of these countries were invaded by one of these two allies, then the third ally would come to the rescue of the country under attack and help fend off the invader. He asserted that such an alliance should be preconditioned on the achievement of parity between the national power of the three countries.[15] However, he emphasised that as the economic levels of Korea and China had not yet developed to that of Japan, this proposed political and military alliance would have to be supplemented by a commercial alliance designed to foster the economic development of Korea and China in order to increase these two nations' national power.

The idea for this commercial alliance had its roots in An's positive assessment of the changes that had taken place in the relationship between China and Japan after the Sino-Japanese War. An viewed the ventures launched by Japan and China to promote mutual commercial benefits, especially China's reform efforts, the investment of Japanese capital in the development of a South China sea route centred around the Guangdong area and the establishment of a Japan-China bank, as representing good omens for the economic development of East Asia.[16] However, he added that if China and Japan included Korea in their "mutual benefits sphere", thus jointly developing such industries as the fishing industry, the economic profits accrued by all three countries would be even greater.[17] An appears to have been of the view that Korea would find itself further and further isolated as this Sino-Japanese economic alliance deepened. To prevent such isolation, he established mutual economic development measures that combined the technological know-how of Japan, the financial resources of China and the resources and geographical advantages of Korea. The main mutual economic development measure which he concentrated on bringing about was the construction of a Japanese-built railroad through the Korean peninsula.[18] An envisaged this railroad running through the Korean peninsula as a north China trading route which would be entirely separate from the South China sea route connecting China and Japan, and as something the existence of which would help enhance the Taehan empire's participation in the mutual economic development of East Asia.[19]

An saw relationships designed to bring about joint ventures or mutual development as having their origins in commercial alliances. He went on record as follows: "Presently, public opinion in all three countries is strongly in favour of a commercial

alliance. This means in other words that people in all three countries are increasingly concerned about securing profits from commerce." In addition, An had the following to say with regard to the need for all three countries to maintain uniform standards regarding the opening of transportation and customs systems: "Every alliance is a meaningless one to begin with. However, any country desiring to develop its own commerce must start by forming such a meaningless alliance."[20] He also asserted that in order to achieve an economic alliance, the trading systems of each country should be unified and their markets opened[21] and argued that before a tripartite commercial alliance could be formed, an alliance between the peoples of the three countries would have to be brought about to facilitate the achievement of mutual benefits from commerce and remove any antagonism which might exist between the three.[22] The notion of a commercial alliance introduced by An Kyŏngsu was one based on the reality on the ground, which was that this increased trade between the three countries would benefit all parties. An recognised that support from developed countries was an integral factor in fostering the economic development of an underdeveloped country. As such, An Kyŏngsu's commercial alliance was an economic development theory which argued that Korea should join the East Asian capitalist order led by Japan.

This commercial alliance, which was aimed at expanding markets and introducing capital, was consistent with the economic policy of the Taehan empire. Although the policies governing the granting of exclusive rights and loan negotiations carried out during the Taehan empire cannot be explained solely in economic terms,[23] such policies were indeed considered to be an integral part of efforts to secure the necessary technologies and investment from overseas in order to capitalise the economy and develop such sectors as waterworks, mining and electricity. Unlike the notion of a commercial alliance introduced by An Kyŏngsu, the royal household of the Taehan empire adopted a strategy of securing its much needed technology and capital from a variety of countries such as the United States, France, Russia and Japan. Nevertheless, these efforts by the royal household cannot be considered to represent an independent economic development policy.

The success of the economic policy adopted by the Taehan empire, which was geared towards the achievement of Western-style (and Japanese-style) capitalist development, was inherently restricted by its own policies governing the domestic market. Taehan economic policy was based on using such strategies as granting exclusive rights to secure the material basis needed to assure the emperor's power, as well as on using capital invested by the royal household and loans introduced from abroad to pursue the development of the domestic economy. However, these economic policies could not succeed as long as the big capitalists, who used the monopolistic nature of the domestic market and monetary instability to reap huge profits from short-term currency turnover, continued to exist. The economic development policy of the Taehan empire was designed to supplement the lack of domestic capital,

acquire wealth and develop the nation's long-term production capabilities; in order for it to succeed, it was necessary to introduce more loans from abroad and increase production. All of this should be carried out without destroying the profit base of large-scale capitalists, who had by this point become the main source of revenue for the royal household. Nevertheless, the growing confrontation between Japan and Russia severely complicated the empire's efforts to secure foreign loans. Even if Korea could introduce the necessary foreign loans, there was no way for it to avoid becoming economically dependent on the country or countries granting the loans. In such circumstances, the capitalist development measures based on the formation of economic alliances developed by An Kyŏngsu and the royal household could not overcome the fact that the division of the world market by the imperial powers had resulted in relegating Korea to the status of an economically dependent nation.

The only difference to emerge between An Kyŏngsu and the royal household and the large-scale capitalists in terms of their economic vision revolved around what kind of domestic market system should be pursued. While An Kyŏngsu promoted the opening up of the domestic market in order to assure the free movement of capital and the creation of joint ventures, the royal household and the big capitalists planned to expand their monopoly over the domestic market in order to increase their profits stemming from the distribution of commodities. These two positions on the nature of the domestic market to be brought about were very different in terms of the potential growth of the main economic actors. The free-market system based on the principle of competition makes the free movement of capital and joint ventures possible, and is the driving force behind the growth and development of capitalists. Such a market system is also prone to encourage various efforts by capitalists and government alike to maintain their dominant position within the market.

Of course, it goes without saying that An Kyŏngsu also intended to achieve economic development by promoting investment from large-scale capitalists and securing the introduction of foreign capital.[24] However, unlike the evolution of a monopolistic market, the free market system pursued by An Kyŏngsu can be regarded as one in which the petty bourgeois could flourish. The establishment of a democratic market system is one of the basic factors upon which the democratic nature of a modern society can be judged. The development of Taehan society, a society that had just begun to do away with the feudal system, as a democratic society was thus closely linked to the development of a petit bourgeois class. The emergence of such a class can be seen as the decisive factor in the formation of a group that would be critical of the colonial system of economic dependence. Although the royal household and An Kyŏngsu both introduced notions that were based on dependent economic development, serious differences emerged in terms of their methods of reform for the domestic market.

The divided attitudes of Korean merchants: alliance and exclusion

Two views of international relations coexisted within Taehan society: anti-foreign sentiment, which emphasised loyalty and patriotism; and the notion of Samguk kongyŏngnon, which emphasised the need for the formation of an alliance between China, Korea and Japan. These dichotomous views were also evident in the economic sphere where, while the need to protect domestic merchants' profits from foreign merchants entering the domestic market was recognised, so was the need to expand economic interests by encouraging trade between the three countries. Given the fact that the overall objectives were to develop the economy of the Taehan empire and to assure the profits of large-scale capitalists, these contradictory theories of alliance and exclusion were able to coexist without ever entering into conflict with each other.

The negative opinion of Koreans towards Chinese and Japanese merchants in Seoul gradually increased. Following the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–5, Chinese merchants began to re-establish their position within the Korean market. However, the situation had changed significantly in that Korea's diplomatic relations with China, its hitherto main trading partner, had been severed. Those Chinese merchants who came back to Seoul and Inch'ŏn after the war quickly set about laying claim to the properties within the foreign community which they had occupied before 1894; this created tensions with the Koreans who had settled in the area during the war.[25] In the aftermath of Queen Min's assassination and of the proclamation of the Topknot Ordinance in 1895, anti-Japanese righteous armies began to form. As a result of the further exacerbation of anti-Japanese sentiment following King Kojong's flight to the Russian Legation, Japanese merchants who had been active in trading outside of the foreign community during the Sino-Japanese War began to withdraw to the open port areas, increasingly insecure about their safety.[26] Violent moves by the *Kyerimjangŏptan* (a group of Japanese merchants organised in 1896) to expand their commercial activities beyond the foreign community only resulted in further fanning of anti-Japanese sentiment among Koreans.[27]

The worsening of the financial situation in Seoul[28] after 1897 and the marked increase in the number of foreign merchants active outside of the foreign community led to the emergence of a crisis among large-scale Korean capitalists. "Korean merchants are losing their commercial rights to foreign merchants, and being forced to fight for whatever is left over. If this situation is allowed to continue, Korean stores will be hard pressed to assure their survival."[29] The Hwangguk Chungang Ch'ongsanghoe, an association of large-scale capitalists led by merchants (Sijŏn sangin) who had in the past secured exclusive rights, decided to call a general strike in order to regain the rights that had been taken away from them as a result of the Kabo reforms,[30] and to block foreign merchants from entering the Korean market.[31] In 1898, the Independence Club, which supported the notion of Samguk kongyŏngnon

and criticised the granting of exclusive rights to the members of the Hwangguk Chungang Ch'ongsanghoe, launched their own campaign to protect the commercial rights of Korean merchants.[32] The Independence Club joined the *Hwangguk Hyŏphoe* in expressing its opposition to foreign merchants' activities in Seoul as well as to their illegal commercial activities outside of the foreign community.[33] As such, the position of the Independence Club and of the Hwangguk Chungang Ch'ongsanghoe overlapped, at least in terms of their desire to protect the national interest.[34]

In an article published at the height of the expansion of this exclusion sentiment among Korean merchants, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* argued that it was necessary for Korea to seek out help from the developed capitalist countries if it was going to carry out its reforms successfully: "In this dream, I visited a great country, one which exhibited the same level of development as the countries in the West. This country had once been engulfed by chaos. However, following its successful implementation of reforms, with the help of Western nations, it became a strong country."[35]

Although this anti-foreign sentiment and the notion of a Japan-China-Korea alliance were contradictory in nature, the actions of the Independence Club and Hwangguk Chungang Ch'ongsanghoe prove that these two trends could be made to accommodate each other in the name of the national interest. In a subsequent article, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* introduced Mai Meng-hua's idea of using the existing secret societies (*huidang*) as the tools for resisting foreign intervention as proof that such a divided attitude could be unified in the name of the national interest and even become the driving force in the implementation of reforms.[36] From an economic standpoint, these perceptions stemmed from the need, on the one hand, to form alliances with the developed countries and reform the domestic market system in order to introduce capital and technology, and on the other to maintain a dominant position within the domestic market.[37] Once agreement was reached by the main political and economic actors on detailed objectives and plans for the establishment of a reasonable political and economic system, such contradictory approaches could be made to work together.[38] However, such cases of cooperation within Taehan society were for the most part found among large-scale capitalists who shared the clear objective of pursuing profits.

In 1898, the big capitalists employed such tactics as the launching of a general strike and the writing of petitions to the Emperor as the means of preserving their monopolistic position within the market. The government decrees passed in October 1898 and January 1899 prove that their actions were to some degree successful.[39] In December 1898, by which point the opposition to foreign merchants had begun to dissipate, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* demonstrated its pro-Samguk kongyŏngnon stance in an article about the problem of reparations in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War. "It is truly remarkable that such a small country was able to demand reparations from such a big country … However, there is some concern that the

friendship which exists between our three countries may be in jeopardy because of this reparations issue."[40] It also began to publish articles about kindly Chinese merchants who provided beggars with cotton clothes.[41] The *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* further reported that the resident minister of the Chinese Legation in Korea had decided, after discussions with Chinese merchants in Seoul, to provide funds for the establishment of a monument to the King's ancestors.[42] This depiction of Samguk kongyŏngnon can be found repeatedly in *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* articles published from December 1898 to the first half of 1899. This perception helped to weaken the anti-foreign sentiment which had once again started to increase among Koreans in the aftermath of the restoration of economic relations with China.[43] As mentioned above, the Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank actively sought out ways to expand its activities, which included strengthening its relations with Chinese and Japanese merchants as well as with the managers of Japanese banks.

The formation of an economic alliance between the three countries became seen as a necessary evil that would have to be brought about in order to safeguard the profits of the large-scale Korean capitalists in Seoul. The spread of this notion of Samguk kongyŏngnon paved the way for the legalisation of the commercial activities of Chinese merchants within domestic areas, as well as their right to take up residence there, both of which were enshrined in the Korea-China Treaty of September 1899. For Korean merchants, the expansion of trade with China and the establishment of relationships with Chinese merchants were issues closely related to their own economic interests. Following the blocking off of the regular trade routes with China in the aftermath of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* reprinted an article which had first appeared in a Chinese newspaper: "As trade and transportation between China and Korea have increased, it is necessary to introduce simple and expedient travel procedures, as well as to abolish the complicated travel procedures of the past."[44] The Korean merchants, who had traded with China on the basis of credit transactions and now suddenly found themselves hard pressed to engage in the trade of commodities with their Chinese counterparts, were also very interested in restoring relations with China.[45]

The economic policy of the Taehan empire resulted in the Korean large-scale capitalists adopting a divided attitude when it came to the pursuit of profits. While the formation of an alliance between merchants from the three countries was seen as being necessary to assure the expansion of their markets and increase their capital turnover ratio, Korean merchants, in order to secure their own monopolies and commercial power, also became the main opponents to the entrance of foreign merchants within the domestic market. Nevertheless, this opposition to what Korean merchants perceived as the economically exploitative ways of foreign merchants never reached the level at which the survival of the economic alliance would be

threatened. The Korean merchants' objection to the circulation of the Daiichi Bank bills serves as a good example of this point.

The Daiichi Bank bills, which started to circulate in Pusan in 1902, eventually found their way into Seoul and Inch'ŏn as well. The Korean merchants immediately asked both the government of Seoul and the central government if they should accept these bills. The *Oebu* (ministry of foreign affairs and trade) stated that while they had never approved the use of the Daiichi Bank bills, they would allow individual merchants to make the decision about whether they should accept them or not. However, in August and September 1902, the Sinsang Hoesa (an association established in 1897 to protect Korean merchants) in Inch'ŏn made the decision to refuse to accept the bills. As a result, the circulation of Daiichi Bank bills was curtailed, and merchants who had already accepted these promissory notes began to bring them back and ask for another form of compensation.[46]

However, under pressure from the Japanese Legation, which argued that the bills should be accepted because they were documentary sight bills, the foreign ministry decided in January 1903 to petition the Chinese Legation to cease immediately the circulation of notes issued by the Tong Shun Tai Company and Ryi Sheng Chun Company. The Korean government argued that the use of these notes, which had the same characteristics as the Daiichi Bank bills, had not been agreed upon between the two governments.[47] However, Cho Byŏngsik, who was foreign minister at that time, allowed the Chinese notes to begin circulating in February. The government's position on the circulation of the Daiichi Bank bills began to waver. Amidst this growing government inertia and foot-dragging, the Kongjeso, an association of peddlers, began to play the leading role in the campaign to oppose the circulation of the Daiichi Bank bills.[48]

In February 1903, a group of Korean merchants in Seoul gathered in front of the foreign ministry and demanded that the use of Daiichi Bank notes be prohibited.[49] They also marched to the offices of the Tong Shun Tai Company and demanded that they take back their bills.[50] Merchants in the Chongno area took the position that there was no need for the Daiichi Bank bills to circulate because trade could be carried out using Korean currency.[51] The big Korean capitalists such as those represented by the Sinsang Hoesa and the Sijŏn Sangin (those who had been granted exclusive rights), who participated in the Chongno opposition to the use of the Japanese Daiichi Bank bills, may have been influenced by the strong campaign launched by the peddlers' association. However, the main reason for this opposition was that Korean merchants were concerned that the circulation of Daiichi Bank bills might jeopardise their dominant position with regards to credit transactions. The *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* published articles aimed at denigrating the creditability of the Daiichi Bank notes, which reflected the position of Korean large-scale capitalists.

In March 1903, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, as part of an ongoing debate with the

Chosen Sinpo, published an article in which it came out strongly against the circulation of the Daiichi Bank bills[52] and also made clear its intention of denigrating their creditability. In this article, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* introduced the basic attributes of a currency exchange system and then proceeded to argue that the Daiichi Bank bills were not backed up by a reserve system. The newspaper, however, conveniently failed to explain the difference between these bank bills and the official Japanese currency.[53] The Daiichi Bank bills, which were promissory notes, were no different from the bills printed by the Tong Shun Tai Company or the Ryi Sheng Chun Company. Given that the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* provided a detailed introduction of the nature of a reserve bank system, it is evident that the writer of the article must have known that the Daiichi Bank bills were different from the official Japanese currency. The article's criticism of the Daiichi Bank bills for not being backed by the same kind of reserve system as the official Japanese currency can be considered as proof of the newspaper's intention to denigrate the creditability of the bills.

Meanwhile, during this same period, the use of credit transactions between the merchants of the three countries began to spread in Seoul and Inch'ŏn, and the use of promissory notes issued by Korean merchants also became more common. In addition, the promissory notes issued by the Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank, which were based on the paektonghwa or white copper, also began to be exchanged for money and to be used in commodity trading.[54] However, if the Daiichi Bank bills, whose creditability among merchants was higher, attained increasing circulation, the possibility grew considerably that the value of the promissory notes issued by the Korean merchants and the Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank would decrease. Consequently, the denigrating of the creditability of the bills issued by the Daiichi Bank was directly linked to the interests of large-scale capitalists, and more specifically to their monopoly in terms of capital transactions. With regard to the interests of these merchants, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* also reported that the forging of the promissory notes issued by the Tong Shun Tai Company had resulted in significant losses for the company.[55] The newspaper published an advertisement paid for the Tong Shun Tai Company which read that all promissory notes issued by the company contained a series of numbers, and that as long as such numbers were present there was no need to worry about being able to redeem a note.[56]

The *Hwangsŏng Sinmun's* attempt to influence public opinion was also related to the currency reform policy launched by the imperial household. Amidst the ongoing debate between the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* and the *Chosen Sinpo*, the former published an article on 20 March 1903 in which it reported that the ministry of finance was debating the need to introduce regulations concerning the establishment of a central bank and the printing of paper money.[57] The same article then went on to say that "the value of the promissory notes issued by foreign banks is presently much higher that the value of the paektonghwa. A deplorable phenomenon in which foreign

banks such as the Daiichi Bank are now controlling the financial situation of Korea has emerged. As such, there is an urgent need to reorganise the currency system." This can be regarded as a sign of the royal household's intention of pre-empting any opposition to its attempts to bring about currency reform. However, the decree calling for the right to print paper money was rejected by the supreme administrative assembly, which did, however, during this same meeting approve the establishment of a central bank.[58] The peddlers' association, which had been quiet for some time, suddenly sprung to life once again in June 1903. However, their activities were not undertaken voluntarily but at the behest of the government.[59] Given the existence of articles which exaggerated the negative aspect of the circulation of the promissory notes issued by the two foreign institutions with arguments that "[b]ecause of the widespread circulation of the promissory notes issued by the Daiichi Bank and Tong Shun Tai Company, prices have rapidly increased. The price of rice has even reached 1 nyang 5 chŏn",[60] it can logically be construed that this campaign to stem the circulation of the Daiichi Bank bills was also intended to pre-empt the emergence of any opposition to currency reform.

The growing influence of the opposition movement launched by the Kongjeso in June 1903, combined with the anti-Japanese articles published by the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* resulted in transforming this sentiment of exclusion into a more general anti-foreign feeling.[61] However, the existence of such an atmosphere did not stop the Sinsang Hoesa in Inch'ŏn from inviting merchants from all three countries to take part in a meeting designed to further solidify relations.[62] In July of that year the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* published an article designed to attenuate the opposition to the circulation of the Daiichi Bank bills, in which it claimed that "[w]hile our foreign exchange problems have become worse by the day, and the domestic atmosphere has also been increasingly combustible, there is of yet no need to fret about these problems."[63] Another article published soon thereafter claimed that "[t]he roadmap for a Japan-China-Korean alliance put forward by Japan is now in danger. The three countries should co-operate with each other in order to protect their own independence and that of the yellow race … The wider objective should not be sacrificed to the pursuit of small profits."[64] As the peddlers became increasingly active and the conflict between the Taehan empire and Japan worsened, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* launched a campaign designed to spread the notion of Samguk kongyŏngnon and to emphasise the need for a tripartite alliance. The Sinsang Hoesa group in Inch'ŏn also intended to ensure that its relationship with the Chinese and Japanese merchants would not be damaged by this campaign to oppose the circulation of Daiichi Bank bills. The campaign proved to be effective to some degree, as the use of such bills decreased during February and March 1903, which was when the campaign reached its peak. After having gradually increased for two months, their use once again decreased in

June 1903 as the Kongjeso became more active. While the use of the Daiichi Bank bills did gradually increase afterwards, they were never in wide circulation.[65]

This change in the Sinsang Hoesa's tactics represents a perfect expression of this divided attitude in which, while alliance was pursued in the name of the development of capitalism, the exclusion of foreign merchants was also sought in order to maintain the Korean merchants' stranglehold over the domestic market. This attitude in which national sentiment was mobilised in order to maintain a position of dominance within the domestic market, and alliance was extolled as a means of using the Japanese capitalist system to pursue individual profits, was not completely contradictory but based rather on economic interests.

As a showdown between Russia and Japan became increasingly likely, more and more large-scale Korean capitalists began to promote the need for an economic alliance with Japan. Han Sangnyong, who was vice-director of the Hansŏng Bank, argued that the development of the Korean economy through the introduction of Japanese loans would bring about an era of co-prosperity in East Asia. Han passionately objected to the introduction of loans from Russian and Chinese banks.[66] For his part, Ha Sanggi, who owned stock in the Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank and was a council member of the Sinsang Sanghoe, a commercial company, invited nine Japanese officials to a party to commemorate the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War, at which he showered them with gifts.[67] In March 1904, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* argued in an article that the country should be reformed on the pattern of the Japanese model: "the Russo-Japanese War will usher in an era of peace in East Asia. Japan's intention is to help Chosŏn reform, a fact which was proved by its actions during the *Kabo* reforms."[68] When the victory of Japan became assured in May 1904, the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* published an article in which it justified the need to form an alliance with Japan on racial grounds, arguing that the victory of Japan was one which would assure the preservation of the yellow race.[69]

However, the frictions caused by economic interests did not disappear simply because this notion of alliance was being strengthened. As the Japanese influence expanded and Japanese immigration and investment in rural areas increased in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War, agriculture became increasingly seen as a new investment field. This phenomenon was closely related to the fact that Korean large-scale capitalists, who thought they might lose their windfall profits if the paektonghwa were abolished, had by then begun to search for other places to invest their capital.[70] It was under these circumstances that the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* introduced measures aimed at agricultural improvement, which they defined as an alternative economic development policy.[71] The newspaper also reported that as there were no financial organisations for agriculture in Korea, the big capitalists in Seoul and Inch'ŏn had agreed to the investment of 300–400 million won in order to establish an agricultural bank.[72] Their plan to sink their liquid assets into land was in danger, however, of

being interrupted by the increase in Japanese immigration and the migrants' illegal purchase of farmland.[73] As the capitalists from the Daiichi Bank operating in the foreign community began to investigate the agricultural land situation,[74] and the rumour of a plan to establish experimental farms in provincial areas[75] began to spread among the members of the Japanese Commerce Association of Korea, friction over the development of agricultural areas finally reached boiling point.

In June 1904, an article was released which claimed that a Japanese individual by the name of Nakamori Fujiyoshi had asked the government to grant him land reclamation rights.[76] As a result, the Poanhoe, an association formed to oppose the granting of such rights to the Japanese, suddenly appeared on the scene.[77] While this movement was to some extent related to the issue of Japanese economic exploitation,[78] it was also closely linked to the interests of large-scale capitalism. On 26 July 1904, when this opposition movement reached its peak, an advertisement was published in the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* which called on Korean land to be reclaimed using Korean capital and labour.[79] Although it is impossible to ascertain the exact relationship between the Poanhoe and large-scale capitalists, Song Suman, who was the president of the Poanhoe, had at one time been a steward within the royal household as well as a member of the Kongjeso in 1903. Given this fact, it is hard to argue that the activities of the Poanhoe were in no way related to the royal household, government officials and the interests of the big entrepreneurs in Seoul. The government accepted the Poanhoe's demands and announced a royal decree subsequently forwarded to all thirteen provinces, prohibiting the granting of land reclamation rights to foreigners.[80]

The behaviour of the large-scale capitalists during the Taehan empire and their divided attitude, which was clearly exhibited in the propositions advanced by the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* were incorporated in the pursuit of two overarching objectives: the expansion of their profits, and the protection of their dominant position within the domestic market. However, in distinction to what is generally perceived, the border between comprador and purely domestic capital was, and still is, very difficult to identify. The most salient difference between the big capitalists and the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* was where they stood on market reform. The position of these capitalists, whose main interest was in accruing bigger profits for themselves, was inherently different from that of the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* which advocated the necessity to reform the market system. For their part, the large-scale capitalists, eager to maintain their dominant position within the domestic market, opposed any such attempts at reform.

Conclusion

The notion of Samguk kongyŏngnon as an economic development plan for the Taehan empire was based upon the enlargement of the trade interests of the three East Asian countries. Meanwhile, An Kyŏngsu's Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon movement had as its origins the belief that Korea should be incorporated into an East Asian capitalist system led by Japan.

On the other hand, the Taehan empire and the big capitalists who long monopolised profits in the domestic market intended to preserve the existing market system. While the imperial household was inclined to continue to impose a monopolistic commercial system, the large-scale entrepreneurs who had used their dominant position within the domestic market and the practice of rapid capital turnover to secure large profits for themselves, also sought to preserve the basis for their surplus profits: the paektonghwa currency system. Their economic orientation resulted in limiting the possibility of a democratic economic system being established within the Taehan empire and precluded the rise of a petty bourgeoisie. As a result of this practice of capital accumulation through rapid turnover, long-term investment in industrial production became impossible. Moreover, the activities of those capitalists who had links to the foreign market resulted in disturbing the organic combination of the domestic market and interrupted the growth of the only economic group who could have criticised the dependent economic structure which emerged.

Under these circumstances, the logic of exclusion came to coexist with the securing of a dominant position within the domestic market. The economic foundation of the Taehan empire, which was based on the concepts of nationalism and patriotism, consisted of the concept of the nation as the unit of economic development and of the individual as the economic agent and of the focus on growth in individual wealth. These were the circumstances under which efforts to protect commercial rights and to take control of the market unfolded. This divided aproach, in which alliance was desired for capitalist development while the exclusion of foreign merchants was also sought in order to assure the dominant position of Korean merchants within the domestic market, was conceived as inherently logical in such an underdeveloped country heading for capitalisation. However, different positions emerged regarding the shape of the domestic market system to be brought about once Korea joined the foreign market. An Kyŏngsu and the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* both maintained that the monopoly over the domestic market should be reformed in order to attract capital and technological investment.

The dichotomous perception of alliance and exclusion as a logic for economic development during the process of capitalisation meant that there were no clear borders between comprador and national capital. As capitalistic development in one country is preconditioned on the establishment of relationships with neighbouring markets,

this split perception of alliance and exclusion emerged as the general strategy of the large-scale capitalist group to maintain their dominant role within the domestic market. The characteristics of this domestic market would determine the nature of Korea's incorporation. In other words, the question became that of determining the method by which Korea would be incorporated and what kind of system would take root.

Editor's note: Dr Kim's text has been translated from the Korean by Michael Bujold and Yu Yŏnggi of Somang Translation and edited as necessary.

Notes

1. The understanding of Korea as an independent state was already beginning to take shape during the 1880s, as is evidenced by Chosŏn's acceptance of international law. This understanding remained below the surface, as for all intents and purposes Chosŏn remained a vassal of China during that period. However, a perception of independence really began to take root, especially within the Chosŏn government, in the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War.
2. The influence of the Japanese notion of Pan-Asianism in the formation of this perception of East Asia as a community with a shared destiny should not be overlooked.
3. *Samguk kongyŏngnon* is a term which refers to the formation of an alliance between Korea, China and Japan for co-prosperity. Previous studies have employed terms such as *Samguk chehyuron* (tripartite alliance), *Samguk kongyŏngnon* (co-prosperity of three countries), *Asia yŏndaeron* (Asian alliance), and *Tongyangjuŭi* (Asianism). On the basis of the frequent use of the term *Samguk kongyŏngnon* in articles from the *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, which was one of the major sources for this paper, it is employed herein as well.
4. Yi Kwangnin 1989:145–7; Cho Chaegon 2000.
5. Hyŏn Kwangho 2000.
6. In this paper, large-scale capitalists are defined as those merchants who were involved in large-scale commodity trading within the foreign community and domestic market, and the financial capitalists who invested in the banks or profited from currency speculation. The lack of materials means that few details have emerged about what was considered to be large-scale capital during this period. As a consequence, this paper is hard pressed to define clearly what constitutes large-scale capital. Be that as it may, I am quite confident that those people who acquired exclusive rights from the Taehan government or who engaged in large-scale trade that was based on credit transactions can be identified as large-scale capitalists.
7. The Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank was registered under the names of Song Kŭnho, Song Musŏp, Chŏng Yŏngdu, Kim Kiyŏng, Kim Tusŭng and Pak Kyŏnghwan, all of whom were influential merchants in Seoul.
8. Taehan Ch'ŏnil Bank, *Ilgi*, vol.1, 1899.
9. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 23 December 1899.

10. Yi T'aejin, 2000:329–34
11. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 7 July 1900; 13 August 1900; 4 March 1901; 10 September 1901. These articles argued that the principle on which the strengthening of the state should be based was that of the expansion of individual wealth; that working with an upright attitude would eventually lead to the development of the state and nation; and finally, that in order to expand individual wealth, the government should protect the fortunes of individuals.
12. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* 21 June 1899; 17 August 1899. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* published many articles related to Samguk kongyŏngnon. The paper used those articles which contained comparisons of the three countries' economic power, or which were related to the development of co-economic prosperity.
13. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', *Nihonjin*, vol.116:118–23.
14. *Tongnip Sinmun*, 12 June 1897
15. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', *Nihonjin*, vol. 116:25.
16. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', vol. 123:25.
17. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', vol. 123:26.
18. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', vol. 120:22.
19. The nature of An's measures indicates his awareness of the prevailing opinion within Japan that, as the Kyŏngbu railroad would have more military and political usages than economic ones, the Japanese government should guarantee that profits would flow from the capital invested. ("The Kyŏngbu railroad should be developed by the government", *Toyo Keizai,* 5 March of the 33rd year of Meiji). It is believed that An emphasised the Kyŏngbu railroad's potential economic value as a means of attracting the funds needed to proceed with its construction.
20. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', *Nihonjin*, vol. 121:23–4.
21. An pointed out that there was a need to reform Chinese commercial practices such as hidden tariffs and exclusive rights, but did not directly criticise the Taehan empire's own practice of granting such rights. Nevertheless, his criticism of Chinese commercial practices appears to indicate that his emphasis on the adoption of a unified trading system by the three countries was geared towards achieving the opening of markets. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', *Nihonjin*, vol. 122:20–22.
22. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', vol. 123:25–6
23. Sŏ Yŏnghŭi 1998:102; Na Aeja 1984:65. It appears that the Taehan empire took political considerations into account when it selected the countries to enter into loan negotiations with, or bestow exclusive rights upon. If such loans or commercial interests were preponderantly granted to one specific country, then the Emperor might find his room for political manoeuvring seriously curtailed.
24. An Kyŏngsu, 1900. 'Il·ch'ŏng·han samguk tongmaengnon', *Nihonjin*, vol. 121:25. An Kyŏngsu developed measures based on using Japan's interest in building railroads, and Japanese capital, to achieve economic development: "I recommend to the Korean government that they give the rights to develop the Kyŏngŭi [Seoul-Sinŭiju] and Kyŏngwŏn [Seoul-Wŏnsan]

railroads to the Chosŏn Bank. The Japanese government should also provide the necessary support."

25. *Kakbu Chŏngŭisŏ Chonan*, vol. 28; *Chŏngŭisŏ,* no. 187, 25 December of the 3rd year of Kojong.
26. Kim Kyŏngtae 1994:348.
27. Han Chŏlho, 1998. 'Kyerimjangŏptan (1896–1898) ŭi chojik kwa hwaltong', *Sahak yŏn'gu*, vols 55 and 56.
28. During the Sino-Japanese War, the use of Japanese currency rapidly increased. Almost all commodity trade within the foreign community was based on the Japanese currency in the aftermath of the war. As a result, trade in Japanese commodities became much easier than before. However, in 1897, the implementation of the Japanese gold standard led to a cash crunch for the Japanese banks operating within the foreign community, which in turn resulted in a shortage of currency in the Seoul area due to the reflux of the Japanese currency. This phenomenon contributed to the worsening of the financial state of the merchants from all three of these countries who were active in the trade of commodities. Kim Yunhŭi, 2001. '1899 nyŏn Taehan Ch'ŏnil Ŭnhaeng ŭi sŏllip kwa mokchŏk':107–110.
29. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 16 September 1898.
30. Although the majority of the members in the Hwangguk Chungang Ch'ongsanghoe were those who had previously obtained exclusive rights, some merchants, who emerged when these rights were temporarily curtailed in 1894, were also involved in this association. Kim Kyŏngtae 1994:365–9.
31. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* 12 October 1898.
32. Cho Chaegon 2001:169.
33. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* 18 October 1898.
34. Differing opinions have emerged as far as the relationship between the Independence Club and Hwangkuk Chungang Ch'ongsanghoe is concerned. Although most agree that the two groups reacted similarly to Kim Hongryuk's attempt to poison King Kojong and towards the need to protect the commercial power of Korean merchants, different opinions have emerged as to which group first adopted such a stance. Sin Yongha,1974, *Asea Yŏn'gu*, vol. 17/2; Chŏn Uyong, 'Kaehangki Hanin chabonka ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa sŏngkyŏk'
35. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* 14 October 1898. This article was published after the Independence Club and Hwangguk Chungang Ch'ongsanghoe had submitted a petition on 8 October 1898 decrying Kim Hongryuk's attempt to poison King Kojong, but before their joint petition opposing the entrance of foreign merchants into the Korean market on October 18 of that same year.
36. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* 24 October 1898. The following was included in an addendum to this article: "Each of these recently founded secret society groups has its own roots, which can be classified as opposition to the West and its people for one part, and the belief that we should learn from the West for the other … However, the best policy would be for the Emperor to do what his Japanese counterpart did, and encourage these groups to alter their objectives somewhat for the sake of patriotism and of the revitalisation of the country."

37. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun* published a series of articles on the need to reform the market system. The main thrust of these articles was that special benefits (including the exclusive rights granted to the Hwangguk Chungang Ch'ongsanghoe) and hidden tariffs should be done away with, and that a gold standard system should be introduced in order to overcome the current instability in the currency market. (Representative articles include those for 19 September and 1 October 1898; 18 and 20 January, 7 February, 13 and 29 March, 4 May, 12 and 19 June 1899).
38. For example, the Independence Club and the Hwangguk Hyŏphoe, which espoused significantly different international viewpoints, were able to reach agreement on the need to establish a legislative assembly. Although previous studies have debated whether or not these two groups really supported the formation of such an assembly, the Independence Club's campaign for a legislative assembly based on a senatorial system and the Hwangkuk Hyŏphoe's campaign to bring about an assembly centred around a representative system demanded that they reach a compromise. Nevertheless, the confrontation between these two groups seems to have stemmed from the Emperor's opposition to political reform. Although the possibility that the Emperor intended to break these two groups by making them confront each other cannot be ruled out, the difference between their objectives, which respectively advocated limiting or strengthening the power of the Emperor, resulted in blurring their shared objective of achieving political reform through the establishment of a legislative assembly. (The difference between anti-foreign sentiment and the notion of a Japan-China-Korea alliance was also based on this perception of whether foreign powers were a threat or an asset to the Emperor's power.)
39. The government decree called for those foreign merchants who had expanded their activities beyond the foreign community to go back within it at once. It is not clear how effective this decree was. However, given the fact that Japanese merchants complained about obstacles to their entrance into the domestic market, we can assume that this decree was for the most part successful. *Toyo Keizai*, 5 January 1901.
40. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 26 December 1898.
41. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* 7 and 17 February 1899.
42. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun,* 21 February 1899.
43. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 25 and 29 March; 24 May 1899.
44. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 17 March 1900.
45. Trade between the Chinese and Korean merchants was usually carried out on a deferred payment basis. Therefore, when the Korean merchants suddenly found themselves unable to secure the commodities they needed from Chinese merchants, they had no choice but to turn to the Japanese merchants. However, the usage of a deferred payment system proved to be much harder to bring about with the Japanese merchants. As the capital capacity of these Japanese merchants was much lower than that of the Chinese merchants, the amount of credit transactions, such as deferred payments, which they could engage in, was naturally limited. Kim Yunhŭi 2002:175–80.
46. *Tongsang Hwich'an*, 'Kyŏngsŏng 35 nyŏn muyŏknyŏnbo' [The 35-year history of the Seoul Annual Trade Report], no. 29.

47. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 17 January 1903.
48. Cho Chaegon, 2001:231.
49. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 9 February 1903.
50. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 14 February 1903.
51. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 21 February 1903.
52. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 16 and 17 February, 1903.
53. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 2, 3 and 4 March 1903.
54. Kim Yunhŭi 2002:190.
55. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 27 March 1903.
56. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 28 March 1903, advertisement section.
57. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 20 March 1903.
58. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 25 March 1903.
59. Cho Chaegon 2001.
60. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 15 June 1903.
61. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 5 and 19 June, 17 July 1903.
62. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 11 June 1903.
63. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 20 July 1903.
64. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 12 August 1903.
65. Cho Chaegon 2001:238.
66. Han Igyo, 1941. 'Han Sangnyong kun ŭl malhanda' [I speak of Han Sangnyong]:50–58. Han Sangnyong Hwanryŏk Kinyŏmhoe.
67. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 7 March 1904.
68. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 21 and 22 March 1904.
69. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 3 and 5 May 1904.
70. The value of the paektonghwa was not uniform within the domestic market. As such, its exchange rate differed between Seoul and Inch'ŏn. The further away from the foreign communities one went, the higher its value. Korean merchants who were involved in the distribution of commodities between the foreign communities and the domestic market thus gained huge profits from these variations in the value of the paektonghwa. The elimination of the paektonghwa would therefore represent a loss of these windfall profits. O Tuhwan 1991:231–2.
71. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 22 and 23 April 1904.
72. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 14 April 1904.
73. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 7 April 1904. The *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*'s article used a quote from the *Chosen Sinpo* which stated that Japanese capitalists and speculators were using information they had received about the future potential of the southern provinces to purchase land in the Kunsan area. The article went on to say that the majority of these people did not have any intention of farming the land, but simply to engage in speculation.

74. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 29 April 1904.
75. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 5 May 1904.
76. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 16, 20 and 21 June 1904.
77. The activities of the Poanhoe began with the sending of a letter calling for a general strike designed to shut down the market in Chongno on 22 June. Its president, Song Suman, was seized and held in the Japanese Legation. As the number of petitions opposing the move grew, the government announced that it would cancel the order granting reclaimable wastelands to the Japanese. Song was released on 30 July and the Poanhoe's activities subsided thereafter. *Hwangsŏng Sinmun*, 22 June 1904; 16, 20, 21, 26, 27 and 30 July 1904.
78. Sin Yongha,1994. 'Kuhanmal Poanhoe ŭi ch'angrip kwa minjok undong' [The establishment of the Poanhoe and the national movement at the end of the Taehan empire].
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